

PROFESSOR R N DANDEKAR FELICITATION VOLUME

AMRTADHARĀ

edited by
S D JOSHI



CONTRIBUTORS

● Adrados Francisco R (Spain) ● Bailey H W (United Kingdom) U K ● Balasubrahmanyam M G (India) ● Bapat P V (India)
● Bender E (U S A) ● Bhat G K (India) ● Bhattacharya Gopikamohan (India) ● Bhattacharya Kamalajewar (France)
● Birwé Robert (Germany) ● Bodewitz H W (Holland) ● Bongard-Levin G M (USSR) ● Burnes T (U K) ● Cardona George
(U S A) ● Dange Sadashtiv A (India) ● De Mota Juan Miguel (Mexico) ● Deshpande Madhav M (U S A) ● Desurthak G
(India) ● Dhivedi R C (India) ● Elizarenkova T Y (USSR) ● Filiozat Pierre (India) ● Ghatage A M (India) ● Gonda J
(Holland) ● Hara Minoru (Japan) ● Heesterman J C (Holland) ● Joshi S D (India) ● Karyanov V I (USSR) ● Keshkar C G
(India) ● Kiparsky Paul (U S A) ● Krishnamoorthy K (India) ● Kuiper F B J (Holland) ● Lallany Gopal (India) ● Laddu S D
(India) ● Liennatt Siegfried (Sweden) ● Limaye V P (India) ● Lokesh Chandra (India) ● Mallal Bimal Krishna (U K)
● Mahendate M A (India) ● Morgenthau Wolfgang (G D R) ● Mylius Klaus (G D R) ● Ophure Yuzaka Lipang ● Patruni
G B (India) ● Parpola Asko (Finland) ● Ram Gopal (India) ● Rau Wilhelm (Germany) ● Rocher Ludo (U S A) ● Roodberger
J A F (Netherlands) ● Schlerath B (Germany) ● Schmidt Hanns Peter (U S A) ● Sharma R K (India) ● Sharm-Surya Vrat
(India) ● Sircar D C (India) ● Smith R Morton (Canada) ● Sreekrishna Sarma S R (India) ● Stauffert (U S A) ● Trauer
Rodulf (India) ● Thieme Paul (Germany) ● Tripathi Gaya Charan (India) ● Vajpayee Devyatovskas M I (USSR) ● Wiedt
Albrecht (Germany)

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
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PREFACE

Friends, pupils, and colleagues of Professor R. N. DANDEKAR will rejoice to know that, on March 17, 1984, he completes seventy-five years of a life of untiring and devoted service to the Muse of Learning. Although all those who are close to Professor DANDEKAR know very well that he shuns all public demonstrations in his honour, it was felt by many of us, who have been greatly benefited and inspired by his scholarship and teaching, that he could be prevailed upon to accept a small token of our esteem, of a strictly academic character, in the form of a Felicitation Volume. This, verily, is the genesis of the present Volume, which contains research papers specially written for the happy occasion of Professor DANDEKAR's Amṛta-Mahotsava by eminent Indologists and Sanskritists from India and abroad, and which, therefore, is fittingly named *Amṛtadhārā*.

Professor DANDEKAR occupies a prominent place among the Indologists and Sanskritists of the world for the impressively wide range of his researches. The volumes of his *Vedic Bibliography* and his other books and articles on such a variety of subjects as Vedic Mythology, the Great Epic, Ancient Indian History, and Religion and Philosophy have won for him international reputation. His inspiring lectures at the University and in college classes and semi-public meetings have, on account of his firm and beautiful delivery, and lucid exposition of the themes, left a permanent impress upon the students and other audiences, and have always provoked some kind of original thinking among them.

It is a common observation that scholarship and administrative or organizational capacity do not generally go hand in hand. Here again it is remarkable that Professor DANDEKAR has proved himself to be a successful administrator at the University of Poona and the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, and an efficient organizer at the sessions of the All-India Oriental Conference and at the meetings of various National and International Bodies. He commands the knack of keeping every activity moving according to the schedule, at the same time seeing to it that the academic standard of that activity is uniformly maintained. Individuals as well as Institutions have gained valuable training by working under his efficient supervision.

As a token of the many-sided indebtedness, respect, and affection which scholars entertain for Professor DANDEKAR, and as an humble tribute to all that he has done directly or indirectly to further the cause of learning, from the highest

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levels down to the roots, this Volume of studies is being presented to him. And it is, indeed, most gratifying that it has become possible to make this presentation to him while he is still very much 'in the midst' of various academic and administrative activities. Scholars all over the world look forward to many more years of a healthy and fruitful life to him.

It was desired that this Felicitation Volume be formally presented to Professor DANDEKAR on the occasion of the Inaugural Session of the All-India Seminars in (i) Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, and (ii) Language Teaching Methods, which were being planned at the CASS to mark his 76th birth-day. I am, therefore, happy to be able to bring out this Volume at the right time and on the right occasion.


In making this possible I was greatly helped by the kind cooperation which I was fortunate to receive from the contributors to this Volume from India and abroad who responded to my appeal readily and in time. I also gratefully acknowledge the readiness with which Shri S. BALWANT of the Ajanta Publications, Delhi, undertook the publication of this Volume.

I am extremely thankful to Shri A. N. GOKHALEY of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute for his assistance in reading the proofs of this work. I must also express my appreciation of the time and energy which Dr. S. K. LAL of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit had to expend on the preparation of this Volume. I am further indebted to Prof. S. D. LADDU, Dr. Smt. Saroja BHATE, Dr. G. U. THITE, Dr. J. R. JOSHI, and other members of the staff of the C. A. S. S., for their willing cooperation. My special thanks go to the Bhandarkar Institute Press for seeing the Volume through the press with great speed and efficiency.

Ratha-Saptamī,
9th February, 1984

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S. D. JOSHI



Indumati Dandekar
R. N. Dandekar

RAMCHANDRA NARAYAN DANDEKAR

Emeritus Professor of Sanskrit, University of Poona
 Honorary Secretary, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
 General Secretary, All-India Oriental Conference
 President, International Association of Sanskrit Studies
 President, International Union for Oriental and Asian Studies

“Padma Bhushan” (awarded by the President of India); “Vācaspati” (D. Litt. Honoris causa, Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi); “Mahāmahopādhyāya” (Akhila Bharatiya Pandit Mahaparisad, Varanasi); “Gaveshana Ratna” (Manipuri Sahitya Parisad); Honorary Member, Société Asiatique, Paris; Honorary Member, École Française d'Extrême Orient, Paris; Kane Medal (Asiatic Society of Bombay); Silver Medallion (All-India Oriental Conference); ‘Tāmrapatra’ of Honour and Silver Medallions (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona); Felicitation Volume (presented by colleagues and pupils, 1969); Uttara Pradesh Sanskrit Academy Viśiṣṭa Puraskāra; D. Litt. (Honoris causa, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi); Nanasaheb Peshwe Puraskara, Poona.

Career

1. Date and Place of birth :— March 17, 1909; Satara, Maharashtra State, India.

2. Educated at Deccan College, Poona, and Heidelberg University, Germany; M. A. (Sanskrit, first rank in the subject, Bombay University, 1931); M. A. (Ancient Indian Culture, first rank in the subject, Bombay University, 1933); Ph. D. (Heidelberg University, 1938); obtained many prizes and scholarships; Friedrich Rückert Stipendiary, Deutsche Akademie (1936-37); Alexander von Humboldt Stipendiary (1937-38); Professor of Sanskrit and Ancient Indian Culture, Fergusson College, Poona, 1932-1950; Life Member (1940-1950) and Secretary (1945-1950) of the Deccan Education Society, Poona; Professor of Sanskrit and Head of the Department of Sanskrit and Prakrit Languages, University of Poona, 1950-1969; Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Poona, 1959-1965; Director of Post-graduate Teaching; held charge as Vice-Chancellor, University of Poona, for some time in 1961; Director, Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, 1964-1974.

3. Presided over Ancient Period Section, 10th Indian History Congress, Vedic Section, 14th All-India Oriental Conference, and Indological Sections at several sessions of the International Congress of Orientalists; attended sessions of the International Congress of Orientalists held at Paris (1948), Istanbul (1951), Cambridge (1954), Moscow (1960), Ann Arbor (1967), Canberra (1971), Paris (1973), Mexico (1976), and Tokyo-Kyoto (1983); Secretary (Academic) of the Organizing Committee of the 26th International Congress of Orientalists, New Delhi (1964); Member, Executive Committee of the International Congress of Orientalists (1967-1976); Member of the Organizing Committee of the First International Sanskrit Conference, New Delhi (1972); attended sessions of the International Congress for the History of Religions held at Tokyo (1958), Claremont (1965), and Lancaster (1975); attended sessions of the World Sanskrit Conference at Torino (1975) and Paris (1977); presided over the World Sanskrit Conference at Weimar (1979) and at Varanasi (1981); attended the International Congress of FILLM at New York (1963); extensive and frequent travel abroad in connection with learned international conferences and committee meetings (Europe, U. S. S. R., U. S. A., South East Asia, Japan, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, etc.).

4. Member Secretary of the Sanskrit Commission appointed by Government of India, 1956-57.

5. Member (of): Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, Ministry of Education, Government of India; Indian Council for Cultural Relations; Indian National Commission for Cooperation with UNESCO; Central Advisory Board for Archaeology, Ministry of Education, Government of India; Council of Asiatic Society, Calcutta.

6. Editor, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*; Member, Editorial Board for *Indo-Iranian Journal*, Leiden, Holland, for *Indologica Taurinensia*, Torino, Italy, and for *Purāṇa*, Varanasi; served as Joint General Editor of the *Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata*; as Managing Editor of the *Journal of University of Poona: Humanities Section*; as Member of the Editorial Boards for *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad), *Indian Antiquary* (Bombay), *Sanskṛta-Vimarśa* (New Delhi), *Annual Bibliography of Indian History and Archaeology* (Kern Institute, Leiden), and *Erasmus* (Darmstadt).

7. Served as Vice-President, International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies, UNESCO (1955-1961); as Vice-President, Linguistic Society of India; as Charter Member, International University Foundation; as member, Sahitya Akademi (General Council and Executive Committee); Executive Committee of Indian History Congress Association; Maharashtra

8. Associated with many Indian and foreign Universities in different capacities ; connected with most of the important activities in the field of Sanskrit, Indology, and Orientology, at local, regional, national, and international levels.

10. Present address : Office : Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute,
Poona-411 004
(India)

Residence : 787, Shivajinagar,
Poona-411 004
(India)

Telephone : Office : 56936
: Residence : 56352

WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR R. N. DANDEKAR

[The following list includes most of Professor DANDEKAR's writings subsequent to those included in the list published in *Professor R. N. Dandekar Felicitation Volume* (*Indian Antiquary*, Third Series), Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1969, pp. vii-xiii. It does not include the many reviews, prefaces, etc., written by him. Abbreviations used here are the same as in DANDEKAR's *Vedic Bibliography*, second and third volumes.]

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ASOKA'S INSCRIPTIONS AND PERSIAN, GREEK AND LATIN EPIGRAPHY

By

FRANCISCO R. ADRADOS

I

Despite the genuinely Indian message transmitted by King Asoka through the edicts of his inscriptions to his contemporaries and, indeed, to all posterity, the form of this message has clearly received external influences. Indian epigraphy began with Asoka's inscriptions and it is commonly thought that this did not take place without a direct influence from Persian epigraphy, specifically from the inscriptions of the Achaemenid kings, above all, Darius's great inscription on the Behistun Rock (or Bīsūtūn, as its present name is).¹ Whilst this is undeniable, I nevertheless believe that it is insufficient.

Upon preparing a Spanish translation of Asoka (the first in this language) and my attention once more being drawn therefore to that great document of Indian religion and thought which his inscriptions are, I believed that I had discovered a series of points which link it to the Greek and Graeco-Roman world in general : the influence of Greek epigraphy on the external form of Asoka's epigraphs and the influence of these latter in turn on certain royal inscriptions of the Graeco-Roman world. If this is so – and I shall offer certain arguments to this effect in the following pages – we should once more be faced with another example of the reciprocal cultural influence between India and Greece as from the time of Alexander, a subject to which I have previously devoted several studies.²

I shall begin with the first point, that is, how far Iranian and Persian models were decisive in causing King Asoka to inscribe his Edicts of Sacred

1. Cf., for example, J. BLOCH, *Les inscriptions d' Asoka*, Paris 1960, p. 41.

2. Cf. "Greek and Indian Philosophy", in *Diamond Jubilee Volume of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Poona, 1978, pp. 1–8; "Elementos cinicos en las Vidas de Esopo y Secundo y en el diálogo de Alejandro y los Deipnosofistas", in *Homenaje al P. Elorduy*, Bilbao 1978, pp. 309–329; *Historia de la Fabula Greco-Latina I*, Madrid, 1979, pp. 301 ff., and 680 ff.; "The influence of Mesopotamia and Greece on the Pañcatantra", *Dr. Shastri Felicitation Volume*, Delhi 1980; "The life of Aesop and Origins of the Greek Novel", *Cuaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica*, N. S. I, 1979, pp. 93–112; *Ātmā y Brahman; Upaniṣad del Gran Āraṇyaka y Bhagavadgītā* (in collaboration with F. VILLAR), Madrid, 1977, p. 40 ff. Several papers of mine on this subject are forthcoming.

Law – to give a rough translation of the term *dhammalipi* – on rocks and pillars. And, although the Iranian models were indeed decisive, to what extent are they insufficient to explain certain features of same which may on the other hand be explained on the basis of Greek epigraphy, as I stated above.

Of course, the influence of Persian epigraphy should be set within the wider context of the Persian influences on India from the moment when Darius arrived at the Indus with his armies (515–516 B. C.), thus creating several satrapies in Western India; perhaps from before this time. Among other things, Persian influences on architecture and art in general belong within this context;³ the use of Aramaic (from which, as is well-known, Indian *kharoṣṭhī* writing comes), the administrative language of the Persian empire in the Indian satrapies and later under the Mauryas;⁴ and, I believe, literary influences, too.⁵

To keep to our subject, I shall now discuss the influence of Persian inscriptions on the creation of Aśoka's own. I shall not discuss precedents to these inscriptions in oriental tradition from remote time: it is precisely the monumental inscriptions of the Persian kings which must have been known in India; even a precedent which was also Persian, Cyrus's cylinder, lies outside the possible influences.

As is well-known, the Persian inscriptions are of several types. There is the great funeral inscription of Darius himself in Nakš-i-Rustam; there are this king's and his successors' inscriptions at Persepolis in which an account is given of the building of the palaces (and Darius's own which give an account of the construction of a canal in Suez); there are small instructions in which Darius and his successors explain their life and deeds, as in the great Bīsutūn inscription.⁶ In any case, they all display things in common which are to be re-encountered

3. Cf. in the volume *Acta Iranica* II, Leiden, 1974, the following articles: S. M. WHEELER, "The transformation of Persepolis architectural motifs into sculpture under the Indian Mauryan dynasties", pp. 249–261, and J. AUBOYER, "Less achéménides et l'art de l'Inde ancienne", pp. 263–267.

4. Cf. in the above-mentioned volume, J. A. DELAUNAY, "L'araméen d'empire et les débuts de l'écriture en Asie Centrale", pp. 219–236. He gives the data on Aramaic writing in India, apart from Aśoka's inscription at Kandahar.

5. The Mesopotamian influences on the composition of the *Pañcatantra* (and previously, on the *Tantrākhyāyika*) mentioned in publications listed in note 2, must have come from Persia where the *Ahikar* was known (we have fragments of an Aramaic translation of the 5th century B. C., discovered at Elephantina, Egypt).

6. For the ensemble of the text of the Persian, Elamite and Babylonian inscriptions, reference should still be made to F. H. WEISSBACH, *Die Keilinschriften der Achämeniden*, Leipzig, 1911. The Persian texts have been re-printed and translated several times, cf. above all, R. G. KENT, *Old Persian, Grammar, Texts, Lexicon*, New Haven 1950.

in Aśoka's inscriptions: the heading of the type "King Darius (Xerxes, etc.) says..." and the account of the king's deeds, either in war or in peacetime or building projects. I have no doubt that Aśoka, as is generally acknowledged, drew inspiration from them. On the other hand, the introduction of the "the king says..." type is usual in letters and diverse communications of oriental kings and potentates within the sphere of the Persian empire.⁷ On the other hand, I should point out that in the inscriptions of the Achaemenids the phrase "the king says..." is preceded by a paragraph in which the king introduces himself and gives his genealogy, and sometimes by another in which praise is given to the god Ahuramazda who had offered him both throne and victory; this is omitted by the Indian king.

The use of translations of the texts of the inscriptions is also a common feature (a feature inherited from antiquity and then passed on to the Graeco-Roman world). Three texts are usually engraved, Persian, Elamite and Babylonian, with the aim that the inscriptions be understood by the diverse peoples who made up the empire. Aśoka likewise adopted the language of his inscriptions to the local dialects in the place in which they are situated⁸ and set up a bilingual inscription in Kandahar in both Greek and Aramaic which was meant for these subjected peoples. On the other hand, although we do not know if the Achaemenids set up one and the same inscription in several places of their empire as Aśoka did, it is nevertheless clear that they, like Aśoka,⁹ attempted to give the greatest possible diffusion to same: in the great Bisutūn inscription, Darius offers prizes or threatens with punishment, respectively, to those who spread or conceal the text of his inscription (60-61); he likewise threatens whosoever might destroy it (67) and expressly states that he has sent it (that is, his text) to all peoples (70). Aśoka does no more than go even further by having the inscriptions engraved in the most remote places in India.

7. Cf. W. DITTENBERGER in his *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, I, Leipzig, 1917, (in the comment to Darius's letter in Greek discovered at Magnesia on the Maeander, which begins precisely "Darius, the king of kings says this to his servant Gadatas").

8. Cf. A. C. WOOLNER, *Aśoka Text and Glossary* I, Calcutta 1924, p. XX ff.

9. Apart from what is to be deduced from the placing itself of the inscriptions in several parts of the empire, the sending of messengers - or rather missionaries - should be remembered, as likewise the fact that they were even sent to foreign countries (*Rock Edicts*, XIII 16 ff), Aśoka's instructions to ministers, the sending out of inspectors (*Rock Edicts*, III 3, *Sep. Rock Edicts*, 127), the indication that the edicts should be read on the days specified (*Sep. Rock Edicts* I 24 and II 15, *Bud. Scrip. Edict* 7 ff.), the "travels of the dhamma" (*Rock Edicts* VIII 4), the recommendation that the edicts should be engraved in any place where there were pillars (*Pill. Edicts* VII 43), etc.

However, among the Persian inscriptions we refer to the most important is obviously the Bīsūtūn one ; it is in this type of inscription that the king gives an account of his life and deeds whilst still alive and which was taken as a model, not the type of funeral inscription like the one in Nakš-i-Rustam which rather more recalls Augustus's *Res Gestae*, however much, as I say, there may be in common between both these types.

Now, apart from features common to other Persian inscriptions, we find a series of things in the great Bīsūtūn inscription which are re-encountered in Aśoka's inscriptions :

- a) Date [occasional] of the facts narrated, counted as from the king's succession to the throne (71).
- b) The king not only boasts of his battles, but also of his good deeds (14). Data on buildings in the other inscriptions should be added.
- c) The king is benevolent, truthful, non-violent and acts in accordance with justice, this being why Ahuramazda has helped him (63).
- d) The king boasts that everything has changed with his reign, and of the difference to past times (59).
- e) He even gives orders and recommendations, although to a very limited extent, for successive kings after him to punish the unjust (64) and that nobody is to destroy his inscription (65).
- f) In some of the versions of Aśoka's Edicts, the Iranian words *dipi-* " inscription " (elsewhere adapted as *lipi-*) and *nipis-* " to write ", are preserved.

A quick reading of Aśoka's inscriptions is enough to realise that these subjects are fully dealt with in same. On the other hand, it is true that the nucleus of them is not to be found here but in the account of the king's succession to the throne and of his victories over his enemies – all of this thanks to the help of Ahuramazda. Now, I consider that Aśoka resorted to a process which I shall term inversion, for he offers texts with a reverse intent to those of Darius, although his dependence on same is no less for this.

Aśoka does not present himself as being protected by any god, although the traditional epithet is given of *devānampiyā*, or beloved of the gods. His activity consists of fulfilling and propagating the *dhamma*, or Sacred Law : among his successes this is the one he boasts of and it is on this that he pins his hope of glory (*Rock Edicts* X 1). On the other hand, the only victory in war he speaks of is the conquest of Kalinga and it is narrated (*Rock Edicts* XIII) precisely to curse it and to tell of his repentance for the deaths and disasters it

brought about. Asoka discovered in this victory the roots of his conversion and his new policy with regard to his neighbours, including the primitive forest tribes. What he now desires is the victory of the *dhamma* (*Rock Edicts*, XII 15). In sum, the *dhamma* somehow takes the place of the personal god, that of warfare and that of hunting and feasts, too. This is a new programme, consciously opposed to that of the Achaemenid kings and, of course, to that of the Indian kings before him. However, it is the inscriptions of the former that are thus corrected. The engravings which accompany some of Asoka's Edicts support the interpretation: instead of Ahuramazda, the white elephant (perhaps a symbol of Buddha) is represented on the rocks of Gīrnār, Kālsī and Dhaulī; in Sañci, King Asoka is represented rendering cult to the Tree of Enlightenment.

II

Having come to this point, we must now take up the original thread of this paper once more, and point out that, together with the Persian influences, another should be postulated: that of Greek inscriptions. To this end, one should note that there are features in Asoka's which can only be explained by these latter. Moreover, the historical circumstances of the epoqe make it quite feasible that the facts could have taken place in this way.

To begin with, I should say that the subject has not been investigated. I could of course refer to papers by G. Pugliese Carratelli and A. J. Festugière,¹⁰ in which they point out connections between Asoka's ethics and the Hellenistic one, as likewise the closeness of his ideal of a king to that of the Hellenistic king. But these are parallels which, although important, are in keeping with the parallels between the religious and ethical ideals of both peoples at that time and which I have discussed elsewhere. The two authors do not centre their argument on the question of influences. And, above all, their study is concerned with content and has no reference to the formal elements of the inscriptions.

On the other hand, I do not think that there can be any objection to accepting Greek influence in Indian in the middle of the 3rd century B. C. It is true that this influence was much stronger in the 2nd century B. C., as from the Graeco-Indian reigns: I have attributed to this epoqe the Greek influence on the birth of the *Tantrākhyāyika*; neither can the origins of the *Milindapanha* be dated any earlier, for obvious reasons. Graeco-Indian sculpture of the school of Gāndhāra and Mathurā is even later. But this Graeco-Indian cultural *koiné*

10. Cf. G. Pugliese CARRATELLI, *La Parola del Passato* "Asoka e i re ellenistici" 8, 1953, pp. 449-454 and J. A. FESTUGIERE, "Les inscriptions d'Asoka et l'idéal du roi hellénistique", *Recherches de sciences religieuses* 39, 1951, pp. 31-46.

evidently developed as from Alexander's conquest. The Persian architecture imported by Aśoka is really a semi-Hellenized architecture.¹¹ Moreover, the data regarding relations between Indians and Greeks as from the Macedonian conquest are well-known: the Treaty between Candragupta and Seleucus, the Greek embassies of Megasthenes and Daimachus to the courts of Candragupta and Bindusāra, the embassies sent by Aśoka to the Greeks according to his own account in the *Rock Edict XIII*, etc.

The books on India by Megasthenes and Daimachus (among others) brought a knowledge of this country to the West. One should think, then, that in the 3rd century B. C., as from the conquest, the Greeks began to attain knowledge on Indian culture and religion, a knowledge which later led to the flowering of a Graeco-Indian literature, partly in Indian languages and partly in Greek (the dialogue of Alexander and the Gymnosophists, in the work of the pseudo-Calisthenes, among other things). One should likewise think that, apart from sending ambassadors to the kings of Greece, Aśoka had Greeks within his own domains, whom he repeatedly mentions and for whose use he wrote the Kandahār inscription in Greek.¹² He therefore had more than sufficient means of access to Greek culture.

Now, a glance at Greek cultural data, above all those reflected in the epigraphy, will help us to understand certain things in Aśoka's inscriptions which cannot be explained by earlier Indian or Persian precedents.

In the first place, the headings to the inscriptions lack the genealogies of those of the Achaemenids, whilst they give fixed epithets to Aśoka that are lacking in these latter. The king is *Piyadasi* "the one with the benevolent look", he is *devānampiya* "beloved of the gods", this latter epithet also being assigned to his son Dasalatha. It may even be that the name Aśoka (which only appears once in a certain version of *The Minor Rock and Pillar Edicts I*) could also be an epithet: its meaning - "he who causes no pain" - is explained by the legend regarding his birth, but he may also have taken on the epithet himself to denote his pacific nature. This is not only an inversion of the names and epithets of epic heroes, but also of his own father's, Bindusāra's, title, whom Greek sources call *Amitrokhates*, that is, *amitraghāta* "the killer of enemies".

Now, the use of epithets or names of this type is typical of the Hellenistic kings: *sōter* "saviour", *theophilos* "friend of the gods", *euergētes* "well-doer", *philopater* "lover of his father" (and corresponding forms regarding

11. Cf. J. AUBOYER, art. cit. in no. 3.

12. On this last point, cf. Vol. II *The Age of Imperial Unity*, of *The History and Culture of the Indian People*, ed. R. C. MAJUMDAR, Bombay 1960, p. 78 ff.

mother and brothers), *dikaïos* "just". One should recall the *Augustuses* and *Piuses* of Rome, Ptolemy V's epithet as *ēgapēmenos hupò toū Phthā* "beloved of Phtha", etc. These names were to be found alongside other such as *epiphanēs* "illustrious", or *nikator* "victorious". It is not unlikely that the fashion for fixed epithets, at times turned into a name, and above all, the use of the epithets which I have termed "converted" ones, was in keeping with contemporary Greek usage: we know from his own testimony that Asoka was familiar with the names of their kings. The supposed practice of the *dhamma* among the Greeks, which Asoka speaks of, may have something to do with these names of their kings and with the concept of royalty reflected in them: Father Festugière has written some important pages on this subject in a paper quoted in n. 10.

I shall now go on to a second, more decisive point. Just as the rock inscriptions have a precedent in those of the Achaemenids (albeit discarding the glorifying reliefs of these kings), the pillar inscriptions have none. Certain small Persian inscriptions on the bases of columns, above all in Persepolis, bear no comparison, for they are inscriptions which give the name of the king who built the palace in question. On the other hand, the pillar inscriptions are edicts, just like the rock inscriptions. It was really Asoka who took the initiative of using pre-existing pillars, just as he did with rock surfaces, for engraving his edicts. He himself tells us this (*Pillar Edicts* VII, 43). These pillars are exactly called *dhammathambhāni* (*Pillar Edicts* VII, 14), "pillars of the Law"; they are, as I said, old cult pillars which he takes over, or else new pillars built by the king. The problem is to find out where he got his inspiration to write his edicts on them.

I believe the answer to this is from the Greeks, among whom the inscription of laws on stones, walls and pillars of diverse types was an ancient custom. Consider that the Indian *dhamma* is both religious and civil law, or as we might put it, there is no difference. Asoka did not only concern himself with preaching purity, respect for life, veneration of one's parents, etc.; he also gives laws on prison sentences, and diverse instructions to his ministers. The distinction is not always quite clear in Greece either; the Greek *nómos* sometimes covers religious aspects. But there are in Greek inscriptions, above all, the sacred laws¹³ which governed the temple cult, feasts, and so forth. Neither is this aspect lacking in Asoka's inscriptions: he recommends the reading of the inscriptions on certain feast-days, speaks of the new religious festivals and pilgrimages, the abolishing of sacrifices (*Rock Edicts* IV, VIII, IX).

13. Cf. F. SOKOŁOWSKI's collection, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques*, Paris 1962.

Asoka could only have drawn inspiration from the Greek inspirations to introduce the mandates of the Law, the *dhamma*, in his own inscriptions. Nothing of this is to be found in Persia. We could of course go back to Hammurabi's code and other documents, but it is unlikely that this could have come down to Asoka; neither should we seek the model in laws written on tablets, such as so many Mesopotamian and Hittite ones.

In fact, one should point out that Asoka's inscriptions are of a mixed nature, which as far as I know, has not received attention. There is much account of the king's deeds, as in Persian inscriptions, albeit in the form of the "conversion" which I mentioned above. But on the other hand, they are true edicts, predecessors of the edicts of the Hellenistic monarchs and Roman emperors, which I shall discuss below. We know of nothing like this in Persia, except for Darius's letter in Greek mentioned above: to this end, he must have used clay tablets or other perishable material.

On the other hand, the sacred places of Greece – agoras, Accropolis, temples – were full of stone inscriptions which contained imperative laws for magistrates, citizens, functionaries of the cult. Sometimes they prescribed a certain type of behaviour fitting to certain occasions or places. This was the model that Asoka took for his edicts, likewise in places of the cult – rocks or pillars. But naturally, Asoka was an absolute monarch, his laws were not passed by an assembly or by magistrates: he imparted them in accordance with the eternal *dhamma*. The combination of the great inscriptions in which the Persian monarchs glorified themselves and the laws of the Greek cities created Asoka's edicts.

Another element could quite easily have been influential: the preaching of Hellenistic philosophers. I do not agree in this with Festugiere's excellent study: this type of philosophy (Cynical, Epicurean and Stoic) carried out veritable proselytism. It is quite clear that these philosophers must have seemed the nearest equivalent to their own Brahmins and ascetes to the Indian emissaries, and that the Greeks in turn saw a counterpart in the Indian ascetes to their Cynics and other philosophers, is a well-known fact. We shall see later how an Epicurean, Diogenes of Oenoanda, resorted to an inscription for his preaching. In any case, these schools created a whole proselytic literature, to one of the components of which, the Cynic, I believe one should attribute an influence on Graeco-Indian literature.¹⁴ In sum, the influence of Greek epigraphy on India should be connected to the fact that both in the ideals as to the good king and in moral philosophy in general, elements were found in Hellenistic Greece which justified

¹⁴. See several papers quoted in no. 2.

Aśoka's initiative to adapt the type of inscription favoured by the Achaemenids to his own ideals, with the aid of Greek epigraphic tradition.

The influence of this tradition may be further confirmed by another fact which I have not mentioned so far. I said that Aśoka's procedure of reproducing one and the same inscription in several places with minor adaptations, is not to be found in Persia. Here, there were, indeed, multilingual inscriptions, and these latter were widely diffused; this, however, was doubtless with the aid of perishable materials, or otherwise, the contents of the inscriptions were passed on orally. There was no "edition" of one single inscription in multiple copies.

Now, we find examples of this procedure in Greece, which later porliferated in Rome. To be precise, we find it in cult inscriptions: in liturgical hymns which became fashionable in the 4th century B. C., and which were engraved on stone in the different places of the god's cult. Thus is the case of Erythrai's poean, of which copies have also been found in Ptolemais (in Egypt) and in Dione (in Thessalia). In other cases, cult hymns have come down to us in remote spots far from the respective god's cult centre (thus, for example, in the case of the hymn to the dactyls of the Ida fonnd in Erythrai): it must be assumed that these are copies.¹⁵

On the other hand, apart from what took place in the epigraphic field, the concept of edition – the systematic multiplication of a text, for its diffusion – is to be found for the first time in Greece. It is in the Hellenistic East that the Indians must have known of it.

Of course, this does not mean that the genre of Aśoka's inscriptions was the result of a Greek-Persian syncretism. No, certain Persian and Greek inscriptions lent formal elements which Aśoka borrowed to create his own new genre. This was possible because there were also elements of content on these inscriptions which coincided with what Aśoka's intention was when writing out his inscriptions. But, from here on, the content is fundamentally Indian. I am not going to describe it here; as is well-known, it represents a syncretic type of thought, not strictly Buddhist, a thought which is otherwise generally religious and human and centred on both the attaining of heaven and on seeking peace and prosperity on earth. This very syncretism is what has made possible the use of Persian and Greek elements at the same time, in the cause of a decidedly unitary intention.

15. Cf. my *Lirica griega arcaica*, Madrid, 1980, pp. 57 ff. For other examples cf. LARFELD (cit. in note 18) I, pp. 180, 187, 194 and II, p. 696.

III

I now come to the third point in this paper : to attempt to give a few indications as to the success of Asoka's new formula in the western world.

The new political régimes of the Hellenistic age and, as from a certain moment, of Rome, were either monarchic or imperial. An important element in their system of government were the edicts (*prostágmata*, *edicta*) of kings, emperors and important functionaries, as likewise their letters.¹⁶ The form is different but the meaning is very often the same : decisions to be respected by cities or individuals. And they are given either spontaneously or as answers to letters or requests.

The edicts above all are generally considered, and rightly too, to have been derived from the oriental tradition. Although the truth is that the details are little known to us (we have said something about it above), we can find the clearest derivation of Darius's inscriptions in inscriptions such as those of diverse kings of the dynasties of Nubia and Ethiopia written in Greek and in which they narrate their conquests.¹⁷ In any case, the initial formulae of the edicts, with the name of the king or of the person who writes and the verb "says" (*légei*, also in the first person "I order", "I permit", etc.),¹⁸ derive from the old tradition. I have already stated that Darius's letter in Greek which has come down to us begins thus.

It is not in any case my intention to go into depth here about the problem of the origin and evolution of the edict and related forms. I shall merely recall two aspects of these documents which repeat things already known to us : the existence of several epigraphic copies of the same document and the habitual use of a Greek translation of the edicts destined for the Greek Orient.¹⁹

I shall, on the other hand, deal with a few documents which, if I am not mistaken, represent a derivation of the tradition begun by Asoka.

In the first place, I should like to mention the great inscription by Antiochus of Commagene in his funeral sanctuary on the Nemrud Dag peak.²⁰

16. Cf. above all C. BRADFORD WELLS, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period*, Rome, 1966.

17. See these inscriptions in the *Orientalis Graeci Inscriptiones selectae* by W. DITTENBERGER, I, Leipzig, 1903, p. 284 ff.

18. Cf. W. LARFELD, *Griechische Epigraphik*, 3rd ed., Munich, 1914, p. 427 ff.

19. Cf. F. MARTIN, *La documentación griega de la cancellaría de Adriano*, Pamplona, 1982 pp. 261 ff, 323 ff.

20. This may be seen in *Orientalis Graeci*.... cit., p. 511 ff. The smaller inscriptions are also to be found there.

Next to the great tumulus of this Hellenistic king, who was a friend of Rome and who ruled this extreme confine of Anatolia between 62 and 34 B. C., five gigantic statues of seated gods were found, himself among them ; the heads of these statues are still preserved. On both sides there is an eagle and a lion ; and on a small wall not far away, steles were placed with the images of Antiochus's Greek and Persian ancestors, evoked in inscriptions on the steles themselves. Finally, the great inscription we are concerned with here is on the backs of the god's seats.

Antiochus gives his titles and genealogy in it and the inscription alludes to the events of his reign, ending with a sacred Law that regulates the cult in the sanctuary. There is no doubt that this is a Graeco-Persian syncretism : the double genealogy, both Greek and Persian, of Antiochus, the gods represented (among them Zeus-Oromasdes, that is, Ahuramazda, and Heracles-Artagnes, that is, Varathragna) and details of the sacred law (Persian costume for the priest in the anniversary celebrations), all leave this quite clear without a shade of a doubt.

The Persian model in this case is Darius's funeral sanctuary at Nakš-i-Rustam, the inscription of which I have already mentioned (and which, for the rest, is not unlike that at Bīsūtūn). The tomb is excavated in a hillside and there is a large relief on its façade surrounded by the inscription. In the relief, we see the king on his throne, the god Ahuramazda, an altar and the moon ; there are also the king's soldiers. It is worth noting that the tomb did not go unnoticed to posterity ; there are seven large Sassanian reliefs on the same rock.

Antiochus, therefore, attempted to surpass Darius's tomb and, perhaps, other ancient Persian tombs ; he doubtless also knew the other inscriptions of his supposed or real Persian ancestors. On the contrary to Asoka, he took from all of them the custom of putting his own genealogy at the top, which is given in greater details in the smaller inscriptions on the steles. The Sacred Law included in the inscription is, on the other hand, of Greek origin, as the description he gives of the sanctuary he built may also possibly be : although it might also make one think of the Persian inscriptions related to the building of the palaces of Persepolis and elsewhere.

However, I do not believe that this completes the study of the influences. For, right from the beginning Antiochus introduces elements which I would unhesitatingly connect with the Indian model :

- a) The king, before giving his genealogy, gives a list of the epithets by which he is called : " The Great King Antiochus, god, just, illustrious, friend of the Romans, friend of the Greeks ".

- b) After the genealogy, he says, like *Asoka* in so many Edicts, that he has had the inscription engraved.
- c) Nevertheless, a key element of Darius's funeral inscription (and of other inscriptions) is missing: an initial paragraph in honour of Ahuramazda.
- d) But above all, an explicit account of Antiochus's life and triumphs is missing, whilst he on the other hand from the start praises his own *eusebeia* (usually translated as "piety"), to which he attributed the prosperity of his reign, as likewise his own *hosiotes* or "saintliness", "my most faithful guardian and my most unequalled pleasure".

At first glance, it would seem clear that this is Indian, inspired by *Asoka's* inscriptions (cf. *Rock Edict XIII* 15 and 20), but it becomes quite certain when one checks that the term *dhamma*, Sacred Law, is translated exactly as *eusebeia* in *Asoka's* Greek inscription found in Kandahar. Let us compare the following:

Asoka

.....King Piyadasi taught men the Sacred Law (*eusebeia*) and thus made them more faithful to the Law and everything prospers in the whole country, etc.

Antiochus

The Great King Antiochus ... Among all my wordly goods, I considered that the Sacred Law (*eusebeia*) is for all men not only the safest possession but also the most pleasurable enjoyment and I have held this choice as the cause of a lucky power and happy usage; and during the whole of my reign, I have considered saintliness (*hosiotes*) to be my most faithful guardian and my most unequalled pleasure, etc.

Antiochus had doubtless seen *Asoka's* inscriptions such as the one at Kandahar and took over some of its subjects, enlarging them in his florid Greek with its Asianic oratory; *hosiotes* turns out to be a simple duplicate of *eusebeia*, to which he attributes his salvation in desperate situations. He certainly omits Indian subjects such as the respect for life and the prohibition on killing animals. Yet he returns to the theme of *eusebeia* time and again. And, however much he may have had statues of Greek and Persian gods sculpted, when he comes to speak of his victories, he does not attribute them to Ahuramazda or to any other god among these, but to the "divine mind, which was often contemplated as a

visible companion to help me in my royal battles". On the other hand, Antiochus's piety is expressed in his founding of the sanctuary and his regulation of the cult in same : the Sacred Law (*hierós nómos*) he includes is the expression of it.

However, I believe that this original document is not unique in the Graeco-Roman world. I shall now briefly discuss another well-known and illustrious one : the *Res gestae divi Augusti*, or the great inscription Augustus wrote to be engraved on his mausoleum in Rome, copies of which, as is known, have come down to us, or fragments of copies from Ancyra (Latin and Greek), Antiochia of Pisidia (Latin) and Apollonia of Pisidia (Greek). The very fact of multilingual texts and copies brings well-known things to mind.

I cannot discuss in detail here the opinions given on the models for this inscription. They range from R. Syme's in the sense that the *Res Gestae* "cannot be explained by analogies or precedents"²¹ to those of the authors who stress the oriental parallels and those who, whilst not denying these latter, insist on the persistence in the inscription of the Roman tradition.²²

The original models mentioned are those we already know, but usually they are only given in general terms ; Antiochus's inscription is, of course, among them, but Aśoka's are not mentioned at all. Yet I believe that India, which did active trade with Rome in Augustus's time, did, indeed, continue to exert its influence in this field.

It is quite clear that we are faced with a funeral inscription that therefore goes back to that of Darius in Nakši-Rustam and that of Antiochus. However, unlike the latter and like the former (and other non-funeral oriental inscriptions), Augustus explains his campaigns, his constructions and his favours to the people in great detail.

I believe that the most convincing analysis of the inscription is Mario Attilio Levi's in a paper quoted in note 22. He insists that the inscription has no Roman precedent and criticizes certain mechanical analyses. For him, what comes to light throughout the whole inscription is Augustus's *pietas*, which

21. *The Roman Revolution*, Oxford, 1939, p. 254.

22. Among other bibliography, Cf. M. A. LEVI "La composizione delle *Res Gestae divi Augusti*", *Riv. di Filologia Classica*, N. S. 25, 1947, pp. 189-210; A. Magariños, *Res Gestae divi Augusti*, Introduction, translation and notes, *Suplementos de Estudios Clásicos* 1, Madrid, 1951; M. GUARDUCCI, *Epigrafia greca* II, Roma, 1970, p. 315 ff.; J. GAYÉ, *Res gestae divi Augusti*, Paris, 1977, p. 25 ff.

punishes the murderers of his father, the god Caesar. Together with his public functions, he expounds the religious honours he has received, the prayers for his health from the people, the founding of the Ara Pacis and the closing of the doors of the temple of Janus. Augustus is merciful (chapt. III) and not merely victorious; he gives an account of his public works in favour of the people (chaps. XIX-XXI); he discusses the embassies sent by the eastern people (including India) in homage to him (chapt. XXX). The intention behind the inscription is to present the reign of Augustus as opposed to that of his predecessor: he inaugurates an era of virtue, peace and prosperity, as likewise one of piety to the gods, too.

It is possible to illustrate all these concepts, one by one, with passages from Asoka. It is true that all this is syncretized with oriental elements in general and with other Roman ones, but I think that the general content of the inscription cannot be understood without the Indian models. This syncretism evidently responds to the religious syncretism of the epoque. It is above all expressed in chapt. XXXIV 2, where there is an account of how the Senate proclaimed Octavianus Augustus (Gr. *sebastós*) and dedicated a gold *clupeus* to him, the inscription of which spoke of his "virtue, mercy, justice and piety" (Gr. *eu-ébeia*). Asoka's motto echoes here once again. His model was evidently easily accessible to Rome at this time. And the fact that copies of the *Res Gestae* were sent to the cities of Asia may have been inspired by him.

Finally, I should like to point to the possibility that a fresh echo of Asoka's inscriptions is to be found in the Greek one of Diogenes of Oenoanda, in which this Epicurean philosopher expounded his philosophy on a large wall as a remedy to the evils of humanity.²³ It is in the above mentioned city on the wall of a *stoa* or porch. That this could be connected to the author's burial is merely a hypothesis; and, on the other hand, the beginning is missing which might perhaps have offered us certain data. More than an inscription, this is really a miscellany of Epicurean philosophy. And there are no precedents for its being placed in an inscription, if one disregards the maxims in Apollo's temple at Delphi.

23. This inscription, which is currently being recovered fragment by fragment among the ruins of the city of Oenoanda in Asia Minor, poses many problems. It is usually dated in the 2nd century A. D., but one should perhaps distinguish between the date of the inscription and that of its author (as, for example, in the case of another literary inscription, that of the *heroon* in Paros in honour of Archilochus, of the 1st century B. C., which includes a text from Demeas, of the 3rd century B. C.). See V. W. CHILTON, *Diogenis Oenoandensis Fragmenta*, Leipzig, 1967; but there are numerous fragments discovered at a later date, cf. the reference in my *Diccionario Griego-Español* I, Madrid, 1980, p. LXXIV.

I have spoken above of the proselytism of the Hellenistic philosophers and one should interpret the inscription within this context. Diogenes speaks of his compassion towards men and states that he places his inscription where it is in order to dispel the empty fear of death from men. It is, then, a moral exhortation to men, although within an atheistic philosophy and with added autobiographical data. That Diogenes should have had the idea of putting all this in an inscription in his city may not be alien to the oriental model I discussed above and others derived from same. For we have seen that in one way or another, their echo reached Asia Minor and even the whole of the Graeco-Roman world.

VEDIC *KṢÚMPA*- AND CONNECTED DATA

By

H. W. BAILEY

An old Indian isolated word the hapax legomenon Vedic *kṣúmpa*— has been left “ unexplained ” in the latest etymological dictionary of Sanskrit.¹ The one passage is RV 1. 84. 8 *kadā mártam arādhásam padā kṣúmpam iva sphurat* ‘ when will (Indra) spurn the giftless mortal, like the *kṣúmpa* - plant with foot ? ’

Sāyana’s commentary glosses with the word *ahi-cchatraka* - ‘ snake’s umbrella ’, epithet of a fungus. Mādhava’s commentary has similarly *ahi-cchatra*-.

The Old Indian *kṣ*- is highly ambiguous in origin. Corresponding to Old Ind. *kṣ*- Old Iranian distinguishes four sounds of different origin : *xš*-, *Yž*-, *š*- *ž*-. But within Indo-European a *k*- may be mobile ; it can be prefixed to some words of a group and be absent from others of the same group. Thus Indo-European *ksyeḱs* ‘ six ’ has the forms Avestan *xšvaš*, Pošto *spaž*, Khotan-Saka *ksäsa* (*xšizā*), Celtic Welsh *chwech* (*xuex*), Sogdian *wYwšw* (*uxušv*), Prakrit *chaḷ*- ‘ with palatalized *kṣ* ’ > *ch*-), Old Ind. *ṣaṣ*-, *ṣaṭ*, but Latin *sex*, Greek *hex*, Germanic *six*, Armenian *več* (*č* = *ts*). Note also Old Ind. *kṣvedati* ‘ to hum ’, Old Slavonic *svistati* ‘ to whistle ’, Avestan *xšvaēw* : *xšviw*- (*-w*- from *-β*- from *-b*-) ‘ to move fast in a sweeping movement ’, Gothic *sweipan* (*p* < *b*) ‘ to sweep ’. Then *kṣúmpa*- could have replaced **súmpa*-. This **súmpa*- with shifted accent from the suffix *-á*- **sumpá*- adjective to a noun **súmpa*- will derive by normal development from a base *sau* : *su*- with nasal and second increment like the base *keu* : *kv*-, *ku-m*- and *ku-m-b* (*h*).² This is the type which is exemplified in Latin *fundō* ‘ to pour ’ from Indo-Eur. *ǵheu*- : *ǵhu*, *ǵhu-n-d*- and Old Indian *bhed*- : *bhid*-, *bhind*-.

This **súmpa*- (transmitted as *kṣúmpa*-) will then belong to a large group of words signifying ‘ soft, spongy ’.

Take first the forms with two increments. Germanic has Gothic (acc. sing.) *swamm*, *swam* ‘ sponge ’ (to a nom. *swamms*), Old Engl. *swamm*, Old High German *swamm*, *swam*, *swamb*, New High German *schwamm*, ‘ sponge,

1. M. MAYRHOFER, A concise Sanskrit etymological dictionary.

2. J. POKORNY, Indogermnisches etymologisches Wörterbuch 592.

fungus, mushroom', Old Norse *svoppr* (**swampus*) from older **suom-bo-s*, beside with full and reduced grades Old Engl. *swamp* 'marsh', Old and New Engl. *sump*. The Germanic *-mm-*, may show *-m* with increment *-m-*, or be simply "strong" *-mm-*, or from *-m̃-* in other words. Here the *-mm-* alternates with *-mp-* from *-m-b-*. Greek has the form *σφῦς* 'spongy, fungous' from **suom-bho-s*. The meanings range over 'sponge, fungus, swamp, sump'.

Within Iranian Pašto *xōmba* 'mushroom' was traced to **hvampā-*, but later explained as an Indo-Aryan loanword.³ It must be retained as Iranian with the following Pamir words.

Without the second increment *-m-*, *-p-*, *-b(h)-* the Iranian Pamir languages Yazgulāmī (particularly archaic), Sarīkolī with ŠuYnī and connected Rōšānī have forms from *huam-*: *hum-*. This is used of the soft stuff arising from winnowed grain. That chaff and husks of grain were recognised as soft can be seen in the Slavonic names Russian *mjakina* 'chaff' from the base *mank-* 'soft' as in the Russ. adjective *mjagkij* 'soft', Old Slav. *menk-* of the verbal base, Lithuanian *mink-* and *mánk-*, *minkštas* 'soft'. The Russian rendering has *očen-melkaja mjakina* 'very soft stuff (powder) remaining after winnowing' for the Caucasian Arčī *gowhār*.⁴ The following is the data from the four Pamir languages.

(1) Yazgulāmī *xuam* 'fine straw and chaff' from older **hyama-* (or final *-i-* or *-u-*) rendered by Russian *melkie solominki u mjakina*. This dialect keeps Old Iranian *-a-*, but replaces *-ā-* by *-ē-*. The *-m* will be old *-m-*. The group *-mb-* is kept in *zamb*, *zamba* 'bank' and when the *-b-* is absent the result is a long vowel in: *zām*; Buddhist Sogdian *znpw*, Turfan Persian *dmb*.

(2) Sarīkolī *xem* with the same meaning is from **hyāmya-*. This dialect has *-ē-* from *-ai-*, but *-ā-* is kept as *-u-* (*mūd* 'mother'). It keeps an older *-mb-* as in *xamb* 'grain pit' and *vizāmb-* 'to crush'.

(3) ŠuYnī and Rōšānī *zēmč* with the same meaning is from **hyāmya-ēi-* (*ē = ts* from *c*). The ŠuYnī dialect has *-ē-* and *-ā-* from *-āi-*, Rōšānī *-ē-*. They keep *-ā-* as *ō*, (*mōd* 'mother'), and keep *-mb-*, as in *zamb* 'bank' and *xumb* 'heap'.

3. G. MORGENSTIERNE, Etymological vocabulary of Pashto 1927, 96, BSOAS 20, 451ff, accepted by C. M. KIEFER, Notes de dialectologie afghane, but rejected rightly by R. L. TURNER, A comparative dictionary of Indo-Aryan, No. 3724, with Sindhī *khumbhī* from *kṣumpha-*.

4. Arčinskij Jazyk 1977, edited V. A. ZVEGINTSEV, 232 (the most archaic language of the Daghestan group).

The reduced grade *hum-* (of *hyam-*) is in Khotan-Saka *huma-* 'spongy, soft' (from the context, see Dictionary of Khotan-Saka 491). Note however that a prothetic *h-* is fairly frequent so that any *h-* may be doubtful. With the two increments *-m-p-* the word *hāba* 'bdellium' (a plant with soft hollow stem) may be traced to older **hyampā-* (hence the same as Pašto *xōmba*). In the later Khotan-Saka *-ā-* and *-ām-* stand often for older *-u-* or *-ū-* or *-au-*.

This *humá-* 'soft' is used of the fingers grown flaccid, and in a medical text of a 'soft swelling' in *huma bāva* 'soft root'. In form *huma-* may be from *hu-má-* with suffix *-má-* or *hum-á-* with suffix *á-*.

Germanic *suam-*, Greek *som-*, and Iranian *hyam-* attest an Indo-European base *seu-* or *sau-* or *sou-*.⁵

Germanic, Greek, Iranian all fail to show which vowel was in the Indo-European base signifying 'soft'. Possibly the Germanic *-a-* (from *-o-*) and the Greek *-o-* of the increment may have carried over *-o-* from the original base *sou-*.

There are several Indo-European bases with *s-u-*, the following four can be named here: (1) *seu-*: *su-* 'to give rain, press out juice', (2) *seu-*: *su-* 'to bear children', (3) *sau-* in *sau-s-* 'dry' and perhaps *sau-k-* in Greek *αὐχuos* 'dryness', (4) *sou-*: *su-* 'sour', in Old Norse *saurr* 'dirt, sperm', *súrr* 'sour', Lith. *súras* 'saline', *súris* 'cheese', Iranian *hur-* in Ossetic Digoron *xurxä* 'sour whey', Iron *xūrx*; *xūrxäg* 'sorrel' (Digoron *tāüäg t'äffä* 'sour leaf'). To these must be added this *seu-* (or *sau-* or *sou-*) 'soft'.⁶

The existence of the base *seu-* 'soft' with its connexion with fungus with the increments *-em-* and *-um-b-* beside *seu-* 'to press out juice' makes the interpretation of Old Iranian *hauma-* (Avestan *haoma-*, Zoroastrian Pahlavi *hōm*), Old Indian *sóma-* ambiguous. The use of ZorPahl. *hōm ī hut* 'expressed *hōm*' and Old Indian *sómam sunoti* 'he presses out juice' is prima facie an easy identification. Yet the word *sóma-* is identified with *ándhas-* which is horse's fodder in RV 1. 28. 7) and is *vṛkṣá-* in RV 10. 94. 3. In Zoroastrian Pahlavi the *hōm* is an *urvar* 'any plant' and *draxt* 'a plant with stem, stalk, or trunk'.

If however the base *seu-* 'soft' is the source of the plant name *hauma-*, *sóma-* it can be treated as 'fungus'.

5. I agree with E. BENVENISTE's *Origines de la formation des noms en indo-européen*, 1935, that the Indo-European base has two consonants separated by a vowel which under accentual stress may be absent. But I would like to have not only the vowel *e*, but also *a* and perhaps *o* (distinct from the *a* and *o* due to the presence of a laryngeal consonant).

6. POKORNY (1) 912, (2) 913, (3) 880, (4) 1039.

The Old Indian word *vrkṣá-* is not basically interpreted. That is to say that it must be discussed together with the related Iranian words. Here five words are concerned.

Avestan *varəša-* is glossed by ZorPahl. *vēšak* 'wood, grove' and the compound *varəša-jī-* is glossed by *rēšak* 'root', *bun* 'stem', *dwn*, Pāzand *eyvan* 'top part of a tree', and Parsi-Sanskrit *skandha-*. Yāzgulāmī has *warš* 'name of a herb' and ŠuYnī has *warš* 'a mountain grass' from **varša-*.

The Alan equivalent of Avestan *varəša-* seems to have been preserved with many other Alan words in the Caucasian Veinakh (Čečen) *varš*, plural *varšaš*, gen. sing *varšan* (also used as an adjective) 'grove thicket'. The phrase *varšan iist* means 'edge of a wooded slope' (*iist* 'end').⁷ From New Persian, *varšān* 'wood pigeon' has been cited.

A syllable containing *-ər-* followed by a consonant has at times been changed to *-rā-*. Thus Khotan-Saka *grāma-* 'hot' has *garma-* only in a compound, Avestan *garəma-*, NPers. *garm*; similarly Turfan Parthian *gr'b* **grāβ* is older *garba-*, Old Ind. *garbha-*; Turfan Persian *hr̥g* (with two dots over the *r-* to indicate *-rā-*), 'tax' is in NPersian and Arabic *xarāj*, Khotan-Saka *harga* (see Dictionary of Khotan-Saka 469).

If in Alan *varša-* became **vrāša-* the result might well be Ossetic Digoron *bälāsä*, Iron *bälās* 'tree'.⁸

7. N. F. JAKOVLEV, *Sintaksis čečenskogo literaturnogo jazyka*, 1940, 304.

8. The Old Indian *palāśa-* seems too remote although quoted in V. ABAEV, *Ossetic etymological dictionary*.

SUBHAGAMKARAṆĪ IN AV 6, 139, 1

By

M. D. BALASUBRAHMANYAM

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[ABSTRACT: The paper examines the validity of the reading, *subhagamkāraṇī* which occurs at 6, 139, 1-b in the *Atharvaveda Śaunaka-Saṁhitā* (= AV) in the light of Pāṇini's rules with regard to the formation and accentuation of the word. It also examines WHITNEY'S view that *subhāgamkāraṇa* is probably the true *Saṁhitā* reading, since the great majority of AV Mss. have attested this reading. The paper concludes with a note on the judicious utility of P's rules for solving text-critical *cum* accentual problems in AV apropos of the word].

1. Pāṇinian position.

1.1 A 3, 2, 56

Pāṇini (= P.) teaches in the rule —

āḍhya-subhaga-sthūla-palita-nagna-andha-priyeṣu cvi arthesu
accvau kṛñāḥ karaṇe khyun (A 3, 2, 56) —

that *KH-yu-N* is suffixed to the root *kṛ* in the sense of the instrumental agent (*karaṇe*), when *āḍhya-*, *subhaga-*, and five others enumerated in the rule are supplementary words (*upapada-s*) to the root, if these words carry the meaning denoted by *cvi*, although (technically speaking) these do not end in *cvi* (A 5, 4, 50). Accordingly we obtain: *āḍhyam-kāraṇa-* 'that by the instrumentality of which the poor becomes rich' (i. e., becoming wealthy or prosperous) *subhagam-kāraṇa-* 'making happy or fortunate', *sthūlam-kāraṇa-* 'by which one becomes big (or fat)', *palitam-kāraṇa-* 'rendering grey', *nagnam-kāraṇa-* 'making naked', *andham-kāraṇa-* 'making blind' and *priyam-kāraṇa-* 'becoming pleasant (or showing kindness)'.

1.2 Grammatical steps

The primary derivative, *subhagam-karaṇa-* is formed in accordance with the following grammatical steps set up by P. in his system.

subhaga	-	kṛ	+	KH-yu-N	...	KHyuN	by A 3, 2, 56
"	-	"	+	φ-yu-φ	...	KH=φ	by A 1, 3, 8; 9
						N=φ	by A 1, 3, 3; 9
Subhaga	+	mUM	-	"	+	yu-	... m (UM) by A 6, 3, 67
"	+	m-φφ		"	+	yu	... U/M=φ A 1, 3, 2; 3; 9

subhagam	„ + ana	... ana for <i>yu</i> by A 7, 1, 1
„	kar + ana	... <i>guṇa</i> by A 7, 3, 84
„	„ + ana	... <i>ṇava</i> by A 8, 4, 2
subhagam -karaṇa		... <i>anusvāra</i> for <i>m</i> by A 8, 3, 23
subhagam (ñ) - karaṇa		... <i>Parasavarṇa</i> for <i>anusvāra</i> by A 8, 4, 59
= subhagam-kāraṇa-		... <i>NIT</i> -accent by A 6, 1, 197 which is preserved. by A 6, 2, 139
= subhagam-kāraṇa-		

The deverbative is proparoxytonic, that is to say, the accent falls on the root-initial syllable, indicated by *ñ-nity ādir nityam* (A 6, 1, 197) which is preserved by *gati- kāraka- upapadāt kṛt* (A 6, 2, 139).

1.3 The feminine formation

P. does not prescribe *ī* (*ÑiP*) for forming the feminine of derivatives made with *KHyuN*. Yet Patañjali resorts to the *vārttika* —

*nañ-snañ-īkak-khyun ... upasamkhyānam*¹ —

of the Saunāga grammarians in his commentary on A 3, 2, 56 in order that the feminine word, *subhagam-kāraṇī*² might be justified. The following steps may be structured for forming the feminine word based on the *vārttika* (No. 2425 to SK 470; s. v. A 4, 1, 15).

subhagam-kāraṇa	+ ÑiP	... <i>ÑiP</i> by <i>vt.</i> to A 4, 1, 15
„	+ ī	... <i>Ñ/P</i> = ϕ
„	+ í	... grave accent for fem. vowel by A 3, 1, 4
subhagam-kāraṇ-	+ „	... <i>a</i> of <i>bha</i> -stem zeroed before <i>ī</i> by A 6, 4, 148
= subhagam-kāraṇī.		

1. VBM II. 105. 8, Ed. F. KIELHORN (1880-5) revised by K. V. ABHYANKAR, BORI, Poona, 1962-1965.

2. *Atharvaveda* (*Śaunaka*) with the Padapāṭha and Sāyaṇācārya's comm., Ed. VISHVA BANDHU, V. I. Series 14, Part II, Hoshiarpur, 1961. For the occurrence of the word at AVP 7, 12, 5, see RAGHU VIRA, *Atharvaveda of the Paippalādas*, p. 108, Delhi, 1979.

2. Vedic data

2. 11 Among the seven *khyun*-derivatives taught by P. in *A* 3, 2, 56, *subhagaṅ-kāraṇī* and *priyaṅ-kāraṇam* are only attested in the *Saṁhitā* texts of the *AV* – the former occurring at the *Śaunaka AV* 6, 139, 1 and *AVP* 7, 12, 5, and the latter at the *Paippalāda Saṁhitā* (3, 28, 5; 6). Neither in the other Vedic *Saṁhitās* nor in the *Brāhmaṇa* – *Āraṇyaka* texts, do we come across these derivatives.

2. 12 *AV* 6, 139, 1

The *Śaunaka AV* text at 6, 139, 1 reads as under :

nyastikā rurohitha subhagaṅkaraṇī māma |
śatām tāva pratānās trāyastrimśan niṛāṇāḥ |
tāyā sahasraparṇyā hṛdayam śoṣayāmi te ||

Sāyaṇācārya's commentary on the text runs as follows :—

हे शङ्खपुष्पिके न्यस्तिका दौर्भाग्यलक्षणं नितराम् अस्यन्ती त्वम् । ... रुरोहिथ प्रादुर्भूताऽसि उत्पन्ना भवसि । मम सुभगं करणी सौभाग्यं कुर्वती । ... हे औषधे तव शतं शतसंख्याकाः प्रतानाः प्रतायन्ते विस्तार्यन्ते इति प्रतानाः शाखाः । ... नितानाः न्यग्विस्तार्यमाणाः प्ररोहाः त्रयस्त्रिंशत् त्रयस्त्रिंशत्संख्याकाः संभवन्ति । ... हे कामिनि तथा तथाविधया प्रागुदीरितमाहात्म्योपेतया सहस्रपर्ण्या सहस्रसंख्याकपत्रोपेतया ते त्वदीयं हृदयम् अहं शोषयामि कामाग्निना परितप्तं करोमि ।

The present charm is addressed to a plant, called *nyastikā* which is identified with *śaṅkhu-puṣpikā* or *Andropogon aciculartum*.³ Clinging to the ground, it grows and produces fortune on the suppliant. A hundred branches extend from it, and thirty-three grow down from it. With this plant of a thousand leaves, the poet, addressing this charm wants to parch its heart,⁴ that is to say, to produce or generate the fire of love in its heart. WHITNEY'S rendering of this verse runs on more or less similar grounds :

Nyastikā hast thou grown up, my good-fortune maker ; a hundred
 (are) thy forth stretchers, three and thirty thy down-stretchers.

With this thousand-leafed (herb) I make dry thy heart.⁵

3. Read *Sāyaṇa-bhāṣyam* ad *AV* 7, 38, 5 : *iyam prastutā oṣadhiḥ śaṅkha-puṣpā-khyā ... tvām ... nayatu* | Cf. *Vaidyakaśābhasinīdhu*, p. 1018; also cf. V. W. KARAMBEL-KAR, *The Atharvaveda and the Āyurveda*, p. 303, Nagpur, 1961:

4. Cf. BLOOMFIELD'S translation of this verse in *SBE* XLII, p. 102, Indian edition, 1964.

5. William Dwight WHITNEY, *Atharva-Veda-Saṁhitā* (trans. with a critical and exegetical comm.), Vol. I, p. 385, Delhi, 1962.

2. 13 *Sāyaṇa's grammatical note*

In this commentary on *AV* 6, 139, 1, Sāyaṇa derives the vocable from the root *kr-* to which is suffixed *KHyuN* through the force of *A* 3, 2, 56. The *mUM*-augment is substituted for the final of the first member according to *A* 6, 3, 66. The feminine ending (*ñip*) is justified on the ground of *ṛiddhāṇāñ* ... *kvarapaḥ* (*A* 4, 1, 15). This is expressed in the following terms :

‘*āḍhyasubhaga ...*’ (*P.* 3, 2, 56 (*ityādinā karoteḥ*

khyun-pratyayaḥ / ‘*khityanavyayasya*’ (*P.* 6, 3, 66) *iti pūrvapadasya*

mum / *ṛiddhāṇāñ ...*’ (*P.* 4, 1, 15) *iti ñip* /

From this explanation it follows that Sāyaṇa has accepted the reading, *subhagam-kāraṇī*, the word-formation and accentuation of which could be satisfactorily accounted for in the light of P.’s rules cited above.

2. 2 *Analogous formations*

I now pass on to certain analogous Atharvanic formations in *-ana-*, having the same accent, meaning and word-formation, which could be explained in the light of P.’s rules so as to see the one-to-one-correspondence between P. and the Veda.

2. 21* *Priyam-kāraṇam*

The vocable occurs at *AVP* 3, 28, 6 and I quote the following lines from the edition of BHATTACHARYA:⁶

प्रियङ्करणमुत्तमं मधुवेन तदाभृतम् ।

त्वं हासि वर्चस्यो अथो हासि सुमङ्गलः ।

अथो सर्वासां वीर्यां प्रियङ्करणमुच्यसे ॥

The Paippalāda word is derived from the process : *Priya* + *muM* + *kr* + *KHyuN* (*A* 3, 2, 56), and the accent falling on the root-initial is through the force of *A* 6, 2, 139 which preserves the *NIT*-accent taught in *A* 6, 1, 197. Needless to say, P. teaches both the upapada *-priya* and the *KHyuN*-suffixation which take perfect care of the word. The proparoxytonesis falling on the word confirms our view that P. is acquainted with the Paippalāda word. P.’s rules *A* 3, 2, 56; 6, 3, 67; 6, 2, 139 and 6, 1, 197— though general— seem to embrace silently the domain of *chandas* too.⁷ Although the Paippalāda text has come down to us in an unaccented form, yet it is now possible to reconstruct the

6. *Paippalāda Samhitā of the Atharvaveda*, Volume Two, p. 223, Ed. D. BHATTACHARYA, Calcutta, 1970; Cf. RAGHU VIRA, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

7. For the applicability of P.’s ‘general’ rules to Vedic facts, read *The System of Kṛt Accentuation in Pāṇini and the Veda*, Tirupati, 1981.

accents based on P.'s system of accentuation on the one hand, and the Atharvanic system on the other.

2. 22 *ayakṣmaṃ-kāraṇī*.

The word occurs in the famous hymn addressed to waters in *AV. 19, 2, 5* which is repeated in *AVP 8, 8, 11*. The text reads as follows (19, 2, 5) :

tā apāḥ śivā apó' yakṣamaṃkāraṇīr apāḥ |
yáthaivá tṛpyate máyas tās ta ā datta bheṣajīḥ ||

The propitious waters effect freedom from diseases ; hence is the expression *ayakṣmaṃ-kāraṇī* which Sāyana glosses with *arogakāriṇyaḥ*. In his grammatical notes on this word, Sāyana derives the word from the root *kr-* to which *KHyuN* is suffixed by the rule *A 3, 2, 56*. Although the supplementary word *ayakṣma-* is not enumerated by P. in *A 3, 2, 56*, this *upapada* operates through the force of *vyatyaya* (*A 3, 1, 85*) which is expressed in the following sentences :

'*ādhyasubhaga ...*' (*P. 3, 2, 56*) *iti vihitāḥ khyun. pratyayaḥ*
ayakṣma- śabdopapadād api vyatyayena utpannaḥ | 'khityana-
vyayasya' (*P. 6, 3, 66*) *iti mum-āgamaḥ |*

Following the Vedic scholiast, VISHVA BANDHU⁸ (= VB) too derives the word from the process :

ayakṣma + m(UM) + kr + KHyuN + NīP —

and justifies the accent falling on the root-initial on the ground of *A 6, 2, 139* which preserves the NIT-accentuation (*A 6, 1, 197*).

2. 23 *sarūpaṃ-kāraṇī*

One other analogous *KHyuN*-form is *sarūpāṃ-kāraṇī* attested at *AV 1, 24, 4* which is directly borrowed in the Paippalāda text at *1, 26, 5*. The text (*AV 1, 24, 4*) reads as under :

śyāmā sarūpaṃkāraṇī pṛthivyā ādhy údbhṛtā |
idāmū śū prā sādḥaya pūnā rūpāṇi kalpaya ||

This is a charm addressed to get rid of leprosy, and the poet prays for this accomplishment that the dark-complexioned, uniform-making one (*sarūpaṃ-kāraṇī*) is brought up off the earth, and the forms are set right again (by being freed from the disease).

In his grammatical note on this word, Sāyana comments as follows :

...सरूपंकरणी असरूपं सरूपं क्रियते अनयेति विगृह्य -- 'आदयमुभय' (पा. ३, २, ५६)
इत्यादिना व्यत्ययेन कृत्तः करणे ख्युन् । 'खित्यनव्ययस्य' (पा. ६, ३, ६६) इति पूर्वपदस्य मुमागमः ।

8. *Vaidīkapadānukramakośa*, Part I, Lahore, 1942.

यद्वा स्वरूपं क्रियते अन्येति 'करणाधिकरणयोश्च' (पा. ३, ३, ११७) इति कृजः करणे ल्युट् । पूर्वपदे सुपो लुगभावश्छान्दसः । उभयत्रापि 'टिड्ढाणञ्' (पा. ४, १, १५) इति ङीप् ।⁹

First Sāyana thinks the word is formed with *KHyuN-* suffixed to the root which takes the *upapada*, *sarūpa-*, by *vyatyaya*. Alternatively he derives the word from the process : *sarūpa + mUM + kr + LyuT + NīP* and says that the *lugabhāva* of *sup* of the first member of the word is a Vedic peculiarity.

3... subhagam-kāraṇī versus subhāgam-kāraṇa —

3.1 In his general introduction to the first volume of the *Altindische Grammatik* (= *AIG*), RENOUE has pointed out that,

...It enseigne *subhagamkaraṇa* - 3, 2, 56 d'après AV.-
padap. 6. 139. 1 le samhp. ayant *subhāgam*.¹⁰

WACKERNAGEL has already listed the *ana*-forms occurring in *AV* (*ayakṣmaṇ-kāraṇa-*, *sarūpaṇ-kāraṇa*, *subhagam* / *subhāgam-kāraṇa-*) and the derivatives listed by *P.* in *A* 3, 2, 56 besides *uṣṇaṇ-kāraṇam* and *bhadraṇ-kāraṇam* formed according to the *vārttika* (No. 8) under *A* 6, 3, 70 - all of which often stand "im Sinne eines Prädikatsakkusativs..."¹¹ According to him, "der Wechsel von *a-* und *-ā-* in den Varianten der Mantras gibt keine Entscheidung, was älter ist..."¹² Consequently, it is not possible for him to decide whether *subhagamkaraṇī* ["glücklich machend" *AV* 6, 139, 1b (die meisten Hss. - *bhāg*) - *subhāgam-kāraṇam* *SMB* (v. *su-bhāga-* "glücklich", *su-bhāga*, 'reich')] or *subhāgam-kāraṇa-* (attested in the *Mantra-brāhmaṇa* 2, 4, 8) is the older form. Since the former reading occurs in the Śaunaka text at *AV* 6, 139, 1, it is older than the latter attested in a later Brāhmaṇa text. The Atharvan reading (*subhagamkaraṇī*) has also come to stay in the traditional recitation of the *Samhitā* text.

3.2 WHITNEY in his notes to *AV* 6, 139, 1 (vol. I. p. 385 - already cited in f. n. 5) writes as follows :

The great majority of mss. (including of ours all but Bp. D. R. Kp.) read *subhāgamk-* in *b*, and this appears to be probably the true *samhitā*-reading, with *bhag-* for *pada*-reading, although neither the *Prāt.* nor its commentary notes the case ; SPP's edn., like ours, reads, *-bhag-*.

9. *Atharvaveda* (Śaunaka). Ed. VB, Part I, p. 131, Hoshiarpur, 1960.

10. L. RENOUE's Introduction générale to *Altindische Grammatik* I, Goetttingen, 1957 ; see Notes to p. 119.

11. *AIG* II. 1. p. 202, Sect. 86c).

12. *AIG* II. 2. p. 67.

3. 3 In fact nine Mss. have read *subhāgam-* in lieu of *subhagam-kāraṇī*, as has been indicated by VB in his edition of the *Atharva-veda*.¹³ But the Mss. edited by ROTH, HAUG, SPP and VB besides the Berlin and Bikaner editions have accepted the traditional reading, *subhagam-kāraṇī* at *AV 6, 139, 1-b*. Now we have to oscillate between the transmitted reading (*subhāgam-*) and the traditional reading (*subhagam-*). “One of the cardinal doctrines of textual criticism” – KATRE¹⁴ observes – “is that codices are to be weighed and not counted”. Consequently the direct testimony of P. (Paras 1. 2; 3), which is supported by the Vedic commentator (Para 2. 13), the present-day traditional recitation of the *Śaunaka AV Saṁhitā*, the context (Para 2. 12) and the reading found in six editions (*supra*) enable us to fix *subhagam-kāraṇī* as the true *Saṁhitā* reading.

4... Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion on the Atharvan word, we are led to the following considerations *argumenti causa* :

4. 1 Since the suffixation and accentuation of the Vedic derivatives can be satisfactorily explained in the light of P.'s rules, *subhagam-kāraṇī* is the genuine *Saṁhitā* reading at *AV 6, 139, 1-b*. (Paras 1. 2; 3).

4. 2 The *Pada* text at *AV 6, 139, 1-b* correctly analyses the word as *subhagam-kāraṇī*.

4. 3 Sāyaṇa has rightly relied on P.'s rules for justifying the Vedic word-formation and accentuation (Para 2. 13).

4. 4 The analogous *ana*-formations which frequently appear in *AV* fall in line with *subhagam-kāraṇī* (Paras 2. 2; 2. 21; 2. 22 and 2. 23).

4. 5 Paul THIEME hits the nail on the head when he declares that P.'s rules, “if interpreted correctly, may occasionally help us to settle dubious readings in Vedic manuscripts”¹⁵ (italics mine). By a careful application of P.'s rules and the principles of textual criticism, I have shown the validity of the traditional reading against the later reading (*subhāgam-*) found in nine Vedic Mss. (Para 3. 3).

I may now round off my discussion by saying that a special *niche* must be allotted to P.'s rules in scrutinising problems concerning Vedic morphology including accentuation, since Pāṇini – as has been formulated in his rule : *śrotriyaś chando 'dhīte* (*A 5, 2, 84*) – is a *śrotriya par excellence*.

13. *Atharvaveda* (Saunaka) Ed. VB, part II, p. 864, f. n. 4.

14. S. M. KATRE, *Introduction to Indian Textual Criticism*, p. 47, Poona, 1954.

15. Paul THIEME, *Pāṇini and the Veda – Studies in the early history of Linguistic Science in India*, p. 70, Allahabad, 1935.

3.2. The Vedic literature is a collection of hymns, mantras, and other religious texts. It is the foundation of the Hindu religion and is considered to be the word of God. The Vedic literature is divided into four main parts: the Rigveda, the Yajurveda, the Samaveda, and the Atharvaveda. Each of these parts contains a collection of hymns and mantras that are used in religious ceremonies and rituals. The Vedic literature is also known for its rich and varied content, which includes stories, legends, and philosophical teachings. It is a treasure trove of knowledge and is a source of inspiration for millions of people around the world.

4... Conclusion

From the foregoing discussion on the Vedic literature, we are led to the following conclusions regarding the same:

4.1. Since the authenticity and sanctity of the Vedic literature can be satisfactorily explained in the light of Vedic theory, the authenticity of the Vedas is established. (Para 1.3.1)

4.2. The Vedic theory is a Vedic theory, and it is not a Hindu theory. (Para 1.3.2)

4.3. The Vedic theory is a Vedic theory, and it is not a Hindu theory. (Para 1.3.3)

4.4. The Vedic theory is a Vedic theory, and it is not a Hindu theory. (Para 1.3.4)

4.5. The Vedic theory is a Vedic theory, and it is not a Hindu theory. (Para 1.3.5)

I may now round off my discussion by saying that a Vedic theory must be attached to the Vedic literature, since the Vedic literature is a Vedic literature, and it is not a Hindu literature. (Para 1.3.6)

1. The Vedic literature is a collection of hymns, mantras, and other religious texts.
2. The Vedic literature is the foundation of the Hindu religion.
3. The Vedic literature is divided into four main parts: the Rigveda, the Yajurveda, the Samaveda, and the Atharvaveda.
4. Each of these parts contains a collection of hymns and mantras that are used in religious ceremonies and rituals.
5. The Vedic literature is also known for its rich and varied content, which includes stories, legends, and philosophical teachings.
6. It is a treasure trove of knowledge and is a source of inspiration for millions of people around the world.

THE TIGERS AND THE MOON REVISITED

By

E. BENDER

In 1967 I presented at the XXVIIth International Congress of Orientalists¹ my interpretation of a painting appearing in several illustrated manuscripts of an Old Gujarati version of the story of the Jain paragon, Śālibhadra. A revised version of the paper was published the following year in the Journal of the American Oriental Society.² The basic scheme of the painting comprises a woman standing on the roof of a house. She looks up at the moon which is attended by four tigers or lions.³ The paper demonstrated the uniqueness of the painting in its function as an indication of the passage of time – i. e., each of the four tigers (or lions) had, as its portion, one quarter of the night which represented a *prahara*, a three-hour period, the first period ending 9:00 p. m. and the last 6:00 a. m., when the final quarter of the moon is gone.

The painting refers to a key incident in the story of Śālibhadra in which he, firm in his decision to leave his luxurious, mundane existence to undertake the life of a Jaina *muni*, follows his announced plan to give up his thirty-two wives, one at a time, that is, at the end of the first night, the first wife is abandoned to be followed at the end of the following night by the second, and so on to the very last wife.

The paintings vary in their arrangement of the elements: the woman is shown in the center or the left-hand side of the roof, looking up to the sky where the moon is surrounded by four tigers (or lions) or the four are positioned, each at or over one corner of the roof, with the woman standing in the center of the side of the roof nearest the viewer and the fourth tiger, his tongue lolling in anticipation of his portion of the moon, looking up over his shoulder at the moon which is in the left-hand side of the picture. The moon is represented by a deer against the background of the full moon atop the new moon,⁴ or with a dot in place of the

1. Subsequently designated "The International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa."

2. *JAOS* 88, 4, pp. 709-11.

3. See Plate I. I am ever grateful to Shri B. S. NAHAR for his generous permission to inspect his collection and to photograph the manuscripts I selected.

4. Cf. "Late late yestreen I saw the new moone,

Wi the auld moone in hir armè...."

from the ballad, "Sir PATRICK SPENS," by an anonymous author.

deer. Variations aside, it is clear that the illustrators of the manuscripts knew the theme and requisite elements of the paintings and each, in his way, rendered it accordingly. However, in a manuscript subsequently inspected I encountered a version of the illustration which indicated an evolution – or rather a devolution – in the comprehension of the theme.⁵

In this rendition there remain of the original elements of the painting the woman on the roof and two tigers, but there is no moon and the tigers are not active participants in the scene, for they are carved ornaments, fixed to the architecture of the house. They are set back to back, in profile, on the near side of the roof, their long tails curled elegantly over their backs. The woman stands between them, facing to her right. Here, the thread of tradition has been broken. The painter was apparently not aware of the oriental function of the painting, and, without the evidence of the other paintings, we would be hard put, indeed, to connect this with the story.

5. See Plate II. I am indebted to Dr. C. SIVARAMAMURTI, the then Keeper of the National Museum, New Delhi, for his kind help and permission to photograph manuscripts in the museum's vast collection, among them the manuscript of the *Sālibhadracarita*, the illustration from which is discussed in this paper.

RASA-RELISH : A CONSIDERATION OF PRE-REQUISITES

By

G. K. BHAT

To recall the explanation of the term given by Bharata, *rasa* is so called because it is tasted, relished.¹ It appears therefore that the very essence and existence of *rasa* consist in its being relished, the relish leading to enjoyment and delight, which is supposed to be the main function and purpose of art-presentation. When the *rasa-sūtra* mentions the *niṣpatti* or creation of *rasa*, the 'creation' is to be understood rather metaphorically; because, as Abhinavagupta points out, the *vibhāva* and other factors which enter into the construction of an emotional experience are not operative causes; they do not actually create *rasa* like *śṛṅgāra* etc. but rather the *flavour* or *taste* (*rasanā*) associated with the particular *rasa*.² Further, the flavour or relish in art experience is not that of a material thing or product; the analogy of *anna-rasa* or *pānaka-rasa* (a delicious dish or drink) is used only to explain the nature of *rasa* in art experience. But just as the taste or flavour of even a delicious dish or drink is different from the taste of the individual ingredients mixed into its preparation, so the aesthetic relish too is different from all the elements of art-construction, including the basic emotion; and it is this flavour (*rasanā*) that the art creates and which we relish. Thirdly, the enjoyment is not *bhoga* as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka understands it, but a consciousness, an awareness of a special kind (*samvitti*). *Rasa* is emotional experience visualised, mentally realised vividly, by this kind of tasting or relishing.

Rasa, thus, is a mental, intellectual enjoyment of an emotional experience brought by art. As such it demands certain pre-requisites. (a) One of them is a certain attitude or mental approach on the part of an experiencer.

(i) The experiencer is expected to have a "mirror-like" mind to permit a ready and clear reflection of the experience received. (ii) He must have an aesthetic sensibility, that is to say, a capacity to understand and reach the heart

[The references are to *Nāṭyaśāstra*, GOS ed., Vol. I, 2nd revised edition, 1956, Abhinava's comm. on ch. 6, particularly on *rasa-sūtra*.

1. NS. VI, Vol. I, p. 288 : अत्राह - रस इति कः पदार्थः । उच्यते - आस्वाद्यत्वात् ।

2. *Ibid.* p. 285 : विभावादयो न निष्पत्तिहेतवो रसस्य । तद्बोधोपायमेऽपि रससंभवप्रसङ्गात् । ... तर्हि सूत्रे निष्पत्तिरिति कथम् । नेयं रसस्य । अपि तु तद्विषयरसनायाः । तन्निष्पत्त्या तु यदि तदेकाग्रत-
जीवितस्य रसस्य निष्पत्तिरुच्यते, न कश्चिदत्र दोषः ।

of the experience. This capacity is induced and strengthened by training under expert guidance and by constant study of poetry and arts. (iii) The experiencer must also have an un-biassed mind. We are aware of personal likes and dislikes and individual reservations when we approach some art presentation. This is an hindrance to aesthetic enjoyment. (iv) The experiencer must be ready to respond to art experience. (v) Finally, the experiencer must have the ability to forget himself, lose himself in the experience presented.

A person who has these qualifications is called a *sahrdaya*,³ connoisseur of art, *rasika*. Art experience yields its deeper meaning and extra-ordinary pleasure to such a person. The lure, skill and charm of art can help others to form a proper approach towards enjoyment.⁴

(b) The second pre-requisite is that inadequate skill on the part of an artist in creating the art work and improper mental frame on the part of an experiencer to understand and receive the art representation must not come in the way of full relish. Both these are likely to be serious handicaps or impediments. Abhinava calls them *rasa-vighnas*⁵ or an inability which hinders perception of aesthetic experience. These impediments are as follows :

1. The artist's inadequacies :

(i) *Sambhāvanā-viraha* or absence of verisimilitude : If the artist is not able to ensure reality or at least the *probability* operating in literary art in the construction of his art presentation, he is not likely to carry conviction to the reader that the emotional experience is worth attending to. Similarly, in dramatic presentation mistakes in the use of the fourfold *abhinaya* or overacting and exaggerated or mechanical representation will equally hamper appreciation. The

3. Cf. Abhinava's *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka*, III : किमिदं सहृदयत्वं नाम । किं रस-भाव-अनपेक्ष-काव्याश्रितसमयविशेष-अभिज्ञत्वम् उत रसभावादिमय-काव्यस्वरूप-परिज्ञाननैपुण्यम् । पूर्वसिन् पक्षे तथाविधसहृदयव्यवस्थापितानां शब्दविशेषाणां चारुत्वनियमो न स्यात्, पुनः समयान्तरेण अन्यथापि व्यवस्थापनसंभवात् । द्वितीयस्मिस्तु पक्षे रसज्ञता एव सहृदयत्वमिति ।

Hemacandra, *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*, writes : यस्य काव्यानुशीलन-अभ्यासवशाद् विशदीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता स स्वहृदयसंवादभाक् सहृदयः ।

4. Cf. Abhinava, NS. Vol. I, p. 279 : अधिकारी च अत्र विमलप्रतिभानशालिहृदयः । And p. 291 : तत्र ये स्वभावतो निर्मलमुकुरहृदयाः ते एव संसारोचितक्रोधमोहाभिलाषपरवशमनसः न भवन्ति । तेषां तथाविधदशरूपक-आकर्षणसमये साधारणरसनात्मकचर्वणग्राह्यः रससञ्चयः नाट्यलक्षणः स्फुटः एव । ये तु अतथाभूताः तेषां प्रत्यक्षोचितचर्वणालाभाय नटादिप्रक्रिया ।

5. Abhinava's comm. on NS. *op. cit.*, pp. 280-281 : विघ्नाश्च अस्यां प्रतिपत्तौ अयोग्यता-संभावनाविरहो नाम, स्वगतपरगतत्वनियमेन देशकालविशेषावेशो, निजसुखादिविवशीभावः, प्रतीति-उपाय-वैकल्यम्, स्फुटत्व अभावः, अप्रधानता, संशययोगश्च ।

remedy against this is the choice of exalted characters and noble action, which enable the reader-spectator to accord a response from his heart.

(ii) *Pratiti-upāya-vaikalya* or looseness, defect in constructing *vibhā-vādi* which are to serve as instruments in taking the perception of the experience to the experiencer. This is artist's inadequacy, lack of his skill in creating convincing characterisation, situations, actions, thoughts, and feelings; all of which, though imaginatively created, must have sufficient resemblance to realities of life and must appear at least probable (except perhaps in fairy tales, supernatural or humorous and absurd presentations).

(iii) *Sphuṭatva-abhāva* or absence of clarity, distinctness in the art presentation. As a matter of fact, mere word or indications themselves are not always enough to produce distinct perception. A real understanding comes to an observer when an experience amounts to almost a direct perception. When a person is able to see something with his eyes, hear with his own ears and so on, then only he is able to understand and feel convinced. But once such a conviction dawns on him it is not likely to be shaken by a hundred scriptures or logical arguments. When a fire-brand is waved round and round one notices a 'circle of fire'; this direct perception cannot be removed by any arguments from one's mind, although the 'circle' is a mere optical illusion. What holds in normal life is applicable to art presentation as well. The *abhinaya* in dramatic presentation takes the place of the operation of spoken words and indicatory marks; and it ought to be so presented as to make the spectator feel that he is directly visualizing something. In other words, an artist must strive to achieve life-life reality in his creation to avoid both the defects of faulty construction and indistinct presentation, lacking conviction and precision.

(iv) *A-pradhānatā* or lack of prominence; that is to say, lack of judicious balance in the artist's presentation. It is expected that the main emotional experience (based on *sthāyī*, to use the Sanskrit theoretical term) must receive prominence naturally. And the other elements like characters (*vibhāva*), situation and environment (*uddīpana*), the characters, actions and gestures (*anubhāva*), and the mental states or moods through which they pass under a particular emotional impact (*vyabhicāri-bhāvas*) must be kept in their complementary place because they are only instruments which must lead to the basic emotion. A writer may blunder in this regard. He may waste too much time in presenting a character or treat a minor character with unnecessary elaboration. He may be too fond of descriptions and devote considerable space for describing the background or the scene of action, the gestures and movements of a character. He may equally delineate the passing moods of a character so elaborately as to create an impression that they are really important. All this, which is the result

of lack of skill and of a sense of proportion, balance and judgement on the part of the artist, will spoil his art creation and hamper proper appreciation. If a reader were forced to take more interest in minor characters and happenings he will naturally neglect or miss the essential central emotional experience. And the fault will be of the artist. The *Kādambarī* of Bāṇa may be taken as a typical example.

(v) *Samśaya-yoga* or the possibility of doubt in the art presentation. The *vibhāvādi* factors are not invariably bound by rule with particular mental states. Tears, for example, may be the consequence (*anubhāva*) of sorrow, joy or some eye-disease. The presentation of tears therefore may create a doubt about the mental state; they cannot be necessarily connected with sorrow and we cannot be sure that this is *karuṇa rasa*. A tiger may be the *vibhāva*, the stimulant, of anger, the mental state of *raudra rasa*, or fear, the state of *bhayānaka rasa*. In the same way fatigue, anxiety, etc. (*vyabhicāri bhāvas*) are accompanied by physical symptoms (*anubhāva*) which could be associated with the mental state of *utsāha* or *fright* and may, therefore, lead to either *vīra* or *bhayānaka rasa*. This is how doubt (*saṁśaya*) may arise in art construction; and if it does it will hamper correct perception and appreciation. Bharata's remedy for removing this defect is *saṁyoga*, mentioned in the *rasa-sūtra*. The artist has to take care that he presents absolutely proper *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāris* and combines them judiciously, correctly (*saṁyag yoga*) so that they leave no doubt about the mental state intended to be presented. For example, if loss or death of a beloved person is presented as the *vibhāva*, lament and crying as the *anubhāva*, and misery, anxiety, etc. as the *vyabhicāri-bhāvas*, there will be no doubt that the experience of sorrow (*śoka*) is offered and this is *karuṇa rasa*. Thus, *vibhāva*, etc. taken separately, each by itself, may produce doubt; but their proper combination (*yoga, saṁyoga*) can remove the possibility of doubt. This is again an artist's responsibility and a demand on his skill.

2. Personal handicaps of the experiencer :

(i) *Samśaya-yoga* : As Abhinava explains it this handicap is of the person who is to take the experience. If he has no faith in the validity and value of the experience art presents and does not believe that it can yield extra-ordinary pleasure, how can he be expected to approach an art experience and, much less, appreciate it? We are aware of persons who are indifferent to reading, especially poetry, and do not read anything except newspapers or religious books and murder stories and detective fiction. We may be familiar too with persons who are incapable of understanding classical music, pictures or other arts.

The artist's design can provide a means to remove this obstacle and establish responsive contact, a sympathetic affinity (*hrdaya-saṁvāda*) between the

artist and the reader-spectator. From this view-point the classical theorists recommended the use of mythological and legendary characters like Rāma whose familiarity to all people and the veneration in which they are held in public mind could easily induce deep interest and conviction in people; and they would easily respond wholeheartedly to the aesthetic experiences connected with them.⁶ It is worth noting that Aristotle too recommends 'exalted action' and noble characters for dramatic representation. This is one way to remove doubt in the mind of an experiencer and draw him towards art with a promise of convincing and rewarding experience.

(ii) *Śvagata-paragaia-niyamena deśa-kāla-viśeṣa-āveśa* or the habit of persons to take an experience personally or impersonally and indifferently, and to stick to the particular contexts in which it is presented. This handicap is a result of human frailty. We are all governed generally by personal likes and dislikes, prejudices and pre-conceived notions. Limited by empirical ego, we are driven to take what pleases us and avoid what is unpleasant or sorrowful. In presence of art experience therefore we may either take it too personally, identifying ourselves with the characters in a story; or we may consider them as total strangers, regard the experience presented as no concern of ours, and be completely indifferent to it. Both these mental attitudes are harmful to art. The latter may leave us cold and deprive us of the joy art can yield; the former may not necessarily give pleasure but set varied reactions like anger, disgust, sorrow, fear, etc. consistent with the nature of the experience offered through art. Art is supposed to give pleasure only; so the varied reactions are certainly an obstacle (*vighna*) in the perception and appreciation of art.

The skill in art is a remedy against this hindrance. Bharata's warning⁷ to guard against any excesses and to avoid them in the preliminaries (*pūrvaraṅga*) to dramatic presentation, the excesses in dance, music or ritual, suggests the care the artist must take. The art presentation must not err on the side of excess and tire the patience of the experiencer. In dramatic representation the make-up,

6. Cf. Abhinava, NS. comm. *op. cit.*, p. 280 : तद् (विघ्न) अपसारणे हृदयसंवादो लोक-सामान्यवस्तुविषयः । अलोकसामान्येषु तु चेष्टितेषु अखण्डितप्रसिद्धिजनितगाढारूढप्रत्ययप्रसरकारी प्रख्यात-रामादिनामधेयपरिग्रहः । अत एव निस्सामान्य-उत्कर्ष-उपदेशव्युत्पत्तिप्रयोजने नाटकादौ प्रख्यातवस्तुविषय-त्वादि नियमेन निरूपयिष्यते ।

7. Cf. NS. V. 158-159, p. 246 :

कार्यो नातिप्रसङ्गोऽत्र नृत्तगीतविधिं प्रति ।
गीते वाद्ये च नृत्ते च प्रवृत्तेऽतिप्रसङ्गतः ॥
खेदो भवेत् प्रयोक्तृणां प्रेक्षकाणां तथैव च ।
खिन्नानां रसभावेषु स्पष्टता नोपजायते ॥
ततः शेषप्रयोगस्तु न रागजनको भवेत् ।

costume, etc. an actor uses are helpful. They help to conceal the private individuality of the actor and enable the spectator to identify him with the character he is impersonating. Similarly, the poet's beautiful extra-ordinary language, as also the use of *lāsya-aṅgas* in the delivery and presentation of dramatic speeches, the scenic arrangements, the special atmosphere of the theatre-hall, beautiful music, gorgeously dressed characters, etc. all help to suppress the fact that the spectacle is only a make-belief and lead the spectator to accept it as a real, vivid experience unfolded before him.⁸ In other words, language, poetry, the varied art devices for presenting an experience, the skill in using them, all tend to make the experiencer forget his personal identity and environment. He is, as it were, transported into a new world of beauty and charm. This is, theoretically speaking, *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* or universalisation; and it enables a person to rid himself of his personal, limited ego. When this happens even an ordinary person is charmed; he develops an aesthetic sensibility; and is then in a position to understand the art experience and experience the delight it gives.

(iii) *Nija-sukhādi-vivaśibhāva* means being at the mercy of one's personal emotions. This is a handicap because it prevents a person either from taking an art experience or it results in his losing himself completely in it. For a proper perception and enjoyment of art we must have an ability to get ourselves completely involved in the experience and, at the same time, keep sufficient detachment to understand it impersonally. Such a correct mental attitude becomes possible through *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* and the various art factors, noted above, which all help to achieve it.

Noting these handicaps or obstacles to art perception Abhinava comes to the conclusion that *rasa* must be regarded as "an emotional experience, essentially of relish, to be taken by perception freed from all impediments."⁹

8. Cf. Abhinava, comm. on NS. *op. cit.* :

p. 280 : तत्र विघ्नापसारकाः विभावप्रभृतयः ।

p. 281 : ["लक्षितप्रस्तावनावलोकनेन च] यो नटरूपताधिगमः तत्पुरुःसरः प्रतिशीर्षकादिना तत्प्रच्छादनप्रकारः अभ्युपायः, अलौकिक-भाषादिभेद-लास्याङ्ग-रङ्गपीठ-मण्डपगतकक्ष्यादि-परिग्रह-नाट्यधर्मि-सहितः ।

P. 285 : मुकुटप्रतिशीर्षकादिना तावन्नटबुद्धिराच्छाद्यते । गाढप्राकृतनसंवित्संस्काराच्च काव्यबला-नीयमानाणि न तत्र रामधीः विश्राम्यति । अत एव उभयदेशकालत्यागः ।

9. Cf. Abhinava, NS. comm., p. 280 :

सर्वथा रसनात्मक-वीतविघ्न-प्रतीतिग्राह्यः भावः एव रसः ।

SYNTAX AND WORD-MEANING

By

GOPIKAMOHAN BHATTACHARYA

One of the questions that has been most hotly disputed in ancient Indian texts on Semantics is whether a sentence is a connected structure of a number of isolated words or it is a unit without any parts and we come to the parts and their mutual interrelations through subsequent reflections. To put the question in the realm of meaning also : Is the sentence-meaning a total denotation brought about by the denotations of the individual lexeme components of the sentence or the sentence-meaning is a whole by itself. The next point made is : If the sentence-meaning is an integrated whole, how do the atomic meanings of the constituent words play their individual role in determining the total meaning of the sentence, or, in other words, what is the mutual relation of the meaning of a word with that of the neighbouring words. To be precise : Are words and the sentences both or only the sentence, the primary bearers of meaning ? Does the meaning of a sentence depend on the meanings of its component lexemes ? The former advocating the theory that the sentence acquires its meaning through the word-meanings is known as *khaṇḍapakṣa*, while the view holding the integrity of sentence-meaning, rendering the word-meanings to mere conceptual constructions, is known as *akhaṇḍapakṣa* i. e. the indivisible sentence is the meaning-bearing unit. The upholders of *khaṇḍapakṣa*, viz. the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, are also sharply divided into two rival camps : the Bhāṭṭas hold that the words denote their individual meanings first and thereafter these cognised (*abhihita*) unrelated discrete word-meanings combine to make the understanding of the sentence-meaning possible – the sentence-meaning being nothing but a coherent combination of word-meanings. This view is also shared by the Nyāya. But Prābhākara would rather say : “ Never ask the meaning of a word in isolation, but only ask it in the context of a sentence ” (Wittgenstein). He finds it hard to accept that a word has a meaning independently of any sentence in which it occurs.

To begin with, I shall attempt to give a brief review of the Indian concept of word and sentence. Language is a communication system and sentence is a means of communication. Word is that which possesses referential power (*śaktimat padam*). As the stem and suffixes which make a word have this power, the Nyāya, contrary to the view of the Grammarians, regards these word-components also as word (*pada*). (The Grammarian calls them *varṇa*).

Nyāya defines sentence as a group of words capable of conveying a complete sense (*padasamūho vākyaṃ arthasamāptau samartham*). This completeness of sense depends upon the communicative or informative character of our speech act. When the speaker utters a group of words he has certain purpose or, in other words, he desires to convey something about the world around us. The completeness of meaning is judged by the fulfilment of this desire. But one may ask: Nyāya accepts the possibility of so-called one-word sentence. Of course, to Nyāya, "gām" is a sentence consisting of two words 'go' and 'am'. Does this sentence serve the primary objective of a sentence, i. e. does it communicate a complete meaning? It is no doubt possible to imagine a situation when someone may simply say 'ghaṛam', in reply to the question 'What should I bring?' It is reasonable to treat this incomplete combination of words as a sentence. The Nyāya would call it a minimal sentence which is a component part of a complete sentence (*mahāvākya*). Contrary to the view stated above, the grammarians led by Bhartṛhari think that a sentence is not a resultant combination of words.

Roughly this componential analysis may be extended to the realm of meaning also. But we cannot say that the meaning of the sentence is merely an amalgam of the meanings of the component words. The understanding of the meaning of a sentence is a qualificative cognition (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) and a qualificative cognition presupposes not only the qualifier and the qualified but also the relation between the two. To know the meaning of a sentence is to know this relation which binds together all the meaning-components of a sentence. In the sentence 'gām ānaya', we not only understand the meaning of the component words, but, in addition, we also cognise the specific relation of these component meanings. In the analysis of meaning-structure of a sentence, the specific mutual relations of the word-meanings come to the fore. The Nyāya holds that in a sentence-meaning, the meaning of the nominative is the primary component. Hence it is said that the meaning of the word which has first case inflexion (*prathamā*) enjoys primacy over the meanings of other words and all those meanings in a successive order ultimately qualifies the meaning of the nominal stem. Consider the sentence: 'gām ānaya' ('Bring the cow'). Here the Nyāya would say that the interrelations of the component word-meanings are to be understood in the following structure: We have here the following lexemes: 'go' (cow), 'am' (accusative case inflexion), ā-nī (the root meaning 'to bring') and hi (*liṅ* suffix). The meaning of the accusative case inflexion 'am' is accusativeness (*karmatā*), which is a relational abstract occurring in 'go' (cow). This accusative case inflexion 'am' binds the two meanings, viz. the meaning of 'go' and the meaning of the root ā-nī, i. e. the act of bringing. Thus the Nyāya says that the 'act of bringing' is related to cow through the relation of *karmatā* (accusativeness) conveyed by the inflexion 'am'. On the other

hand, the act of bringing is related to effort (*kṛti*), which is indicated by the suffix 'hi' added to the root *ā-nī*, through the relation of causality (*anukūlatā*), because effort which qualifies the agent 'tvam' ('you') is responsible for the act of bringing to occur. The meaning of the above sentence, so far as their structural relations of the meaning-components are concerned, may be expressed in the following manner: "You (are) possessed of effort, which is the cause of the act of bringing, which in its turn is the determinant (*nirūpaka*) of objectivity (*karmatā*) occurring in cow" (*govṛttikarmatānirūpakānayanānukūlakṛtimān tvam*).

In the view of the grammarian, the meaning-content of the above statement will be as follows: "The act of bringing, which has cow as its object, occurs in you". (*tvanniṣṭhagokarmakānayanakriyā*). In his view, the 'action' (*vyāpāra*) is the principal meaning-component in the sentence-meaning. In Mīmāṃsā, the effort (*bhāvanā*), which causes the act of bringing, is the principal element. Kumārila says: "It is the action which unites the component word-meanings in a sentence" (*ekakriyāgṛh̄teṣu sambandhaś ca parasparam* / ŚV. *vākyādhikaraṇa* 267). It may be noted that although the grammarian analyses the meaning-structure of a sentence, he thinks that a sentence is an indivisible unit and so also the sentence-meaning. In Bhartṛhari's language, it is merely *apoddhāra*, an unreal abstraction through logical analysis. Neither the word nor its meaning has any real existence.

But the upholders of *khaṇḍapakṣa*, the Mīmāṃsaka and the Naiyāyika, think that words and sentences and their respective meanings are separate realities. But the major problem which is responsible for the two schools of Mīmāṃsā - Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara - bringing in sharp contrast is the relation of word-meanings and sentence-meaning. The Bhāṭṭa thinks that the meaning of a sentence is derived from the word-meanings and their combination, while the Prābhākara believes that the words get their meaning in the context of sentence only. The former is *abhihitānvaya* theory and the latter is *anvitābhidhāna* theory. One thinks of the word-meanings first and then the sentence-meaning, the other understands the sentence-meaning first and then the word-meanings. Let us explain briefly the way through which the Bhāṭṭa wants to take us from the word-meanings to sentence-meaning: Consider the sentence: '*gām ānaya*' ('Bring the cow'). The Bhāṭṭa says that at first the two words *gām* and *ānaya* convey their respective meanings and the attentive hearer who knows the language understands these word-meanings. The meanings of the words are now understood (*abhihita*). Then follows the understanding of sentence-meaning. Now here Kumārila thinks that the primary denotation rests in words through which the componential words denote their respective components of meanings.

But we do not get the sentence-meaning unless these components of meanings are turned into a combined meaning, which is the sentence-meaning.

How is this combination possible? Kumārila says: What is understood through words is understood through its primary denotation (*abhidhā*), but what is understood through word-meanings is understood through secondary denotation (*lakṣaṇā*) or indication, which rests in word-meanings and not in the words. To quote Kumārila: "Sentence-meaning is everywhere indicated - this is our position" *vākyaārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ* (ŚV). In other words, the sentence-meaning is never directly conveyed by the primary denotation of words.

But one may ask: Sentence-meaning is not merely the sum-total of word-meanings, rather it is a distinct type of synthesis, an organic structure, of word-meanings. Consider the expression: "*gaur aśvaḥ puruṣo haṣṭi*" ("cow horse man elephant"). It is a simple cluster of unrelated words and not a sentence. It does not convey any synthetic meaning i.e. a sentence-meaning. Kumārila says that unrelated words enter into the new relationship only if they adhere to certain semantic principles. These are *ākāṅkṣā* (expectancy), *āsatti* (contiguity) and *yogyatā* (compatibility).

Kumārila bases his *abhihitānvaya* theory largely upon the remark of Śābara to *Mīmāṃsā sūtra* 1. 1. 25. Śābara says:

"Words cease to function after these (words) convey their meanings; and now the word-meanings being understood express the sentence-meaning" (*padāni svām svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāni, athedānīm padārthāḥ avagatāḥ santaḥ vākyaārtham avagamayanti*).

Clearly Śābara says that it is the word-meanings which are responsible for conveying the sentence-meaning and the words cease to play any direct role in the understanding of sentence-meaning. But Kumārila was perhaps conscious of the danger involved in this view of Śābara and tried to modify it by introducing certain modification. If on Śābara's theory the words do not directly operate in generating the total sentence-meaning, the intuitively felt verbal character of the understanding of sentence-meaning will be difficult to explain. Śabda is a recognised independent means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). The understanding of the meaning of a sentence, known as *śābdabodha*, is distinguished from inferential cognition (*anumāna*), another independent means of cognition, on the basis of this verbal character of the cognition which we get on hearing a sentence. Hence Kumārila has modified his earlier view stated in his lost *Brhāṣṭikā* as quoted above. Now he says: "In our view the words do not give up their potency (in conveying) the sentence-meaning. When these words are cognised, the sentence-meaning is understood through word-meanings" (*na*

vimuñcati sāmārthyam vākyaārtheṣu padāni naḥ / tanmātrāvasiteṣu eṣu padārthebhyaḥ sa gamyate || ŚV. vākyaādhikaraṇa, pp. 228-231).

Although in the next verse Kumārila clearly states that sentence-meaning is *a-śabda* (non-verbal) in character, but ultimately he admits that words are used to convey a sentence-meaning and therefore the words operate till the sentence-meaning is understood, although they have no direct bearing in generating the understanding of sentence-meaning. They operate through the mediation of word-meanings in the same way as the fuels through the mediation of fire operate in cooking. It is the word-meanings which directly operate in communicating sentence-meaning (*aśābde cāpi vākyaārthe na padārtheṣu aśābdatā / ŚV. 230*, also, *vākyaārthamitaye teṣāṃ pravṛttau nāntariyakam / pāke jvāleḥ kāṣṭhāṇām padārthapratipādanam || ŚV. 343*). But nothing is gained by arguing in this way, if on the process of understanding the meaning of a sentence Kumārila sticks to his pet theory that the meaning of a sentence is known through secondary denotation, which rests only in word-meanings and not in the words. For, in that case it would be legitimate to hold that the words are irrelevant so far as the understanding of sentence-meaning is concerned. Hence the charge of *aśābdatva*, i.e., the non-verbal character of sentence-meaning, cannot be easily dismissed.

There is another major difficulty in Kumārila's theory of *vākyaārthalakṣaṇā*. Kumārila seeks the help of *lakṣaṇā* to explain the innate qualitative difference between the word-meanings and sentence-meaning – the former conveyed through primary denotation and the latter through secondary denotation. But Kumārila's theory loses its force when we realise that both the denotations, primary and secondary, belong to the word itself. When the primary meaning of a word, which it conveys through primary denotation does not fit in well with the meanings of other component words occurring in the same sentence, then and there only the selfsame word, through its secondary function, conveys the secondary meaning. Take the common example : 'The village is on the Ganges' (*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*). The selfsame word *gaṅgā* denotes through transference of meaning 'the bank of the Ganges', because its primary meaning is incompatible with the meaning of the word *ghoṣaḥ* ('village') and consequently, for this incompatibility, the meanings of component words are not able to enter into relation. There is then no sense in divesting the words of the power of conveying the sentence-meaning. Words are given as parts of sentence and they should be connected with the process of generating the semantic relation directly or indirectly.

Moreover, if the primary denotation is unsuccessful, it is then expected that the secondary denotation is called for to make the syntactic meaning possible. We are implicitly committed to say that which has secondary denotation, should

also have a primary denotation. But the primary meaning of a word has no further primary meaning. On the other hand, it is the word which conveys the primary meaning. Furthermore, as already mentioned, the question of *lakṣaṇā* comes in only when the syntactic relation between the word-meanings (*anvaya*) is not possible, or when there is incompatibility with the intention of the speaker, i. e. to say, the primary meaning is not what the speaker intends to communicate. But in the case of ordinary sentence, neither such incompatibility exists, nor the syntactico-semantic relation is absent.

Anvitābhidhānavāda

This theory is associated with Prabhākara. The points that have been made against the Bhāṭṭas led Prabhākara to put forward his theory of meaning and language. The Mīmāṃsā theory that language is a mode of action led the Prabhākara to think that words and sentences mean either some action or things in reference to some action. Language is closely associated with the practical needs of man in a society and the fulfilment of the need presupposes some action. Hence a reference can be meaningful only if it directs the hearer of the sentence to some action. This takes us to the view that the unit of a meaningful discourse is a sentence that presents an action. A word in isolation is never used to convey a single unrelated idea. A word is meaningful only in context of a monolithic structure of sentence-meaning. Words have no doubt referential meaning, but they acquire it through being parts of action generating sentences. Unrelated word-meanings in isolation, so to say, are no meanings at all. From word we get to the sentence-meaning and on subsequent logical analysis we understand the word-meanings. It is a front-to-back process. The words have no doubt their meanings, but the meaning of a sentence is understood through the words, not through the word-meanings (which is Bhāṭṭa view), nor even through the sentence (which is the view of the Grammarians). A child knowing a language for the first time depends entirely on the linguistic behaviour of his elders. He learns the sentences uttered by his elders, closely observes the course of action that follows afterwards and thereby he discovers, so to say, an absorbing relation (*sammugdhā pravṛtti*, *Tantra-Rahasya*, p. 29) between the sentence uttered and how the hearer reacts on hearing the sentence, i.e. the course of action that follows. Suppose, *A* utters the sentence *gām ānaya* ('Bring the cow'), *B* on hearing the sentence acts accordingly, i.e. he brings the cow. But at this stage the child cannot grasp the meaning of the word *gām* or of *ānaya*. He only associates the sentence *gām ānaya* with the corresponding action of the hearer. Now the child again hears that *A* says to *B* '*gām badhāna*' ('Bind the cow') and the corresponding action of *B* on hearing the sentence. The child again associates the whole sentence uttered by *A* with the behaviour of

B. Thereafter he, by the Joint method of Absence and Presence, understands the referent of the word 'gām'. Next if he hears *A* saying *B aśvam ānaya* ('Bring the horse'), he, by the same method of Inclusion and Exclusion, understands what the word *aśvam* refers to. Of course, the child does not *consciously* take to this logical analysis. It is an unconscious mental process occurring in him automatically in his childhood. From this linguistic behaviour, the followers of *anvitābhidhāna* theory want to make out that a word has its meaning only in its being a sentence-component. It is not strictly the part-whole model of Nyāya; on the other hand, to be exact, here the case is otherwise. Whole (*avayavī*) depends on the parts (*avayava-s*) for its existence, but the opposite is not true. Parts are independent of the whole, but a word can mean only a related meaning, an unrelated word-meaning is only a logical abstraction or a fiction.

But one may argue: The above account of understanding sentence-meaning fails in many respects. Any attempt to account for the understanding of sentence-meaning, so argued Kumāriḥ, makes all words in a sentence, barring the initial word, redundant or it is circular. Consider first the alleged charge of non-serviceability of all other words in a sentence barring the first in one's attempt to communicate with others. Suppose, I make the statement '*aśvo dhāvati*' ('the horse runs'). Prabhākara's theory, as we have discussed, is that the meaning of a word is a related meaning, i. e., a word conveys its meaning only when this meaning is related to the meaning of other words in the sentence. This relation would be possible when all those meanings are known. That is to say, when I understand the meaning of the first word in a sentence, it is implied that the meanings of all other words in that sentence are to be understood. All other meaning-components of that sentence-meaning are to be brought in the orbit of the meaning of the first word. This means that only one word would suffice for the understanding of the entire sentence-meaning. So we can dispense with other words. Consider the above example *aśvo dhāvati* ('the horse runs'). The meaning of *aśvaḥ* is '*dhāvanānvitaḥ aśvaḥ*' ('the horse related to the act of running') and the meaning of *dhāvati* is '*aśvānvitam dhāvanam*' ('the act of running as related to the horse'). So if one word conveys the related meaning and if sentence-meaning is the natural outcome of related meaning, we would be left with no alternative than saying that when we hear the first word in a sentence, we would understand the complete sentence-meaning also. Thus there is no warrant why all other words in the sentence would not be synonyms with the first word, because all these words play an identical role in determining the meaning of the sentence.

The Bhāṭṭas further argue: In Prabhākara's theory a word denotes a related meaning – a meaning related with the meanings of other words in the

sentence. Now one may ask: Are those meanings also, with which the first word-meaning is said to be related, already known? If those meanings of other words are already known, one is justified to ask: how are they known? They can be known only as related to the meaning of the first word. So, in a sentence, suppose, there are two words A and B. The cognition of the meaning of A would presuppose the cognition of the meaning of B and vice-versa, thus involving the fallacy of mutual dependence (*abhihitena cet tad api tarhi padam anvitābhidhāyitayā padāntaropāttam artham abhidhānāyāpekṣata ititaretarāśrayaḥ prāpnoti* | *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 383) And if you say, well, the meaning of B is brought into relation with the meaning of the first word without the meaning of that word being known, that would mean that to know the meaning of the first word, which is a related meaning, it is not necessary that the meanings of other words in a sentence are to be known. This would mean that to get to sentence-meaning, the cognition of the meaning of only one word would be sufficient and the meanings of the rest of the words would add nothing to the cognition of the sentence-meaning. Thus it will lead to the same charge, viz., all other words in a sentence barring one will be synonyms of that word.

On one more point, the Bhāṭṭas object: the Prābhākaras say that a word in a sentence denotes meaning in relation to the meaning of other words. So the meaning of one word is related with other word-meanings. In a relation we have at least two relata – one is *anuyogin* (correlate) and other a *pratiyogin* (counter-correlate). The main meaning-component in a sentence is the *anuyogin*: In Nyāya, it is the meaning of the substantive (having first case inflexion); in Mīmāṃsā, it is the meaning of the word conveying action. And other meaning-components are counter-correlate. Now suppose I understand the meaning of the sentence (i) '*gām ānaya*' and later on I hear the sentence (ii) *gām badhāna*, a sentence which I have never heard before. I hear it for the first time. In (ii) the same word *gām* is used. From (i) I know the relation between *gām* and *ānaya*, but till now I have not cognised the relation between *gām* and *badhāna* or say, between *gām* and any other word *x y z* with which I relate the word *gām* for the first time. A word can be used infinite times in a number of sentences, but the relation between *gām* and those new words in those sentences is not known to me. We are so far aware of only one relation i. e. between *gām* and only word *ānaya*. It is common sense that innumerable other words barring *ānaya* can be used with *gām* and it is not possible to know the relation of the meaning of *gām* with the meanings of other innumerable words. Relations differ when the relata differ. So when the counter-correlates may be infinite, the relations are also infinite. And it is obviously not possible to grasp all such relations, i. e., the relation of the word-meaning with other infinite word-meanings. Consequently, if

such relations are not cognised before, it would not be possible to cognise the meaning of a new sentence in which a known word occurs.

But one point must be made clear that the Prābhākara puts main stress on the word as the vehicle of the cognition of sentence-meaning. If there is power anywhere to convey the sentence-meaning, the word is the seat of this power. Word conveys the meaning – on this none disputes. The dispute centres round the question: Whether a word, through this power, denotes its own meaning only or also the relational meaning? For Bhāṭṭa, the first alternative is acceptable; while the Prābhākara subscribes to the second alternative. Prābhākara argues: you, Bhāṭṭa, also accept that words have their own meaning-denoting power, why not then extend this function of word to relational meaning (= sentence-meaning) also? It is logically more simple than to ascribe this power also to word-meanings (*dharmikalpanāto varam dharmakalpanā laghīyasīti anvitābhidhānaśaktiḥ padānām kalpayitum ucitā* | *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, p. 400).

13

THE HINDU RELIGION: A HISTORY

THE HINDU RELIGION, as we know it, is a complex of many different elements, which have been fused together into a single system. It is a religion of many gods, many temples, many rituals, and many customs. It is a religion which has been able to survive for thousands of years, and which has been able to adapt itself to the changing needs of the world.

The history of the Hindu religion is a long and complicated one. It is a religion which has been able to survive for thousands of years, and which has been able to adapt itself to the changing needs of the world. It is a religion which has been able to survive for thousands of years, and which has been able to adapt itself to the changing needs of the world.

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AUTHORS AND WORKS REFERRED TO IN MAHENDRA'S ANEKĀRTHAKAIRAVĀKARAKAUMUDĪ

By

ROBERT BIRWÉ

Mahendra's Anekārthakairavākarakaumudī, a commentary on Hemacandra's homonymic dictionary, the Anekārthasaṃgraha, "is quite a unique work", said Th. ZACHARIAE,¹ "and, therefore, of the greatest importance for Sanskrit lexicography. It is, in fact, the only complete commentary on one of the larger Anekārthakośas that up to the present day has come to light." This estimation is shared by Cl. VOGEL² who, in accordance with ZACHARIAE, stresses the fact that the value of Mahendra's commentary can hardly be overrated.

In 1893, Th. ZACHARIAE³ published Hemacandra's Anekārthasaṃgraha with extracts from the commentary of Mahendra. He printed the commentary on *kāṇḍa* 1 in full; the extracts concern the remaining *kāṇḍas* 2-7. An edition of the complete commentary remained a desideratum for a long time. It was only in 1980 that the entire work of Mahendra was published. For this achievement many Indologists will be grateful to the editor JINENDRAVIJAYA GAṆĪ.⁴

By the following lines containing some critical remarks and additions I do not intend to belittle the value of his edition, the publication of which needs no word of vindication.

The manuscript(s) upon which the edition is based is (are) not made known.⁵ It would be interesting to compare ZACHARIAE's extracts and this edition in detail, but I refrain from doing so.

1. *Der Anekārthasaṃgraha des Hemacandra mit Auszügen aus dem Commentare des Mahendra*. Herausgegeben von TH. ZACHARIAE [— Quellenwerke der Altindischen Lexikographie, Bd. I], Wien, Bombay 1893, Preface, p. XV.

2. *Indian Lexicography* [— A History of Indian Literature, vol. V, 4], Wiesbaden 1979, p. 341.

3. See note 1.

4. *Anekārtha-Saṃgrahaḥ saṭīkah. Granthakārah.... pūjyācāryadeva-śrīmad-Hemacandra-surīśvaraḥ. Kairavākarakaumudīṭīkāḥ.... pūjyācāryadeva-śrīman-Mahendra-sūrīśvaraḥ. Saṃsodhakah saṃpādakaś ca.... śrī-Jinendraviṇaya-Gaṇī. Prathamaviḃhāgaḥ. Lākhābāval (Saurāṣṭra) 1972. Dvītiyo viḃhāgaḥ. Lākhābāval 1980 (= Śrī-Harsapūṣpāmṛta-Jaina-Granthamālā, Granthāḥ 59 [and] 91.*

5. According to ZACHARIAE, *loc. cit.* (note 1), Preface, p. XVI and VOGEL, *loc. cit.* (note 2), p. 341, the *praśasti* consisting of 4 stanzas is found at the end of the *kāṇḍas* 2, 3, and 7. In the new edition it is missing after *kāṇḍa* 2.

Each of the two volumes of the edition contains an index of words⁶ only. The order of the words is that of Hemacandra's in the *Anekārthasaṃgraha*. It may be asked if the editor was well advised to follow Hemacandra's way of arranging the lemmata. Though ZACHARIAE⁷ asserted it is in general easy to find the words, even without an index prepared according to the "European manner", this view did not prevent him from arranging the words in the European manner in his index⁸ to the edition of the *Anekārthasaṃgraha*. I would have preferred an index in the strict alphabetical order of our modern Sanskrit dictionaries. An index of this type is also found in the edition of the *Anekārthasaṃgraha*⁹ published in the Kashi Sanskrit Series (Haridas Sanskrit Granthamālā), no. 68.

Mahendra derives the lemmata according to the grammatical system of Hemacandra. For the purpose of illustration a short passage¹⁰ from the scholium on 1. 5 may be quoted: *ko brahmaṇi ... —kāyati kāmīyate vā kaḥ "kvacit"* (5/1/171) *iti ḍaḥ / ... kham svaḥ samvidi ... aśnute iti kham "aśer: ḍit" iti ḍit kaḥ ... /*; i. e., *ka-* *m.* in the meaning of *brahman* etc. is derived from the root *kaim* 'śabde' (Dhp. 36)¹¹ or the root *kamūm* 'kāntav' (Dhp. 789)¹¹ with the suffix *ḍa* according to the rule 5. 1. 171: *kvacit*; ... *kha-* *n.* in the meaning of heaven etc. is derived from the root *aśauḥi* 'vyāptau' (Dhp. 1314)¹¹ with the suffix *kha* having *ḍ* as *anubandha* (*it*) according to the *uṇādi-sūtra* 87; *aśer: ḍit*.

In the first instance the reference to the role *kvacit* is supplied by the editor; in the second one, however, it is — for reasons unknown to me — not stated that *aśer: ḍit* is one of Hemacandra's *uṇādi-sūtras*. The missing reference in the second case cannot be regarded as a mere accident; for far too many omissions of this kind are found in the edition. The only conclusion possible is that such

6. Vol. 1, *Śabdasūcī*, p. 339 ff.; vol. 2, *Śabdakrama*, p. 463 ff. — Many misprints are not corrected in the list of errata (vol. 1, *Śuddhipātrikā*, p. 357 ff.; vol. 2, *Śuddhipātraka*, p. 518 ff.).

7. *Die indischen Wörterbücher (Kōśa)*, Strassburg 1897 [= Grundriss der Indoarischen Philologie und Altertumskunde, I. Band, Heft 3 B], p. 33.

8. The index of words appeared in: *Das Unadiganasutra des Hemacandra mit dem selbstverfassten Commentare des Autors*. Herausgegeben von JOH. KIRSTE. *Nebst einem Appendix, enthaltend den Index zum Anekārthasaṃgraha*, von TH. ZACHARIAE. [= Quellenwerke der Altindischen Lexikographie, Bd. II], Wien, Bombay 1895.

9. Ed. by JAGANNATH SHASTRI HOSHING, Benares 1929.

10. The text of the new edition is accurately reproduced.

11. The references are to the Dhātupāṭha contained in: *Svopajñalaghuvrtti-samvalitaṃ śrī-Siddha-Hemacandra-śabdānuśāsanam*. [= Śrī-Vijaya-Nemisūri-Granthamālā-ratnam 35], Boṭāḍ (Saurāṣṭra), s. 2008 [= 1951 A. D.], p. 258 ff.

references are given in an extremely haphazard manner much to the regret of the reader.

Another feature of Mahendra's commentary is that it generally illustrates the meanings of a certain lemma by quoting examples (*dr̥ṣṭānta*). About 7000 of them "are, almost without exception, given anonymously and mostly consist of fragments of verses.¹² Cl. VOGEL¹³ mentions three examples for which references are given: they "(at III 27, III 545, IV 179) are to Māgha's Śisupālavadhā (V 24, XII 18) and Bāṇa's Harṣacarita (p. 13. 1-2 ed. FÜHRER)."

With the help of the complete edition of Mahendra's commentary it is now possible to add two more examples to VOGEL's list. On 3. 226 we find: *amṛtam ... ayācite yathā yan manuḥ / ṛtam uñchaśīlam jñeyam¹⁴ amṛtam syād ayācitam /* The source is the Manusmṛti 4. 5.

Examples are nearly always preceded by the meaning of the lemma and by the word *yathā*, as follows from the instance just quoted. However, the *dr̥ṣṭānta* for *mṛta* meaning *yācita* is introduced without *yathā* on 2. 185: *mṛtam ... mṛtyau yathā ... / yācitam bhikṣitam / yan manuḥ mṛtam tu yācitam bhaikṣam*. This is quoted from the Manusmṛti 4. 5.

One of the anonymous examples is found on 1. 5. Mahendra says *kham ... / sarge yathā - tasmin gate kham sukṛtopalabdham /* This *dr̥ṣṭānta* being a *pāda* of a verse written in the *indravajrā* metre, is probably taken from Kālidāsa's Raghuvamśa¹⁵ 18. 22.

Mahendra's commentary contains, as already remarked, about 7000 examples of this kind. These decidedly form the most important part of his work. Th. ZACHARIAE identified the sources of many examples; e. g., to the above example *tasmin gate* ... he appended in his edition of the extracts from Mahendra's commentary the source: "c[ompare] Ra[ghuvamśa] 18. 22." All the sources identified by ZACHARIAE have been omitted by JINENDRAVIJAYA GAṆIN¹⁶ in his edition. This procedure is hard to understand; for it may induce somebody to whom ZACHARIAE's edition is inaccessible to take up the work again of identifying those examples which have already been identified.

When reading Mahendra's commentary I noted the sources of a few examples where ZACHARIAE did not give them. These are the following :

12. ZACHARIAE, *loc. cit.* (note 1), Preface, p. XVI.

13. *loc. cit.* (note 2), p. 342, n. 158.

14. The edition's reading *kratum uñchaśīlam kṣeyam*.... is not corrected in the *suddhapatraka*.

15. The edition by NARAYAN RAM ACHARYA, 11th ed., Bombay 1948, reads *dyām* and *labdhām* (thus also Mallinātha) and mentions the variants *svaḥ* and *labdham*.

16. He mentions Th. ZACHARIAE in the *prastāvanā* to vol. 1, p. 10,

Mahendra	Example	Source ¹⁷
on		
1.	<i>śikṣā kalpo vyākaraṇaṃ chandojyotirniruktayah </i>	Abhi. 2. 164
2. 2. 321	<i>mahāpadmaś ca padmaś ca śāṅkho makarakacchapau </i>	Abhi. 2. 107
3. 580		
3. 3. 177	<i>āṣāḍhasya prathamadivase megham āśliṣṭasānum </i>	Me. 1. 2
4. 3. 205	<i>sargaś ca pratisargaś ca vaṃśo manvantarāṇi ca </i> <i>vaṃśānuvaṃśacaritaṃ purāṇaṃ pañcalakṣaṇaṃ </i>	Gan. 345, 11 (Z); Abhi. 2. 166
5. 3. 215	<i>gandhena gāvaḥ paśyani vedaiḥ paśyanti brāhmaṇāḥ </i>	Pañcat., ed. BÜHLER, 3. 67 ¹⁸
6. 4. 163	<i>prahartum abhyudgatam ātmayonim </i>	Ku. 3. 70
7. 4. 168	<i>na tvaṃ dṛṣṭvā na punar alakāṃ jñāsyase kāmācārīn </i>	Me. 1. 66

... An alphabetical list of the unidentified examples¹⁹ could help future attempts of identification.

Apart from the quotations appearing as examples, the commentary contains many others given by Mahendra in support of his interpretation of certain passages of the Anekārthasaṃgraha. An instance is found on 4. 3 : ... *aśmanta-*

17. The following abbreviations are employed :

- Abhi. *The Abhidhanachintamani of... Hemacandracharya (with his own notes). Ed... by... HARGOVINDAS and... BEHECHARDAS. Part II with Index etc. Ed. by JAYANTA VIJAYA [= Yashovijaya Jaina Granthamala 41, 42]. Bhavnagar, Veer Era 2441, 2446 [= 1915/16, 1920/21 A. D.]*
- Gan. or GR *Vardhamāna's Gaṇaratnamahodadhi, ed. J. EGGELENG, Part I, London 1879; Part II, London 1881. Reprint: Delhi, Varanasi, Patna 1963.*
- Ku. *The Kumārasambhava of Kālidāsa, ed. by NĀRĀYANA RĀMA ĀCHĀRYA, 14th ed., Bombay 1955.*
- Me. *The Meghadūta of Kālidāsa, ed. by M. R. KALE, 4th ed., Bombay 1947. — The figure before the dot refers to the pūrvaṃmegha (= 1) or to the uttaraṃmegha (= 2).*
- Pañcat. *Pañcatantra II & III [= Bombay Sanskrit Series, no. 111], Bombay 1891. — The figure before the dot refers to the tantra, that behind it to the verse.*
- (Z) Sources followed by (Z) have been given by ZACHARIAE.

18. BÜHLER reads *vai dvijāḥ* instead of *brāhmaṇāḥ*. In the notes, loc. cit. (note 17), p. 85 he remarks: "Taken from Mahābhārata V. 34. 34." Cf. also O. BÖHTLINGK, *Indische Sprüche*, St. Petersburg 1863-65, no. 832.

19. Such lists are found, e. g., in K. G. OKA's edition of the *Nāmalingānuśāsana of Amarasimha with the commentary of Kṣīrasvāmin*, Poona 1913, Appendix I, p. 5 ff., in B. LIEBICH's edition of the *Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī*, Breslau 1930, p. 207 ff., etc.

kaṃ mālukācchade ||2|| *cul[ḷ]yāṃ ca ... / ... ||3||* After having given the example for *āsmantaka*- meaning *cullī* 'fire-place' he continues: *tṛṇe 'pi ... yad āha maṅkhaḥ - āsmantakaṃ bhare cul[ḷ]yāṃ nā vṛkṣatṛṇabhedayor iti*; i. e., regarding *āsmantaka*, the meaning *tṛṇa* is not mentioned by Hemacandra; hence adds: *tṛṇe 'pi ...* "because Maṅkha says:..." The quotation is from Maṅkha²⁰ 82.

Another instance may be quoted from the scholium on 2. 44-5: *rāgaḥ syāt ... ||44|| ... kleśādike ... / ... ||45||* On *kleśādike* Mahendra remarks: *kleśā avidyādayaḥ / yad āha - avidyāsmītārāgadveṣābhīniveśāḥ kleśāḥ / ādiśabdāt ...*; i. e., regarding *kleśa* meaning *avidyā* etc. an anonymous quotation, enumerating the five *kleśas* of Yoga philosophy, is introduced by the sentence: *yad āha* "because he (or: one) says." The source of this anonymous quotation has been identified by ZACHARIAE as "Y[oga] S[ūtra] 2. 3." This reference as well as all the other identified sources have been omitted by JINENDRAVIJAYA GAṆIN as he has also done with regard to the identified *dr̥ṣṭāntas*.

I have noted 55 anonymous quotations introduced by *yad āha* or *yad ghuḥ*; those identified, 45 in number, precede the unidentified ones.

As far as the column 'Source' of the following table is concerned, a short note on the dates of some sources is required beforehand:

1. Kṣīrasvāmin's commentary on the AK²¹ contains many quotations from Bhoja (c. 1010-1055 A. D.) and is quoted by Vardhamāna in his Gaṇaratna, mahodhadi²² and by Hemacandra in his Tīkā on the Abhidhānacintāmaṇi.²³ VOGEL²⁴ places Kṣīrasvāmin in the first half of the 13th century A. D.

2. Hemacandra's *mahāvvyākaraṇa*²⁵ dates from 1139-1141 A. D. according to the opinion of LIEBICH.²⁶

20. *The Maṅkhakośa* edited, together with extracts from the commentary, and three indexes, by TH. ZACHARIAE [= Quellenwerke der Altindischen Lexikographie, Bd. III], Wien, Bombay 1897. Reprint: Varanasi 1972 [= Kashi Sanskrit Series 216].

21. AK = Amarakośa

22. Vṛtti on v. 306 (p. 343; Kṣīrasvāmin 2. 8. 14) and on v. 430 (p. 454; cf. Kṣīrasvāmin 1. 6. 14). The Tīkā on Abhi. 3. 146 (index: 3. 164) and 2. 247 repeats without naming any source what GR and Kṣīrasvāmin say.

23. Tīkā on Abhi. 3. 541 (cf. Kṣīrasvāmin 1. 9. 11) and on 4. 211 (cf. Kṣīrasvāmin 2. 4. 61).

24. loc. cit. (note 2), p. 314.

25. It consists of *sūtrapāṭha*, *dhātupāṭha*, *gaṇapāṭha*, *uṇādi-(sūtra)-pāṭha* and *lingānuśāsana*.

26. *Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī*, p. 203. As far as Hemacandra's *sūtrapāṭha* is concerned, I have tried to show that it is older than the GR. Cf. BIRWÉ, *Der Gaṇapāṭha zu den Adhyāyas IV und V der Grammatik Pāṇinis*, Wiesbaden 1961, p. 481.

3. Vardhamāna's Gaṇaratnamahodadhi was composed in 1140/41 A. D.²⁷
4. Hemacandra's Abhidhānacintāmaṇi and Anekārthasaṃgraha were "probably" written "between 1141 and 1143 A. D."²⁸
5. Hemacandra's own Tīkā on his Abhidhānacintāmaṇi, "undoubtedly his last work", was composed between 1141/43 (s. no. 4) and his death in 1172/73 A. D. BÜHLER's date of Hemacandra's Deśināmamālā and Nighaṇṭuseśa (between 1142/43 and c. 1157/59) limits the time of the composition of the Tīkā to 1159/60–1172/73 A. D.²⁹
6. The commentary on the Anekārthasaṃgraha "was committed to paper by Mahendra on the basis of what Hemacandra had imparted to him before his death."³⁰ The oldest known manuscript of Mahendra's commentary dates from 1229/30 A. D. From this results in all probability that the commentary was "committed to paper" in the last quarter of the 12th century A. D.

The survey makes it plain that Kṣīrasvāmin's commentary on the AK is one of Hemacandra's sources (s. above no. 1). That Hemacandra also used Vardhamāna's Gaṇaratnamahodadhi and that Mahendra knew this work as well as Kṣīrasvāmin's commentary is shown by almost identical passages in the Tīkā on Abhi. and in the GR (and in Kṣīra³¹),³² in Mahendra's commentary and in GR,³³ and in Mahendra and in Kṣīra,³⁴ although both the authors do not give the names of these sources.

Now follows the announced table.

-
27. J. EGGELE in his edition of the GR (note 17), Part I, Preface, p. 6.
 28. TH. ZACHARIAE, *loc. cit.* (note 7), p. 31.
 29. Cf. CL. VOGEL, *loc. cit.* (note 2), p. 345, note 170.
 30. VOGEL, *loc. cit.* (note 2), p. 342.
 31. Kṣīra. = Kṣīrasvāmin — The edition I used has been mentioned above in note 19.
 32. Cf., e. g., Tīkā on Abhi. 2. 146, 2. 247, Vṛtti on GR 306, 430, and Kṣīra. 2. 8. 14, 1. 6. 14.
 33. Cf., e. g., Mahendra on 7. 60 and Vṛtti on GR 17. — The same quotation is also found in Hemacandra's Dhātupārāyaṇa, ed. by MUNICHANDRA VIJAYA, Amadāvād 1979, p. 2.
 34. Cf., e. g., Mahendra on 2. 528 and Kṣīra. 3. 3. 214. — With regard to passages like Tīkā on Abhi. 6. 70, Mahendra on 2. 235 and Kṣīra. 1. 2. 16 where we find the same quotation from an unknown Tīkā, it may be asked whether Hemacandra and Mahendra followed Kṣīra. or whether all three, independent of each other, made use of that Tīkā. This question cannot be answered at present; for lexicographical commentaries anterior to Kṣīra. (first half of the 12th century A. D.) are not available: Sarvānanda's Tīkāśarvasva, written in 1159/60 A. D., is later than Kṣīra.; likewise the (incomplete) Maṅkhaṭīkā quoting Kṣīra. 3. 3. 68 on verse 274; and regarding the Viśvaṭīkā known from quotation only, all we know is that its anonymous author must have lived between 1111/12 A. D. (date of the Viśvakośa) and 1610/11 A. D. (date of Śrīyallabha Gaṇin's Sāroddhāra where the Viśvaṭīkā is referred to).

Mahendra on	Quotation ³⁵	Source ³⁶
1. 2. 45	yad āha — avidyāsmītarāgadveṣābhīniveśāḥ kleśāḥ	*Y. S. 2. 3 (Z)
2. 2. 171	yad āha ¹ — suvarṇaṃ rājataṃ tāmraṃ rītiḥ kāmśyaṃ tathā trapu sīsaṃ ca dhīvarāṃ ² caivam aṣṭau ³ lohāni cakṣate	Kṣīra. 2. 9. 99; s. C. on H. 1039 (Z)=C. on Abhi. 4. 105
	1. Kṣīra., Abhi āhuḥ 2. Kṣīra. vīmaram (kālāyasaṃ) 3. Kṣīra. caiva hy aṣṭau; Abhi. caiva aṣṭau.	
3. 2. 177	yad āha — plutaṃ tu laṅghanam pakṣimṛgagatyanuhārakam	Abhi. 4. 314

35. Variant readings, if existent, are given directly under the quotations in the usual way. The abbreviated sources in the column 'Source' are still further shortened; e. g.: Kṣīra 2. 9. 99 under no. 2 appears as Kṣīra., etc., i. e. the abbreviations employed in the column 'Quotation' are to be supplemented by those of the column 'Source'.

36. Sources preceded by an asterisk have not been checked by me: they are taken over from (Z) (note 17), (OKA) (note 19) or (SKD) (see below). — In addition to the abbreviations mentioned in notes 17, 21 and 31 the following are used:

- Bh. *The Vyākaraṇa-Mohābhāṣya of Patanjali*, ed. by F. KIELHORN, 3rd ed., ed. by K. V. ABHYANKAR, 3 vols., Poona 1962-72. — References are to the volume, page and line.
- Bhānu. Bhānuji Dīkṣita's commentary on the AK.
- c. compare (Z).
- C. Commentary (Z).
- DhN. *Rājaniḅhaṇṭu-saḥito Dhanvantariyaṇṭiḅhaṇṭuḥ*, ed. by N. V. PURANDARE [= Ānandāśrama-Saṃskṛta-Granthāvaliḥ, Granthāṅkaḥ 33], Poona 1896.
- H. Hemacandra.
- Hal. *Halāyudhakośaḥ*, : JAYASANKARA JOSHI [= Sarasvatī Bhavana Prakāśanamālā 12], Varanasi, śake 1879 [= 1957/58 A. D.].
- JIN. JINENDRAVIJAYA GAṆIN (see note 4).
- Maṇu *The Manusmṛti with the commentary of Kullūka Bhaṭṭa...*, ed. by GOPAL SĀSTRĪ NENE [= Kashi Sanskrit Series 114], 2nd ed., Varanasi 1970.
- NS *Hemacandra's Nighaṇṭuśeṣa...*, ed. by PUṆYAVIJAYAĪ [= Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series, no. 18], Ahmedabad 1968.
- Ra. Raghuvamśa of Kālidāsa (cf. note 15).
- Rāya. Rāyamukuta's commentary on the AK.
- Seṣa Addenda to Hemacandra's Abhidhānacintāmaṇi, contained in the Tīkā on Abhi. (cf. note 17)
- S. K. Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharana; BOROAH's ed. (Z).
- SKD *Śabdakaṭṭhadrūpa* by RADHA KANTA DEVA [= Chawkhamba Sanskrit Series, no. 93], 3rd ed., 5 vols., Varanasi 1967.

(Continued on the next page)

4. 2. 177 *yad āha*¹ —
vāpikūpatadāgāni devatāyatanāni ca / *Jātūkarna (SKD);³⁷
*annapradānam āramam*² *pūrtam āryāḥ*³ *pracakṣate*¹ // Kṣīra. 2. 7. 28
-
1. Kṣīra. *āha ca* 2. Jātūkarna, JIN. °māḥ, Kṣīra °māḥ
 3. JIN. *adhyāḥ* 4. Jātūkarna, *pūrtam ity abhidhīyate*
 — Jātūkarna's nominative *ārāmāḥ* is correct, but not
 that of Kṣīra. and JIN. Hence I read *ārāmam* because
 of *pracakṣate* in Kṣīra. and JIN.
5. 2. 193 *yad āha* —
pādakarma yataṁ proktaṁ yātam aīkuśavāraṇam / Hal. 222
*ubhayaṁ vītam ākhyātam*¹ //
-
1. JIN. *ākhyānutam*.
6. 2. 195 *yad āha* —
vāñijyaṁ pāsupālyam ca karṣaṇam ceti vṛttayaḥ / H. 864 (Z) —
 Abhi. 3. 528
7. 2. 196 *yad āha* —
kaiśiky ārabhaṇi caiva sātvaṭi bhāratī tathā Cf. Vaij. 3.9.101-2
catastro vṛttayo hy etās tāsū nāṭyaṁ pracakṣate // and Abhi. 2. 199
8. 2. 275 *yad āha*¹ —
*jātau jātau yad utkr̥ṣṭam tad ratnam abhidhīyate*². *Cāṇakyaśa. (OKA);
 1. Kṣīra. *āhruḥ*, 2. Mallinātha on Ku. 1. 2 : '... ratnam Yādava³⁸ (Malli-
iti kathyate iti yādavaḥ JAYASANKARA JOŚI, *Halāyudha* nātha) Kṣīra. 3. 3.
dhakoṣa, p. 559 a : *iha kathyate*. 126; c.
 *Ujjv. Uṇ 3. 14 (Z)
9. 2. 349 ... *mañkhaḥ. yad āha* —
*citṛyā syād agnicayane na nā*¹ / Mañkha 630.
-
1. JIN. *vā*.

(Continued from the last page)

- Tattv. *Eine Jalna-Dogmatik. Umāsvatī's Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra ...* von H. JACOBI
 (Sonderabdruck aus Band LX der Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen
 Gesellschaft, 1906.). Leipzig 1906.
- Vaij. *Vaijayantīkoṣa of Yādavaṇṣa*, ed. by HARAGOND. ŚĀSTRĪ [= Jaikrishnadas-
 Krishnadas Prachya Vidya Granthamala 2], Varanasi 1971.
- Y. S. *Yogasūtra* (Z).
 Z. ZACHARIAE.

37. vol. 3, p. 221c, s. v. *pūrta*.38. The quotation is not found in Yādava(ṇṣa)'s *Vaijayantī*.

10. 2. 359 *yad āha*¹ —
vrihir yavo masūro godhūmo² mudgamāṣatilacaṇakāḥ³ / Bh. 2. 372. 21 (last
aṇavaḥ priyaṅgukodravamayusṭhakāḥ⁴ śalir āḍhakyah || pāda only); c. C.
kim ca kalāyakulatthau śaṇaḥ sapladaśāni⁵ dhānyāni / on H. 1168 (Z) =
C. on Abhi. 4. 234
 1. Abhi. *āhuḥ*, 2. Abhi. *°mā*, 3. Abhi. *°vaṇakāḥ*,
 4. Abhi. *°guḥ kodravamayucchakāḥ*; JIN. *°mapuṣṭhakāḥ*,
 5. Thus Z; Bh., Abhi., JIN. *śaṇasapta°*.
11. 2. 386 ... *maṅkhaḥ. yad āha* —
usro¹ ' mśau gavi dvayoḥ / Maṅkha 691.
 1. JIN. *asro*.
12. 2. 414 *yad āha* —
*sādhāraṇaṃ bhavet tantram / c. *S. K. II, 68 p.*
92 (Z); Kṣīra 3. 3.
186.
13. 2. 465 *yad āha*
aṣṭādaśa nimeṣāḥ syuḥ¹ kāṣṭhā triṃśat tu tāḥ kalā² AK 1. 4. 11; cf.
Abhi. 2. 50.
 1. AK *tu*; Abhi. *syuḥ*, 2. JIN. *kalāḥ* — Cf. also below
 no. 16.
14. 2. 516 *yad āhuḥ* —
dhruvā tu sarvasaṃjñārthaṃ yasyām ājyam nidhīyate / Abhi. 3. 493.
15. 2. 519 *yad āha* —
ambuvṛddhau pūraḥ plavo¹ pi ca / H. 1087 (Z) =
Abhi. 4. 153.
16. 2. 523 *yad āha* —
aṣṭādaśa nimeṣāḥ syuḥ kāṣṭhā¹ kāṣṭhādvayam lavaḥ / Abhi. 2. 50.
 1. Cf. above no. 13.
17. 2. 528 *yad āhuḥ* —
vastūpalakṣaṇaṃ yatra sarvanāma prayujyate / Vākyapadīya, ed.
dravyam ity ucyate so' rtho bhedyatvena¹ vivakṣitaḥ² || RAU, 3. 219; Kṣīra.
3. 3. 214.
 1. JIN. *'bhedyā°*, 2. Kṣīra. *vyavasthitaḥ*.
18. 2. 589 *yad āha*¹ —
daṇḍo maṇḍalabhogau² cāpy utsannaś³ cābalo⁴ dr̥ḍhaḥ / Kṣīra. 2. 8. 80; C.
vyūhās teṣāṃ viśeṣāḥ syuḥ cakravayūhādayo¹ pi ca || on Abhi. 3. 411.
 1. Kṣīra., Abhi. *āhuḥ*, 2. Abhi. *°bhāgau*,
 3. Abhi. *ucchannaś* 4. Kṣīra. *cācalo*; JIN. *cāvalo*,

19. 3. 49 *yad āha —*
pakṣiṇā yena grhyante pakṣiṇo 'nye sa dīpakah / H. 1342 (Z) =
 Abhi. 4. 408.
20. 3. 105 *yad āha —*
punarnavo viśākhā¹ ca kaṭillāḥ² saśilāṭakah³ / DhN 1. 274; C. on
 NS 207.
 1. DhN, C. on NS °narā viśākhaś, 2. JIN. kaṭillakah
 3. JIN. sa śi°; C. on NS saśi°; DhN śaśivātikā.
21. 3. 114 *yad āha —*
reventas tv arkarelojah plavago hayavāhanah / H. 103 (Z) =
 Abhi. 2. 17.
22. 3. 130 *yad āha —*
maricir atryaṅgirasau pulastyah pulahas tathā / C. on Abhi. 2. 38;
vasiṣṭhaś ca mahātejāḥ saptamah parikīrtitah //
23. 3. 146 *yad āha —*
kīkaṭā magadhāhvayāḥ / Abhi. 4. 26.
24. 3. 178 *yad āha¹ —*
pragāḍham kṛcchram icchanti pragāḍham balavad Kṣīra. 3. 3. 44.
bhr̥śam² /
 1. Kṣīra. āhuḥ, 2. Kṣīra. dṛḍham.
25. 3. 253 *yad āha —*
triṣṭup ca jagatī caiva / *Gāṅgadāsa's Chan-
 domānjari (ŚKD)³⁹
26. 3. 258 *yad āha —*
brāhmaṇah kṣatriyo vaiśyas trayo varṇā dvijātayah / Manu 10. 4.
27. 3. 295 *yad āha —*
vr̥hatī paṅktir eva ca / *Gāṅgadāsa's Chan-
 domānjari (ŚKD)³⁹
28. 3. 302 *yad āha*
īryābhāṣaiṣaṇādānanikṣepotsargasamjñakāḥ / Cf. Tattv. 9. 5.
pañcāhuḥ samitih //
29. 3. 317 *yad āha —*
prayutaṁ koṭim athārbudam / C. on Abhi. 3. 538
iti
30. 3. 339 *yad āha¹ —*
bahupramāṇāḥ paridher² acchinnāgro 'tipatralah / Kṣīra. 3. 3. 97.
 1. Kṣīra. āhuḥ, 2. Kṣīra. °māṇaṁ paridhir.

39. vol. 2, p. 466c, s. v. chandās.

31. 3. 376 ... *anyaḥ. yad āha —*
dhamano' py anale bhastrādhmāyakakrūrāyoḥ smṛtaḥ / *Vi[śva] 1009 (Z)
32. 3. 416 *yad āha —*
śataghnī tu catustālā lohakaṇṭakasaṃcitā /
 Vaij. 3. 7. 169;
 Śeṣa on Abhi. 3.
 451; Keśava⁴⁰
 (Mallinātha on Ra.
 12. 95).
33. 3. 433 *yad āha —*
sarasvatyās tu kacchapi /
 Abhi. 2. 202.
34. 3. 445 *yad āha¹ —*
karabhas tu trihāyanaḥ /
 H. 1255 (Z) =
 Abhi 4. 321.
35. 3. 458 *yad āha¹ —*
dāḍimo dālīmaḥ sārāḥ kuṭṭīmaḥ phalakhādavaḥ² /
svādvamlo³ raktabījaś ca karakaḥ śukavallabhaḥ //
 DhN 2. 61; Kṣīra.
 2. 4. 65; C on NS
 149.
 1. Kṣīra. āha ca, 2. DhN °śāḍavaḥ; Kṣīra. °ṣā (śā)
 3. Kṣīra. °lau.
36. 3. 607 *yad āha —*
vaṃśādikaṃ tu śuṣīram ānaddhaṃ muraajādikam¹ /
 H. 287 (Z) =
 Abhi. 2. 201.
 1. Cf. AK 1. 7. 4: ... ānaddhaṃ muraajādikam / vāṃ-
 śādikaṃ tu śuṣīram ... //
37. 3. 620 *yad āha —*
śṛṅgāraḥ śucir ujjvalaḥ /
 AK 1. 7. 17.
38. 3. 665 *yad āha —*
*pūraṇagalanadharmānaḥ sparśarasagandhavarṇa-
 vantaḥ pudgalāḥ¹ /*
 *Av. Ni. Harl. Vr.
 Malaya. Vr. 662,⁴¹
 Tattv. 5. 23.
 1. This definition of *pudgala* seems to be composed of two
 originally independent ones: 1. *pūraṇagalanadharmānaḥ pudgalāḥ* (Av. Ni. Hari. Vr. Malaya. Vr. 662;
 Sthānā. Abhaya. Vr 51; Śataka. De. Svo. Vr. 86). and
 2. *sparśarasagandhavarṇavantaḥ pudgalāḥ* (Tattv.
 5. 23). Cf. *Jain Lakṣaṇāvalī*, ed. by Balchandra
 Siddhāntashāstri, vol. II, Delhi 1973 (— Vir Seva
 Mandir Series, no. 15), p. 712 f.

40. Is this referring to Keśavasvāmin's Nānārthhārṇavasamkṣepa? The edition is not available to me.

41. For this abbreviation cf. the work mentioned in the note on the quotation,

39. 3. 693 *yad āhuḥ —*
antarābhavadeho hi¹ neṣyate² vindhyavāsinaḥ |
 1. JIN. °dehādi, 2. Z niṣputter.
 *Kumārilabhaṭṭa (OKA); Kṣīra. 3. 3. 132.
40. 3. 712 *yad āhuḥ —*
lubdhah¹ kināśaḥ syāt kināśo' py ucyate kṛtaghnaś ca | H. on Up 534.
yo 'śnāti vāmamāṃsaṃ² sa ca³ kināśo yamaś caiva |
kināśas tadvataḥ⁴ kṣudraḥ |
iti ca⁵
 1. JIN. lughdhaḥ, 2. H. on Up. 'śnaty āma°, 3. JIN., Z om. 4. Z taddhanaḥ, 5. H. on Up. om. kināśas ...
iti ca.
41. 3. 763 *yad āha —*
viṣvakṣenapriyā gr̥ṣṭir vārāhi badarīty api¹ |
 AK 2. 4. 151.
 1. Kṣīra., Rāya. °rety api; Bhānu. °reti ca.
42. 4. 22 *yad āhuḥ —*
utsaveṣu suhr̥dbhir yad balād ākr̥ṣya gr̥hyate |
vastramālyādi tat pūrṇapatraṃ pūrṇānakaṃ ca tat ||
 Abhi. 3. 341.
43. 4. 43 *yad āha —*
pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā¹ brahmakṣatrasya rāghava | Bh. 1. 5. 15;
śaśakaḥ śalyakaḥ śvāvid godhā kūrmaś ca pañcamah ||² Smṛti?
 1. Pāda a quoted in Bh. 1. 5. 15, 2. Cf. ŚKD, s. v. pañcanakha:
 'śaśakaḥ śallakī godhā khaḍgī kūrmaś ca pañcamah'
iti smṛtiḥ.
44. 4. 85 *yad āha —*
sākalyavacanam prajñaiḥ pārāyaṇam udāhṛtam |
 Hal. 2. 246 (Z)=
 Hal. 401.
45. 7. 60 *yad āhuḥ —*
nipātās copasargās ca dhātavaś¹ ceti te trayah |
anekārthāḥ smṛtāḥ sarve pāṭhas teṣāṃ nidarśanam ||
 s. Gaṇ. 43, 1 (Z);
 H. on Dhātupāra-
 yaṇa, p. 2.
 1. Patañjali already says *anekārthā api dhātavo bhavanti*
 (Bh. 3. 408. 22) and *bahvarthā api dhātavo bhavanti*
 (Bh. 1. 256. 11).

The unidentified quotations, which are introduced by *yad āha*, are the following :

1. 2. 575 *anekanartakīyojyaṃ citratālatayānvitam¹ |*
ā catuḥśaṣṭiyugalād rāsakaṃ masṛṇoddhate² ||

1. Z °tālalatayā°, 2. JIN. °odvate.
2. 3. 406 *anyad ato hi vitānam |*
3. 3. 146 *avaṭuḥ kathitā ghāṭākūpagarteṣu sūribhiḥ |*
4. 3. 405 *tribhir gulmair gaṇas tais tu vāhinī tribhir iṣyate |*
5. 2. 334 *dharo¹ dhruvaś ca somaś ca ahaś ca caivanilo² nalaḥ² |*
3. 616 *pratyūśaś ca prabhāvś³ ca vasavo³ śṛau prakirtitāḥ ||*

1. JIN. on 2. 334 *dhīro*, 2. JIN. *caivanalonalah*
3. Read *prabhāsaś*? – Regarding *ahar* – cf. MW, s. v. :
“ day personified as one of the eight Vasus, MBh. i, 2582 seqq.”
6. 3. 23 *pañcādibhiś caturdaśāntaiḥ purāṇaḥ kulakam |*
7. 3. 205 *ṣoḍaśapaṇaḥ purāṇaḥ paṇo bhavet kākini catuskeṇa |*
8. 3. 48 *sakṛdvṛttis tu dharmasya prakṛtā prakṛtātmanām |*
saiva kriyāsu bahviṣu kārakasyeti dīpakam ||
9. 2. 525 *sādhyaś trayodaśa proktā viśve devāś caturdaśa¹ |*

1. According to Kṣīra. 1. 1. 10 and Śeṣa on Abhi. 2. 2-3,
the number of the Sādhyaś is 12, and that of the Viśve-
devas 13.

It would have been of great importance for the history of Indian lexicography to learn the other sources which were used by Mahendra besides those named in the introductory verses 2 and 3. The following ones are mentioned : Viśvaprakāśa, Śāśvata, Rabhasa, Amarasimha, Maṅkha, Hugna (read : Hugga), Vyādi, Dhanapāla, Bhāguri, Vācaspati, Yādava etc., Dhanvantarini-ghaṇṭu and Līngānuśāsanās.

The following index of authors and works referred to in the Anekārthakairavākarakauṃudī is a necessary supplement to JINENDRAVIJAYA GAṆIN'S edition, which contains, as already stated above, an index of words only.

With regard to the authors and works referred to by Mahendra, two classes may be distinguished :

A. Seeing that many authors are quoted by general terms such as *anyah*, *anye*, *apare* etc. it would be appropriate to speak of anonymous sources.

B. The sources quoted by name make up the second class.

A. Anonymous sources

<i>anyah</i>	2. 1. 15 ⁴² ; 166. 7; 180. 18; 336. 23;
<i>anye</i>	1. 5. 12; 139. 8; 160. 21; 220. 24; 244. 22; 252. 12; 252. 19; 281. 17; 320. 14; 325. 20; 2. 51. 20; 80. 15; 86. 17; 180. 8; 190. 12; 191. 8; 208. 12; 208. 20; 220. 14; 240. 8; 298. 19; 311. 7; 320. 19; 327. 12; 423. 9
<i>apare</i>	2. 81. 24
<i>eke</i>	1. 53. 10; 69. 14; 169. 24; 2. 81. 24; 132. 21; 226. 21
<i>kaścid</i>	2. 43. 13
<i>kecid</i>	1. 181. 22; 308. 23; 2. 110. 24

B. Sources quoted by name

Ajaya	1. 21. 22; 29. 12; 329. 15
Amara	1. 57. 5; 59. 22; 119. 13; 130. 20; 2. 105. 9; 120. 3; 251. 23; 385. 13
Amarasimha	1. 1. 8
Urata ⁴³	1. 215. 21
Kātya	1. 294. 11; 2. 255. 25
Kāmasāstra	2. 168. 23; 206. 18
Kautilya	1. 86. 17; 200. 13; 2. 46. 11
Gauḍa	1. 10. 20; 16. 10; 71. 5; 110. 22; 128. 16; 131. 7; 240. 6; 264. 20; 269. 18; 291. 21; 322. 23; 329. 15; 2. 166. 22; 236. 21 (Gaura); 246. 7 (Gaura); 281. 12; 311. 22; 321. 20; 373. 25
Gauḍāh	1. 54. 17
Cānakya	2. 202. 15

42. The references are to the volume, page and the line of Jñeindravijaya Gaṇin's edition (note 4). The number of the volume (in bold type) appears at the beginning of the series only.

43. Read Bharata?

BIRWE : *Authors and Works in Anekārthakairuvākarakaumudī* 61

Cikitsā-	
granthakāra	1. 281. 6
Jyotiḥśāstra	1. 74. 11
Ṭikā	1. 139. 9
Daśamukha-	
vaḍhanāṭya	2. 397. 18
Durga	2. 325. 14
Dhanapāla	1. 1. 9
Dhanvantari-	
nighaṇṭu	1. 1. 10
Nācirāja	2. 306. 12
Nighaṇṭu	1. 58. 14; 202. 18; 274. 8; 2. 65. 11; 364. 24
Pāṇini	1. 67. 8; 2. 440. 25; 441. 8
Pāṇiniya	1. 259. 8
Bhadrabāhu	2. 441. 8
Bharata	1. 283. 16; 324. 16; 2. 309. 12
Bhāguri	1. 1. 9
Bhela	1. 281. 6
Maṅkha	1. 1. 8; 10. 5; 29. 16; 38. 21; 51. 17; 89. 24; 90. 5; 93. 10; 95. 5; 99. 16; 100. 5; 104. 9; 104. 21; 109. 20; 112. 24; 113. 19; 115. 21; 116. 10; 117. 6; 119. 9; 120. 21; 122. 10; 128. 19; 130. 7; 134. 10; 136. 24; 138. 19; 139. 5; 140. 10; 141. 11; 141. 21; 142. 23; 143. 9; 153. 10; 155. 20; 159. 20; 161. 7; 163. 17; 166. 17; 171. 24; 179. 7; 180. 20; 182. 5; 184. 19; 187. 20; 191. 17; 193. 9; 197. 3; 197. 22; 199. 17; 201. 5; 201. 24; 202. 24; 204. 7; 296. 19; 207. 21; 211. 11; 211. 13; 216. 23; 222. 20; 223. 21; 224. 10; 226. 20; 240. 12; 244. 16; 253. 15; 259. 13; 260. 23; 264. 17; 265. 13; 266. 3; 271. 22; 272. 14; 274. 2; 274. 18; 281. 20; 285. 20; 286. 18; 289. 13; 294. 16; 298. 8; 299. 23; 304. 20; 308. 9; 309. 24; 311. 19; 312. 25; 318. 18; 323. 24; 324. 16; 327. 19; 329. 91; 332. 10. 333. 20; 335. 3; 336. 23; 338. 17; 2. 10. 21; 14. 21; 22. 7; 23. 10; 30. 15; (31. 7); 31. 7; 31. 10; 33. 9; 35. 22; 38. 17; 40. 7; 41. 23; 46. 24; 62. 12;

62. 23; 63. 7; 63. 15; 66. 19; 72. 23; 86. 4; 102. 11; 109. 10;
115. 18; 122. 22; 137. 11; 145. 11; 147. 7; 162. 21; 165. 14;
166. 14; 170. 8; 172. 18; 180. 12; 182. 20; 207. 7; 210. 16;
214. 12; 215. 23; 215. 25; 218. 24; 222. 23; 225. 21; 232. 17;
233. 6; 233. 19; 239. 18; 241. 12; 250. 25; 260. 13; 262. 5;
264. 19; 266. 23; 268. 19; 271. 7; 271. 24; 274. 25; 276. 11;
282. 13; 284. 21; 287. 26; 291. 22; 294. 16; 295. 17; 301. 16;
301. 18; 302. 7; 308. 5; 311. 19; 312. 22; 315. 13; 317. 5;
325. 14; 344. 19; 345. 13; 346. 9; 368. 18

Manu	1. 111. 15; 2. 100. 18; 280. 4
Māgha	2. 96. 15; 231. 25
Mālava	2. 67. 12
Yādava	1. 1. 9
Rabhasa	1. 1. 8
Līnganirṇaya	1. 1. 12
Lingavidah	1. 219. 6; 2. 18. 13; 30. 7; (31. 6); 185. 22; 219. 9; 248. 11; 387. 24
Līngānuśāsana	1. 1. 11; 1. 12
Līngānu- śāsanakāra	2. 373. 25
Vallabha	2. 113. 17
Vācaspati	1. 1. 9; 88. 7; 88. 19; 2. 373. 22
Vātsyāyana	1. 165. 12; 267. 17; 2. 23. 15; 64. 18; 99. 14; 121. 15; 131. 19; 140. 20; 258. 20; 290. 20; 330. 18; 356. 15
Viśvaprakāśa	1. 1. 8
Vaijayanti	1. 28. 9; 33. 7; 57. 12; 71. 4; 79. 6; 124. 12; 185. 9; 288. 10; 2. 45. 15; 226. 11; 410. 16
Vaijayantikāra	2. 196. 18; 219. 24
Vyādi	1. 1. 9; 29. 13; 47. 9; 142. 10; 313. 14
Śāśvata	1. 1. 8; 53. 8; 63. 21; 2. 32. 17
Śeṣa	2. 202. 13
Saivāgama	1. 218. 23

Śruti	1. 260. 4
Sūtrakāra	1. 2. 5
Smṛti	1. 221. 7; 228. 8; 281. 15; 2. 17. 9; 65. 24; 191. 20
Harṣacarita	2. 367. 9
Hugna (Hugga)	1. 1. 8

Appendix

Two peculiarities concerning the grammar of Pāṇini shall not be excluded from this paper.

1. The Pāṇinian technical term *ac* is treated by Hemacandra in 2, 454 as an ordinary word of the Sanskrit language. According to Mahendra's commentary it designates 14 vowels (*akārādīnām caturdaśānām varṇānām*). But, leaving aside the *pluta* vowels, the Pāṇinīyas know 13 only, namely : *ā, i, ī, u, ū, ṛ, ṝ, ḷ*,⁴⁴ *e, o, ai*, and *au*. The existence of *ḷ* acknowledged by later grammatical systems⁴⁵ only.

2. Another error has crept in Mahendra's scholium on 7. 21. Here he maintains that *h* and *visarga* are called *urasya*, according to the opinion of Pāṇini (*urasyau havisargau tu samprāhuḥ pāṇiner iti*). The term *urasya* is familiar with the Prātiśākhya and Śikṣāś,⁴⁶ but not known in the old works of the Pāṇinian school of grammar.⁴⁷

44. The existence of *ḷ* is denied, e. g., by the Kāśikā on Pāṇini 1. 1. 9 [and by Candra (gomin) in Varṇasūtra 39].

45. Cf. Abhayanandin on Jainendravāyākaraṇa 1. 1. 2, Amoghavṛtti on Śākaṭāyanavāyākaraṇa 1. 1. 6 and Hemacandra 1. 1. 7.

46. Cf., e. g., L. RENOU, *Terminologie grammaticale du Sanskrit*, Paris 1942. Reprint : Paris 1957.

47. The Bṛhadvṛtti on Hemacandra 1. 1. 7 records the opinion attributed by Mahendra to Pāṇini as that of others (*anye*).

WHAT DID INDRA DO WITH THE YATIS?

By

H. W. BODEWITZ

The question-mark in the title of this paper bears upon another paper with a question-mark: "Religious suicide in the Vedic period (?)".¹ The main part of the present article, however, is formed by a treatment of the Indra-Yati topic which was not mentioned there: JB. 1, 185 and its parallels in the PB. (13, 4, 16 and 8, 1, 4).

The text of JB. 1, 185, which deals with the Traikakubha Sāman to be used in the second Uktha Stotra by someone who is desirous of food, was not edited and translated by CALAND in his *Auswahl*² and it is also missing in his transcript of the relevant MSS which is kept in the University Library of Utrecht University. The reason for this omission is that OERTEL had already edited and translated this section.³ Unfortunately the critical edition⁴ did not consult OERTEL's contribution to the decipherment and interpretation of this Brāhmaṇa which still misses a complete translation.⁵ As a result the text of this chapter in the mentioned edition shows many defects. This was also observed by HOFFMANN who devotes about one and a half page to JB. 1, 185 in his review of the edition.⁶ Still I think that there is room for comment on the interpretation of this passage.

The subject of JB. 1, 185 is the salvation by Indra of three Yatis who are connected with three *kakubhs*. These *kakubhs* on the one hand are situated on Indra's back; on the other hand there seem to have been *kakubhs* of cosmic dimensions which were associated with food. Therefore the Traikakubha Sāman should be applied by someone who is desirous of food.

First one may ask how it is possible that Indra saves some Yatis, while he himself is the cause of their destruction according to some texts. JB. 1, 185

1. S. A. DANGE, *Indologica Taurinensia* 8-9 (1980-81), pp. 113-121.

2. W. CALAND, *Das Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa in Auswahl*, Amsterdam, 1919.

3. H. OERTEL, *JAOS* 19 (1898), pp. 123-125.

4. RAGHU VIRA and LOKESH CHANDRA, *Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa*, Nagpur, 1954.

5. I am preparing a translation with commentary of the Jyotiṣṭoma (Agni-ṣṭoma) section [= JB. 1, 66-365].

6. K. HOFFMANN, "Textkritisches zum Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa", *IJ* 4 (1960), pp. 1-36 [pp. 9-10 on the passage under discussion].

states : *indro yatīn sālāvṛkebhyah prāyacchat* " Indra gave the Yatis over to the hyaenas ". This topic was discussed by OERTEL in his treatment of the so-called *Indrasya kilbiṣāni*.⁷ AB. 7, 28 and KauṣU. 3, 1 refer to this feat of Indra in enumerations. In the first mentioned text this crime disqualifies him for the Soma ritual, although the same enumeration also mentions the defeat of Vṛtra.

In other passages where the laceration of the Yatis by the hyaenas or wolves is described, Indra's share in the bloodshed is missing. In the paper mentioned above (n. 1) DANGE tries to prove that originally Indra had nothing to do with the massacre of the Yatis. They are supposed to have killed themselves. The opening clause " The title of the paper is bound to arouse some curiosity, not unmixed with doubt " hits the mark. However, the doubts are not restricted to the title. Of course suicide by starvation was practised by old people in the Vedic period⁸ and since the *saṃnyāsins* were not cremated some of them will undoubtedly have been devoured by hyaenas. There are, however, no indications that living ascetics committed suicide by surrendering themselves to hyaenas or wolves. The only parallel adduced by DANGE is the story of the Bodhisattva who offers himself to a hungry tigress.

Even if, however, this horrible suicide should have been practised by the Yatis, it is not imaginable how the topic of Indra giving the Yatis over to the *sālāvṛkas* may have been introduced. Are we supposed to assume that Indra acted as a helper of ascetics with suicidal tendencies and that this in itself formed one of his *kilbiṣāni*? I doubt it. Moreover, even in KathS. 25, 6, a passage in which Indra does not play a role, the intention of suicide seems to be entirely absent. I quote DANGE's translation : " The wolves, indeed, devoured the *yati*'s. As they were being devoured so, being clutched, they ran to the northern altar (*uttaravedi*).⁹ That is why the wolves could not attack them ". I may also refer to PB. 8, 1, 4 and 13, 4, 16, where it appears that the Yatis did not only consist of old men, but also of children. A wholesale suicide in

7. OERTEL, o. c., pp. 118-125.

8. See J. F. SPROCKHOFF, " Die Alten im alten Indien ", *Saeculum* XXX, 4 (1979), pp. 374-433, especially p. 395 (with references to further literature in n. 75).

9. The *uttaravedi* is not the northern *vedi*; it is a *vedi* which is more elevated than the rest of the *mahāvedi* and it is situated in the east. DANGE also mentions a " southern altar " in the analysis of this passage. This *vedi* does not occur in the ritual with which this text deals. It seems to be based on a combination of two data: the misinterpretation of the *uttaravedi* as northern *vedi* and the reference to the place to the south of the *uttaravedi*, where the Yatis were devoured by the wolves, in TS. 6, 2, 7, 5.

which some people try to escape and even children are involved does not seem to be really Vedic.

It is evident that according to some texts Indra killed the Yatis or let them be devoured by the *sālāvṛkas*. The expression 'to surrender people to the *sālāvṛkas*' may originally simply have meant 'to kill people and leave them uncremated or unburied'. However, in the enumeration of Indra's *kilbiṣāni* this expression exclusively refers to Indra's dealings with the Yatis. Moreover, in every passage where the Yatis and the *sālāvṛkas* occur together (with or without Indra) some of them are alive and escape from these wolves or hyaenas. The fact that Indra is not mentioned in some contexts does not prove much. Well-known myths, stories, topics or passages are often abridged. The ritualistic texts only use what is relevant for the context.

In JB. 1, 185 Indra acts as the saviour of three Yatis, which may seem strange. However, the three Yatis who survived, were not saved from the jaws of the wolves. They survived because the massacre had stopped. Moreover, they had praised Indra as young boys without parents who needed a father to support them. Indra agrees to support them.

Here a major issue of the passage JB. 1, 185 and its parallels starts. The interpretation of *bibharti* is essential. On the one hand this refers to supporting people and keeping them alive,¹⁰ on the other hand to carrying beings who are not able to walk themselves. I think this double meaning of the verb *bhr̥* plays an important role in the Sāmavedic treatment of the story. The three *kakubhs* on Indra's back give a firm grip to the three young Yatis who are carried by him. On the other hand the text also mentions three *kakubhs* of the threefold universe and the food which is clinging to them.

The story is rather confused and the exact text forms a matter of dispute. First I give the text as edited by RAGHU VIRA :

traikakubham annādyakāmaḥ kurvīta. indro yatīn sālāvṛkebhyaḥ prāyacchat. teṣāṃ adyamānānāṃ trayāḥ kumārāḥ paryāśiṣyanta rāyovājāḥ pṛthuraśmir br̥hadgiriḥ. ta indram astuvan. tān abravīt kiṃkāmāḥ kumārās stutheti. bibhṛhy eva nō maghavann ity abruvan. tān antarāṃsayor adhyāsyata. tā asya tisraḥ kakubho 'lambanta. ime vai lokās saha santas tredhā vyāyan. tāṃs te sānnādyam anuvyaino u. eṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ lokānāṃ tisraḥ kakubho 'nnādyam avalambata. sa aikṣataiṣāṃ ced vai trayāṇāṃ lokānāṃ tisraḥ kakubho 'nnādyam avarundhate nemās tisraḥ kakubho 'vahareyeti. sa etat sāmāpaśyat. tenāstuta. tenaiṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ lokānāṃ tisraḥ kakubho 'nnādyam

10. Compare *bibhṛhy eva nō maghavann* with *bibhṛhi mā* in the flood legend (SB. 1, 8, 1, 2).

'vārundhata. tenemās tisraḥ kakubho 'vāharata. tad yad eteṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ tisraḥ kakubho 'nnādyam avārundhata tat traikakubhasya traikakubhatvam. tad etad annādyasyāvaruddhis sāma. avānādyam runddhe 'nnādaś śreṣṭhas svānāṃ bhavati ya evaṃ veda.

The interpretation of the first sentences is uncomplicated. The first difference between OERTEL's and HOFFMANN's translations is introduced with *tā asya iisraḥ kakubha 'lambanta*. OERTEL translates "They clung to his three points" and observes in a note: "This, and what follows is not quite clear to me". HOFFMANN, who renders "Diese drei Höcker hingen an ihm", apparently takes *tā kakubhaḥ* to be nominatives and perhaps he assumes that the three Yatis are (or become) Indra's humps.

There are some objections to be made against this interpretation. First Indra seems to be already *trikakubh*¹¹ before the arrival of the Yatis. In the parallel PB. 8, 1, 4 Indra promises to support the young Yatis and then the text continues: *tāṃs trikakubh adhinidhāyācarat. sa etad sāmāpaśyat. yat trikakubh apaśyat tasmāt trikakubham*. Moreover, if HOFFMANN does not equate the three Yatis and the three *kakubhs*, the passage becomes even more confused than it is already now, since the Yatis entirely disappear out of the story and the text simply states that Indra had three humps. My most important criticism is that *kakubhs* do not hang (*lamb*) down from something or someone. They use to point upwards. Therefore *kakubh* denotes everyone and everything that is eminent. The only non-vertical eminences or points denoted by *kakubh* seem to be the points of the compass.¹² Now Indra's humps of course do not hang and the verb *lamb* hardly expresses the connection between Indra (the bull) and his humps.

Later on the verb *lamb* occurs again: *eṣāṃ trayāṇāṃ lokānāṃ tisraḥ kakubho 'nnādyam avalambata*.¹³ OERTEL reads *ta u eṣāṃ (...)* *kakubho 'nnādyam alumbanta* and translates "And they clung to the three points of these worlds, to food". HOFFMANN again makes the *kakubhs* the subject ("Die drei Gipfel (*kakubhaḥ*) dieser drei Welten hingen als Speise da") and he observes: "Der einzige Anstoss liegt m. E. in *ta u*, wofür ich *tā u* erwarte". On account of the crit. app. of the edition he postulates the reading *tā u*.

11. See RV 1, 121, 4 on Indra *trikakubh*, who "is here represented as a bull" (J. GONDA, *Triads in the Veda*, Amsterdam, 1976, p. 106). Cf. *triprṣṭha*, Soma as the bull with three backs or humps (i. a. RV. 7, 37, 1 and 9, 71, 7).

12. H. LÜDERS, *Varuṇa I*, Göttingen, 1951, p. 83ff.

13. For *avalamb* construed with the accusative see the Petrograd Dictionary ("sich klammern -, sich halten an, sich stützen auf").

Three possible subjects for (*ava*) *lamb* are available here: the Yatis (OERTEL), the *kakubhs* (HOFFMANN) and food (the crit. ed.). Against OERTEL's interpretation one might object that the Yatis jump from the one type of *kakubh* to the other in a way not to be expected from young helpless boys. The same objection as put forward above still applies to HOFFMANN's interpretation: *kakubhs* do not hang, not even if they are edible. I prefer the version of the edition: food clings to (*ava-lamb*) the three *kakubhs* of the three worlds.

Indra becomes interested in these three cosmic *kakubhs* and the food clinging to them. He needs the threefold food¹⁴ for his three Yatis, since he had promised to support (*bhr̥*) them. One of Indra's considerations was: *eṣām ced vai trayāṇām lokānām tisraḥ kakubho 'nnādyam avarundhiya* (OERTEL's correct reading) *tenemās tisraḥ kakubho 'vahareyeti* (or: '*pahareyeti*'), which OERTEL and HOFFMANN translate "If I should obtain the three points of these three worlds, food, I should thereby carry off these three points" and "wenn ich mir die drei Gipfel (*kakubhaḥ*) dieser drei Welten als Speise aneignete, würde ich damit diese (meine) drei Höcker (*kakubhaḥ*) wegbringen". The logic of this reasoning, as it is translated by OERTEL and HOFFMANN, escapes me. How does the winning of three new humps guarantee the disappearance of the old ones? I think the optative should be differently interpreted. The cosmic bull does not want to get rid of his humps. No, he wants to change the one set of humps for the other for the simple reason that the cosmic *kakubhs* are provided with food so that he can carry (*bhr̥*) as well as support (*bhr̥*) the Yatis on his back. This implies that *apa-* or *ava-hareya* should be translated: "then I could put down (or: throw away) these". The Yatis like the fish supported by Manu in the flood legend assume cosmic dimensions. The cosmification of the Yatis in the Jaiminīya version makes Indra's promise to keep young boys alive almost disappear. PB. 13, 4, 17 is much clearer on Indra's role: he makes the boys grow (*vardhayati*).

Now the question remains why Indra wanted to kill the Yatis, why he selected this extraordinary procedure and why he spared or helped some of them.

The answer to the last question seems to be simple. The young ascetics praise Indra in JB., i. e., they acknowledge his authority. It is hardly conceivable that other adversaries of Indra might save their lives by praising him. This implies that the conflict with the Yatis is not a military or a cosmic conflict. Indra does not act as the champion of the Devas and the Āryas against the Asuras

14. On threefold food of cosmic dimensions see GONDA, o.c., p. 105: "When Soma first became sacrificial food for the gods he did not wish to become food for them with his whole self. 'Accordingly he deposited those three bodies of his in these (three) worlds' (SB. 3, 9, 4, 12)".

and the Dasyus. The authority of Indra and orthodox Vedic religion is at stake. We may see traces of this in the Kāthaka passage quoted in translation by DANGE (p. 114) in which Indra does not play a role, but the Vedic ritual represents the saviour: *yatin vai sālāvṛkeyā ādamaḥ ta ādiyamānās saṁmrśyamānā uttaravediṁ samudakrāmāḥ tān nābhyadhṛṣṇuḥ teṣāṁ eko ' smayata tata enān abhyadhṛṣṇuḥ (...)* *tasmād na moghahāsinā bhavyam* (KāthS. 25, 6: 109. 20 ff.). The statement that the *sālāvṛkas* were not able to devour the Yatis, after they had mounted the upper *vedi*, implies an exaltation of the power of Vedic ritualism. It may also indicate that under pressure of the circumstances the Yatis came to acknowledge this efficacy of the Vedic religion (especially its ritual). One of them, however, disqualifies himself for the presence inside the *uttaravedi* by smiling or laughing. At that moment the Yatis are no longer sacrosanct and they are devoured by the *sālāvṛkas*.¹⁵

Indra and the *uttaravedi*, two symbols of orthodox Vedic religion, do not kill the Yatis. They only deliver these Yatis to the powers of destruction (the South and the wolves, who may be actual wolves as well as the wild dogs of the nether world) as long as they do not adapt themselves to Vedic religion by praising Indra and by honest behaviour within the sacrificial enclosure.

The Yatis of these Vedic myths can hardly be disconnected from the ascetics who are (later) denoted by this term.¹⁶ The position of ascetics in Vedic literature is rather ambivalent. In the old Upaniṣads they are placed above

15. See also H. KRICK, *Das Ritual der Feuergründung*, Vienna, 1982, p. 141, n. 358 on the "*valmīkīrohaṇam* von Besiegten als Zeichen eines Unterwerfungsschwurs [i. e. Zachariae's interpretation]. Ich würde darin eher den Akt von Schutzfliehenden sehen, die sich auf den heiligen Altar (= Asyl) retten und sich so unter den Schutz der Gottheit (...) stellen". The *uttaravedi* represents the cosmic hill, the axis mundi, the centre of the world. Outside this *uttaravedi* is the world which does not belong to the own culture; here (to the south of the *uttaravedi*) the Yatis are lacerated by the *sālāvṛkas*. Their only refuge is the *uttaravedi* and the god belonging to the axis mundi, Indra.

16. L. VON SCHROEDER, WZKM 23 (1909), p. 14: "Und wenn wir die Yatis im Rigveda mehrmals neben den Bhṛgus genannt finden, so wird der Schluss nicht zu kühn sein, dass auch sie eine bestimmte Ordnung oder Klasse von alten Zauberpriestern, Schamanen der Vorzeit gewesen sein dürften. (...) Unter dieser Voraussetzung lässt sich das spätere Appellativum *yati* 'Asket' verhältnismässig leicht an jene alten *yātayah* anknüpfen. Ist doch die Zauberkraft der Asketen ein sehr hervorstechender Zug in ihrem Wesen." It is uncertain whether VON LEOPOLD's sketch of the developments ("...die Umwandlung der alten primitiven Zauberpriester oder Schamanen in die späteren zaubermächtigen Asketen") is correct or not. I for one am at least convinced that the Vedic Yatis and the *yatis* of the dharma texts and the late Upaniṣads somehow belong together. According to RENOU, EVP 16 (1967), p. 142 *yati* occurring in RV. 10, 72, 7 should be the only example

(Continued on the next page)

the ritualists.¹⁷ The ritualistic texts hardly pay attention to people outside their own sphere. Non-sacrificing ascetics, however, cannot have been acceptable to the orthodox ritualists who produced the older Vedic prose texts. In this situation the topic of Indra letting the *yatis* be killed may have originated. Being ascetics the Yatis cannot be killed by Indra with weapons. Therefore they are surrendered to the wolves or hyaenas, who may often have devoured these unarmed persons outside the *grāma* or have consumed them after suicide. The fact that these ascetics did not stand completely outside the Vedic sphere is indicated by the condemnation of Indra's act, by the help offered to some surviving Yatis by Indra and the possibility to use the *uttaravedi* as an asylum. They even figure as positive mythic seers in the Veda.

In conclusion I translate the whole passage and mention the emendations of the text in the notes.

"He who desires food should apply the Traikakubha Sāman.¹⁸ Indra gave the Yatis to the wolves. When they were being eaten, three boys were left: Rayovāja, Pr̥thurāsmi and Br̥hadgiri. They praised Indra. To them he said: "Wishing what, O boys, do you praise me?"¹⁹ They said: "Support us, O bounteous one". He then on his back.²⁰ They²¹ clung to his three well-known humps.

(Continued from the last page)

of this word in Vedic texts meaning "ascète". Are we to assume that two kinds of *yatis* occur in the Veda? As to the connection between the Yatis and the Bhṛguś (signalized by von SCHROEDER) we may observe that Bhṛgu according to the Śatapatha and Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇas only became a ritualist after he had seen some horrible visions in yonder world which forced him to the conclusion that establishing his fires was the only way to avoid these atrocities. Apparently the Bhṛguś as well as the Yatis were on the fringe of Vedic orthodoxy. The Bhṛguś became accepted as Vedic seers, be it associated with the Atharvans who were likewise situated outside the sphere of the Vedic triad. The Yatis became connected with the fourth *āśrama* rather than with the fourth Veda.

17. See the *pañcāgnividyā/devayāna/pitryāna* passages in BĀU. and ChU., where the people in the forests (BĀU. 6, 2, 15; ChU. 5, 10, 1) are connected with the *devayāna* and the ritualists with the *pitryāna*.

18. SV. 1, 247; 2, 1073-74; JS. 1, 2, 2, 2, 5 (based on RV. 1, 84, 19-90).

19. *mā* is missing in the crit. ed.

20. Literally: between his shoulders. Indra is described as the bull who has a hump (or rather three humps) on his back between his shoulders.

21. In Vedic prose the anaphoric pronoun *ta-* is expected. In this context *te 'sya*... might be preferred to *tā asya*... However, HOFFMANN's interpretation ("Diese drei Höcker hingen an ihm..."), in which *tāh* (nom. plur.) seems to replace *te* due to attraction (fem. *kakubhah*), does not convince, since *lamb* is not a copula. In my interpretation *tā arya tisrah kakubho*.. (acc. plur.) and *tā u eṣām trayānām lokānām tisrah kakubho*.. (acc. plur.; see n. 23) belong together.

These worlds which had been together separated in three parts. Food threefoldly²² followed them.²² And to the three 'humps' of these three worlds was also²³ clinging something namely food.

He (Indra) considered: "If I should²⁴ obtain the three 'humps' of these three worlds [and] the food, I could thereby throw away these humps of mine". He saw this Sāman and praised with it. Thereby he obtained the three 'humps' of these three worlds [and] the food. Thereby he could throw away these three humps of his. Because he obtained the three 'humps' of these three worlds [and] the food, therefore the Traikakubha ("three-humped") is called Traikakubha. Therefore this Sāman means the obtainment of food. He who knows thus, obtains food,²⁵ becomes an eater of food and the most powerful amongst his own people."

22. OERTEL reads *tāns tredhā 'mādyam anuvyait* (instead of *tānis te sāmādyam anuvyaino u* ..).

23. After *anuvyait* (see n. 22) OERTEL reads *ta u eṣām trayāṇām lokānām tisraḥ kakubho 'mādyam alambanta* instead of (*anuvyaino u*) *eṣām trayāṇām lokānām tisraḥ kakubho 'mādyam avalambata*. I adopt HOFFMANN's emendation *tā u* (O.C., p. 9), but reject his interpretation "Die drei Gipfel (*kakubhaḥ*) dieser drei Welten hingen als Speise da", in which *u* is not expressed at all. This particle connects the *kakubhs* on Indra's with these cosmic *kakubhs*. Both have something clinging to them: the Yatis and the threefold cosmic food. The Yatis need this food and consequently the *kakubhs* have to be changed.

24. Read *avarundhīya* for *avarundhate* in agreement with OERTEL and HOFFMANN.

25. Read *amādyam* for *anādyam*.

SANSKRIT *KAROṬA*- 'BOWL, BASIN, VESSEL'

By

T. BURROW

The attestation of this word and its varieties in classical Sanskrit is late and rather limited. The forms, as summarised in MONIER-WILLIAMS' Sanskrit dictionary, are as follows: *karoṭa*- 'basin, cup (lex.), the bones of the head, skull (lex.)', *karoṭi*-/*karoṭī* 'basin, cup, the skull (lex. and Rājat.)'; and (at the end of a compound) *karoṭika*- 'skull, head'. A form *karoṭika* 'skull' is recorded in Schmidt's *Nachtrage*.¹ A word is necessary concerning the relationship between *karoṭi*- and *karoṭī*. This is to be viewed in connection with the well-known confusion between *ī*- and *i*- stems discussed in detail by WACKERNAGEL-DEBRUNNER in *Altindische Grammatik*, Band III, pp. 182-187. This involves a frequent transference of *ī*- stems to feminine *i*-stems, a process carried further in Middle Indo-Aryan. This is the case with *karoṭi*-/*karoṭī*. The form *karoṭī*, a feminine corresponding to the masculine *karoṭa*- is the more original form, and *karoṭi*- fem. has developed from it as part of the above mentioned confusion between *ī* and *i*-stems. It should not, as has been commonly done, be cited as the basic form of this word. The basic and original form of the word is *karoṭa*-.

It might seem that a word so late and comparatively rare would not be very likely to have an Indo-European etymology, an opinion expressed by M. MAYRHOFER in his treatment of this word.² Nevertheless this appearance is rather deceptive, since an examination of other sources, namely Buddhist Sanskrit and Middle Indo-Aryan, shows that its usage is quite widespread, and that its attestation is much earlier than can be gathered from the Sanskrit dictionary alone.

Buddhist Sanskrit has *karoṭa*- and *karoṭaka*- 'cup, basin' and there is a class of minor gods known as *karoṭa-pāṇi*- 'those who hold basins in their hands'. On the other hand the meaning 'skull' which EDGERTON assumes in *Lalitavistara* 305, 22 is, to say the least, highly dubious. Pāli has *karoṭi*- fem. found mainly in the Jātaka prose meaning 'basin, bowl, cup, dish' and *karoṭika*- 'id'. There is also an adjectival *karoṭi*- having the same meaning as the

1. R. SCHMIDT, *Nachträge zum Sanskrit-Wörterbuch in kürzerer Fassung* von Otto BÖHTLINGK p. 136 (Hanover, 1924).

2. M. MAYRHOFER, *Kurzgefasstes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen*, Vol. I, p. 169 (Heidelberg, 1956).

karoṭa-pāṇi- of Buddhist Sanskrit. The Pāli dictionary also gives the meaning 'skull' for *karoṭiya* — occurring in a Jātaka verse at Jātaka VI, 592. This is erroneous, since it is clear from the context that this is an adjective meaning 'helmeted, wearing helmets'. The line of verse in question reads *karoṭiyā cammadharā khaggahatthā suvammīno*, and it describes warriors equipped for battle. The meaning is perfectly clear from the context: "helmeted, bearing leather shields, having swords in their hands, and having good body-armour". Here we have a secondary development of meaning from 'basin' to 'helmet' based on the shape of the helmet. The adjective *karoṭiya-* implies a *karoṭa-* or *karoṭi-* used in this secondary sense. The use of this word in a Jātaka verse takes back the history of the word in Indo-Aryan to a period considerably antedating the beginning of the Christian era, and it shows that the impression of lateness of the word given by the Sanskrit dictionary is misleading.

In Prakrit we have *karoḍaga-* 'a kind of vessel, cup' and *karoḍiyā/karoḍi* 'pitcher, earthen vessel, metal vessel, begging bowl, box (for betel, etc.)'. There is also another secondary meaning development in *karoḍa-* 'coconut'. In addition there is *karoḍi-* in the sense of 'a servant of the king carrying a bag, etc. of betel leaves, etc.' This illustrates the meaning of Buddhist Sanskrit *karoṭa-pāṇi-* and the corresponding Pāli *karoṭi-*. These words are found in Jain canonical works, and are therefore considerably earlier than the appearance of the word in classical Sanskrit. The meaning 'skull' is not found in Prakrit, as far as the evidence of our dictionaries is concerned, although it has been erroneously assumed in the case of the derivative *karoḍiya-*. This means simply 'carrying a begging bowl', and it is a synonym of *kāpālīka-*. The Ardhamaṅgaḍhi gives the preposterous meaning 'an ascetic carrying a garland of human skulls'. For a similar mistaken meaning in the case *kāpālīka-* see below.

To sum up we can say that the basic forms of this word are *karoṭa-* and *karoṭi-*, from which are further derived *karoṭaka-* and *karoṭikā*, and through the common confusion of *i-* and *ī-* stems, *karoṭi-*. The meaning is primarily 'vessel, bowl, basin', etc., from which, though comparatively rarely, certain secondary meanings have been derived, namely, 'helmet', 'skull', and 'coconut'. The word, though well represented in Middle Indo-Aryan was normally avoided in standard Sanskrit until a late period. On the other hand, its existence in Indo-Aryan at quite an early period is established in Pāli, albeit in a secondary sense.

A Dravidian etymology for this word was formerly proposed by me, connecting it with Ta. *ciraṭṭai* 'coconut shell, begging bowl' and related S. Drav. words (DED 2101). This etymology assumed that the Dravidian word had originally initial *k-*, which was later confirmed (cf. Halakki Ka. *geraṭe* and Koraga *gey'e*). Nevertheless it can now be seen that this suggestion is not

acceptable, since the Dravidian word means primarily, and, apart from Ta. 'begging bowl' exclusively 'coconut shell', whereas in Indo-Aryan the primary meaning is 'basin, bowl', etc., and the meaning 'coconut' is only a rare secondary development of meaning in Prakrit. On the other hand, there is in Marathi a word *karṭi* 'the shell of a coconut, a vessel made from it,' which is probably directly derived from this S. Drav. word. Professor TURNER constructed an alternative base *karoṭṭi-* to account for this Marathi form, but there is no way in which Skt. *karoṭi-*, which, as will be seen, is native Indo-Aryan, could develop in this way. It is better therefore to separate it from Skt. *karoṭa-*, etc. and to derive it directly from Dravidian. When this is done there remain no examples in modern Indo-Aryan, so far as at present recorded, of derivatives from Skt. *karoṭa-* 'basin, bowl' and its derivatives.

An Indo-European etymology of this word was proposed by F. SPECHT, who connected it with OSlav. *koryto* 'trough' and Lettish *karaūte* 'spoon, ladle'.³ Before evaluating this proposal there are some further forms of this Indo-Aryan to be considered. In Sukumar SEN's etymological dictionary of Old Bengali⁴ there is recorded a word *karoyā* 'a begging bowl' (used by some, generally Muslim, religious mendicants). As to its etymology SEN connects it with Sanskrit *karaka* or *karaṅka-*, but this is impossible since such originals would not account for the form of the OBeng. word, and in particular for the vowel of the second syllable. Nor can it be derived from *karoṭa-*, since intervocalic *-ṭ-* is not elided in modern Indo-Aryan, but converted to *-r-*. The only original from which *karoyā* can be derived is *karotaka-* with dental *-t-*. This reconstituted form is not merely hypothetical, since in Pāli, whenever the word *karoṭa-* or its variants occur, there is found to be a variant reading with dental *-t-*, and this is sometimes admitted into the text, as in the commentatorial passage in Jātaka VI, 592 (*sisakarotiko*). These variants might have been considered to be merely of a textual nature, but viewed in connection with OBeng. *karoyā* they can be seen as genuine alternative forms of the word.

Thus two forms of this word can be established for Indo-Aryan, and of these **karota-*, with dental *-t-* must be the more original. It has recently become increasingly clear that the spontaneous substitution of cerebral or retroflex consonants for original IE dentals in Sanskrit and later Indo-Aryan occurs on an extensive scale. I have dealt with this subject elsewhere,⁵ and further examples

3. F. SPECHT, *Der Ursprung der Indogermanischen Deklination*, p. 140 (Göttingen, 1947). The connection of Skt *karoṭi-* with Lett. *karaūte* and Slav. *koryto* had previously been proposed by J. ENDZELIN in *Lettische Grammatik*, p. 287 (Heidelberg, 1923).

4. Sukumar SEN, *An Etymological Dictionary of Bengali* : c. 1000 – 1800 A. D., p. 120 (Calcutta, 1971).

5. T. BURROW, *Spontaneous cerebrals in Sanskrit*, BSOAS, 34 (1971), pp. 338–359.

of the same kind will be given later in the course of this paper. The combinatory changes which were responsible for the generation of retroflexes in Sanskrit are limited, being confined to the development of *-ḍ-* from the original combination *-ḷd-*, the effect of Fortunatov's law, and in the case of the nasal, the influence of *r*, etc. occurring earlier in the word. There are also a few instances of Prakritic developments. Where there is no possibility of any of these causes being present, as is the case with *karoṭa-* it is necessary to assume spontaneous retroflexion without further evidence. In the case of this word, however, further evidence, as we have observed, is available.

Now that the original form of the Sanskrit word has been established, it can be seen that the relationship between the Sanskrit word on the one hand, and the Slavonic and Baltic word on the other, is much closer than that had appeared. SPECHT analysed the Sanskrit word as *karo-ṭi-*, leaving the *-ṭi* unexplained, and comparing only the first two syllables. Now it can be seen that the whole word, including the final suffix, corresponds exactly with the related forms, so that we can regard the comparison as certain. The only difference is one of vowel gradation in the second syllable, with *y < ū* in Slavonic as opposed to the diphthong in Sanskrit and Lettish.

A radical connection of *karoṭa-* with *karaka-* 'water-pot' and *karāṅka-* 'vessel made from a coconut; skull' has been suggested,⁶ and a similar connection could be suggested with *karāṇḍa-* 'box, basket, etc.' Not much is to be said about such suggested connections beyond the fact that there exists such a possibility, though it cannot be proved. Concerning Slav. *koryto* a radical connection with Gk. *Reiēw* 'cut', etc. has been suggested by some etymologists.⁷ This also is not to be proved, but, since in early Indo-European times such vessels were to a large extent constructed of wood, as were later the Vedic sacrificial instruments, it is likely that they were produced by a process of hollowing out by sharp instruments. This being so it is worth looking at a rare Greek verb which contains the same succession of phonemes as Slav. *koryto*, etc., and has a meaning which could have developed from a more general meaning of 'gouge out'. This is *krouteĩtac* (Hesychius) 'pick out the kernel of fruit'. If the words we are discussing had originally meant vessels produced by a gouging process, this meaning could be continued in the Greek word in a more specialised sense.

The secondary meaning 'skull' which this word has developed is comparatively rare, and late, but it is one of a series of words in which the same kind

6. C. C. UHLENBECK, *Kurzgefasstes etymologisches Wörterbuch der Altindischen Sprache*, pp. 44-45 (Amsterdam, 1898/1899).

7. Cf. M. VASMER, *Russisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, Vol. I, p. 638.

of meaning development has taken place. Apart from Sanskrit it is also a familiar semantic development in other languages. A well known example is Lat. *testa* 'earthenware, earthen pot', from which have developed Romance words meaning 'head', e. g., Italian *testa*, French *tête*. In South Dravidian the word *Ta, maṇṭai*, etc., which properly means 'earthen vessel' has commonly acquired the meaning 'skull, head', and in some of the languages only this meaning remains (Cf. DED. 3831). Likewise *Ta. ōṇu*, etc. meaning 'tile, earthen pan', etc. also has the meaning 'skull'. This is a development of meaning in one direction only, and we do not have examples of words meaning 'head, skull' developing the meaning 'vessel, pot'.

For this reason we must assume that in the case of Sanskrit *kapāla-* which means both 'bowl, begging bowl', etc. and 'skull cranium', the first meaning is primary, and the second a meaning that has developed from this. Consequently we must reject etymologies which connect the word with Lat. *caput* 'head' and OE *hafola* 'id', since in those cases the meaning 'head' is primary. The Sanskrit word *kapāla-* can be derived from the well-known IE root which appears in Lat. *capio*, etc., meaning 'take, hold, contain', and which frequently appears in the names of vessels and containers.⁸ It should also be noted that the coexistence of these two meanings in this word has led to some serious misunderstandings, such as the unbelievable statement that the sect of *kāpālikas* went round using human skulls as begging bowls. They were called *kāpālikas-* only from the begging bowls (*kapāla-*) which they used.

Sanskrit *bhagāla-*, which has the same meaning as *kapāla-*, is a rare word, which nevertheless is of good Indo-Iranian inheritance. This is established by the fact that a corresponding word is found in Khotanese Saka, namely, *bagala-* 'vessel', from which we can also see that this is the original meaning of the Sanskrit word. In connection with this *bhagāla-* there is an interesting passage in the *Pāraskara-grhyasūtra* (2. 7) dealing with the substitution of more auspicious words for the ordinary words which might be considered less auspicious. For instance, instead of *nakula-* 'mongoose' which might be taken to imply that the animal had no family, the word *sakula-* should be substituted. In the case of *kapāla-*, meaning the dish in which the offerings are laid out, *bhagāla-* should be substituted. The word *kapāla-* was to be avoided because it also had the meaning 'skull', and was therefore inauspicious. The fact that the rare word *bhagāla-* was to be substituted indicates that at that time it had not acquired this secondary meaning. Later it did so, but our dictionaries are mistaken in giving this as the only meaning of the word.

8. Cf. BURROW, BSOAS, 45 (1982), p. 188.

The same combination of meanings is found in *karpara*- 'cup, pot, bowl', and 'skull'. The word is connected with OSlav. *crépŭ* 'potsherd' which shows the original meaning. In OPruss. *kerpetis*, however, the same secondary meaning 'skull' has developed, as it also has in some modern Slavonic languages in derivatives of the above OSlav. word.

The position is more complicated in the case of the word *karāṅka*-, which also combines these two meanings. The definitions of this word in MONIER-WILLIAMS' dictionary are inadequate, and have to be supplemented from R. SCHMIDT's *Nachtrage*, the Buddhist Sanskrit dictionary of EDGERTON, and the Prakrit dictionary. From all these we get the following range of meanings, corresponding generally to those of *karoṭa*-: 'box, casket, container (especially for holding betel ingredients); begging bowl; a coconut hollowed out to form a cup or vessel; skull, head'. The development of the meaning 'skull, cranium' can be derived without difficulty from the meaning 'vessel, container', but in this case there is a complication. In addition to the meanings listed above the word *karāṅka*- has another quite distinct meaning, namely, 'skeleton, bones of a skeleton'. This is so different from the other set of meanings, that it must be considered as a separate word. Instances of this word are found in classical Sanskrit in the *Harsacarita*, and in Buddhist Sanskrit. The Prakrit dictionary gives the meaning *haḍḍi* 'bone', but this is misleading. It only means 'bones devoid of flesh, bones of a skeleton', not 'bone' in general. The lexical meaning quoted by MONIER-WILLIAMS for Sanskrit is likewise misleading. In view of this second word *karāṅka*-, it might be thought that the meaning 'skull' could be derived from this, rather than from *karāṅka*- 'box', but this is not necessary in view of the similar developments of meaning from 'vessel, container' to 'skull'.

It is interesting to note that in modern Indo-Aryan, as registered by TURNER, there is no trace of *karāṅka*- 'box'. On the other hand *karāṅka* 'skeleton' is widely represented: Panj. *karāṅg* 'skeleton', etc.

ON THE MAHĀBHĀṢYA EVIDENCE FOR A PAṆINĪYA DHĀTUPĀṬHA WITHOUT MEANING ENTRIES

By

GEORGE CARDONA

Pāṇini's sūtra 1. 3. 1 : *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ* provides that items in the ordered set whose first member is *bhū* are called *dhātu*. Members of this set are thereby given the class name *dhātu* (' verb, root ') and thus assigned to the class of verbs.

In the Mahābhāṣya on Aṣṭādhyāyī 1. 3. 1 a discussion takes place concerning why Pāṇini says *bhūvādayaḥ*, using a compound with the term *-ādi* ('first'). A discussant remarks that if the items in question are explicitly recited, there is no purpose in using such a compound. In other instances where Pāṇini explicitly lists particular items he does not use a term with *-ādi* in referring to them. For example, 1. 2. 7 : *mṛdamṛdagudhakuṣakliśavadavasah ktvā* (*kit* 5) provides that the affix *Ktvā* is treated as marked with *k* after certain verbs.¹ Pāṇini gives these verbs in the sūtra ; he does not refer to them by means of a compound with *-ādi*.² If on the other hand, the bases *bhū* etc. are not explicitly recited, there is all the less purpose in using a term with *-ādi*, since it is not possible that items not recited in order be qualified as members of a group beginning with a given element.³ The aim of this Mahābhāṣya passage is clearly to question the propriety of using *bhūvādayaḥ* in Aṣṭādhyāyī 1. 3. 1 under the assumption that the items to be called *dhātu* by this rule are given in rules of Pāṇini's sūtrapāṭha. Suppose that the elements in question were *bhū* and others alluded to only in sūtras of the Aṣṭādhyāyī proper, starting with *bhū* referred to in 1. 2. 6 :

1. *mṛd* ' be gracious ' (3 sg. *mṛdati*), *mṛd* ' crush ' (*mṛdnāti*), *gudh* ' cover ' (*gudhyati*), *gudh* ' be angry ' (*gudhnāti*), *kuṣ* ' draw out ' (*kuṣṇāti*), *kliś* ' be afflicted ' (*kliśyati*), *kliś* ' afflict ' (*kliśnāti*), *vad* ' say ' (*vadati*), *vas* ' remain in a place ' (*vasati*), the absolutes of which are *mṛditvā*, *mṛditvā*, *gudhvitvā*, *kuṣitvā*, *kliśitvā*, *uditvā*, *uṣitvā*. Although *Ktvā* is marked with *k* in the first place, 1. 2. 7 is required as an exception to other rules (1. 2. 18 : *na ktvā seḥ*, 1. 2. 26 : *ralo vyupadhūd dhalādeḥ samś ca*), whereby this marking is suppressed or made optional. Additional details are not needed for the present discussion.

2. Mahābhāṣya (KIELHORN'S edition, revised by K. V. ABHYANKAR) I, 253. 7-9 : *athādigrahaṇam kimartham | yadi tāvat paṭhyante nārtha ādigrahaṇena | anyatrāpi hy ayam paṭhaṇm ādigrahaṇam na karoti | kvānyatra | mṛdamṛdagudhakuṣakliśavadavasah ktvēti*.

3. Mahābhāṣya I, 253. 9-11 : *atha na paṭhyante natarām artha ādigrahaṇena | na hy apāṭhitā śakyā ādigrahaṇena viśeṣayitum*.

indhibhavatibhyām ca. Under this assumption an objection is possible : Pāṇini could as well simply have recited these items in sūtras of his Aṣṭādhyāyī and then said *te dhātavaḥ* 'these (have the class name) *dhātu*', just as he introduces certain taddhita affixes and then says of them (Aṣṭādhyāyī 4. 1. 174) *te tadrājāḥ* 'these (have the class name) *tadrāja*.'⁴ Of course the bases referred to in 1. 3. 1 : *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ* are not simply listed in the Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtrapāṭha; they are given in a separate appendix to this. As Patañjali goes on to note, by using *bhūvādayaḥ*, with *-ādi*, Pāṇini makes it known that there is a text in which *bhū* etc. are recited, a text external to the corpus of sūtras of the Aṣṭādhyāyī proper.⁵ In brief, *bhūvādayaḥ* refers to bases listed in Pāṇini's dhātupāṭha.

Patañjali also notes the reason why Pāṇini should make known that there is a dhātupāṭha separate from the sūtra text of the Aṣṭādhyāyī proper : The class name *dhātu* applies, by 1. 3. 1, to elements by virtue of their being recited in this text.⁶ This point opens the way to objections which Kātyāyana brings up in his first two vārttikas on 1. 3. 1.⁷ First, it is claimed, if the name *dhātu* is given to elements by virtue of their being recited in the dhātupāṭha, one has to deny this class name to items which are homophonous with some elements given in the text but which should not be referred to by the term *dhātu*. Thus, the relative pronoun *yā* (fem.), the particles *vā* 'or', *nu* 'now', the affix *nu* (3. 2. 140 : *trasigr̥dhidhr̥ṣiksipeḥ knuḥ*), and the noun *div* 'heaven' are homophonous with *yā* 'go, reach', *vā* 'blow', *nu* (*nú*) 'praise', *div* (*divU*) 'gamble'; these verbs should indeed be called *dhātu*, but the other items should not be so called.⁸ Secondly, if the name *dhātu* is given to items by virtue of their inclusion in the dhātupāṭha, one also must note the extent of each unit that is to have this class name, saying that a stretch of a given extent in each instance is termed *dhātu*. For, on what grounds should it be the case that, for example, the speech segment *bhū* will be called *dhātu* and not the segment *bhvedh*?⁹ I have followed

4. Pradīpa (Rohatak edition) II. 174-175 : *nārth itī : bhūvādīn paṭhitvā te dhātava itī vaktavyam yathā te tadrājā itī.*

5. Mahābhāṣya I. 253. 11-12 : *evam tarhi siddhe sati yad ādigrahanam karoti taj jñāpayaty ācāryo'sti ca pāṭho bāhyaś ca sūtrād itī.*

6. Mahābhāṣya I. 253. 12 : *kim etasya jñāpane prayojanam | pāṭhena dhātusamjñety etad upapannam bhavati.*

7. 1. 3. 1 vt. 1 : *pāṭhena dhātusamjñāyām samūnaśabda-pratiśedhaḥ*, vt. 2 : *parimūnāgrahanam ca.*

8. Mahābhāṣya I. 253. 14-16 : *pāṭhena dhātusamjñāyām samūnaśabdānām pratiśedho vaktavyaḥ | yā itī dhātur yā ity ābantaḥ | vā itī dhātur vā itī nipātaḥ | nu itī dhātur nu itī pratyayaś ca nipātaś ca | div itī dhātur div itī prātipadikam.*

9. Mahābhāṣya I. 254. 11-12 : *parimūnāgrahanam ca kartavyam | iyān avadhīr dhātusamjño bhavātīti vaktavyam | kuto hy etad bhūśabdo dhātusamjño bhaviṣyati na punar bhvedhśabda itī.*

Patañjali's interpretation of Kātyāyana's first and second vārttikas on 1. 3. 1. According to Patañjali, Kātyāyana means this : If the name *dhātu* applies to elements because they are recited in the dhātupāṭha (*pāṭhena dhātusamjñāyām*), a negation (*pratiṣedhaḥ*) has to be stated (*vaktavyaḥ*) in respect of certain items that have the same shape (*samānaśabdānām*) as some elements to which the name *dhātu* should apply properly, and a specific mention of the extent (*pturimānagrahaṇam ca*) of each unit to be called *dhātu* must be made (*kartavyam*). That Patañjali has properly interpreted these vārttikas follows from what Kātyāyana says in subsequent vārttikas. In his next two vārttikas to 1. 3. 1,¹⁰ Kātyāyana deals with a problem that arises under the assumption that the name *dhātu* applies to terms which signify actions (*kriyāvacane*) : One has to deny the class name to preverbs and affixes, since the meaning in question — an action — is understood from complexes including bases with preverbs and affixes.¹¹ What Kātyāyana has to say in the first four vārttikas to 1. 3. 1 is thus best interpreted as follows : Objections are raised under the assumption that Pāṇini's sūtra assigns the name *dhātu* to elements as listed in his dhātupāṭha; to overcome these objections, an alternative descriptive definition is considered, such that an element which signifies an action is called *dhātu* ;¹² objections are then brought up against this alternative.¹³

10. 1. 3. 1 vt. 3 : *kriyāvacana upasargaḥpratyayaḥpratiṣedhaḥ*, vt. 4 : *saṃghātenārthagateh*.

11. Mahābhāṣya I. 254. 26 : *saṃghātena hy artho gamyate saṃprakṛtikeṇa saṃpratyayakena sopasargena ca*. Patañjali (Mahābhāṣya I. 254. 23) gives the examples *pacati* '... cooks', *pra-pacati* '... begins to cook.'

12. Mahābhāṣya I. 254. 13 : *yadi punaḥ kriyāvacano dhātur ity etal lakṣaṇam kriyeta*.

13. J. BRONKHORST has recently claimed (JIP 9 : 346 [1981]) that Patañjali's interpretation of vārttikas 1 and 2 on 1. 3. 1 is not necessarily acceptable and that the two vārttikas may properly be translated as follows : "Owing to the Dhātupāṭha, [utterances] of the same sound-pattern [as verbal roots] are prevented from [assuming] the designation 'root'; and the measure [of the individual roots] is known." This is unacceptable on two counts. First it fails to account satisfactorily for the sequence of Kātyāyana's vārttikas. If in his first two vārttikas on 1. 3. 1 Kātyāyana indeed states that the dhātupāṭha serves to preclude assigning the class name *dhātu* to items such as the relative pronoun *yā* and that the dhātupāṭha makes known the extent of each verbal base, it is difficult to account for Kātyāyana's considering alternatives in vārttikas that follow. This makes better sense, and conforms with what Kātyāyana does elsewhere, if one understands the first two vārttikas to raise objections. Moreover, translating Kātyāyana's second vārttika to 1. 3. 1 "and the measure [of the individual roots] is known" attributes to *parimānagrahaṇam* here, a sense not justified by usage in comparable passages elsewhere by Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Of course, *grah* means 'grasp, take' and can be used of intellectual grasping, but it is known that this verb also means 'utter, mention, refer to', as can be seen from earliest Indic texts (e. g., RV 10. 145. 4a ; *na hy āsyā nāma grbhṇāmi* 'I do not utter her name'). In

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Pāṇinīyas have recognized that the objections raised in the first and the second vārttikas to 1. 3. 1 presuppose a dhātupāṭha different from the one transmitted by commentators such as Kṣīrasvāmin, Maitreya or Sāyaṇa, a text without the meaning entries included in the dhātupāṭha versions handed down by these later commentators. For such glosses would have served to specify items used in particular meanings and also to separate verbs listed in the dhātupāṭha. Moreover from vārttika 2 on 1. 3. 1 and the Bhāṣya thereon we are entitled to conclude that the dhātupāṭha to which Kātyāyana and Patañjali allude here began *bhvedha-spardha* ..., not *bhū sattāyām* ... or *bhū sattāyām udāttaḥ parasmaibhāṣah* ...¹⁴ Now, it would be perfectly proper for the dhātupāṭha which Pāṇini himself adopted to include ordered groups and subgroups of bases, without meaning entries, and for Pāṇini's sūtra 1. 3. 1 to provide simply that bases given in the dhātupāṭha have the class name *dhātu*. Certainly, bases such as *yā*, *nu* (*nū*), *div* (*divU*) do not have to be accompanied by glosses to distinguish them from nominal elements, since the verbs as recited in the dhātupāṭha are not truly homophonous with these items. Thus, the verb *yā* is recited with a low-pitched base vowel, showing that an ārdhadhātuka affix beginning with a consonant other than *y* does not receive the initial augment *iT* after this base (7. 2. 10: *ekāca upadeśe'nudāttāt*), but the feminine relative pronoun *yā* (< *yā-ā*) has a high-pitched vowel. The particle *nu* has a high-pitched vowel, as does the affix *Knu* (3. 1. 3: *ādyudāttaś ca*), and the verb *nū* is indeed taught with a high-pitched base vowel. However, for metalinguistic reasons, this item is also listed with *n*, which is replaced by *n* (6. 1. 65: *no naḥ*). Again the verb *divU* as recited in the dhātupāṭha has a marker (*it*) *u*, so that it is not then homophonous with the noun *div*.¹⁵ The need to recite base vowels with different pitches and to list

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passages comparable to 1. 3. 1: vt. 2; Kātyāyana regularly uses *grahana* as a derivative of *grah* with these meanings; e. g., vt. 1 on Śivasūtra 5: *hakārasya paropadeśe 'dgrahaneṣu hagrahaṇam* argues that if the sound *h* is taught only in the last Śivasūtra (*hal*), not also in the fifth Śivasūtra (*hayavarāt*), then one will have to refer to *h* separately in sūtras where the pratyāhāra *aT* is used.

14. Rāṭnaprakāśa (*Mahābhāṣya Pradīpa Vyākhyānāni*, edited by M. S. NARASIMHACHARYA, volume IV [Publications de l'Institut Français d'Indologie No. 51, 4], Pondichéry, 1977) 134-135: *idānīm bhvedhaspardha ityādirūpaṃ gaṇapāṭhaṃ āsṛitya prakṛtasūtram pravṛttam iti manyamānasya pāthena dhātusamjñāyām ityādivacanāni avatārayati atheti*, 135: *pātheneti* (Mahābhāṣya I. 253. 14): *bhvedhaspardhagādhir ityādirūpeneti śeṣah*, 137: *kuto hy etad iti* (Mahābhāṣya I. 254. 11-12): *bhvedhaspardha ityādirūpapāṭhajañānam asya mūlam ity uktam na vismartyam*. Śabdakaustubha II. 49: *nā ca yā prāpane ityādyarthanirdeśo niyāmakah tasyāpāṇinīyatvāt... pāṇinis tu bhvedha ityādy apāthīd iti bhāṣyavārttikayoḥ spaṣṭam*. See also Pradīpa II. 178, *Vaiyākaraṇa bhūṣaṇa* (K. P. TRIVEDI's edition) 48.

15. Space limitations preclude my going into additional details or discussing the Mahābhāṣya's arguments (I. 253: 16-254. 9) concerning homophonous items.

verbs with certain appended markers, in order to show that particular operations apply or not to the items in question, makes it improper for Pāṇini's original dhātupāṭha to have begun *bhvedhaspardha* and to have continued in a like manner, with sandhi modifications observed across boundaries. For this would have obscured the required features. For example, the verb *bhū* should have a high-pitched vowel, since an ārdhadhātuka affix with an initial consonant other than *y* takes the augment *iT* after this base (7. 2. 35 : *ārdhadhātukasyeḍ valādeḥ*), but the *v* of *bhv* in *bhvedha* cannot have this pitch feature. Again, the verb *jūṣī* 'take pleasure in something' has to be marked with a low-pitched *ī* to show that it takes ātmanepada affixes in agentive forms (1. 3. 12 : *anudātta- nīta ātmanepadam*) and that, although it conditions the initial augment *iT* for other ārdhadhātuka affixes, it does not do so for *Kta* and *KtavotU* (7. 2. 14 : *śvidito niṣṭhāyām*) : *jūṣāte* (3 sg. pres.), *jūṣisyate* (3 sg. fut.), *jūṣta-* 'enjoyed, liked.' If the *-ī* of *jūṣī* were subject to replacement by *-y* before the vowel of *Oviḥī* 'tremble, fear', this marking would be obscured : *-y* can also be a replacement for *-i*, which Pāṇini also uses as a marker ; if *jūṣ* were treated as marked with *i*, moreover, it would wrongly get an infixed augment *n* (7. 1. 58 : *idito num dhātoḥ*). In sum, in the dhātupāṭha originally adopted by Pāṇini bases must have been recited without sandhi modifications : *bhū édha spārdha* and so on. Of course, such a list clearly shows the extent of each base, with its markers.

Together with evidence from the Aṣṭādhyāyī, Kātyāyana's and Patañjali's discussions of 1. 3. 1 : *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ* thus allow the following conclusions. Pāṇini's dhātupāṭha originally listed verbs separately, without sandhi substitutions, and also without meaning entries. The text underwent two major modifications. First, items in the dhātupāṭha came to be recited continuously, with sandhi substitutions observed. This took place at some time prior to Kātyāyana. It is doubtless to be connected with the loss of the distinctive nasalization Pāṇini used to show that certain vowels were markers.¹⁶ Despite this development, however, the dhātupāṭha known to Kātyāyana did not yet include entries such as *udāttaḥ parasmaibhāṣaḥ*. In addition, at some time after Patañjali, meaning entries were introduced, doubtless together with entries such as *udāttaḥ parasmaibhāṣaḥ*. The forms in which these glosses appear accord with Pāṇinian usage in the Aṣṭādhyāyī. For example, 1. 3. 31 : *spardhāyām ānaḥ* (*hvaḥ* 30, *kartari* 14, *ātmanepadam* 12) provides that ātmanepada affixes follow *hvā* with the preverb

16. *pratiñānūnāsikyāḥ pāṇinīyāḥ*. The development is also doubtless linked with a loss of distinct accents in the tradition of Pāṇinian recitation, including the loss of the svarita which Pāṇini used (1. 3. 11 : *svaritenādihikārah*) to mark adhikāras (*pratiñānsvaritāḥ pāṇinīyāḥ*).

āN, if a *ā-hvā* is used in the meaning 'compete' (*spardhāyām* [*vartamānāt*]). The locative *spardhāyām*, which is to be construed with a supplied form *vartamānāt* 'occurring', gives the meaning in which *ā-hvā* occurs when it takes ātmanepada affixes. In accordance with such usage, locative forms are used for meaning entries in the dhātupāṭha.

THE KUNTĀPA HYMNS AND THE 'ŚILPA'

By

SADASHIV A. DANGE

In the context of the Viśvajit sacrifice, in both the types, viz., the Atirātra and the Agniṣṭoma,¹ there is a mention of the hymns termed Śilpa. The tradition uses the term Kalpa for a sacrifice in general, and the Śilpa-s are a unique method for producing wonderful results. The term Śilpa comes in the context of the rites of the Sixth day of the Prṣṭhya sacrifice; and it is said that the combination of verses at a hymn, or certain methods of reciting the verses in a hymn (with a *nyūnika* etc.) are at the basis of the concept of Śilpa. These, then, are called Deva-śilpa, as we have the *śilpa* among the humans to be seen in producing an elephant, a mirror, ornaments of gold or even a chariot drawn by a female mule (*aśvatari-rathaḥ*).² The purpose of these Śilpas is said to be to accomplish the sacrifice and to bring about the new birth of the sacrificer (*kalpata eva yajñāḥ kalpate yajamānasya prajātiḥ*, at Ai. Br. VI. 31). The Śilpas included in this special technique (*kalpa*) are based on the following hymns from the Ṛgveda: Nābhānediṣṭha (X. 61), Vālakhilya (VIII. 49-59), Vṛṣākapi (X. 86) and Evayāmarut (V. 87). These hymns are deftly combined with others, each combination being allotted to a separate priest among the Hotṛ, the Maitrāvaruṇa, the Brāhmaṇacchamsin and the Acchāvāka. The hymns combined with the four main noted above are Nārāśamsa, Sukīrti and the Kuntāpa. Actually another set of the Nārāśamsa is included in the Kuntāpa, while the Sukīrti is from the Ṛgveda (X. 131). Every hymn has a purpose and symbolic value. The Nābhānediṣṭha is without a clear deity; hence, it is said, it is to be recited first; because, the whole Śilpa is for the new birth of the sacrificer; and the Nābhānediṣṭha hymn stands for the semen; and, being without a clear deity it should be recited, as semen is sprinkled in the vagina without its being seen openly (Ai. Br. op. cit. 27 *aniruktam śamsaty 'aniruktam vai reto guhā yonyām sicyate*). This particular hymn is selected for this purpose, as it has the expression "With the earth does he unite sprinkling the semen" (X. 61. 7). The Hotṛ priest recites the hymn; and after this he recites what are called Nārāśamsyaḥ verses from the Kuntāpa group. This is so, because the Nārāśamsīs indicate "progeny" (*naraḥ*) with the speech (*śamsaḥ*).

1. See Sāyaṇa on Ai. Br. VI. 31 (=5).

2. Ai. Br. loc. cit. 27 (=1=); Gopatha Br. Uttara 6, 7.

After this has been done by the Hotṛ priest, it is believed that the sacrificer is himself sprinkled in the form of the semen (*retobhūtam siktva*). Thereafter the sacrificer (in the form of the semen) is given over to the Maitrāvaruṇa priest to work another symbolic wonder (*śilpam*). The Maitrāvaruṇa, now, recites the Vālakhilya hymns. The reason is that the sacrificer is on the way to be a full foetus. Along with being endowed with the faculty of "being born" with the Nārāsaṃsa hymn, which is *prajāh*, he is now got endowed with the vital breaths; that is why the Vālakhilya hymns are to be recited (Ib. 28). Here, again, out of the eight Vālakhilya hymns only the first six are to be recited. The reason is (obviously) that this is the Silpa of the Sixth day of the Pṛsthya Śaḍaha sacrifice, and it is known in the tradition that the "sixth" is a symbol of new birth or new life.³ These six hymns are to be recited as separated from each other; because the vital breaths (*prāṇāh*) are separated – the Prāṇa, the Vyāna, and the Apāna. The first two are to be recited according to the hemistiches (*pac-śah*), the next two in halves and the next two in a whole verse. Thus, the sacrificer is endowed with the vital breaths, and also with speech, with eyes and mind and with the ears and the soul. (Other details are left out). After this is done, the last two are to be recited with mutual inversion: the eighth first and the seventh thereafter (Ib. 28). Thereafter the sacrificer is (conceptually) handed over to the Brāhmaṇācchamsin priest, who recites the Sukṛti (X. 131) hymn, which is supposed to be the divine womb. By reciting this hymn, the said priest places the sacrificer in the divine womb for being born on the divine plane of the sacrifice. He, then, recites the Vṛṣākapi-hymn, which is symbolically the soul and provides also the food, as one gives milk to the new-born child. After this new birth, the sacrificer is handed over to the Acchāvāka priest, who provides him with stable ground to stand; and this is done by means of the recitation of the Evayāmāruta hymn (mentioned above).

While the process of the new birth of the sacrificer goes on, the Kuntāpa hymns are ushered in after the recitation of the Sukṛti and the Vṛṣākapi hymns by the Brāhmaṇācchamsin. The Vṛṣākapi hymn is symbolic also of the five vital breaths, as it has the Paṅkti metre in its structure (Ib. *sa pāṅkto bhavati pāṅkto 'yam puruṣaḥ pañcadhā vihitah*, the five being hair, bones, marrow, flesh and skin). The Kuntāpas are to be recited by the Brāhmaṇācchamsin himself. This means that the Kuntāpas are to be recited at the end of the birth-process of the sacrificer, but prior to his *pratiṣṭhā* by the Evayāmāruta hymn by the Acchāvāka. The sixth day is thus closely associated with the

3. Cf. Sat. Br. IV. 5.9.4 *atha śaṣṭhe 'hani 'śukrāgrān grhṇāti*. The Ai. Br. says in the present context that the sixth day is heaven, loc. cit., 10 *svargo vai lokah śaṣṭham ahaḥ*.

Kuntāpas; and without these hymns the foetus cannot be complete. It may be noted that the normal foetus gets fully grown by the sixth month, for which the sixth day is symbolically used. As noted above, this birth at the sacrifice is brought about with the recitation of the hymns. But, according to the belief recorded by the Ai. Br., the essence of the normal metres went away on the sixth day. Prajāpati got afraid feeling that the essence (*rasaḥ*) would never turn back; but he managed to get it turn back. He, however, could not use the same oriental metres, but the Kuntāpas. The essence of the Gāyatrī he got with the help of the hymns called Nārāsaṁsyāḥ, the first of the Kuntāpa hymns. That of the Tristubh by the Raibhīs (i.e. the hymns that have the word *rebha* in it), that of the Jagatī in the hymns called *Pāriksityāḥ* (having the word *pariksīt*), that of the Anuṣṭubh in the Kāravyaḥ (where the word *kāru* is present); and after gathering the essence this way, he placed it again on the original hymns. About the method of recitation in the case of these Kuntāpa-hymns, the norm is the Vṛṣākapi hymn, but with the difference that in the Vṛṣākapi Nyūṅkha⁴ is employed while in these its place is taken by the mode called Nardana (or, Ninarda). This Ninarda is said to be equal to the Nyūṅkha for these hymns (Ib. 32). Other Kuntāpa hymns to be similarly recited are Diśān-klpti Janakalpāḥ, and Indragāthāḥ. These are the main Kuntāpa hymns, the verses numbering thirty.⁵ Others that are loosely included in the same category are Etaśa-pralāpāḥ, Pravahlikāḥ, Ājijñāsenyāḥ, Pratirā-dhaḥ, Ativādāḥ, Devanīthāḥ, Bhūtacchedaḥ and Āhanasyāḥ. All except the last are enjoined to be recited with breaks, with the Ninarda, but not the Nyūṅkha. The last have the Nyūṅkha, again.

If we examine the statement of the Ai. Br. about the metres and the essence of the original metres and the Kuntāpa hymns, it appears that the Kuntāpa hymns are believed to be on par with the original ones. But the fact is that there are variations metrically. Let us take the example of the Nārāsaṁsyāḥ which is said to have the essence of the Gāyatrī. The analysis of the hemistiches is as follows:

(1) 8 + 8 + 8, which is Gāyatrī all right. But the verse does not end here. It goes further and has 12 more letters.

(2) 8 + 7; the latter portion is confused, with total 20 letters.

4. The *nyūṅkha* is accomplished by the utterance of short *o* sounds, thirteen times, followed by the same long; see Sāyaṇa on Ai. Br. VI. 4. According to the Āśv. Śr. S. the *nyūṅkha* is to be imposed on the second vowel of each of the two halves of the verse VIII. 3. Also VII. 11. 1-3; see also KASHIKAR C. G., *A Survey of the Śrauta Sūtras*, Bombay University, Bombay, (Journal), Sept., 1966, p. 85.

5. Sāyaṇa on Ai. Br., loc. cit. 6.

(3) $8 + 8$; and further 14.

Barring the last of the three Nārāśamsyaḥ, which is their total number, the first two could be arranged as having a uniform pattern with $12 + 8$ in the latter part, thus:

(1) $8 + 8$; $12 + 8$; also (2) $8 + 7$; $12 + 8$. Even then the last is a difficulty, which may be solved by reading the latter half as 7 (= 8 with *śātani-arvatām* in the place of *śātany 'arvatām*), leaving the last portion with only 7.

What has been stated above would show how the legend at the Ai. Br. has to be taken with a discount, unless we believe that the Kuntāpa, i. e. Nārāśamsyaḥ, were slightly changed later. But there is nothing to admit the latter supposition, as at all occurrences they are uniform, with a slight change of a word or so. The Ai. Br. states that the Raibhī-s were fashioned from the Triṣṭubh; but, this is not correct; for, the Raibhī verses are perfectly in the Anuṣṭubh, which is the metre mentioned for the Kāravayāḥ by the Ai. Br. Actually, the Kāravayāḥ are in the Anuṣṭubh metre, except for the last verse which has an added *pāda* of 8, making it split like the Gāyatrī. This puts the statement of the Ai. Br. to confusion. The only conclusion is that the statement is not exact; nor probably, was it to be taken as mentioning the exact position of the letters in the verses. The same inexactitude is seen in the case of the Pāriksityaḥ, which do not answer the statement of the Ai. Br. that they were fashioned from the Jagatī.

The Ai. Br. which mentions the legend of the original hymns losing their essence, which is then gathered in the Kuntāpa hymns, does not explain the name Kuntāpa. The Gopatha Br., however, explains it. According to it *kuyam* (not *ku*) is "the despised"; as they burn what is despised, they are called Kuntāpa (*kuyam + tāpa √tap*, "to burn"; cf. VI; 12 *kuyam harai nāma kutsitam bhavati, tad yat tapati tasmāt kuntāpāḥ*). The verb *tapati* (in singular) would indicate that by reciting the hymns, the despised thing gets itself burnt up. The sacrificer, in whose favour these hymns are recited is termed *kuyāḥ*; and when the hymns are recited he gets settled in the heaven (after death) and gets all prosperity in food and cattle in this world (Ib.). The Gopatha Br. also mentions the account of the essence of the metres flowing away and being collected in the Kuntāpa hymns. It, like the Ai. Br., states that by reciting the Kuntāpa-s the metres (original ones) get the essence (Ai. Br. VI. 32; Gop. Br. loc. cit. 11). The Gopatha Br. closely follows the treatment of the hymns as seen from the Ai. Br., and even the explanation of the various names of the hymns included in the Kuntāpa is about the same. It seems, however, that the names of these hymns are due to the key-words therein;

and the explanation of these names is a later phase. For example: The name Raibhī is due to the word *rebha* that occurs at the verse in that hymn (*vacyasva rebha vacyasva*). This name is already settled and is taken as such by the Ai. Br. or the Gop. Br.; and, then, it is explained thus: "*rebhante vai devās ca ṛṣayaś ca svargam lokam āyan* etc.)".⁶ This would indicate that:

- (i) These hymns had already been taken as sanctified by the priests, though they were not actually part of the accepted normal hymns.
- (ii) They had no definite measured metre; but, they were akin to the accepted metrical measurement; hence, they were described in comparison with the normal metres; mostly they had about eight letters in a *pāda*, which appears to be a normal, popular way suitable for singing.
- (iii) They were given the status of the four important hymns, and were mixed with them, as the *śilpa*, as they were already settled in belief as wonder-producing. Here, probably, we have the difference between the *Brahman* and the *Śilpa*.

An important point to be noted in this connection is that the Kuntāpa and the following hymns (included under the Kuntāpāḥ) are preserved in the R̥gvedic tradition, as is seen from the fact that they occur in the Ai. Br., Śāṅk. Br., and also in the Āśv. Śr. S. The Yajurveda tradition (see Vāj. Saṁ. 23.28, 29) has only two verses from the last of these hymns, known as Āhanasyāḥ (RV Khila V. 22.1 and 4). However, the Atharvaveda and its Gopatha Br. have all the hymns mentioned above; and we have seen it above. These two verses are enjoined by the Vāj. Saṁ. (loc. cit.) to be recited at the horse-sacrifice, along with others of similar nature (i.e. having sexual tone), which are common in the Yajurveda tradition.⁷ An interesting remark may be noted in this connection. The Gop. Br. (of the Atharvaveda) says that the Kāravyas are, in reality, *gāthā-s*; and it includes the Pārikṣitya-s also under the same term.⁸ Actually, we have the verses called Indra-gāthā among the main Kuntāpa-group which is said to contain only thirty verses in all. Taking into account these points, and also the looseness of structure, as noted above, it could be said that all these verses were only popular verses, *gāthās* or

6. For others, cf. *śamsanto vai devāḥ svargam lokam āyan (Nārāśamsyaḥ); ... kalyāṇam karma akurvans tat kāravyāḥ*; etc.

7. Cf. Vāj. Saṁ. XX. 18ff; Mait. Saṁ. III. 12.20ff; Taitt. Saṁ. VII. 4.19ff; Sat. Br. XIII. 2.8.3ff.

8. Gop. Br. Uttara 6.12 : *atho khalv 'āhuḥ gāthā evaitā kāravyū rājñāḥ parikṣita iti*.

Nārāsaṁsī⁹ or, in other words, verses meant for, or of, the common people, as against those of the priestly class. In essence, they were folk-songs! Being so, they were devoid of any strict and measured metre. Getting once embedded in the R̥gveda ritual-tradition, they continued to have the halo, and were indispensable, though not included in the Samhitā proper. Like the verses in the Yajurveda tradition, used at the Horse-sacrifice, these ones known as Kuntāpa, have to be taken as a grafting from the secular common folk-tradition (*śilpa*) on to the priestly ritual-tradition (*brahma*). This is supported by the hymns (from among the Kuntāpa) that are termed Etaśa-pralāpa, which is verily the "mad man's prattle". The Ai. Br. has an interesting account of the origin of this "Pralāpa", in which it states that Etaśa told his sons that he knew the special group of *mantras* called "Life of Fire", and that they should not disturb him when he prattled. The verses are so confused, apparently, that they make no sense (Ai. Br. VI. 33). The Gop. Br. also records the same account. The Pravahlikāḥ and the Ahanasyāḥ are decidedly sexual in tone.

The Kuntāpa-s show a variety of ideas mingled together; and they are not always coherent. A few examples would be welcome in this context. Thus Nārāsaṁsyāḥ make sense; and they are in praise of one Kaurama (Kaurava at RV Khila and certain other texts) and Iṣa. The Raibhī-s praise the *rebha* (the singer) and his clan; but, the expression "your tongue moves on like a razor" (*niṣ ṛe jīhvā carcarīti kṣuro na*) is rather un-suited to a sober assembly.¹⁰ The Pārikṣityāḥ are in praise of king Parīkṣit, and refer to the king at every verse (in all four). The Kāravyāḥ praise the *kāru* (artisan), and refer to the favour of Indra for him. The whole picture is complete. Actually these can be taken together with other hymns in this collection that, praise Indra; and this is done by the Śānk. Śr. S (XII. 15-16). The verses called Disām kṛtayaḥ speak of various persons that are installed by gods at the different quarters. The good man who offers to the gods, presses Soma at the sacrifice, and is worthy of an assembly, is placed to the East; one who censures his friend and commits fault against his near relations (*jāmyāḥ*), also one being the eldest is not considerate (*apracetaḥ*), is placed to the South; one

9. Cf. AV XV. 6. 11-12 which mentions these as different from the Vedic verses (*ṛc-s*), as following the Mahāvrātya, indicating a mixture of these two types in popular rituals and festivals. The Ai. Br. mentions various *gāthas* as mixed with the Vedic ritual; VII. 8, where we have the mention also of a verse called *yajña-gāthā*. The famous Sunah-sepa legend is full of such *gāthās*. The legend forms part of the Rājāsūya sacrifice. The Śat. Br. also has many *gāthās* at various rituals.

10. The latter part of the expression occurs at RV. VIII. 4.16a: *bhūriḥ iva kṣuram*, but the expression *niṣ ṛe jīhvā carcarīti* is unique. See MACDONELL A. A. and KEITH A. B., *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, under *bhūriḥ*.

who is the son of a gentleman and is bold, for him the priest, Gandharva, utters fruitful desire (*kāmyam vacaḥ*), and he is in the North; the Paṇi who is non-generous (*abhujiṣyaḥ*), and the rich who is a miser and not favouring the noble, is relegated to the West. Here, the belief regarding the various quarters is to be noted. Good is associated with the East and the North, while bad with the West or the South. This holds good even in later times, as it did in the earlier.¹¹ Here the simple sober (so we may say!) hymns end. The next, called Janakalpāḥ, is a mixture of the sober and the sexy. It has the refrain: *to tā kalpeṣu sam mitā*, indicating that the persons and things mentioned herein are to be included in the *kalpa* (rituals). They are: The son of a brāhmaṇa who is himself not practising (or knowing) *brahman*, having his eyes without collyrium, having not taken bath, not having gold or a jewel; in contrast to this, the son of a brāhmaṇa who is himself a *brahman*, washed and bathed, having gold and jewels etc. These contrasting pairs are mentioned even further. A pond without (and with) water-supply, a rich donor (and a rich miser), a beautiful maiden not admitting (and admitting) sex (*ayabhyā* and *suyabhyā*); a rejected wife (queen, *Parivṛktā*), a soldier (*yudhīngamaḥ*), a not active (and active) horse. Here there is clear indication of the three queens that took part in the horse-ritual at the Horse-sacrifice, along with the horse (*anāśur aśvaḥ* and, in contrast, *svāśur aśvaḥ*). It may be noted, however, that at the ritual in the Horse-sacrifice, mentioned in the Yajurveda Samhitās, these verses do not occur. But, as the mention of the Horse (along with the names of the queens) occurs here, there is ground to believe that these verses are from the earlier phase of the Horse-sacrifice, or, at least, a ritual connected with the queens and the horse. If so, we could safely believe that the ritual was lost. The ritual was, obviously, that from the Ṛgvedic tradition, as the Kuntāpa hymns are all seen in the Ṛgvedic Brāhmaṇas, and in the Śrauta sūtras of the same branch. There seems to be no doubt that this Ṛgvedic ritual tradition with the *mantras* was superseded by the Yajurveda ritual tradition, which also used other verses at the Horse-sacrifice that were of similar nature. The Pravahlikāḥ are fully sexual in tone, in expression being riddle-like. Thus, for example: "Extended are the two 'rays' (*kiraṇau*); them does the male press. Not so it is, O maiden, as you think!" ("Not so ... think" is the refrain for all the six verses in this hymn). Further, "The two 'rays' of your mother go asunder, without a male; Not so ...". The images that follow are of a woman falling on her back; a man covering her and It ends with the expression, "the 'slippery' one has been concealed into the 'slippery' one (that of the male

11. Cf. RV, X, 101, 2 : *prāñcam yajñam; prāgvamśa* etc.,

into that of the woman); the slippery one has slipped into the hairy pond!"¹² Every time the maiden is told that the verses do not mean as she would think - i. e., they are not to be taken at face value; they are to be understood with their inner meaning! The dialogue had already gained a ritual context; and, as noted above, it might have been also like the one at the Horse-sacrifice or the Mahāvratā, but it was already a lost tradition - the Ṛgvedic one. The Śāṅk. Śr. S. (XII. 22), which records these verses, adds one more, which is the most eloquent and well-grounded in the ritual-sex symbolism: "What is Minus and what is Plus, that all does he conceal". 'Minus' refers to the organ of the woman, 'Plus' to that of the man.¹³ The last of the hymns is called *Ahanasyāḥ*; and, in the ritual tradition, these verses are associated with the concept of releasing the semen (Ai. Br. VI. 10=36), as noted above. Before that group of verses, the group called *Etaśa-pralāpāḥ* is enjoined. Some specimens of these are as follows: "These mares gallop against *Prāti-satvan*; one of them is the fallow one (*hariklikā*) ...". It is not necessary to translate the whole passage; it is too difficult, as it uses obscure words, suiting the 'prattle'. But some of the images are: The *hariklikā* desires a son of noble character and endowed with gold; a man with his face turned says that he is at a place where there are the three *Simśapa* trees, round which sit three scorpions (*prḍākavaḥ*). They blow the horn etc.". The language is elliptical, and appears to be made so on purpose.

The conclusion that may be drawn from the record of the Kuntāpa hymns is that they once formed part of a regular ritual for fertility. The mention of *Ruśamas* and *Kaurama* on the one hand, and of *Parikṣit* on the other, would indicate that these were popular in their period, and the persons are mentioned as donors. They must have been a necessary ritual-accompaniment for a pretty long period and formed the older tradition of such popular songs for fertility. Their recital was believed to destroy evil (*ku* or *kuya*) and ensure prosperity. The element of sex was a necessary charm, as is seen in other Vedic texts and rituals.¹⁴ Why this older Ṛgvedic tradition was set aside, giving place to the similar practice in the Yajurveda tradition is not quite clear. This is a matter of further investigation. The probable reason

12. The tr. is from CALAND, Śāṅk. Śr. S., Nagpur, 1953, XII, 22.1-6. For *kiraṇau* he has "reigns"; and in the bracket, "slang for *romanvantau bhedaṁ* or *ūne* at the Pañc. Br."; *romanvantau bhedaṁ* is RV. IX. 112.4c; these and *ūna* (*ūne*) stand for the female organ.

13. Śāṅk. Śr. S. XII. 22.7; even the AV which records these hymns does not have the verse. For the symbolism of the 'Minus' and 'Plus' (*ūna atirikta*), see my book, *Sexual Symbolism from the Vedic Ritual*, Delhi, 1979, pp. 105ff.

14. Ibid.

is the hymns appearing prominently in AV; and the latter was their source ! But, there can be no doubt that the Kuntāpa hymns are an important link between the Yajurveda tradition and that of the Ṛgveda. Also these, and such other hymns with loose metrical set up are to be taken as the remnants of the Folk-traditions of the Vedic period which the ancient Purohitas could not set aside, and had to adjust in their ritual set-up for popularity and the spread of their cult.

INTRODUCING THE *MILINDAPAÑHĀ-ATTHAKATHĀ* OF THATON MINGUN ZETAWUN SAYADAW

By

MADHAV M. DESHPANDE

1. In 1968, before I left Poona for Philadelphia to do my doctoral work, Professor P. V. BAPAT handed over to me a copy of a Burmese book for further study. It was an edition of the *Milindapañhā Aṭṭhakathā*, a Pali commentary on the *Milindapañhā* written by a Burmese scholar, Thaton Mingun Zetawun Sayadaw, and published in Burmese characters in Rangoon in 1949 (Burmese era 1311). At the time Professor BAPAT handed over the book to me, he also gave me a cutting from a Burmese newspaper which contained an item relating to this commentary. During my month long ship-journey to Philadelphia from India in August 1968, I transliterated a considerable portion of this *Aṭṭhakathā* into Devanagari, and found that it contained some very interesting discussions. After I reached my destination, however, this particular work had to be shelved because of the pressure of other more urgent undertakings. In this paper, I will present some interesting aspects of this *Aṭṭhakathā* which I believe is a very important work, and I hope that this will be a prelude to bringing out a complete edition of this text. At the outset, I would like to thank Professor P. V. BAPAT who gave me this opportunity by letting me use the Burmese book. I would also like to thank Bhikkhu OUNG MEAN of Cambodia, who was visiting Poona in 1968, for translating the article in the Burmese newspaper. Professor Alton BECKER, Department of Linguistics, The University of Michigan, also helped me with details in Burmese, and Dr. Sao SAIMONG, a Burmese scholar visiting Michigan, also read parts of the text with me. I am grateful to both of these scholars for their help.

2. Until now, the only Pali commentary on the *Milindapañhā* known to the world of scholarship was the *Milindaṭṭhikā* edited by Professor Padmanabh S. JAINI and published by the Pali Text Society in 1961. The text of this commentary was based on a single manuscript written in Cambodian characters. Professor JAINI made the following comments in his introduction¹: "The *Milindapañhā* occupies, on account of its historical value and literary merits, a very high position among the non-canonical Pali texts. But whereas *Ṭīkā*s are available on several major and minor non-canonical texts, not a single commentary on the *Milindapañhā* had been hitherto known to exist in the libraries of

1. *Milindaṭṭhikā*, Introduction, p. vii.

Ceylon, Burma or Siam. The discovery, therefore, of this MS. raised high hopes in my mind when I first set out to decipher it." According to JAINI's decipherment, this *Milindaṭṭhikā* dates to 1474 A. D., but the existence of this text has not been widely known even to the Buddhist traditions in Burma, Ceylon or Thailand.

3. The title page of the *Milindapañhā Atthakathā* gives the name of Thaton Mingun Zetawun Sayadaw as the author, and the book was edited and published by Insein Mingun SAYADAW, and printed at the Hanthawaddi Press in Rangoon in 1949. It is a very extensive commentary and runs for 404 printed pages. Below I am reproducing the brief introduction by the author to his commentary²:

निदानकथा

मिलिन्दपञ्चापकरणं नाम सागलनगरे धम्मेन समेन रज्जानुसासकतं पत्तेन मिलिन्देन नाम रज्जा पुच्छितपञ्चानं नागसेनत्थेरेन विस्सज्जितविस्सज्जनायो संगहेत्वा कतं होति । सेय्यथापि नाम पञ्चमहानदियो सागरं उपगच्छन्ति । एवमेव खो मिलिन्दो राजा सागलनामके नगरे नागसेनत्थेरमुपगन्त्वा अतीव निपुणे पञ्हे अपुच्छि । तेसञ्च द्विन्नं महापञ्जानं पुच्छाविस्सज्जनायो अतीव गम्भीरा होन्ति अनुपचितपुञ्जसम्भारेहि मन्दबुद्धीहि ससादीहि विय महासमुद्धो दुक्खोगाळहा अलम्भनेय्यपतिट्ठा च । तेन बुत्तं -

मिलिन्दो नाम सो राजा सागलायं पुरुत्तमे ।

उपगच्छि नागसेनं गङ्गा व यथा सागरं ॥

आसज्ज राजा चित्रकथी उक्काधारं तमोनुदं ।

अपुच्छि निपुणे पञ्हे ठानाट्ठानगते पुथू ॥

पुच्छा विस्सज्जना चेव गम्भीरत्थूपनिस्सिता ।

हययंगमा कण्णसुखा अब्भुता लोमहंसना ति ॥

तयिदं मिलिन्दपञ्चापकरणं सङ्गहट्ठकथानं कतुभूतेन भदन्त अनुबुद्ध बुद्धघोसाचरियेन तहिं तहिं साधकं कत्वा समुपनीतपाठवसेन सम्भावित्तमुपनीतं समानं सासनीयपरम्परासु यावज्जतनापि गुरुकतं होति मानितं च ।

अपि चेदं मिलिन्दपञ्चापकरणं परिसीलयन्तानं परिवारगन्थन्तरभूता मिलिन्दपञ्चावत्थुनामेन पाकटा सुद्धमरम्मवण्णना चेव पदत्थविवरणवसेन विरचिता मिलिन्दपञ्हा-निस्सयनामेन पाकटा मरम्म-अत्थवण्णना चा ति द्वे गन्था बहुसो उपत्थम्भभावेन तिट्ठन्ति । मिलिन्दपञ्हं पति पालिभासाय क्तो यो कोचि अत्थसंवण्णनागन्थो एकोपि न संविज्जतेव । किञ्चापि सीहळदीपे महानामरज्जो काले भदन्ताचरियबुद्धघोसेन विमुद्धिमग्गादि अट्ठकथायो च ततो अपरभागे धम्मपालाचरियादीहि सेसट्ठ-

2. *Milindapañhā Atthakathā*, (Introduction),

कथायो च विरचिता । तथापि पेटकोपदेसस्स चैव मिलिन्दपञ्चस्स च तेहि संवण्णिता याकाचि अट्ठ-
कथा अत्थीति न सूयते । तस्मा सञ्चयेयधम्मेषु पञ्चा विय सञ्चसत्तेसु महाकरुणावेगं सयुष्पादेन्तस्स
बुद्धस्स भगवतो पटिवेधपटिपत्तिसासनानं मूलभूतस्स परियत्तिसासनस्स बुद्धिया विरुद्धिया वेपुल्लाय
गन्थवाचकानं सुखोलोक्केने पामोञ्जत्थाय धम्मकथिकानं च विचित्रकथाकथनेन तोसनत्थाय गम्भीर-
त्थानं च पञ्चानं निरायासेन विस्सज्जनत्थाय सोत्तन्नञ्च उग्गहणधारणादिवसा अकिलमन्तथाय मिङ्गुन्
जेतवुन् सयदाव् इति विस्सुतेन महाथेरवरेनायं मिलिन्दपञ्चकथा सुट्ठु विरचिता होति । एतेनेव महा-
थेरवरेन विरचिता पेटकोपदेसट्ठकथापि सासनस्स बहूपकारा हुत्वा पवत्तेव ।

मुदापनकाले पनायं रङ्गूननगरे पटिपत्तिसासनानुगहसमितिया पधानभूतेन इन्सायन्
मिङ्गुन् सयदाव् इति विस्सुतेन महाथेरवरेन सोधिताभिसङ्गता च । हंसावती ति विस्सुते तिपिटकमुदालये
सयाहतान इति विस्सुतेन पाळिवाचिस्सराचरियेन विसदीकता च होति ।

यदेत्थ दिस्सते किञ्चि पमादेन भमेन वा ।

खलितं अवसिट्ठं तं संसोधेन्तु विचक्खणा ति ॥

The introduction contains several points of interest. The author of this *Milindapañhā Atthakathā* does not know of any other commentary in Pali on the *Milindapañha*, and hence this commentary is quite independent of the *Milindaṭṭikā* edited by Professor JAINI. The author also draws attention to the fact that he knows of no older Pali commentary on the *Petākopadesa* and that he has himself also written a *Petākopadesatthakathā* before writing his commentary on the *Milindapañhā*. I am trying to acquire the published text of this commentary on the *Petākopadesa*, but I have not yet been successful. The author informs us that his commentary on the *Milindapañhā* is essentially based on two Burmese commentaries on the same text, i. e. *Milindapañhāvatthu* and *Milindapañhānissaya*. It would be interesting to see if these Burmese commentaries shed any additional light on the text of the *Milindapañha*.

4. The *Ganthārambhakathā* of the author is also very eloquent³ :

अनुपपन्नस्स मग्गस्स उप्पादेत-वळञ्जस्स ।

निब्बानस्स वळञ्जेतं बुद्धं नमामि आदरं ॥ १ ॥

तिपहानेहि सम्पन्नं अरियेहि निसेवितं ।

मग्गं फलञ्च निब्बानं धम्मं नमामि आदरं ॥ २ ॥

अरियं ओघमुत्तिण्णं निरङ्गणं तमोनुदं ।

मग्गे फले सुतिट्ठन्तं सङ्घं नमामि आदरं ॥ ३ ॥

इति मे रतनत्तये पणामेन असेसतो ।

अन्तरायं विसोसेन्तो अहं भिमतसिद्धिको ॥ ४ ॥

3. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

सोत्तुनं बुद्धिपत्तानं नयं साधेतुकामेन ।
 मेघमन्देन नामेन महाथेरेन याचितो ॥ ५ ॥
 किञ्चापि या मिलिन्दस्स पञ्चस्स अत्थवण्णना ।
 दुत्तरा व मया कातुं जातुं गम्भीरभावतो ॥ ६ ॥
 पोराणेहि कता नेसा नत्थेसा तस्स वण्णना ।
 तस्मा पेत्तं मिलिन्दस्स पञ्चस्स अत्थवण्णनं ॥ ७ ॥
 अनाकुलं करिस्सामि नानानयेहि मण्डितं ।
 सम्पुण्णं निच्छयेनेव तं मे सुणाथ साधवो ति ॥ ८ ॥

From these introductory verses, we learn that the author knew of no other commentary in Pali on this text, and that he was requested by some Mahāthera Meghamanda to compose this commentary.

5. It seems that at the time this commentary was published, it created a big stir among the monastic community in Burma, because of certain "unorthodox" views held by the author and expressed in this commentary. Below, I shall present a translation of an article which appeared in the newspaper Hanthawaddi (Pali: Hanṣāvātī). The text is given in Appendix A. There is no date on the pages available to me, but other stories on these pages indicate a date between November 6 and 13, 1949.

REFLECTIONS ON THE MILINDAPAÑHĀ-ATTHAKATHA

Carefully observe the wavering mind of the people about the Milindapañhā Atthakathā. (Says the Sangha.):

On November 11 at Kamayut village, in the Adicca monastery of the high priest, the Kathina ceremony was to take place where some monks from the outside were invited to take part. At that time, Chaikala Mahāthera, a degree holder of Pathamajaw and Aggamāhapandita, and Kamayuk Ywama Mahāthera, a degree holder of five Vinaya text books, together with 55 other monks had selected the Mahāthera of Tonlong Pien Tipitaka Taik Chaung as president and Hema Ganaing Mahāthera as secretary of the Sangha meeting. After having chosen the president and the secretary, they then discussed the following points.

Do not neglect these points,

They (the Sangha) discussed the Kathinakamn as elaborated in this book, i. e. the *Milindapañhā Atthakathā* written by Thaton Mingun Zetawun Sayadaw Payagyi and corrected and published by Insein Mingun Zetawun Sayadaw as follows :

To offer the yellow robe to a monk who does not know the way how to perform the Kathina ceremony is to make the yellow robe improper. The monk who accepts it becomes a sinner and other monks who get advantages in that Kathina ceremony are considered to have committed offences like *Pārājika* etc.

The present *Bhikkhus* can give a woman ordination by which she can become a full-fledged *Bhikkhuni*. It is in accordance with the opinion of the *Milindapañhā Atthakathā*.

But the Sangha meeting opined that such a thing will spoil the Teaching of the Buddha. With this view in mind, all *Bhikkhus* and laymen must remove from that book (these points) on pages 195, 200, 228, 281, 203, 276 and 77, and they must carefully examine the reflection of the *Milindapañhā Atthakathā*, and propogate this (criticism ?) with the authority given by the secretary of the Sangha meeting.

Request :

After you have carefully examined the above mentioned matter, please send me all your opinions in writing on the *Milindapañhā Atthakathā* written by that *Mahāthera* which seemed to be against our *Sāsana*. If all the Sangha feels that his commentary is right, it is no problem. But if it is wrong, then how will we consider him ?

Insein Town

The High Priest of Hema Ganaing To Chaung

6. It is clear from the above news-item that the views expressed in this commentary had contemporary social relevance and not all of these views were acceptable to the leaders of the monastic community. This makes this text all the more fascinating, and it would be appropriate for a scholar of Burmese sociology to look closely into this particular incident. Of the criticisms launched against this commentary, the most important one is about his views on admitting women to the full status of Bhikkhunīs. As is well known, no Theravāda country at present maintains the Sangha of the Bhikkhunīs, though women do indeed take part in religious life by taking particular five or eight Sīla-vows. It seems that this particular monk was advocating a reintroduction of Bhikkhunī-Sangha, a view which was unacceptable to the larger monastic community at that time. The relevant passages from the commentary are as follows :

- 1) अयं पन इमस्मिञ्च पण्डे अनागतभिक्षून् नयो दिन्नो नाम होति । को एसो अनागत-भिक्षून् दिन्ननयो नाम । अनुजानामि भिक्षवे भिक्षूहि भिक्षुनियो उपसम्पादेतुं । द्वे वस्तानि छसु धम्मेसु सिक्खितसिक्खाय सिक्खमानाय उभतोसङ्घे उपसम्पदा परियेसितव्वा ति एवमादिको ।⁴
- 2) भिक्षुसङ्घेन हि मातुगामो एतरहि उपसम्पादेतुं भव्यो ति ।⁵

7. It would be extremely important to do a comparative study of this commentary on the *Milindapañha* with the *Milindaṭṭhikā* edited by Professor JAINI. I shall point to only one passage in this commentary, which shows that perhaps the *Milindaṭṭhikā* and our present commentary share certain identical traditions about the composition of the *Milindapañha*, and especially about the role of Buddhaghosa in it.

Commenting on the *Milindaṭṭhikā*, Professor JAINI remarks⁶ :

“We may note here one useful piece of information furnished by our author. Commenting on the first five introductory verses (*milindo nāma so rājā*, etc.), he observes that these *gāthās* as well as several other sentences consisting of prologue and epilogue were made (*katā*) by Bhadanta Buddhaghosa. Usually in the Pali commentaries one finds passages attributed to *Porāṇas*, or *Saṅgītikāras*. So this specific reference to Buddhaghosa is significant. It shows the existence of the tradition which believed that he was actively responsible in revising or even in recasting the Miln. It will not be too bold a conclusion to draw from this statement that the Miln. received several additions during the time

4. Ibid., p. 228.

5. Ibid., p. 231.

6. *Milindaṭṭhikā*, Introduction, p. xli.

of Buddhaghosa and since then remained more or less in the form that has come down to us."

The present *Milindapañhā Atthakathā* also seems to share some such tradition, which probably goes back to older Burmese commentatorial sources. Our author says :

- 1) तयिदं मिलिन्दपञ्चापरणं सङ्गहट्ठकथानं कत्तुभूतेन भदन्त अनुबुद्ध-बुद्धघोसाचरियेन तर्हि तर्हि साधकं कत्वा समुपनीतपाठवसेन सम्भावितत्तमुपनीतं समानं सासनीयपरम्परासु यावज्जतनापि गरुक्तं होति मानितं च ।⁷
- 2) तत्थ यं पन वुत्तं मिलिन्दपञ्चं तस्स मिलिन्दपञ्चस्स निदानकथासंखातं उद्देसनिद्देसवसेन दुविधं बाहिरकथं कथेन्तेहि अभयवासीगणपामोक्खेहि सीहळदीपे वट्टगामणि राजकाले आलोकगुहायं मुखेन वाचुग्गतं मुखेनेव धारितं तेपिटकं बुद्धवचनं पोत्थकारुळहवसेन सङ्गायन्तेहि महाथेरेहि पञ्चसतेहि अरहन्तेहि मिलिन्दराजवंसे आगतं

मिलिन्दो नाम सो राजा ति

गाथापञ्चकमिदं वचनं अत्थुप्पत्तिया बाहिरकथाय उद्देसवसेन वुत्तं ।⁸

The first passage seems to indicate that the tradition did ascribe some role to Buddhaghosa in compiling and settling the text of the *Milindapañhā*; the second passage seems to refer to some compilatory activity during the reign of the Ceylonese king Vattagāmaṇi (104-188 B. C.), and it also links it with monks at the Abhayagiri monastery. According to the *Mahāvamsa*,⁹ the Ceylonese chronicle, Vattagāmaṇi established the Abhayagiri monastery, but this monastery seceded from the Theravāda and became a seat of the Dhammaruci Nikāya of the Vajjiputtaka sect. Our Burmese tradition seems to connect the Abhayagiri monastery with a redaction of the *Milindapañhā*. It thus makes it likely that there is here some unconscious recognition that the original of the *Milindapañhā* may in fact have belonged to a non-Theravāda tradition, and that it was adapted to the Theravāda tradition in Ceylon through successive redactions.¹⁰ It is indeed surprising to find that the *Milindapañhā Atthakathā*, which is almost a contemporary work, indirectly links us to ancient traditions which may prove to be very important in reconstructing the text-history of the *Milindapañhā*.

7. *Milindapañhā-Atthakathā*, (Introduction),

8. Ibid., p. 2.

9. *Mahāvamsa*, Chapter 33, verses 81 ff., and Chapter 36, verse 111.

10. Thich Minh CHAU (1964), pp. xiii-xiv for a critical bibliography on the text of *Milindapañhā*, and pp. 24-35 for a critical discussion of various versions.

မိလိန္ဒအဋ္ဌကထာအတွက် ဂယက်သံ

အထူးဂရုပြု၍ သုံးသပ်တော်မူကြပါဆိုခြင်း

တန်ဆောင်မုန်းထဆန်းသရက်
နေ့ကမာရွတ်ရွာမကျောင်း ဆရာ
တော် ဦးအာဒိစ္စကျောင်းထိုက်၊ က
ထိန်ဝံသို ကြွရောက်တော် မူကြကုန်
သော ပဌမကျော် အဂ္ဂမဟာပဏ္ဍ
တဘွဲ့ ရတော် မူသော ကျိက္ကလား
ဆရာတော်၊ ဝိသုဒ္ဓိဗျာဓိကျမ်းဖြန် က
မာရွတ်ရွာမဆရာတော်အစရှိသော
၅၅ပါးသော သံဃာတော်တို့သည်၊
သံဃာ ထေရ် ဖြစ် တော် မူ သော
တောင်လုံးဖြန် ဝိ ခု ကတ် တိုက်
ကျောင်းဆရာတော်ဘုရားကြီးအား
သဘာပတိတင်မြှောက်၍၊ ဟေမာ
ဂဗိုလ်ဆရာတော်အားအကျိုးဆောင်
တင်မြှောက် ပြီးလျှင် အောက်ပါအ
ဆိုများကိုစည်းဝေး ဆုံးဖြတ်တော်
မူကြကြောင်း။

ကြောင့်ကျကင်းလျက်မနေအပ်
သံဃာ မင်း ကွန်းဇေတဝန်ဆရာ
တော်ဘုရားကြီး ရေးသား၍၊ အင်း
စိန်မြို့ပင်းကွန်းဇေတဝန်ဆရာတော်
ဖြင့်ဆင်ထုတ်ဝေသော မိလိန္ဒပဉ္စ

အဋ္ဌကထာကို ဘတ်နာ ဆွေးနွေး
တော်မူကြရာ ၎င်းစာအုပ်တွင် က
ထိန်ဝံသိုနှင့်စပ်၍ အစဉ်မပျက်
လေ့ကျင့်စဉ်များအတိုင်း ဆိုလျှင်
ပါပဘိက္ခုနုချည်း ဖြစ်နေကြ၏။ သံ
ဃာအားရည်ညွှန်း၍ ဟူ၍ အကော
လ သင်္ကန်းချည်းဖြစ်သည်သာမက
ခင်းပြီးအသိသင်ရသည်ဟု အယူရှိ
သောရဟန်းတော်ဟူသမျှတို့မှာ ပါ
ရာဇိက အစရှိသော အာပတ်အများ
သင့်ကြောင်း။

မာတုကာမကို ယခု လက်ရှိ
ဘိက္ခုနု သံဃာတော် များက ဥတ္တိ
စတုတ္ထ ကမ္မဝါစာဖြင့် ပဉ္စင်းခံပေး
အပ်ကြောင်း၊ အစရှိသော သာသနာ
တော်ကိုချောက်ချားစေသော ဝါဒ
တို့ကို သိတော်မူကြသဖြင့်၊ သာသ
နာတော်ထမ်းရဟန်းဟူသမျှအတွက်
မဲ့ ကြောင့်ကျကင်းလျက် မနေအပ်
သင့်ကြောင်း၊ အားလုံးသဘောတူ
ဆုံးဖြတ်ဟောကြားပြီးလျှင် သာသ
နာတော်ဆိုင်ရာ ရဟန်းရှင် လူတို့
အား၊ အဆိုပါ အဋ္ဌကထာစာမျက်
နှာ ၁၉၅၊ ၂၀၀၊ ၂၂၈၊ ၂၃၁၊ ၂၃၃
၂၃၆၊ ၂၄၇၊ တို့ကိုအထူးဂရုပြု၍ သုံး
သပ် ကြည့်ရှုထောက် မူကြမည့် အ
ကြောင်းသတင်းစာမှ တောင်းပန်
နှိုးဆော်ရန် အကျိုးဆောင်အားတာ
ဝန်လွှဲတော်မူကြကြောင်း။

တောင်းပန် နှိုးဆော်ချက်
အထက် အဆိုပါ အချက်တို့ကို
သုံးသပ် ဆွေးနွေးလောကတော် မူကြပြီး
သော သံဃာတော် အရှင် ဖြတ်တို့

APPENDIX [A]

AN ARTICLE ON
THE
MILINDAPANĀ-
ATTHAKATHĀ
IN THE
NEWSPAPER
HAMSĀVATĪ

[No date on
this particular
page. Other
news-items on
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THE KRAMA-PĀṬHA UNIT

By

G. V. DEVASTHALI

Krama-pāṭha is one of the well-known modes of the recitation of the *Rgveda*, which is aimed at combining the *Samhitā* and the *Pada* modes of recitation into one; and which has a special interest of its own as being the mode on which the other eight modes, known as the eight *vikṛti*-s, are based.¹ Thus the importance of the *KP.* can be easily realised when it is remembered that, on the one hand, it combines in itself the earlier two modes of recitation, and at the same time, serves as the basis or the foundation, on which stand the eight *vikṛti*-s.² The *KP.* itself, however, is not considered to be a *vikṛti*. Together with the *Sam-* and the *Pada-pāṭha*-s, it forms the triad of Vedic *Prakṛti*-s. I have already written³ about this mode of recitation, just to give an idea in a broad outline about it, to the curious readers. In what follows, I should like to place before the interested readers one aspect concerning this mode, a knowledge of which is a desideratum for getting acquainted with the mode of forming the *Krama-pāṭha*, and for being able to form it, though not without enough care and even difficulty. There, while describing the *Krama* (or *Krama-pāṭha*), I have said: The *Krama* is a recitation of the words (*pada*-s) of a hemistich (*ardharca*) taken two at a time, as a general rule, in a chainlike manner, concluded with *parigraha* (a technical term meaning: 'repetition of a word with *iti* interposed') of the last word.' The two words thus taken together form a sub-unit called *varga*,⁴ or *Krama-varga*. One more point to be noted about the *KP.* is that it is considered as one of the three *prakṛti-pāṭha*-s the other two being, of course, the *Samhitā*- and *Pada-pāṭha*-s. But why should it be classed as a *prakṛti-pāṭha*? In fact, on the face of it, it is evident that it is quite different from the *Samhitā-pāṭha*, which is the *prakṛti-pāṭha* par excellence. One would hardly call it a *prakṛti-pāṭha*, particularly when one knows that it

1. *KP.* is called the *prakṛti-pāṭha* because in it the original order of words is retained, while in the *vikṛti*-s it is occasionally reversed.

2. The eight *vikṛti*-s are enumerated in a couplet as follows:

jaṭā mālā śikhā rekhā dhvaja daṇḍo ratho ghaṇaḥ |

aṣṭau vikṛtayaḥ proktāḥ kramapūrvā manūṣibhiḥ ||

Krama is the very basis of all the eight *vikṛti*-s. Hence also it may be described as the *prakṛti* of the eight *vikṛti*-s.

3. See G. V. DEVASTHALI, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* (Diamond Jubilee Volume), pp. 573-582.

4. Loc. cit. p. 573.

combines within itself two other *pāṭha*-s, namely, the *Sam.* and the *Pada-pāṭha*-s. This question is answered by declaring that it is called *prakṛti-pāṭha*, just because it does not adopt the reverse order of *pada*-s at any point. It surely has introduced some changes in the original *pāṭha*-s, but has scrupulously taken care not to reverse at any point the original order (*krama*) of the *pada*-s. Thus, it may be seen that it is a *prakṛti-pāṭha* in a rather narrow sense of the term, which has been applied to it, just to emphasize the fact that it serves as the basis of all the *vikṛti*-s; or from another point of view, the name *prakṛti* may apply to it with some justification, when we consider that it combines within itself the other two *prakṛti-pāṭha*-s, namely, the *Samhitā-pāṭha* and the *Pada-pāṭha*.

But now the question is what is the unit for the formation of the *KP*? The answer to this question is in, *tathārdharcaṁ samāpayet*.⁵

This makes it quite clear that a hemistich is the unit for the *KP*. Moreover, as an indication of where the *KP*. unit has come to an end, it is laid down that the concluding *pada* of a hemistich should be repeated with what is technically called *parigraha*, or *veṣṭaka*.⁶ The same again is indicated negatively by the rule that there can be no *saṁdhi* between two hemistiches, that is, between the final of a hemistich and the initial of the following one.

But the question still remains: how to determine the exact extent of a hemistich? In the *RV*. we find *mantra*-s comprising any number of lines (verses) from one to eight. Of these, the *ekapadā*-s and *dvipadā*-s are to be taken as a unit by themselves,⁸ so much so that the question of determining the unit pertains to *mantra*-s having three or more verses (*pāda*-s) only. In the case of *mantra*-s with even number of verses, it may, theoretically at least, be possible to fix up the hemistich by assuming that a hemistich in all cases comprises exactly half of the number of verses⁹ contained in the *mantra*. This however, holds good in the case of *anuṣṭubh*¹⁰ *mantra*-s only. But it cannot hold good in the case of other metres having even number of verses.¹¹

Moreover, it cannot obviously help us to fix up the hemistich of *mantra*-s comprising odd number of verses. More intriguing is the case with *Gāyatrī*¹² and

5. RPr. 10. 2. Also cf. *ārdharacāntāt*, *Upalekha*. 1. 16.

6. Read: *ārdharacāntyaṁ ca (atītya parigrhṇīyāt)* | RPr. 10. 9. Also cf. *Upalekha*. 4. 10.

7. Read: *saṁdhir nārdharacayor bhavet*, RPr. 10. 18.

8. For these read: *eka ekapadāiteṣāṁ dvau pādaḥ dvipadacyate | te tu tenaiva procyete sarāṇi yasya pādātāḥ* || *ibid.* 17. 41.

9. '*madhye*' *vasūnaṁ tu*, as RPr. (says of *catuspādā* *ṛc*-s) RPr. 18. 47.

10. Read: *dvātriṁśadakṣarā'nuṣṭubh catvāro'sṭūkṣarāḥ samāḥ* | RPr. 16. 37.

11. This will be demonstrated in due course.

12. This is defined as: *gāyatrī sū catvriṁśatyakṣarā | aṣṭūkṣarāḥ trayāḥ pādāḥ* || RPr. 16. 16.

*Pura-uṣṇik*¹³ verses, which both have only three verses. The obvious division in the case of these metres is one and two. But there the question still remains, which part will be of one verse; and which, of two. From all this it will be clear that this question of *ardharca* has to be carefully studied in full details before we are able to fix up the appropriate division of a *mantra* into its component parts.

In this connexion the *RPr.*¹⁴ has laid down only one general rule, stating that in the case of *mantra*-s with three verses (*tripadā ṛk*-s), the first hemistich shall comprise two *pāda*-s, while the remaining *pāda* will form the second. This can be well illustrated by the well-known *Gāyatrī mantra* (*RV.* 3. 62. 10). Here the concluding *krama-pada*-s of the two hemistiches will be *dhīmahī* and *prácodayādīti prácodayāt*, respectively. But it is further pointed out that occasionally there are cases where the division of a *tripadā ṛk* is *one + two pāda*-s, instead of the usual *two + one* as above. Thus, for example, *RV.* 6. 48. 18 has its hemistiches with one and two respectively;¹⁵ and their concluding *Krama-pada*-s will be, *sakhyām iti sakhyām*, and *dadhanvāta iti dadhanvātaḥ*, respectively.

Here it may be interesting to note that the *RPr.* 18. 57¹⁶ has noticed five *mantra*-s, which, according to some authorities, do not admit of a division into hemistiches like the other *mantra*-s. This by implication means that such division is admitted in their case by other authorities. And it is striking to note that whenever these *ṛk*-s are thus divided, the division adopted invariably is one and two (verses) only, in all of them. Thus in the case of *RV.* 6. 48. 13 (one of the *mantra*-s under discussion) the concluding *Krama-pada*-s will be *dvitēti dvitā*, and *viśvábhojasam iti viśvā-bhojasam*, respectively.

Passing on now to the *ṛk*-s of four verses (*catuspadā*), we find that generally they are divided into two equal halves of two verses each.¹⁷ As an illustration of this type we may take *RV.* 1. 10. 1, which is in the *anuṣṭubh* metre. The halves of this in the *KP.* will end with *arkīṇa ityarkīṇaḥ*, and *yemira iti yemire*.

13. Read : *dvābhyām avasyet tripadāsu pūrcam*
pādena paścāt kvacid anyathaitat || RPr. 18. 46.

Also read : *aṣṭāvinīśatyakṣaroṣṇik sā pādair vartate tribhiḥ ||*
pūrvāo aṣṭākṣarau pādau trītyo dvādaśākṣarah || RPr. 16. 29.

14. Read : *dvābhyām avasyet tripadāsu pūrcam*
pādena paścāt kvacid anyathaitat || RPr. 18. 46.

15. Read : *kvacid etad anyathā | pūrcam pādena paścād dvābhyām*, as in *RV.* 6. 48. 18. see Uvaṭa on *RPr.* 18. 46.

16. These *mantra*-s are : *RV.* 6. 48. 13; 7. 66. 16; 10. 93. 15; 8. 4. 21; and

6. 48. 18. Also see *Upalekha*, 3. 7 where the other view is stated.

17. Read : *madhye vasānam tu catuspadānām | RPr.* 18. 47.

But cases are not wanting where *mantra*-s with four verses have to be divided into two parts comprising either three and one, or one and three verses respectively.¹⁸ Thus *RV.* 10. 93. 11¹⁹ and 15²⁰ are both *catuṣpadā*-s. But in the former the division is three and one, while in the latter it is one and three verses.

It may be observed here that upto now we have dealt with *mantra*-s which for the purposes of *KP.* are divided into two parts (hemistiches) only. But now we have to deal with *mantra*-s, which have to be divided into more parts than two. All *mantra*-s, comprising more than four verses belong to this category. Thus a *mantra* with five verses (*pañcapadā*)²¹ is generally divided into three parts comprising two, two, and one verses respectively.²² This can be illustrated by *RV.* 4. 17. 14f, the three parts of whose *KP.* will end with *saṣṛmāṇām iti saṣṛmāṇām*, *yónāu iti yónau*, and *hótéti hótā* respectively.

But there are also cases where a *pañcapadā ṛk* is divided into two parts only, comprising two²³ and three, or three²⁴ and two verses respectively. The former division is adopted in *RV.* 8. 31. 17;²⁵ and its *krama-pada*-s end with *yoṣatīti yoṣati*. The remaining part being all *galita* is given in the *Samhitā* form only; and hence has no *KP.* to it. The other type of division is found in the *KP.* of *RV.* 10. 134. 7,²⁶ the two parts of which in the *KP.* will end with the *krama-pada*-s, *carāmasīti carāmasi*, and *rabhāmaha iti rabhāmahe*, respectively.

There are also cases where a *ṛk* with five verses is divided into three parts comprising two, one, and two verses respectively.²⁷ This may be illustrated by *RV.* 2. 22. 4,²⁸ the concluding *krama-pada*-s of which will respectively be *kṛtām iti kṛtām*, *apā ity apāh*, and *iṣam itīṣam*.

18. Read : *tribhis samastair avaratī parair vā* | *RPr.* 18. 48.

19. The concluding *krama-pada*-s of *RV.* 10. 93. 11 will be :
abhiṣṭaya ityabhiṣṭaye | and *vaso iti vaso* |

20. The concluding *krama-pada*-s of *RV.* 10. 93. 15 will be :
ceti ca | and *mūyava iti mūyavaḥ* | respectively.

21. This is named *pañkti*. Uvaṭa explains it as *pañktyām pañcapadāsvityarthah*.
See Uvaṭa on *RPr.* 18. 49

22. Read : *pañktyām dvīṣo vā tata uttareṇa* | *RPr.* 18. 49a.

23. Read : *tribhiḥ parair vā* | *RPr.* 18. 49b.

24. *viparītam etat* | *RPr.* 18. 49b.

25. *nakiṣ ṭam karmaṇā naśat...*

26. *nakir devā minīmasi...*

27. Read : *dvābhyām pādēna dvābhyām tu tava tyat pañcapadāṣṭīh* | *RPr.* 18. 54 ab.

28. The metre of this *ṛk* is *aṣṭī* of five verses, or *atiśakvarī*, [in the absence of *vyūha* = resolution of semivowel] (as laid down by *RPr.* 17. 25) *RPr.* 18. 54.

Another peculiar division observable in the case of *ṛk*-s with five verses is into only two parts comprising four and one verses respectively.²⁹ This is illustrated by *RV.* 4. 10. 1; and the final *krama-pada*-s of these will be *hṛdispr̥śam iti hṛdispr̥śam* and *óhair iti óhaiḥ* respectively.

Ṛk-s with six verses³⁰ are also divided into two equal parts of three verses each as in *RV.* 8. 41. 3; or sometimes they are also divided into two parts comprising two and four verses respectively as in *RV.* 8. 47. 15. In the former,³¹ the two parts will end with *krama-pada*-s, *darśatá iti darśatáh* and *avardhayannīty avardhayan | nábhuntām anyaké samé* respectively; while *diva iti divah* and *dadmasīti dadmasi, anaháso va ūtáyah su-ūtáyo va ūtáyah* will be the concluding *krama-pada*-s of the parts of the latter.³²

A *ṣaṭpadā ṛk*³³ is also found divided into three parts comprising two *pada*-s each, or two parts comprising three *pada*-s each, or two parts with four and two *pada*-s respectively. Thus *RV.* 4. 10. 5³⁴ is, in the *KP.*, divided into two parts, which respectively are found to end with *aktór ity aktóh* and *upāká ity upāké*. The *sapta-padā ṛk*³⁵ is found divided in three³⁶ different ways. The division adopted may be (i) three, two and two verses as in *RV.* 1. 137. 1; or (ii) it may also have only two parts, of which the first may have three verses and the other, four; or (iii) the two parts, may have two and five verses respectively. The concluding *krama-pada*-s in the various parts of these illustrations may be given as follows :

(i) *RV.* 1. 137. 1 (three parts of 3, 2 and 2 *pada*-s respectively):
imá itimé; na iti nah; and gāvāsira iti gó-āsirah.

29. See *RPr.* 18. 55 *caturbhis tata ekena.*

30. Read: *dviśas triśo vā parataś caturbhiḥ*
syūt ṣaṭpadānām avasānam etat || RPr. 18. 50.

31. i. e. *RV.* 8. 41. 3.

32. *RV.* 8. 47. 15.

33. Read: *dviśas triśo vā parataś caturbhiḥ*
syūt ṣaṭpadānām avasānam etat || RPr. 18. 50.

Here three alternatives have been stated, out of which only two pertain to the *Śūkala śākhā* of the *RV.* They are 3 + 3 and 2 + 4. These are illustrated above according to *Uvāṭa's bhāṣya.*

34. Read: *caturthis tu param dvābhyām tava svādiṣṭhā tacchanīyoḥ | RPr.* 18. 56.
The illustrations given by *Uvāṭa* are *tava svādiṣṭhā* (*RV.* 4. 10. 5); and *taccanīyor ā vṛṇīmahe* (not from *Śaunaka's Ṛgveda*). See *RV-Khila* 10. 191. 5.

35. Read *RPr.* 18. 51: *tribhis tu pūrvam tata uttaram syāt |*
dviśas triśo vā yadi vā samastam |
dvābhyām punas saptaṭpadāvasānam || RPr. 18. 51.

36. These three have been illustrated in the *RPr.* by *RV.* 1. 137. 1; 8. 40. 2; and 10. 133. 1 respectively for the variant divisions laid down in the rule cited above.

(ii) *RV.* 8. 40. 2 (two parts, of three and four verses respectively); *nāram iti nāram*, and *medhāsātaya iti medhāsātaye nābhantām anyaké same*; and

(iii) *RV.* 10. 133. 1 (two parts of 2 and 5 verses respectively); *arcatéty arcata*; and *dhānvasv iti dhānva-su*.

The *aṣṭapadā ṛk*-s³⁷, for the purpose of the *KP.*, are found divided into three parts, comprising three, two, and three verses respectively.³⁸ Thus, for example, in *RV.* 1. 127. 6 the three parts in the *KP.*, will end with *iṣṭānir itīṣṭānir*; *arhānēty arhānā*; and *pānthām iti pānthām*, respectively.

It may be observed here that the topic of division of *mantra*-s into two or more parts, that has been discussed so far has been dealt with in the *RPr.* 18. 46-52. But a perusal of these rules shows that they give us only a general idea of how the *mantra*-s, comprising the varying numbers of verses, are to be sub-divided; and in doing this, they have given alternative ways of doing this in several cases. This is what we also have observed in our treatment of this topic so far. And here arises the question as to the exact *mantra* or *mantra*-s where those alternatives are to be adopted. The illustrations show how the division is to be made in several cases. But we are still in the dark as to the exact *mantra*-s where they are to be adopted. Neither the *RPr.* nor *Uvaṭa* appear to have done anything to enlighten us in this matter.³⁹

With this problem in our mind, if we cast a glance through the pages of a printed edition of the *Samhitā*, we shall find that every *mantra* in it has been divided into two or more parts by means of a vertical line after each part. A careful perusal of the *Samhitā-pāṭha*, from this point of view, will reveal to us where we have to adopt the various alternatives stated in the *RPr.* This, in other words, would mean that the division of the *mantra*-s in the *RV.* has been already fixed, possibly (or presumably) at the time when they came into being. It is left

37. Read: *dvābhyām ca madhye'ṣṭapadāsu vidyāt* | *RPr.* 18. 52.

38. A perusal of the illustrative *ṛk*-s stated above will show that a *ṛk* has to be divided according to the mode applicable to it. It cannot be amenable to any of the other modes discussed up-to-now. Hence the teaching about the division of a *ṛc* as given in the *RPr.* is only incomplete; and not much helpful in thoroughly understanding and mastering the topic of the division of Vedic *ṛk*-s into its *krama* divisions (if we may so call them). Though they are conveniently referred to by the word *ardharca* in some works (or places), it is evident that they are not *ardharca*-s in the exact sense of the term. They are the divisions into which a *ṛk* is divided to indicate the concept of *ardharca*, that is, a division of a *ṛk* comprising a unit for forming its *krama-pāṭha*. It may be remembered that *kramapada* is a totally different term.

39. Not even does the *Upalekhasūtra*, the only other work on the *KP* (known so far), afford us any aid or clue on this point.

for us only to follow the same, if we want to arrive at the exact text of the *KP.*, as it has come down to us by oral tradition.

But in spite of all this, one might be inspired to raise the question : Can there be any definite principle behind these alternative modes of dividing the *ṛk*-s ? Or are they only arbitrarily divided ?

In this connexion, it is intriguing to note that Veṅkaṭamādhava⁴⁰ has made some pertinent remarks, which surely deserve a careful perusal. In his *R̥gvedā-nukramaṇī* 6. 8. 2 ff, he remarks⁴¹ that generally a *ṛk* contains a complete sense ; and that within a *ṛk* also we do find even a hemistich, conveying some complete sense so far as it goes, possibly suggesting thereby the principle behind the practice of dividing a *ṛk* into its component parts. Here then we find that a *ṛk* (according to VM) is divided into two (or more) parts according to the completion of a unit (or rather sub-unit) of the sense conveyed by the whole *ṛk*.⁴²

We have seen above that *ardharca* is considered as the unit for division (for the purposes of the formation and recitation of the *KP.*) ; and this suggests that a *ṛk*, formed of one *ardharca* or less than it, cannot and should not be split up into smaller units, but should be considered as a unit by itself. This is what VM also has expressly stated in the words : ‘*avasyeḍ antatas tatra dvipadaikapaḍā ṛcaḥ*’.⁴³ According to him the question of splitting up a *ṛk* into parts crops up in the case of *mantra*-s with three or more verses only.

Finally, we may conclude our discussion about the unit of the *KP.* by raising the question whether and how far it is possible to prepare the text of the

40. This Veṅkaṭa-Mādhava is the author of the *R̥gvedānukramaṇī*, (Madras University Sanskrit Series, No. 2) edited by C. K. RAJA in 1932. He is to be distinguished from another Mādhava whose *Mādhavānukramaṇī* (only *upodghāta*, *ākhyātānukramaṇī*, and *nāmānukramaṇī*) has also been brought out as Appendix IV to the above work. This latter Mādhava's *R̥gvedavyākhyā* (the twelfth and the last part of this work) has been separately edited by C. K. RAJA in the Adyar Library Series (ALS) No. 22 (1939) and No. 61 (1947) under the title *R̥gveda-vyākhyā mādhavakṛtā*. I have written several papers on this Mādhava (coming out in due course).

41. Read : *tatrarcaṁ avasānūni prāyēnārthānūnūṛpataḥ |*
avasyeḍ antatas tatra dvipadaikapaḍā ṛcaḥ || 1 ||
ardharace'vāntaraḥ kaścid vākyārthaḥ paryavasyati |
bahviṣṭv ṛkṣu viśeṣam tam na vijānanti apāṇḍitāḥ || 2 ||

By this he possibly means to say : It has been handed down by the tradition (whose beginning cannot be traced beyond doubt, and hence) which is considered to be without a beginning. (*anādi*)

42. That *avasāna* and *artha* are interdependent, has been stated by Mādhava in ‘*yaṭrānyathāvasānam syāt tatrārtho'pi ca tādrśaḥ*’ | Mādhava, Loc. cit., st. 4.

43. Loc. cit. verse 1.

KP. merely on the basis of the rules given, discussed, and exemplified in the *RPr.* and Uvaṭa's *Bhāṣya* on it.⁴⁴ The first point that crops up out of the discussion is about the fixing up of the unit of the *KP.* We have already seen the variety of ways in which *ṛc*-s with the same number of verses (*pada*-s) are divided. And there are no rules given as to where exactly, which of these particular divisions, is to be adopted; and the only help we can have in this respect is, as has been indicated above, the division adopted in our manuscripts and printed editions themselves prepared on the basis of the Mss. material, coupled with oral tradition.

One might argue here that if we keep the *RV.* Text, (MS. or edition) before us, (together with the *RPr.*) our purpose will be served; and we can prepare an accurate ms. of the *KP.* (as preserved by oral tradition), so much so that there is no need to prepare and publish an edition of the *KP.*

But it may be pointed out that there are various rules, sub-rules, and exceptions pertaining to a large number of points that, how-so-ever careful an editor may be, there is every risk of his nodding at some places and going astray. For, the rules for the formation of the *KP.* as given in *RPr.* 10 (and 11 in particular) themselves give no rules in this connexion. The *RPr.* 18 speaks of a variety of alternatives to be adopted in the same type of *ardharca*: and there is no authentic source to decide between (or among) these alternatives, except the traditional text of the *KP.*

In some cases, *RPr.* (text itself) has been explained in two or more ways; and this raises the question, as to which of the several alternatives should be adopted. The only course in such cases to have the authentic text can be nothing else than oral tradition.

Here I should like to draw the attention of scholars to *RPr.* 11. 8 and Uvaṭa's *Bhāṣya* thereon:

ado pito, so cid, uṣar vasūyavo |
na dhakṣi dhukṣītyapi cātīyanti kim || RPr. 11. 8

Uvaṭa on this writes: if the *pada*, *āvar*, cannot be *avasānīya* (for this see *RPr.* 11. 7 and Uvaṭa on it), then why do they not treat *ado pito, so cit, uṣarvasūyavaḥ*, also as *anavasānīya*? These also are of the same type. Here it is remarkable that Uvaṭa has no better explanation to offer than the following

44. It is argued by some that once you study the *RPr.* very thoroughly, it is not at all difficult for you to prepare the *KP.* of the *Samhitā* quite accurately. But a little effort at such a task will convincingly show that preparation of the *KP.* in this way is 'easier said than done'. This I intend to illustrate by bringing out an edition of the *KP.* (along with *SP.* and *PP.*) of *RV.* 2. 1-10, discussing the peculiar features of the *KP.* occurring therein in some details,

remarks : *satyam* (what you say is right). But, these have not been included in the *anvasānīya* rules in the *Kramaśāstra* ! *tasmānnātiyanti | tatra gṛhītānām iha hetur ucyate*. This clearly shows that what has been handed down by tradition is to be accepted, and what is not accepted by tradition, has to be rejected, though it might appear to be covered by a particular rule !

At another place⁴⁵ Uvaṭa in reply to a similar question has remarked : *saṁhitāyām yad dṛṣṭam tad anena śāstreṇa vyākhyāyate | nānenādṛṣṭam sādhyate* |, which again clearly shows that rules cannot help you in the formation of *Samhitā* (or in fact, any other) *pāṭha* wholly and solely; rules are meant to explain what is found in the *pāṭha*, and not to introduce any innovations therein.

There is much to be said on this point. But what has been stated so far, I think, is enough to demonstrate the need of an edition of the *Krama-pāṭha* (like the *Samhitā*), true to our oral tradition.

45. Uvaṭa on *ṚPr.* 1. 60.

JAINA DEFINITIONS OF THE PRAMĀṆA

By

R. C. DWIVEDI

Definitions of the Pramāṇa proposed by the Jain logicians may be broadly divided into six types, the first two of which are simply derivative, such as :

(i) प्रमिणोति प्रमीयतेऽनेन प्रमितिमात्रं वा प्रमाणम् ।

Pūjyapāda, Sarvārthasiddhi, 1. 12

(ii) प्रकर्षेण संशयादिव्यवच्छेदेन मीयते परिच्छिद्यते वस्तुतत्त्वं येन तत् प्रमाणं, प्रमायां साधकतमम् ।

Hemacandra, Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, p. 2.

These follow the Nyāya tradition first recorded by Vātsyāyana¹ and continued through the ages² down to the times when popular hand-books like Tarkabhāṣā³ ruled the day.

1. Defining the Pramāṇa derivatively, that it is the unique and active cause (*karana*)⁴ of valid cognition, serves the purpose of excluding such general conditions of all knowledge as subject (*pramātā*), object (*prameya*), time and space etc. within the scope of means of knowledge. Pramāṇa, being the source, means instrument or organ of valid cognition ; its supreme value in ascertaining and comprehending the truth can hardly be exaggerated.⁵

1. उपलब्धिसाधनानि प्रमाणानीति समाख्यानिर्वचनसामर्थ्याद् बोद्धव्यं प्रमीयतेऽनेनेति करणार्थाभिधानो हि प्रमाणशब्दः । (Nyāyabhāṣya, I 1. 3).

2. (i) प्रमासाधनं हि प्रमाणम् सामान्यलक्षणं तु प्रमाणपदादेव समाख्यानिर्वचनसामर्थ्यसंहितादवगम्यते । (Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā, p. 21).

(ii) प्रमीयते येन तत्प्रमाणमिति करणार्थाभिधायिनः प्रमाणशब्दात् प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणमवगम्यते । (Nyāyamañjarī, p. 25).

3. प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम् । (Tarkabhāṣā).

4. व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं करणम् । or साधकतमं करणम् । The term *Pramāṇa* is formed by suffixing *lyuṣ* (*ana*) to *√mā* (to measure) prefixed by *pra*.

5. (i) प्रमाणादर्थसंसिद्धिस्तदाभासादिपर्ययः । (Māṇikyanandin, Parikṣāmukha, Verse 1).

(ii) प्रमाणादिष्टसंसिद्धिरन्यथातिप्रसङ्गतः । (Vidyānanda, Pramāṇa-parikṣā, p. 63).

(iii) सम्मग्नज्ञानपूर्विका सर्वपुरुषार्थसिद्धिरिति तदव्युत्पाद्यते ।

(Dharmakīrti, Nyāyabindu, I. 1).

(iv) मानाधीना मेयसिद्धिः । (Nyāya maxim).

(v) प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणादि । (Sāṃkhya-kārikā, 4).

Philosopher of every shade agrees that *Pramāṇa* is the only source of valid cognition, knowledge or truth. This initial agreement is followed by sharp disagreement on major issues involved, namely, the nature of instrument (*karana*) and of the knowledge (*pramā*).

2. Vidyānanda, who follows Āgamic tradition or more precisely Ḡṛddhāpiccha (*Tattvārtha-Sūtra* 1.9-10), defines *pramāṇa* as right or valid cognition.⁶

In order to assert the Jaina view, even the term *pramāṇa* is taken in the sense of abstract state (i. e. *pramiti* or valid cognition⁷); knowing, according to Jainism, is a conscious act, the means of knowledge, therefore, can be knowledge itself which is of the nature of cessation of ignorance. According to the Nyāya, the means of perceptual knowledge is threefold, namely, sense, sense-object-contact, and cognition. In indeterminate knowledge, sense-object-contact is the means, and it is only in generating the attitudes or rejection, acceptance or indifference, as the case may be, that indeterminate cognition is the means.⁸

As both cognition and non-cognition are admitted to be instruments of knowledge in the Nyāya system, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa accepts collocation of the two as the nature (*svarūpa*) of *pramāṇa*.⁹ According to the Nyāya, an object is not known without its contact with the sense. If object unconnected with the senses were to be cognised, then all the objects will be known, but no object, which is beyond our ken, is ever known.¹⁰ Moreover, instrument is always different from the subject and object. "I see the Jar with the eyes." In this example, eye is

6. सम्यग्ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् । This simple definition partly echoes the Buddhist definition :

(i) प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम् । (Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇa-vārttika*, 2. 4).

This definition has been adopted *verbatim* in the *Nyāyāvātara* (p. 3).

7. Besides Pūjyapāda's derivation, the following may also be noted : प्रमितिः प्रमाणमिति भावव्युत्पत्त्या सम्यग्ज्ञानमेव प्रमाणम् । (Bhavasena, *Pramāṇapraveśa*, pp. 1-2).

8. (i) कदा पुनरिन्द्रियं करणम् ? यदा निर्विकल्पकरूपा प्रमा फलम् । ... यदा निर्विकल्पकानन्तरं सविकल्पकं ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः करणम् । यदा उक्तसविकल्पकानन्तरं हानोपादानोपेक्षाबुद्ध्यो जायन्ते तदा निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञानं करणम् । (Tarkabhāṣā, pp. 48-49). Earlier also, in the context of definition of *pramāṇa*, it is stated that sense-contact etc. is the instrument and not the subject or the object.

सत्यपि प्रमातरि प्रमेये च प्रमानुत्पत्तेरिन्द्रियसंयोगादौ सति अविलम्बेन प्रसोत्पत्तेरत इन्द्रियसंयोगादिरेव करणम् । (ibid., p. 45).

(ii) यदा सन्निकर्षस्तदा ज्ञानं प्रमितिः, यदा ज्ञानं तदा हानोपादानोपेक्षाबुद्ध्यः फलम् । (Nyāyabhāṣya, I, 1. 3).

9. अव्यभिचारिणीमसंदिग्धामर्थोपलब्धिं विदधती बोधाबोधस्वभावा सामग्री प्रमाणम्, बोधाबोधस्वभावो हि तस्य स्वरूपम् । (Nyāyamañjarī, p. 12).

10. ननु सन्निकर्षविगमे किं व्यवहितानुपलब्धिरिति ब्रूमः । यदि ह्यसन्निकृष्टमपि चक्षुरादीन्द्रियमर्थं गृहीयात् व्यवहितोऽपि ततोऽर्थे उपलभ्येत, न चोपलभ्येत, तस्मादस्ति सन्निकर्षः । (Nyāyamañjarī, p. 69).

the instrument which is different from both, the agent 'I' and the act of seeing. Therefore, knowing itself cannot be the instrument.¹¹ To this, the Jainas reply that even when eye is in contact with the ether, along with a Jar, there is no knowledge of the former. So far as the difference of means and result is concerned it can be maintained otherwise. It is only the sentient cognition, which can, like light, illuminate the object and not the insentient sense-contact. Similarly, collocation of different causes including cognition, admitted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa as the means of knowledge, cannot be so regarded. Collocation of causes, like sense-contact, is insentient. Only a sentient cause can produce sentient knowledge. Moreover, the collocation will not be a direct cause because it will first produce cognition and then only will lead to knowledge. An indirect cause is not a *karāṇa*.¹²

The Vaiśeṣikas also define *pramāṇa* as the flawless knowledge.¹³ However, the author of the Vyomavati, following the line of the Naiyāyikas, regards contact and cognition as the *Pramāṇa*.¹⁴

Sāṃkhya¹⁵ and Yoga¹⁶ consider *Pramāṇa* to be the modification of intellect, which assumes the form of object. This is also not acceptable to the Jainas, firstly because no blind modification of unconscious principle of intellect can create sentient knowledge, and secondly, it is against our experience to say that intellect or sense can assume the form of an object.

According to the Prābhākaras, the function of knower (*jñātṛvyāpāra*) producing knowledge is considered to be *Pramāṇa*.¹⁷ This is refuted by the Jainas on the ground that the entity named as the function of the knower cannot be established by any of the *Pramāṇas*.¹⁸

11. Vide ibid., pp. 66-67.

12. For detailed criticism of the Nyāya view of *pramāṇa*, see Nyāyakumudacandra, pp. 40-41 and Prameyakamalamārtanda, p. 19.

13. अदुष्टं विद्या । (Kapāda Sūtra, 9. 2. 12).

14. Vide Vyomavati on the Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 553.

15. (i) सांख्यस्तु बुद्धिबुद्धिः प्रमाणमिति प्रतिपन्नः विषयाकारपरिणतेन्द्रियादिवृत्त्यनुपातिनी बुद्धि-वृत्तिरेव पुरुषमुपरजयन्ती प्रमाणम् । (Nyāyamañjarī, p. 24).

(ii) इन्द्रियप्रणालिकयाधेसन्निकर्षेण लिङ्गज्ञानादिना वा बुद्धेरर्थाकारा वृत्तिर्जायते ।

(Sāṃkhyapraśastapādabhāṣya I. 87).

16. प्रमाणं वृत्तिरेव च । (Yogavāsiṣṭha, p. 16).

17. ज्ञानं हि नाम क्रियात्मकं, क्रिया च फलानुमेया, ज्ञातृव्यापारेण फलनिष्पत्तेः । (Nyāyamañjarī, p. 16). Later on Jayanta concludes Mīmāṃsaka's view : तदेव फलानुमेयो ज्ञानव्यापारो ज्ञानादि-शब्दाबाधः प्रमाणम् । (ibid).

18. See Nyāyakumudacandra, pp. 42-45, and Prameyakamalamārtanda, pp. 20-25.

Like Jainas, Buddhists also define *Pramāṇa* in term of valid cognition and do not regard sense, contact or modification of blind intellect or activity of the cogniser as the means of knowledge. However, the Buddhist contention that cognition of the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), being devoid of all constructions, is indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and there is no determinate preception, is unacceptable to the Jainas on the ground that *Pramāṇa* must be definite and competent to decide good and bad so as to be empirically useful.¹⁹ Moreover, idealistic Buddhists regard identity between cognition and its content as the organ of knowledge,²⁰ i. e. object and its cognition are not different. This is clearly unacceptable to the Jainas who consider object external and independent of cognition. Cognition reveals itself and the content, but does not assume the form of the object because the abstract cognition cannot become concrete. Also in the case of an illusion, the cognition, even if it were to assume the objective form, does not become knowledge. Hence the Buddhist view of identity between cognition and its object or assuming the form of the object²¹ is clearly untenable,

A question may be asked that if valid cognition is the means of knowledge, then what will be the result i. e., how the difference in the means and end can be maintained. The Jaina reply is that cessation of ignorance or creation of attitudes of rejection, acceptance or indifference on knowing the objects can rightly be taken to be the end of knowledge.²²

Thus the second type of definition underlines the instrumentality of cognition which is sentient, determinate and different from the object and refutes contact etc. as the *Pramāṇa*.²³

3. Samantabhadra is the first Jaina logician to define the *Pramāṇa* as the knowledge which illumines itself and the object.²⁴ This definition was modified by Siddhasena by adding a new term 'without obstruction'.²⁵

19. हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारसमर्थं हि प्रमाणं ततो ज्ञानमेव तत् । (Parikṣāmukha, I. 2).

20. (i) विषयाधिगतिश्चात्र प्रमाणफलमिष्यते ।

स्ववित्तिर्वा प्रमाणं तु सारूप्यं योग्यतापि वा ॥

(Sāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṃgrahakārikā, 1344).

(ii) करणसाधनेन मानशब्देन सारूप्यलक्षणं प्रमाणमभिधीयते ।

(Dharmottara, Nyāyabinduṭīkā on Sūtra 3).

21. स्वसंवित्तिं फलं चात्र ताद्रूप्यादर्शनश्चयः । विषयाकार एवायं प्रमाणं तेन मीयते ॥

(Dinnāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya I. 10).

22. (i) ननु चोक्तं ज्ञाने प्रमाणे सति फलाभाव इति । नैष दोषः, अर्थाधिगमे प्रीतिदर्शनात् । सा फलमित्युच्यते, उपेक्षाऽज्ञाननाशो वा फलम् । (Pūjyapāda, Sarvārthasiddhi I. 10).

(ii) अज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्हानोपादानोपेक्षाश्च फलम् । (Māṇikyanandin, Parikṣāmukha V. 1).

23. सन्निकर्षादिरज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमनुपपन्नमर्थान्तरवत् । (I. 3).

24. स्वपरावभासकं यथा प्रमाणं सुवि बुद्धिलक्षणम् (Svayambhūstotra, 63).

25. प्रमाणं स्वपराभासि ज्ञानं बाधविवर्जितम् । (Nyāyāvātāra, 1).

Although this definition bears impact of the Buddhists inasmuch as they had characterised knowledge as self-illuminating²⁶ and of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas who had used 'without obstruction' in their definition,²⁷ yet it sets aside their views as also those of others. While Jains consider knowledge as illuminating²⁸ both the self and the object, the realistic Buddhist, the Naiyāyika²⁹ and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka hold that it illumines the external object alone, as it cannot illuminate itself. The Jains assert that if knowledge cannot illumine itself, it cannot cognise the external object either. It should therefore be admitted that knowledge, like a lamp, illumines itself as well as the external object. The very nature of cognition is self-manifesting. It is the manifestation of the object, however, which determines a particular cognition to be valid or invalid.³⁰ The Jaina view of *Pramāṇa* also sets aside the Yogācāra view which maintains that knowledge illumines itself alone because there is no object independent of it. The Upaniṣadic view of Reality being consciousness³¹ and all else as appearance stands similarly refuted according to the Jainism which maintains the reality of external world.

In order to differentiate knowledge from false cognition illustrated in the cases of false images, wrong beliefs etc., the term 'without any obstruction' has been used. A valid cognition is never erroneous, that will be a contradiction in terms.³²

This third type of definition thus emphasises the character of knowledge as determinant of both the self and the object and asserts the reality of external phenomenon.³³

26. स्वरूपस्य स्वता गतेः । Also स्वरूपाधिगतेः परम् । (Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika*, II. 4).

27. तत्रापूर्वार्थविज्ञानं निश्चितं बाधवर्जितम् । अदुष्टकारणारब्धं प्रमाणं लोकसम्मतम् ॥
Ascribed to Kumārila but not found in the extant *Slokavārttika*. Quoted and criticized by Vidyānanda in the *Tattvārtha-Slokavārttika* I. 10. 71.

28. (i) अज्ञातार्थज्ञापकं प्रमाणम् ।

(ii) अज्ञातार्थप्रकाशो वा । (Dinnāga, *Pramāṇavārttika*, II. 5).

29. (i) अर्थप्रकाशो बुद्धिः । (Tarkakaumudī, NS. ed. p. 6).

(ii) विज्ञानमनात्मसंवेदनम् । *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*, p. 4).

30. भावप्रमेयोपेक्षायां प्रमाणाभासनिवृत्तिः ।

वृद्धिः प्रमेयापेक्षायां प्रमाणं तन्निमित्तं च ते ॥ (*Āptamīmāṃsā*, Verse 83).

31. (i) सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म । (Taittiriya, II. 1. 1).

(ii) विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म । (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, III. 28).

32. (i) न प्रत्यक्षमपि भ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वविनिश्चयात् ।

भ्रान्तं प्रमाणमित्येतद् विरुद्धवचनं यतः ॥ (*Nyāyāvātāra*, 6).

(ii) अनुमानं तदभ्रान्तं प्रमाणत्वात् समक्षवत् । (ibid. 5).

33. सकलप्रतिभासस्य भ्रान्तत्वासिद्धितः स्फुटम् ।

प्रमाणं स्वात्मनश्चापि द्वयसिद्धौ प्रसिद्धवति ॥ (ibid. 7).

4. Akalaṅka maintained true cognition to be manifesting both the self and the object.³⁴ Further, he proposed another definition of *Pramāṇa*³⁵ by incorporating the term *avisamvādi*³⁶ of the Buddhists and 'anadhigata' (unknown) or 'apūrvā' (novel) of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas.³⁷ According to the Buddhists, knowledge, being practically useful, should lead to the realisation of some end, be harmonious with experience and should favour successful volition. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas consider it necessary that the content of knowledge should be unknown, or previously unacquired and hence novel. Māṇikyanandin combined the opinions of Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka by including 'sva' and 'apūrvā' in his single definition. Use of the term '*vyavasāya*'³⁸ (determination) by him bears further the influence of Nyāya where this term occurs in the definition of perception.³⁹

If the object of cognition must be novel as admitted by Akalaṅka following the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists⁴⁰ how continuous cognition (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) of an object can be regarded as *pramāṇa*? The Naiyāyikas have not to

34. सिद्धौ यत्र परापेक्ष्यं सिद्धौ स्वपररूपयोः ।

तत् प्रमाणं ततो नान्यदविकल्पमचेतनम् ॥ (Siddhivinīśaya, p. 175).

35. प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानमनधिगतार्थाधिगमलक्षणत्वात् । (Aṣṭasatī).

36. (i) ततोऽर्थक्रियासमर्थवस्तुप्रकाशकं सम्यग्ज्ञानम् ।

(ii) यतश्चार्थसिद्धिस्तत् सम्यग्ज्ञानम् ॥

(iii) अविसंवादकं ज्ञानं सम्यग्ज्ञानम् । लोके च पूर्वमुपदिशितमर्थं प्रापयन्संवादक उच्यते । तद्वज्ज्ञानमपि स्वयं प्रदर्शितमर्थं प्रापयत् संवादकमुच्यते । प्रदर्शिते चार्थे प्रवर्तकत्वमेव प्रापकत्वं नाम ।

(Nyāyabinduṭīkā on Sūtra I).

37. (i) तत्रापूर्वार्थविज्ञानं quoted above.

(ii) यथार्थमगृहीतग्राहि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् । (Sāstradīpikā, p. 45).

(iii) औत्पत्तिकगिरा दोषः कारणस्य निवार्यते । अबोधो व्यतिरेकेण स्वतस्तेन प्रमाणाता ॥ सर्वस्यानुपलब्धेऽर्थे प्रामाण्यं स्मृतिरन्यथा । (Ślokavārttika, 10-11).

(iv) एतच्च विशेषणमुपाददानेन सूत्रकारेण कारणदोषबाधकज्ञानरहितमगृहीतग्राहि ज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणलक्षणं सूचितम् । (Sāstradīpikā p. 123).

(v) अनधिगतार्थगन्तृ प्रमाणमिति भाट्टमीमांसका आहुः । (Siddhacandrodaya, 20).

38. स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् । Parīkṣāmukha, I. 1.

39. इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् ।

(Nyāyasūtra I. 1. 4).

40. (i) अज्ञातार्थज्ञापकं प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् । (Dīnnāga, *Pramāṇasamuccaya*).

(ii) अतएवानधिगतविषयमप्रमाणम् । येनैव हि ज्ञानेन प्रथममधिगतोऽर्थस्तेनैव प्रवर्तितः पुरुषः प्राप्तिश्चार्थः तत्रैवार्थे किमन्येन ज्ञानेनाधिकं कार्यम्, ततोऽधिगतविषयमप्रमाणम् ।

Dharmottara concludes this in his explanation of the term '*avisamvādaka*' in his *Ṭīkā* on the *Nyāyabindu*, p. 3. While the term *Anadhigata* excludes both *Vikalpa* and *Smṛti* in Buddhism, in Mīmāṃsā it excludes only the cases of recollection and not '*Vikalpa*'.

bother themselves on this question because cognition of even previously known object can be *pramāṇa* in their opinion.⁴¹ The Mīmāṃsakas also admit the validity of continuous cognition. According to the Prābhākaras, the *pramāṇa* is experience⁴² and therefore there is no problem in admitting a case of continuous cognition under the *pramāṇa*. The followers of Kumārila, who insist on the novelty (*anadhigatatva* or *apūrvatva*) of the object, however, say that subtle difference in time makes the object novel. Śālikanātha, the follower of Prabhākara School, has a better explanation to offer. He says: each individual cognition in the series of continuous cognition is independent of the other. None of them can be distinguished either in its awareness or creation. Hence each one of these cognitions is valid.⁴³

Digambara logicians admit continuous cognition to be valid only if it cognises the moments also, otherwise it is held to be invalid. This view corresponds with the one held by the Buddhist Arcaṭa⁴⁴ who conceded Yogic continuous cognition to be valid as it can cognise the difference wrought by time and regarded ordinary man's continuous cognition as invalid. In the Jain system 'memory' is also included under valid knowledge, hence the element of novelty in the definition of *pramāṇa*, accepted by Akalaṅka and Māṇikyanandin, stands in a different sense of 'novel in some aspect' and not that of totally novel.⁴⁵

5. Vidyānanda discards the element of novelty in his definition of *pramāṇa*⁴⁶ which follows largely the views of Samantabhadra and Siddhasena, accepting the term '*vyavasāya*' introduced by Māṇikyanandin. Abhayadeva, the commentator on the Sanmati, follows Vidyānanda with the only difference that he substitutes '*Vyavasāya*' by a synonym *Nirṇīti*.⁴⁷ Vādi Devasūri, however, accepts

41. अनधिगतार्थगन्तृत्वं च धारावाहिकविज्ञानानामधिगतार्थगोचराणां लोकसिद्धप्रमाणभावानां प्रामाण्यं विद्वन्तीति नाद्रियामहे । (Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā; p. 20). See also Kandali, p. 61, Nyāyamañjarī, p. 22 and Nyāyakusumāñjali, 4. 1.

42. (i) अनुभूतिश्च नः प्रमाणम् । (Prabhākara, Brhatī, I. 1.5).

(ii) प्रमाणमनुभूतिः सा स्मृतेरन्या । (Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 42).

43. अन्योन्यनिरपेक्षा धारावाहिकबुद्ध्यः व्याप्रियमाणे हि पूर्वोक्तज्ञानकारणरूपा उतरेषामप्युत्पत्तिरिति न प्रतीतितः उत्पत्तितो वा धारावाहिकविज्ञानानि परस्परस्यातिशेरेत इति युक्ता सर्वेषामपि प्रमाणता । (Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 42). See Brhatī also p. 103.

44. Vide his Tīkā on the Hetubindu, p. 39.

45. (i) गृहीतमगृहीतं वा स्वार्थं यदि व्यवस्यति ।

तत्र लोके न शास्त्रेषु विजहाति प्रमाणताम् । (Tattvārthasloka, I. 10. 78).

(ii) प्रमान्तरागृहीतार्थप्रकाशित्वं प्रपञ्चतः । प्रामाण्यं च गृहीतार्थग्राहित्वेऽपि कथंचन ॥ (ibid.).

46. तत्त्वार्थव्यवसायात्मज्ञानं मानमितीयता ।

लक्षणेन गतार्थत्वात् व्यर्थमन्यद्विशेषणम् ॥

(Tattvārthasloka, I. 10. 77). See also Pramāṇaparīkṣā, 53,

47. प्रमाणं स्वार्थनिर्णीतस्वभावं ज्ञानम् । (Sanmatītikā, p. 518).

Vidyānanda's definition as it is.⁴⁸ All the Śvetāmbara logicians accept continuous cognition and recollection as *pramāṇa*. They see, therefore, no need to keep *anadhigata* or *apūrvā* in their definitions of knowledge.

6. Hemacandra defines *pramāṇa* as authentic definitive cognition of an object.⁴⁹ His definition follows Umāsvāti,⁵⁰ Dharmakīrti⁵¹ and Bhāsarvajña⁵² in using the term *samyag* and Abhayadeva in using the term *nirṇaya*, which stands for cognition devoid of the characteristic of doubt, indecision and indeterminate cognition, and negates the status of *pramāṇa* to the sense-object contact (admitted by the Nyāya) and to doubt etc., though they are included under the category of cognition of Jainas.⁵³ The prefix 'pra' in the term *pramāṇa* signifies the same.⁵⁴ Hemacandra's definition is important for excluding the term for self-illuminating character of knowledge in the definition of *pramāṇa*. It is true that knowledge is self-manifesting, as is revealed in introspection which illuminates cognition along-with its subject and object. Cognition cannot be held to be revealed either by second cognition or by presumption or be made dependent on the cognition of the object, because that will involve either an infinite regress or a logical see-saw. Therefore the cognition must be accepted to be self-illuminating, says Hemacandra.⁵⁵ However, he objects to the inclusion of this well-established self-illuminating character of the cognition in the definition of *pramāṇa* because this overlaps cases of erroneous cognition,⁵⁶ such as doubt, which are equally self-revealing as there is not a single case of cognition which is not *ipso facto* self-manifesting. The old masters included this character of cognition for clear understanding of the learners.⁵⁷

Hemacandra's definition is also significant on account of exclusion of the term *apūrvā* (novel) or *anadhigata* (unknown) admitted by the Buddhist, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka and the Digambara School of Jaina logicians. According to him, cognition of an object cognised before, as in the case of continuous cognition,

48. स्वपरव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् । (Pramāṇanirṇaya).

49. सम्यगर्थनिर्णयः प्रमाणम् । (Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, 2).

50. सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गः । (Tattvārthasūtra, I. 1).

51. सम्यग्ज्ञानपूर्विका सर्वपुरुषार्थसिद्धिः । (Nyāyabindu I. 1).

52. सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम् । (Nyāyasāra, p. 1).

53. तत्र निर्णयः संशयानवध्यवसायाविकल्पकत्वरहितं ज्ञानम् । ततो निर्णयपदेनाज्ञानरूपस्येन्द्रिय-सन्निकर्षादेः ज्ञानरूपस्यापि संशयादेः प्रमाणत्वनिषेधः । (Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, p. 3).

54. प्रकर्षेण संशयादिव्यवच्छेदेन मीयते परिच्छिद्यते वस्तुतत्त्वं येन तत् प्रमाणम् । (ibid. p. 2).

55. तस्मादर्थोन्मुखतयेव स्वोन्मुखतयापि ज्ञानस्य प्रतिभासता - स्वनिर्णयात्मकत्वमप्यस्ति - संवित् स्वप्रकाशा अर्थप्रतीतित्वात्, यः स्वप्रकाशो न भवति नासावर्थप्रतीतिः, यथा घटः । (ibid. (pp. 3-4)).

56. स्वनिर्णयः सन्नप्यलक्षणम्, अप्रमाणेऽपि भावात् । (ibid. p. 4).

57. स्वनिर्णयस्तु अप्रमाणेऽपि संशयादौ वर्तते, न हि काचित् ज्ञानमात्रा सास्ति या न स्वसंविदिता नाम ततो न स्वनिर्णयो लक्षणमुक्तमस्माभिः, वृद्धैस्तु परीक्षार्थमुपक्षिप्तः । (ibid. p. 4).

determinate perception and its judgement, as also the recollection, may legitimately be considered valid cognition. The term *anadhigata* will serve no purpose either with reference to the substance which does not vary being self-same unity and eternal in either state qua cognised before or to be cognised hereafter.

Nor has this term any significance with reference to modes which are temporary. Because then even the case of continuous cognition cannot be regarded as cognising the pre-cognised object.⁵⁸ The qualifying proviso of *anadhigata* is, therefore, unnecessary with reference to both the eternal selfsame substance and the changing modes.

In recollection, which is admitted to be *pramāṇa*, there is cognition of the pre-cognised. Even those, who regard recollection to be invalid, do so on the basis that it is not directly derived from an object and not on the basis that it cognises the pre-cognised object.⁵⁹

An exposition of the six varieties of definitions given here gives the Jaina views of *pramā* (knowledge), *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) and *jñāna* (cognition). Salient features of this view may be summed up as follows :—

1. Cognition illumines itself and the object. This is a synthesis of idealistic view of the Buddhist, the Prābhākara and the Vedāntist (also the Kāśmīr Śaivaite), which regards knowledge to be self-evident and of the realistic view of the Sautrāntika, Nyāyavaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yogin, and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, which regards that the knowledge illuminates the object alone.
2. According to Jaina, authentic cognition alone is the instrument of knowledge. Sense, sense-object-contact (Nyāyavaiśeṣika), modification of intellect (Sāṃkhya) or identity (Sārūpya, idealistic Buddhist) cannot be the source of knowledge.
3. Source and end of knowledge are different. While authentic cognition is the source of knowledge, it is the cessation of ignorance by removing the Kārmic Veil enveloping the individual soul which is the ultimate end. In empirical state, however, forming the attitude of rejection, acceptance or indifference, as the case may be, is the result of *pramāṇa*.

58. ग्रहीष्यमाणग्राहिण इव गृहीतग्राहिणोऽपि नाप्रामाण्यम् । (Pramāṇapamīmāṃsā, 4). See also the Vṛtti.

59. See Pramāṇapamīmāṃsā, p. 5, which quotes the following at the end of the discussion on this point : न स्मृतेरप्रमाणत्वं गृहीतग्राहिताकृतम् ।

अपि त्वनर्थजन्यत्वं तदप्रामाण्यकारणम् ॥ (Nyāyamañjarī, p. 23)

4. *Pramāṇa* is comprehensive as it reveals the object fully.⁶⁰ Even when one perceives the colour of an object he knows the full object and is thus aware, for example, that this is the Jar, whereas Naya reveals only a particular aspect of an object. This jar is possessed of colour. This example illustrates that Naya focusses its attention only on the colour, but when through cognisance of different aspects the object jar is known fully it becomes the case of *pramāṇa*.
5. The Jaina view of *pramāṇa* accepts all shades of definitions without compromising its independence. In its Philosophical dialogue with the non-Jaina thinkers, it maintained its idealistic realism by defining *pramāṇa* as knowledge illuminating itself and the object, but did not hesitate to benefit from the wisdom of others. This explains the impact of the Buddhistic, the Nyāyavaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsaka definitions, both in form and idea, over the Jains whose contribution to epistemological problems is massive and significant for properly constructing the history of Indian wisdom in all its details.

60. तथा चोक्तं सकलादेशः प्रमाणाधीनः । (Sarvārtṥasiddhi, I. 6).

ABOUT SOME ARCHAIC PECULIARITIES OF THE RGVEDIC SYNTAX

By

T. Y. ELIZARENKOVA

The translator of the R̥gvedic hymns into a modern Western language has to face many difficulties, one of the most serious among them being that of adequate understanding of syntactic constructions. While dealing with a living modern language one is able to understand, what particular sense is attributed to a given formal structure, and it is possible to verify it in many ways, in case of an ancient dead language one is completely devoid of such a possibility, being unable to use this language actively. The interpreter of the RV cannot check up its data, consulting other monuments, because it is only the RV, that has remained to us from this period. The text is complicated, and needs interpretation, but in obscure passages interpreters disagree with each other. Owing to the force of these circumstances, adequate definition of the meaning of syntactic constructions can sometimes make great problems.

Translating the hymns of the RV, the interpreter establishes correspondence between an ambiguous Vedic construction and a monosemous Russian, English, German or French one. This construction can also be polysemous in any of these languages, but it is treated as monosemous in each given case. That is why there are reasons to work out in such cases an experimental artificial type of transmission of meaning – a kind of suspended ambiguous construction in a modern language.

The question discussed above makes a problem of our inadequate knowledge of those meanings, that were natural to syntactic constructions of the RV. There exists also another difficulty, which in principle can be minimized or even overcome by the interpreter of the RV. Vedic is one of the ancient Indo-European languages, and it is characterized by much more archaic constructions, than those peculiar to the new advanced institutionalized syntax of modern languages. If one takes the language of translation for a mightier instrument, the Vedic syntax would look poor, primitive and imperfect. But that would be an erroneous approach. One should proceed from the conjecture, that the Vedic syntax was capable to express those syntactic relations and with that degree of definiteness the Vedic Ṛ̥ṣi's needed. New works on reconstruction of the Indo-European syntax (first of all, those of W. P. LEHMANN), discovering the possibility of a

more archaic interpretation of constructions of the ancient Indo-European languages, are of great help in this respect. Syntactic constructions of the RV are a comparatively complete reflexion of archaic Indo-European structures, which performed quite different functions as compared to those of living modern languages.

There is another consideration of no less importance. The borderlines between syntax and morphology are much vaguer in Vedic, not only than in modern Western languages, but than in classical Sanskrit as well. A number of elements, which later on become morphemes (adverbs-verbal prefixes), are functioning in Vedic as syntactic units. The existence of particles and their frequency in this system testify to the archaic stage of development of the language.

The complications of the syntactic level begin with the problem of syntactic division of the text. There is sometimes such an ambiguity, that one has to choose among a sequence of independent sentences, a complex and a compound sentence. It is a well known fact, that the text of the RV was meant for oral transmission, and it was performed in accordance with *sāman*'s, a certain tune corresponding to each metre. This was a situation, when the intonation could hardly be used as a criterion for the division of the text. The graphical form of the RV-Saṃhitā (a very late one) lacks practically punctuation marks. There exist only two marks, one of them dividing the Pada's in certain points of the metrical scheme, and another one dividing verses. Usually (but not necessarily always) the end of the verse coincides with that of the sentence, so that mostly the ambiguity of syntactic division takes place within the limits of a verse.

Before starting the analysis of certain syntactic peculiarities of the RV, a preliminary general idea should be discussed. The syntactic level of this monument seems to be done for in the best way by the following formula: "mostly, but not necessarily", which speaks well for the strong degree of entropy characteristic of this system.

It is, probably, a kind of situation, which from the view point of general linguistics should be treated within the range of problems: grammar, communication, and noncategorical rules, and which the American linguist Talmy GIVÓN has put as a case, when the speaker "may also *choose* to forego the use of a more efficient strategy in favor of a less efficient one and take the penalty in terms of decreasing efficiency of communication, decreasing clarity, increased indeterminacy, etc."¹ With only one reserve. The author describes the act

1. *On understanding Grammar*. New York - San Francisco - London, 1979, p. 32.

of communication, when the speaker deliberately chooses the tactics of breaking the rules. In case of the RV the indeterminacy in the transmission of information seems to pertain to the arrangement of the system itself, at least in some of its fragments.

One can get certain information for the division of the text of the RV into separate sentences from the word-order, however, in this system it cannot be formulated as a set of rules and prohibitions. The clearest is the tendency to the final position of the verbal predicate in a sentence of neutral style. This position may serve a starting-point in the analysis of the text. The subject in the Nom. case has a tendency to occupy the initial position in a sentence, but it can be missing, and in that case information about it is given only by the verbal flexion. At last, a name in the Nom. can function not as a subject, but as an apposition to it, as well. As it was noted by L. RENO², it was characteristic of the RV to arrange a number of attributive adjuncts, especially of nouns-epithets of the gods or of demonstrative pronouns, according to the principle of appositions. E. G.: *sá ghā nah sūnūḥ śavasā | prthūpragrāmā suśevah | mīdhvāñ asmākam babhūyāt ||* (I, 27, 2) "He is, indeed, the son (born) by our strength, the one who is pushing forward, very gracious – let him be generous to us!" or "Let this son (born) by our strength... be generous to us!"; *mahāñ āmatro vṛjāne virapcy | ūgram śavaḥ patyate dhṛṣṇv ójaḥ* (III, 36, 4) "A great vessel, overfilled during the sacrifices, he possesses formidable strength, daring courage". While the construction SOV (subject-object-verb) is a predominant one, the SVO type is also rather frequent³, and this fact diminishes the efficiency of word-order as a criterion for the division of text into sentences.

The syntax of the RV is characterized, first, by rather frequent asyndeton, and secondly, by a prominent role of particles, functioning as conjunction in compound sentences, and besides one should take into consideration sentence accent, when dividing the text of the RV into separate sentences. As it is well known, according to a general rule the finite verb in an independent sentence is accentless, being accented only in dependent and subordinate clauses. The limits, within which this rule is applied, are rather significant. As it is clear from the definition, the rule cannot be applied to nominal sentences, which are frequent enough in the RV. It cannot either be applied in those cases, when the verb occupies the initial emphatic position in a sentence – the beginning of a Pada or a sentence makes in general an accentually strong position. At last, the presence

2. "Remarques générales sur la phrase védique" *Symbolae linguisticae in honorem Georgii Kurylowicz*. Wrocław – Warszawa – Kraków, 1965.

3. W. P. LEHMANN, *Proto-Indo-European Syntax*. Austin and London, 1974, Chap. 7.

of an emphatic particle, functioning as a conjunction, like *hi* "for", "because", "since", *id* "just", "even", *caná* "even" and some others, implies subordination, which involves the accented character of the finite verb. Nevertheless, this process is carried out not quite consistently, and in this respect L. RENOUEUX makes a remark in his "Vedic grammar": "...certains emplois toniques en phrase non subordonnée ou atodes en phrase subordonnée, demeurent malaisés à interpréter".⁴ For instance: *nahí vo ásty arbhakó | dévāso ná kumārakāḥ | víṣve satómahānta it* (VIII, 30, 1) "None of you, o gods, is either small or a child - (you) all are equally great". The use of the emphatic negation *nahí* implies here semantic contrasting, and makes the verb accented. One more example of a subordinating emphatic particle: *yátrācidhvam maruto gáthathéd u tát* (V, 55, 7) "Wherever you have decided, o Maruts, it is there that you go". There is no contrasting of sense here, as it was in the previous example, and the verb in the main clause is accented because of the emphatic particle *id*. In a third example, at last, it is not a subordinating, but a coordinating conjunction (particle) *ca* that is used: *á ca huvé ní ca satsīhá devāih* (I, 76, 4) "I invite (you), and you sit down here with the gods". Some implicit contrast or relation of cause and effect seems to justify here the accented verb as well. It is clear even from the few examples given above, that the criterion for the interpretation being at times a formal, and at others a semantic one, there remains enough place for indeterminacy.

One should not forget at the same time that these examples belong rather to the periphery of the syntactic model of the composite sentence in the RV, the central position being occupied by cases, when formal devices expressing subordination are used - the relative pronoun *yá* "which", and conjunctions based upon it. It might seem at first, that the syntax of the RV is similar in this respect to that of some modern Western languages, but further analysis makes it clear, that there is great difference in the kind the sphere is divided between simple and composite sentence in the language of the original text, and of the translations. The matter is, that there exists in the language of the RV an extensive syntactic synonymy between the functions of a subordinate clause in a composite sentence, and those of some deverbative forms, first of all, of participles and infinitives, in a simple one.⁵ Since these are very frequent functions of participles and infinitives, the sphere of functioning of subordinate clauses is considerably narrowed this way (cp. the frequency of Dative infinitives in the function of subordinate clauses, expressing aim; and a small frequency of such clauses).

4. *Grammaire de la langue védique*. Lyon, 1952, p. 74.

5. T. Y. ELIZARENKOVA. *Grammatika vedijskogo jazyka* (*Grammar of the Vedic language - in Russian*). Moscow, 1982, p. 419 ff.

It should also be reminded, that indirect speech is in general alien to the language of the RV. The speech of another person is usually given in the form it was pronounced by its author, and it is followed (or not) by the particle *iti* "thus". e. g. : *idám udakám píbatéty abravītana* (I, 161, 8) "Drink this water" – thus you have said". The verbs of speech, perception and sensation require a construction with the double Acc. in a simple sentence, which functions as a subordinate explanatory sentence, e. g. : *evā hi tvām ṛtuthā yātāyantam / maghā viprebhyo dádatam ṣṛṇómi* (V, 32, 12) "Well, I hear, that you reward in due time, giving plenty to the poets" (lit. "I hear about you (Acc.) rewarding, giving").

Participles are attributes in concord, used prepositionally or postpositionally (gerunds though morphologically various, being not very frequent in the language of the RV – they spread widely in the period of the Brāhmaṇas). Like nominal attributes, they are often used as appositions, due to their verbal nature they can govern cases (Acc. etc.), have adverbs as attributes, that is they can form participial phrases. The semantic interpretation of these phrases depends completely on the context. Cp., for instance : *ánnā yád índraḥ prathamā vy āṇa / vṛtrám jaghanvāñ avṛṇīta sómam* || (III, 36, 8) "When Indra had devoured his first meals, he who killed Vṛtra, chose Soma for himself" and *tvām vṛtrám śavasī jaghanvāñ / srjáḥ síndhūñr áhinā jagrasānāñ* (IV, 17, 1) "After you had killed Vṛtra with your force, you let loose the waters to flow, that had been gulped down by the serpent" (in both cases the interpretation follows that of GELDNER⁶), where one and the same participle *jaghanvāñ*, agreeing with the subject of the sentence, is treated in translation according to the context either as an attribute to Indra, or as a predicate of a subordinate clause of time. Besides, since the attributes in the RV, as it was mentioned above, are inclined to be used as appositions, the participle in concord with the subject can be used in expressions implying comparison, e. g. : *adhvaryávo gharmīṇaḥ siṣvidānā / āvīr bhavanti gūhyā ná ké cit* || (VII, 103, 8) literal translation : Adhvaryus, sweating from hot milk, they become visible – none (of them remains) hidden" (the frogs being meant here); interpretation : "Sweating like Adhvaryu's from hot milk (in the Pravargya ritual), the frogs, sweating from the heat (of summer), become visible".⁷ Finally, in some contexts the participial attributes to the subject can be treated by the language of translation as a synonym of a clause

6. K. F. GELDNER. *Der Rig-Veda aus dem Sanskrit ins Deutsche übersetzt*, T. 1-3. Cambridge, Mass., 1951 (HOS vol. 33-35).

7. Cp. this verse translated and commented by W. D. O'FLAHERTY : "The officiating priests come forth heated and sweating. None remain hidden" – *The Rig Veda. An Anthology*. Selected, translated and annotated by Wendy Douger O'FLAHERTY. Penguin books, 1981, p. 234.

of purpose, e. g. : *çūro ná dhatta āyudhā gābhastyóḥ svār síśāsan* (IX, 76, 2)
 "Like a hero, he is grasping at his weapons with his hands to win the sky".

Absolute participial phrases (Loc. abs., Gen. abs.), which are usually translated with the help of a subordinate clause of time or a conditional clause, can also be interpreted in more than one way. For instance : *tvām id dhī sahasas putra mārtya | upabrūtē dhāne hité* (I, 40, 2) "It is you, O son of strength, that the mortal invokes, when the prize is fixed" (Loc. abs. = clause of time). But in a number of cases the same construction should be understood as the Loc. of a noun, having a participial attribute, e. g. : *sutā it tvām nīmiṣṭa indra sóme | stóme bráhmaṇi çasyámāna ukthé* (VI, 23, 1) "O Indra, you resort to the pressed Soma, to the laudation, to the sacred formula, and to the recited hymn" (the adjective *nīmiṣṭa*- requiring the Loc.).

As to the complex sentences with a formally expressed subordination, the type of relative clauses with the pronoun *yá-* "which" is the most frequent among them. Demonstrative pronouns *tá-* or *á-* in the main clause may correspond to the relative pronoun in the dependent one. The type of relation between the two clauses is coordination. It is expressed in a strict way in case there are coordinate pronouns, e. g. : *yénemā víçvā cyāvanā kṛtāni... sá janāsa indrah* (II, 12, 4) "By whom all these changes were made, he, O my people, is Indra". While the relative pronoun is always present in the subordinate clause, the demonstrative one can be missing in the main clause (the agreement with the corresponding noun or agreement in person expressed by the verbal flexion remaining), e. g. : *yā jāmāyo vṛṣṇa ichānti çaktīm | namasyāntīr jānate gárbham asmin* (III, 57, 3) lit. "Which sisters are looking for the bull's strength, bowing, they discern the embryo in him" (the subject clause). The agreement can be broken (anacoluthon) by the elliptic character of the sentence, attraction of cases, various semantic shifts etc., e. g. : *tvām víçveṣām varuṇāsi rājā | yé ca devā asura yé ca mārtaḥ* (II, 27, 10) "You, O Varuṇa, are a king over all (Gen.) who (Nom.) are gods, and who (Nom.) are mortals"; *nāsmāi vidyūn ná tanyatúḥ siṣedha | ná yām mihām ákirad dhrādúniṃ ca* (I, 32, 13) lit. "Neither lightning, nor thunder have helped him, or what (Acc.) fog and hail had scattered about". This way, the formal connection between the relative and the main clause can be rather a loose one.

Relative clauses possess a broad semantics. According to L. RENOU, it is either "du type définissant" (this clause being equivalent to a noun, participle or a compound word), or "du type attributif" (attributing a certain quality to a person or object).⁸ In other words, these clauses express the relation

8. *Grammaire de la langue védique*, p. 387.

of an attribute (or – widely – the sense of connection with the coordinate word), subject or object. Much rarer is the expression of a condition, e. g. : *yó no dvésīy ádharah sás padīṣṭa | yám u dviśmās tām u prāṇó jahātu* (III, 53, 21) “ If anybody hates us – let him fall down. If we hate anybody – let his breath abandon him ! ” ; or of time, e. g. : *á yé víṣvā svapatyāni tasthūh | kṛnvānāso amṛtatvāya gātum | mahná mahádbhīh pṛthivī ví tasthe* (I, 72, 9) “ Till they have obtained a completely healthy progeny, preparing the path to immortality for themselves, the earth has separated from the great ones by its greatness... ” (lit. anacoluthon “ those who have obtained... the earth has separated... ”) etc.

Such a broad scale of different meanings met with relative clauses gives grounds to suppose, that their general invariant meaning is a very abstract one, and according to the context it acquires a more concrete semantic shape (cp. the situation with the participles), being translated into Western languages by means of different syntactic constructions.

One of the most frequent types of complex sentence in the RV is built with the help of the conjunction *yád* “ that ” (n. of *yá-*), the involved sentences being coordinated with each other. There is a demonstrative pronoun *tád* “ it ”, an adverb or a particle, corresponding to *yád* in the subordinate clause (the former ones can sometimes be missing). As to the semantics of *yád*, the meaning of the conjunction has not completely separated from that of the neuter demonstrative pronoun, and some ambiguous cases are met in the hymns of the RV side by side with cases of distinct pronominal meaning and with those of distinct conjunctive meaning. For instance : *yád vaḥ grāntāya sunvaté | várūtham ásti yác chardīh | tēnā no ádhi vocata* || (VIII, 67, 6) “ What refuge, what protection you have for the zealous soma-presser – with its help do take our part ! ” (*yád*-relative pronoun); *idám āpaḥ prá vahata | yát kíṃ ca duritám máyi | yád vāhám abhidudrōha | yád vā ṣepá utānṛtam* || (I, 23, 22) “ O waters, carry away all that is bad in me, either if I have betrayed, or if I have cursed, as well as any untruth. ” (in Pāda b – relative pronoun, agreeing with *idám* in Pāda a ; in Pādas c, d – rather a conjunction, than a direct object of the verb).

Yád is the most frequent conjunction in the RV. It has a very broad semantics. In explanatory clauses *yád* means “ that ”, e. g. : *tád indra prēva vīryám cakārtha | yát sasántam vājreṇābodhayó 'him* (1, 103, 7) “ And that heroic deed you seem to have performed, O Indra, that you awoke the sleeping dragon with your thunderbolt ”. In clauses of time it means “ when ”, “ after ” e. g. : *ád it te víṣve krátum juṣanta | śúṣkād yád deva jīvo janīṣṭhāh* | (I, 68, 3) “ Everybody rejoiced here in your mental power, when you, O god, had been born alive from a dry (piece of wood) ”. In conditional clauses it means “ if ”, e. g. : *yád yūyám pṛcñimātaro | mártāsaḥ syātana | stotā vo*

amṛtaḥ syāt / (I, 38, 4) "O sons of Prṇi, if you were mortals, your eulogist would be immortal". In clauses of purpose it means "in order that", e.g. *āhā yád indra sudinā vyuchān | dádho yát ketúm upamám samátsu | ny āgniḥ sīdad ásuro na' hótā* (VII, 30, 3) "Agni is sitting down as a priest, like Asura, in order that wonderful days might blaze up, that you might give a supreme sign in battles...". It is clear from the above examples, that *yád* possesses rather a vague semantics, which becomes unambiguous only due to the context.

The rest of the conjunctions used in complex sentences are much less frequent than *yád*. Morphologically they are all derived from the relative pronoun *yá-* by means of various affixes, and usually possess a limited narrow meaning. These are relative conjunctions *yátas* "from which", "whence", *yátra* "where", *yadā* "where", *yádi* "if" and *yáthā* "as", "in order that", "so that". The conjunction *yád* remains frequent in the late Vedic prose, but in the further development of the language it yields to other, semantically more specified conjunctions.

The comparison of the use of the participles and participial phrases in a simple sentence with that of the subordinate clauses with the relative pronoun *yá* and the conjunction *yád* in complex sentences suggests the idea, that each of these frequent and productive constructions possessed a unique broad syntactic meaning (of the attributive, explanatory type), which functioned as an invariant in all the syntactic contexts. Due to the general and abstract meaning of these constructions they were translated into Western languages with their elaborate syntax by means of quite different syntactic devices in different contexts.

The situation of syntactic division of the text of the R̥gvedic hymns, when they are translated into Western languages, reminds one of the difficulties connected with the injunctive on the morphological level. Its meanings in different contexts are translated into Western languages with the help of different tenses and moods. Originally the injunctive seemed to possess a unique grammatical meaning represented in different contexts by a number of widely diverged from each other occasional meanings, i. e. that of memorativeness (mentioning, and not description of an action)⁹. Another example of such a morphological indeterminacy can be found in the Casus indefinitus of the noun of the *āhan / aha* "day" type, to which in different contexts various concrete meanings are attributed. Thus, this archaic phenomenon, the functioning of units, possessing a general, undifferentiated meaning, which acquire concrete occasional meanings in different contexts, is characteristic of the system of the RV. The examples of it can be found on all the levels: in syntax and morphology (both in the verb and noun).

9. K. HOFFMAN. *Der Injunktiv im Veda : eine synchronische Funktionsuntersuchung*. Heidelberg, 1967.

ON THE SEMANTIC USE OF THE WORD SPHOṬA

By

PIERRE FILLIOZAT

Sphoṭa is a well-defined technical term in the school of Vaiyākaraṇas, and the subject of separate treatises, from the time of Maṇḍana Miśra. However it appears in a few excentric passages, in the beginnings of Vyākaraṇa literature and at a later period in other schools. Therefore there exists a problem which is to examine if the precise acception of the word is already existing in the first mentioned of these texts and preserved in the others.

Apart of the presence of the base *sphoṭa-* in the derivative *Sphoṭāyana*,¹ name of a grammarian, but which does not throw any light on the notion, the earliest mentions of the word accessible to us are in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. In two passages he employs the word, but does not explain the notion. He takes it as already known and appeals to it, in order to solve a problem of interpretation of a Pāṇinian wording. Before we examine them in detail, it is proper to consider another passage which displays a certain conception of the meaningful speech-unit.² This passage is the conclusion of the commentary on "paraḥ saṁnikarṣaḥ saṁhitā (extreme contiguity between phonemes has the technical name *saṁhitā*)" 1. 4. 109. A different formulation is proposed: "paurvāpyam akālavayavetaṁ saṁhitā (a sequence of phonemes not interrupted by any time has the technical name *saṁhitā*)" and it is then objected that the sequence, i. e., the relation of ulterior to anterior, does not exist for phonemes, "because speech resides in one phoneme and phonemes are destroyed as soon as uttered; one does not pronounce two phonemes simultaneously; "gauḥ" being given, when speech is in *g*, it is not in *au*, nor in *h*; when speech is in *au*, it is not in *g*, nor in *h*; when speech is in *h*, it is not in *g*, nor in *au*: phonemes indeed are destroyed as soon as uttered; a phoneme is uttered, it is destroyed, then another phoneme is used; a phoneme is not the companion of a phoneme."³ To this objection Patañjali answers: "Having figured (lit. made) in his mind all the activities (of the organs of speech), having seen the objects to be named by speech, the steady speaker, whose conduct is attentive (*tatvannītiḥ*: *tatvant* (*tatpara*)-*nīti*?), may create a sequence in

1. Unless it is a compound "sphoṭa eva ayanam parāyanam yasya" (*Śabdakalpādruma*).

2. See D. S. RUEGG, *Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne*, Paris, 1969, p. 52.

3. *Mahābhāṣya*, ed. N. S. P., vol. 2, Bombay, 1935, pp. 308-309.

his mind. The sequence of speech-units exists in the field of the mind. Here, a person, who acts after seeing things, considers : 'for this object this word has to be used ; in this word there is this phoneme, then this one, then this one.' "4

We note here that an objection is done against the notion of a sequence of phonemes, on pure logical grounds. An answer is given on psychological grounds. It is not easy to understand logically the relation between physical sounds and a physical object. But we understand quite well the psychological process of connecting words with objects. Language is mainly a psychic entity. A unit of speech is a unit in the mind of the speaker. Otherwise it is a mere set of disconnected sounds. Patañjali conceives here a structure of sounds connected with a meaning, which does not exist in the physical sounds, but which is a psychic structure to be manifested by external sounds.

In the light of this passage we may now examine the two passages where he uses the word *sphoṭa*. In the first the problem is to interpret the words "raḥ" and "laḥ" in "krpo ro laḥ" 8. 2. 18 in the view where the generic form (*ākṛti*) is not denoted by words, in order to obtain the meaning "in place of *r* and *ṛ* in *kṛp*, *l* and *ḷ* are substituted". Patañjali gives the solution by saying "ubhayataḥ sphoṭamātram nirdīśyate / raśruter laśrutir bhavati (in both words "raḥ" and "laḥ" the mere *sphoṭa* is mentioned ; the *sūtra* means : the (*sphoṭa*) the auditive manifestation of which is *l* appears in the place of the (*sphoṭa*) the auditive manifestation of which is *r*".⁵ Patañjali does not define here the word *sphoṭa*. We have to understand it from the context. In this context we see that the denotation of *r* and *ṛ* is not obtained from "raḥ", because according to "svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya" only the form of the word mentioned is denoted, nor from the generic form of the mentioned *r* in "raḥ", because this is placed in the view of non-denotation of *ākṛti*. The pronounced sound and its properties being excluded as giving the understanding of *r* and *ṛ*, there remains this psychic entity which we have seen in another passage of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. The process of using a word shown in this above-quoted passage can be very well applied here. The author of the wording "laḥ" has seen the objects *l* and *ḷ* to be named by a speech-unit, and he has considered the form "laḥ" in his mind. As a psychic unit it is connected with both sounds *l* and *ḷ*. This psychic unit is very likely what is called *sphoṭa* here. We may thus understand Patañjali's interpretation in this way. In the view of non-denotation of *ākṛti* "laḥ" means only *l* according to "svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya". But if the mere *sphoṭa* is mentioned in "laḥ" the application of this *paribhāṣā* is suspended and we obtain the notation of *l* and *ḷ*.

4. Ibidem, p. 309.

5. *Mahābhāṣya*, ed. N. S. P., vol. 1, Bombay, 1951, p. 120.

We note here that the recourse to the mere mention of *sphoṭa* is done to obtain the withdrawal of the *paribhāṣā*. The role of this *paribhāṣā* is a technical one; it proposes a device of understanding words which is not the usual natural one, which is proper to the treatise of grammar. Patañjali suspends the *paribhāṣā* by resorting to the normal course of understanding. This implies that the *sphoṭa* is taken as the normal course of understanding speech.

The second passage where Patañjali uses the word *sphoṭa* is quite similar to the first one. According to "taparas tatkālasya" a *sūtra*-wording made of a vowel followed by a *t* denotes a vowel of that duration only, for example the word "ataḥ" in "ato bhisa ais" 7.1.9. In the context of the view where there is no denotation of the generic form, it is argued that "ataḥ" pronounced in a swift tempo will denote a short *a* in this swift tempo only, and not short *a* of different tempos. Then as in the previous case, Patañjali calls for help the *sphoṭa*: "sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ / dhvaniḥ śabdaguṇaḥ (a speech-unit is a *sphoṭa*; the sound is a property of the speech-unit)".⁶ Here *sphoṭa* refers clearly to the fundamental constituent of the speech-unit and it is equally clearly distinguished from the sound. We can understand here also that the author of the formulation "ataḥ" figured in his mind all the class of short *a* of any tempo and the form "at-" as corresponding to this class of objects. This psychic entity is again called *sphoṭa*.

In conclusion Patañjali's *sphoṭa* appears to be a psychological notion, the mental form of speech which is the representation of a set of sounds corresponding to a representation of objects.

The author of *Yogasūtra* has had his word to say on the process of the understanding of speech. He speaks about the "confusion of the verbal form, the object and the knowledge through a mutual superimposition of the three elements (śabdārthapratyayānām itaretarādhyāsāt saṃkaraḥ)" 3.17. This is also a psychological analysis. Like the author of *Mahābhāṣya*, he conceives an operation of the mind which unifies the constituents of speech externally differentiated. But if the ideas of both authors can be compared, the vocabularies used to express them are quite different. Therefore we cannot draw any conclusion from this about the identity of the two Patañjalis. This tradition which accepts it, may be was formed from this very similarity of ideas and others.

When we come to Vyāsa's *bhāṣya*, the similarity of ideas is still more striking. Vyāsa conceives clearly a mental speech entity which is constituted of a recapitulatory knowledge of phonemes (*anusamhārabuddhi*): "tad eteṣāṃ

6. Ibidem, p. 563.

arthasamketenāvacchinnānām upasamhṛtadhvanikramānām ya eko buddhinirbhāsa tat padam vācakam vācyasya samiketyate (the single appearance (*nirbhāsa*) in the mind of these (phonemes), delimited by a conventional relation with an object, made into a sequence of sounds, that is conventionally taken as the *pada* expressive of the object)".⁷ This psychic entity is called *pada* by Vyāsa. The similarity with the entity accepted by the Vaiyākaraṇas is clear. And later authors in the school of Yoga, Vācaspati Miśra, etc. use the word *sphoṭa* freely.

The destiny of the word *sphoṭa* in the school of Grammarians, from the time of Bhartṛhari, is well-known. In *Vākyapadīya* the word *sphoṭa* is rather sparingly used, compared to the word *śabda*. We note that Bhartṛhari uses it in a context similar to that of Patañjali, having certainly in mind those passages where the author of *Mahābhāṣya* has mentioned it. But it is well-known also that Bhartṛhari's conception is situated at a higher level. It is a metaphysical conception of idealistic character. And later authors have a marked preference for the term *sphoṭa* with reference to that eternal speech-constituent.

However the psychological notion has never been forgotten. Even the old formulation of Vyāsa is still retained and utilised by the late author Nāgeśa, when he says that the idea of *sphoṭa* is based on the mental notion that there exists an entity "word" different from the mere phonemes : "ekam padam ekam vākyam iti pratyayaḥ sphoṭa-sattve tadaikye ca pramāṇam (the notion "one word, one sentence" is the proof of the existence of *sphoṭa* and of its being a unit)".⁸ For Nāgeśa, as for Vyāsa, the mental representation of the word as a unit of speech, which the external sounds cannot be established to be, is a basic evidence on which the metaphysical concept of *sphoṭa* can be formed. This basic evidence, authentic psychological observation, can never be discarded. Even a theorist who does not accept the *sphoṭa*, must accept this evidence and give a place to it in his theory.

In spite of their relationship with the Yoga school, Sāṃkhyas, with a few exceptions,⁹ have not accepted *sphoṭa*. The rejection of *sphoṭa* theory is formulated in *Sāṃkhyasūtra* 5. 57 : "pratītyapratītibhyām na sphoṭātmakaḥ śabdaḥ". Vijñānabhikṣu explains that perceived set of phonemes causes the understanding of the object and says that the notion of word as unit is like the notion of a forest

7. *Pātāñjalayogadarśanam*, ad 3. 17, ed. by SRINARAYANAMISRA, Varanasi, 1971, p. 318.

8. *Mahābhāṣya*, ed. N. S. P., vol. 1, p. 18b.

9. See *Sāṃkhyatattvavivēcana* quoted in *Yoga Philosophy* by S. N. DASGUPTA, Calcutta, 1930, p. 268, n. 1.

not to be differentiated of the trees which compose it.¹⁰ Nāgēśa has written a *Laghusāṃkhyavṛtti* which is according to the colophon a *Bhikṣubhāṣyasāra-saṃgraha* : and indeed it appears to be a simple abridgement of the *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*. However in the *vṛtti* of that particular *sūtra* 5. 57, after summarizing Vijñānabhikṣu's *bhāṣya*, he adds one original sentence, the purpose of which is to justify the evident notion of the word as unit in the theory which accounts only for phonemes : "ekam padam iti tv ekam vanam ititvat / antyavarṇo-tpattikāle pūrvapūrvavarṇānām śabdajaśabdarūpenotpattyāngikārān na pada-pratyakṣānupapattiḥ / yāvatkālam anubhavas tāvatkālasthāyitvaṃ vā / kṣaṇikatvaṃ iti tv āsraddheyam eva, alpakālasthāyitvena vā tathāvyavahāra iti dik (the notion "one word" is like the notion "one forest" : there is no impossibility [in this theory] of the direct perception of the word (*pada*), because it is accepted that at the moment of the production of the last phoneme there is production of the previous ones under the form of phonemes born [as *samskāras* ?] from phonemes ; or [the perception of phonemes] lasts as long as the perception of the (last phoneme) ; and the idea that [phonemes] are momentaneous is not at all believable ; or [phonemes] are treated thus [i. e. as momentaneous], because they last a short time".¹¹ We see here that Nāgēśa tries to explain, in the context of the purely realistic *sāṃkhyā* conception, how the word can be externally constituted, in order to justify the perception of the *pada*, which is the basic psychological evidence.

Nāgēśa is an example of a Vaiyākaraṇa who has a great debt to the school of Yoga. He expressed his indebtedness by accepting completely the identity of the author of *Yogasūtra* and the author of *Mahābhāṣya*. He was even accepting the tradition which ascribes *Carakasamhitā* to Patañjali. Vaiyākaraṇas have also another heavy debt to the tantric schools who have proposed, under several forms, a theory of the evolution of speech in a series of four stages from a higher principle (*parā vāc*) upto a gross form (*vaikharī*), right from the time of *Vākyapadiya* who mentions three stages, and the commentary of Harivṛṣabha who quotes a verse on the fourth stage "svarūpajyotir evāntaḥ sūksmā vāg anapāyinī" (verse also found in the *Ratnatraya* of the Śaivasiddhāntin author Śrīkaṇṭha, ed. Kṛṣṇasāstrin, Śrīraṅga, 1925, p. 32).

A similar influence in the reverse direction does not seem to have taken place, at least in early texts. For example the Kashmirian author Rāmakaṇṭha, son of Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, (c. 11th century A. D.), in his *Nāḍakārikā*, establishes the theory of *nāḍa* as being the factor of expression (*vācaka*), in the context of

10. See *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, ed. by R. GARBE, Harvard, 1895, p. 129.

11. From a manuscript preserved in the Library of the Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine. The *sūtra* "pratītya-" bears the number 55 in the ms, ... 18

the dualistic view of Śaivasiddhānta. He criticizes the mimamsist theory of phonemes as *vācaka*, but does not even mention *sphoṭa*, even though he quotes the refutation of the *varṇa* theory done by Maṇḍana Miśra in his *Sphoṭa-siddhi*. His commentator Aghoraśivācārya (Tamilnāḍu, 12th century) takes the care to do a detailed refutation of the *sphoṭa* theory.¹²

In later texts of Śaivasiddhānta we can see traces of the acceptance of *sphoṭa*, and we have to examine in which form the notion has been borrowed and adapted. A mention of the word *sphoṭa* appears in the commentary (*bhāṣya*) of Umāpatiśivācārya (Tamilnāḍu, 14th century?) on *Pauṣkarasamhitā*, in the course of a demonstration that *nāda* is the *vācaka* component of speech: "na ca sphoṭanāde pramāṇābhāvaḥ / sthūlaṃ padaṃ sthūlaṃ vākyam ekaṃ vākyam iti pratīter eva tatsādhakatvāt (and there is no absence of means to establish the *sphoṭanāda*, because the notion "gross word, gross sentence, one sentence" establishes it)" (*Pauṣkarabhāṣya*, *pumstattvaparaṭala* v. 319, p. 488, l. 8-10, ed. Ampalavanāvalajñānacampantaparācattisvāmikal, Cītamparam, 1925). The text of the *saṃhitā* has a rather long passage devoted to this demonstration (v. 310-328) and uses the word *nāda*. In his detailed *bhāṣya* Umāpatiśivācārya uses the same, with the exception of the quoted passage where appears *sphoṭanāda*. This word seems to be a *karmadhāraya* compound: "*nāda* which is *sphoṭa*." Umāpatiśivācārya identifies thus his own tantric concept of *nāda* with *sphoṭa*. We have to note here that the mere psychological notion is referred to here, not the metaphysical doctrine. This is clear from the reference to the establishment of *sphoṭa* from the knowledge of the word or sentence as a unit. In the Śaivasiddhānta theory, the *nāda*, which is established as *vācaka*, is the mental form of speech (*antaḥsamjālpa*); it is told to be an evolute of the pure supreme *bindu* and plays the role of a mental matter for the operation of reflection (*parāmarśa*) by which the mind connects the sounds, not with the mere individual object, but with the object qualified by its genus (*jāti*), etc. This *nāda* is a mental entity and as such can be equated with the *sphoṭa* conceived as a mental component.

It seems that these Śaivasiddhāntins have gone still further. After establishing *nāda* as *vācaka*, *Pauṣkarasamhitā* establishes that there is a *śakti* in the objects. In this context *śakti* is conceived as the potentiality to be a cause of a function (*kāraṇatva*). In conclusion for the whole passage the text says: "tataś śaktir aśeṣārthavartinī gamyatām iti / śabdasphoṭaprasaṅga bhāvasphoṭo vinīścitaḥ // (thus a *śakti* should be understood as residing in every object; on the occasion of *śabdasphoṭa*, *bhāvasphoṭa* is determined)" (*ibidem*,

12. See P. FILLIOZAT, *Les Nāḍakārikā de Ramakaṇṭha*, in *Bulletin de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient*, LXXI, Paris, 1983.

v. 346, p. 497). Commenting on this verse, Umāpatiśivācārya says “śabdasphoṭaḥ śabdaśaktir ity arthaḥ / bhāvasphoṭo rthaśaktir ity arthaḥ (śabdasphoṭa means the power of speech; bhāvasphoṭa means the power of the object)”. Śakti is the power of the speech form to express the object, its *vācakatva*, i. e. its being the cause (*kāraṇatva*) of the knowledge. From this follows the assimilation with *sphoṭa* which is the *vācaka*. This is told in the text of the *saṃhitā* in the conclusion of its demonstration of *nāda* as *vācaka*. It shows that even at the level of the *saṃhitā* the assimilation of *sphoṭa* to *nāda* is already done. It is also interesting to see the word *sphoṭa* used in the expression “bhāvasphoṭaḥ” for an entity which is not a component of speech, to see *sphoṭa* as a *śakti* of things.

All these occurrences stand clearly apart of *sphoṭa* as a metaphysical principle also called *śabdabrahman*. We have seen that it refers to the notion of a mental component of speech, the function of which is to account for the psychological process of understanding an object from a sound. It is also easy to understand how this notion can be correlated with the notion of *śakti*; the component responsible for the function of speech is a power. The extension of the term to cover the notion of a causal power in things is to be understood as done through the concept of *śakti*. It is more difficult to understand why the particular term *sphoṭa* has been selected to refer to these abstract concepts.

The usual sense of the word is “breaking, bursting” or “opening”: it means also a boil, a tumour. Nothing seems to predestinate this word to the great role it has played in philosophy. In order to ascertain the appropriation of applying this word to its technical purport, we do not want to speculate through successive approximative equivalences of meanings from the root *sphuṭ*. What we can do only is to consider as a document the etymologies of the word, which are given in a few late texts of the exponents of the doctrine. Through these etymologies we have attestations of what was the conscious conception of the propriety of the word in the minds of the authors themselves.

For example, Mādhava, a descendant of Sāyaṇa, says in his *Sarvadaśana-saṃgraha* (3rd ed. B. O. R. I., Poona, 1978, p. 300): “sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇair iti sphoṭo varṇābhivyāṅgṛhaḥ, sphuṭati sphuṭī bhavaty asmād artha iti sphoṭo rthapratyāyaka iti sphoṭaśabdārtham ubhayathā nirāhuḥ (they analyse in two ways the meaning of the word *sphoṭa*: *sphoṭa* “sphuṭyate” i. e. is manifested by phonemes...; *sphoṭa* is that from which the object “sphuṭati” i. e. becomes clear in the mind...). Here the word is derived from the root *sphuṭā* *vikasane* “to open, to be bright” of the 6th class, with suffix *ghañ*. This root is to be distinguished from *sphuṭīr* *viśaraṇe* “to burst, to break” of the 1st class. A few other texts give, with slight variations, a similar etymology, always from the same root, and with a connection with the word *sphuṭa*.

This etymology is thus referring to the position of *sphoṭa* between the sounds and the object. To express this position the words *abhivyaṅgya* and *vācaka* or *pratyāyaka* are the most appropriate and currently used, as shown by Mādhava himself. The word *sphoṭa* was not necessary to express only this. Thus there may be another connotation, an image contained in the word and which explains its appropriation to the process of speech. As a matter of fact we note that all the etymologies connect *sphoṭa* with *sphuṭā vīkasane* (and not with *sphuṭīr viśaraṇe*), and with the word *sphuṭa*. This word is used frequently as an adverb "sphuṭam" and denotes clearness qualifying a mental action, perception, knowledge, speech, etc. Considering this analysis we see that *sphoṭa* is presented through the image of a clear manifestation in the mind, we feel that the authors of these etymologies had in their conscience an image of a factor of mental clearness.

This image may have been also in the conscience of more ancient authors. Patañjali does not give any analysis of the word, but gives an example of *sphoṭa* in connection with a sound which is not a speech-sound. His selection of the example gives a hint to what image may have been present in his mind, when he applied the word to the process of understanding speech. "Bheryāghāto bherīm āhatya kaś cid viṃśatipadāni gacchati, kaś cit triṃśat, kaś cic catvāriṃśat / sphoṭas tāvān eva bhavati / dhvanikṛtā vṛddhiḥ (one drum-beater, after beating his drum, goes twenty steps, one goes thirty steps, one goes forty steps; the *sphoṭa* is the same [in all cases]; the increase is made by the sound").¹³ This text refers to the difference between the duration of the physical sound and the mental image which is disconnected from it and not affected by its duration. Patañjali takes the example of a drum-sound, because it is a strong sound which gives a clear perception and illustrates well what is a clear mental image.

It appears natural that the word *sphoṭa* taken as referring to a clear mental entity has become almost exclusively used to refer to the mental form of speech. A clear knowledge is that which is accompanied by speech. Thus understood, *sphoṭa* is more a psychological notion. And it appears to be only this in the texts quoted here. The metaphysical concept could evolve logically from it, especially in an idealistic view, as mental speech and clear conscience are the central components of speech and of knowledge.

13. *Mahābhāṣya*, ed. N. S. P., vol. 1, p. 564.

UKTĀRTHĀNĀM APRAYOGAḤ

By

A. M. GHATAGE

The system of grammar as formulated by Pāṇini and developed by Kātyāyana and Patañjali approaches an axiomatic system to a considerable extent. As such its understanding requires a good grasp of the pre-suppositions, assumptions or postulates which underlie the system. A mnemonic stanza enumerates the essential elements of this system as consisting of *dhātu* 'root', *sūtra* 'aphorism', *gaṇa* 'class', *uṇādi* 'underived words', *vākya* 'sentence', *liṅga* 'gender', *āgama* 'augment', *pratyaya* 'suffix', and *ādeśa* 'substitute'. Patañjali himself defines *upadeśa* (glossed as *ādyoccāraṇa* i. e. elements stated at the very beginning of the system and hence its postulates) as consisting of *dhātu*, *prātipadika* 'base form of nouns', *nipāti* 'arbitrarily formed elements or particles', *pratyāhāra* 'abbreviations', *sūtra*, *pratyaya*, *ādeśa* and *āgama*. Basically the two lists amount to the same thing and the guiding principle appears to be the amount of motivation which can be detected in the linguistic expressions of Sanskrit, all unmotivated elements being included in the *upadeśa*.

The list also contains the elements of grammatical description as well. If we now add to them the various types of *sūtras* like *saṃjñā*, *adhyāyā*, *paribhāṣā*, *vidhi*, *niyama* and a few others, we can divide the whole list into two distinct groups, one dealing with the basic elements of language and the other belonging to the analysis and description of the language, elements of the mechanism of grammar or features of the metalanguage used. Here we are concerned with the second type of elements used by Patañjali, in his *Mahābhāṣya*.

These elements of grammatical description in the system of Pāṇini differ from each other in two respects, precision and scope. A *pratyāhāra* has the greatest precision while the *paribhāṣās* (including the *laukikanyāyas* similarly used by Patañjali) have the least precision. This scale varies inversely with the scale of extent or scope. Naturally these rules or maxims based on common sense have greater importance in understanding the nature of language than the more accurately formulated traffic rules of grammar in which we may also include the *saṃjñās* of Pāṇini. While the Pāṇinian system is very well formulated as regards the second, the same cannot be said of the first. This is really due to the very nature of the material and one such case is studied here in some details to highlight the problems involved in them.

The list of *paribhāṣās* in the system of Pāṇini, as also in the other systems of Sanskrit grammar, is a varying collection of maxims of diverse nature. The maxim *uktārthānām aprayogaḥ* finds a place in the lists of *pratibhāṣās* attached to other grammatical systems like those of Vyāḍi, Śakaṭāyana, Cāndra, Kātantra, Kālāpa and others. It is not formally included in the list attached to the grammar of Pāṇini. This does not, however, mean that it is not known to it. Patañjali makes use of it in his Mahābhāṣya more than a dozen times. The other systems have simply given it a formal status. To judge from its different wording and the explanation of this maxim given in the commentary of Vyāḍi and those of Durgasiṃha and Bhāvamīśra on Kātantra, this *paribhāṣā* appears to be very close to the principle of *anabhihitatva* of the Pāṇinian grammar. One is the converse of the other.

Unlike the other *paribhāṣās*, this is not extensively commented upon and hence a survey of its use in the Mahābhāṣya is essential. Patañjali uses it in numerous ways as a link in a long chain of arguments, which makes it necessary to follow them to some extent to ascertain its precise application. However valuable and interesting these arguments are, only the relevant portion is summarised here, neglecting much out of them.

P. i. 4. 83 lays down conditions under which an *upasarga* (pre-verb) can be given the designation *karmapravacanīya* (adnominal use). Almost all these conditions are semantic in nature because some of the *upasargas* have developed an adnominal use in some specific meaning, thus detaching themselves from the verbs. The theory of the origin of the *karmapravacanīyas* based on the explanation of the name is substantially correct. These are said to have expressed an action earlier but now do not do so (*karma uktavantaḥ*). This amounts to saying that originally they were used as pre-verbs with some specific verb, the meaning of which they modified, but in course of time, this verb was no more used and another took its place. This broke the bond between the pre-verb and the verb and the *upasarga* got attached to the noun, giving rise to an adnominal usage. Thus *śākalasya saṁhitām anu prāvarṣat* came from *saṁhitām anu- niśamya* where *anu* was a second pre-verb of the verb *niśam*—and with the disuse of the verb got attached to the noun *saṁhitā* because it would not be construed with *pravṛṣ-*. Though we cannot now ascertain the actual examples which may have given rise to such changes, the mechanism is clear enough. P. i. 4. 93 states that in case of *adhi* and *pari* the condition is *anarthaka* producing a piquant situation because this amounts to no semantic condition at all Patañjali attempts to solve the problem by assigning two different meanings to the word *anarthaka*. One way is to take it to mean 'having no meaning' and thus assign to these two the *karmapravacanīya* status unconditionally. The ultimate

gain would be that they can be called *prātipadikas* even when they have no meaning (*artha*) which is necessary for such a base. The second interpretation takes the word to mean 'having no additional meaning than that of the verb to which it is attached.' This means that they are superfluous and therefore militate against this maxim. They could not be used. Patañjali is thus driven to the conclusion that the maxim is not acceptable; words, the meanings of which are already expressed, can also be used. He justifies it by citing examples like *apāpau dvāv ānaya* 'bring two cakes', *brāhmaṇau dvāv ānaya* 'bring two Brahmins' where the duality is expressed twice, once by the numeral two and again by the dual suffix. One can go a step further and state that it is expressed three times, another time by the dual suffix of the numeral *dvi*.

P. viii. 2. 83 states that in a conversation involving greetings, in the answer of the greeted person the final part of his utterance beginning with the last vowel (called *ṛi*) is prolated. This prolation is to be used only in the principal word when it comes at the end of the utterance and not a subordinate word. Thus in *devadatta kuśalyaḥ asi* in the counter-greeting of the teacher, the final *i* is not prolated. This leads to a difficulty in a case like *ādheyo' gniḥ rñādheya* 3, because the word *agni* is considered principal and *ādheya* as subordinate. Patañjali solves the problem by calling *ādheya* qualified by *agni* as principal, the whole idea being 'the setting up of the fire'. This entails the consequence that the word *agni* must be used twice one for each alternative 'setting up' and 'not setting up', being an integral part of the meaning. The use of the word *twice* is avoided by invoking this maxim. A consistent use of the rule would also lead to the dropping of the word *ādheya* as well. No, the truth is that the rule need not be always observed: *uktārthānām api prayogo dṛśyate*.

Both these examples bring out the fact that this maxim is used to avoid a preliminary objection of no linguistic significance. The answer points out that this is not an absolute rule. This *paribhāṣā* is *anitya*.

In other cases Patañjali admits the validity of the maxim and uses it to parry a point raised against a statement or adds restrictions and limitations on its application.

In P. i. 2. 51 a statement is made to the effect that when a derivative suffix is dropped with the use of the word *lup*, and the derived word remains identical with the base but adds to it the meaning indicated by the suffix, the gender and number of the derived word remain the same as that of the basic word. Thus by adding the suffix *an* to a word like *śirīṣaḥ* (a kind of tree) in the sense of a place close to it and then dropping the suffix (by the use of the word *lup*

and not another like *luk*) the word comes to mean a village near such trees. This new word, however, keeps the gender and number of the original word in spite of its new referent, a clear case of a semantic change. To explain that only the gender and number of the original word remain and not the other features like its being a plant, it is pointed out that in a compound like *śirīṣavanam* formed from the derived word the *n* does not change to *ṇ*, which change requires the word to mean a plant.

A question is raised: Do other grammatical features of the basic word continue to remain in the derived word? When *Kaṭubadarī* as a name of a village is explained as *Kaṭubadaryā adūrabhavo grāmaḥ*, the Genitive suffix will not be carried over to the derived word because it is neither a gender nor a number. Now an attempt is made to interpret the word *vacana* in such a way as to include the case as well. A distinction is made between its technical sense (*pāribhāṣika*) and its literal meaning (*anvārtha*) deriving it as *ucyate iti vacanam*, 'what is expressed by the verb 'to utter', its object i. e. the concept of number'. The point made here is not quite clear. However we know that in Sanskrit the morphemes of case and number form cumuls and are not segmentable. If we now refer by *vacana* the suffixes themselves, cases will also be included and the inference drawn that case suffixes should also be carried over to the derived word. Admitting this position Patañjali argues that because the derived word already includes the meaning of the genitive case in the process of derivation, it cannot be again expressed by its own suffix on the authority of this maxim.

P. i. 2. 64 lays down the rule of *ekaśeṣa* to explain the formation of the dual and plural forms of nouns, based on a semantic analysis, which, to say the least, is unusual. The dual of a word like *vrkṣa* (a tree) is analysed as *vrkṣaś ca vrkṣaś ca vrkṣau* and the plural as *vrkṣaś ca vrkṣaś ca vrkṣaś ca vrkṣāḥ*. Applying the rule of *ekaśeṣa*, only one of these identical forms of the noun is retained and the others are dropped. This requires further rules for the dropping of the singular termination of the retained word and assignment of the dual and plural inflections to it so that we get the desired forms *vrkṣau* and *vrkṣāḥ*. As the analysis is based upon the normal pattern of a *dvandva* compound, we must also bar that compound in favour of an *ekaśeṣa*. Because a *dvandva* requires two independent words which are formally and semantically different from each other for compounding, for *ekaśeṣa* a kind of *sahavivakṣā* (combined idea) or *yugapadvivakṣā* (simultaneous idea) is suggested, which helps us to assign to it the required number. To emphasise this aspect the process of derivation is revised as *vrkṣau ca vrkṣau ca vrkṣau* and *vrkṣāś ca vrkṣāś ca vrkṣāś ca vrkṣāḥ*.

To justify the preference shown to *ekaśeṣa* over *dvandva*, the rule of *sāvakaśatva* is invoked and it is shown that in the absence of such a preference *ekaśeṣa* will have no scope left. This is objected on the ground that an *ekaśeṣa* can be formed of two identical verbal forms like *pacati ca pacati ca pacataḥ* where no *dvandva* can be formed. It is now argued that because the act of cooking, the meaning of the verb, is only one, we cannot use the same form twice due to the present maxim. Does this mean we cannot use the dual and plural of a verb at all? The answer is, we can, provided we consider the duality and plurality as not applying to the action expressed by the verb but belonging to either the subject or the object of that verb.

But the rule has a wider scope. Whether it is the verbal forms or nominal forms, as long as they express the same idea, they cannot be used twice and hence no *ekaśeṣa* can be formed. Even in the case of *dvandva*, as long as we regard each word as expressing the idea of the other member, no usage is possible in the form of either a phrase or a compound. Patañjali suggests a number of devices to resolve the difficulty. For us what is important is to note that this maxim is not applicable to words which show any difference in the form or nuance in their meaning.

A well known feature of the IE. languages is that when a pronoun refers to nouns of different genders collectively, preference is given to the masculine form over feminine, and to a neuter form over the other two. Pāṇini has brought this phenomenon under the scope of *ekaśeṣa* in his rule i. 2. 72 *tyadādīni sarvair nityam. tyadādi* is a sub-group of the larger *gaṇa* defined by the sūtra P. i. 1. 27 *sarvādīni sarvanāmāni*. The peculiarities of this sub-group are stated in P. i. 1. 74, i. 2. 72; iii. 2. 60 and vii. 2. 102. This group consists of what are known as demonstrative pronominal adjectives and the numeral *eka*. Different situations are involved in the scope of the rule i. 2. 72. This has given rise to a difference in the interpretations proposed. What is meant by *sarvaiḥ* by Pāṇini cannot be now ascertained. To judge from his examples *sa ca devadattaśca tau*, and *sa ca kuṇḍe ca tāni*, Patañjali appears to think that groups of nouns and pronouns are indicated. Later writers include groups of two pronouns as well. Patañjali's remarks on the Vārttikas 4 and 5 and his examples *sa ca yaśca tau* and *sa ca yaśca yau* would indicate that such groups do show the *ekaśeṣa*, but which one is optional.

A question is raised about the need of this aphorism. One such purpose would be to avoid a *dvandva* in the groups of a noun and a pronoun or a pronoun and a pronoun. This is not necessary because the situation is already covered by the more general rule that there cannot be a *dvandva* between words related as genus and species or a situation of hyponymy. Counter examples like *śūdrā-*

bhīram, *gobalivardam*, *tr̥ṇopalam* are explained away by giving unusual meanings to the second members. By such a procedure the situation is brought under the scope of this maxim, which thus is made to object to the collocation of two such words. Patañjali, however, rejects this scope of the rule on the basis of examples like *taṁ brāhmaṇam ānaya gārgyam*, and the use of the principle that whatever can be expressed by a phrase can also be expressed by a compound. The upshot of this lengthy discussion is to admit some kind of restriction on the identity or similarity of meanings which should make the rule applicable to such words.

In his sūtra i. 1. 44 *naveti vibhāṣā* Pāṇini lays down his definition of option in his grammar. Leaving aside the various implications of his diverse method of indicating it, we may take it that option in his grammar implies that two optional forms are acceptable and available to the user. Patañjali points out that this will be true if we take the view that words are constructed in accordance with a set of rules laid down, corresponding to the formation rules of an axiomatic system. The user is then free to apply a rule or not to apply, if an option is available, and two acceptable forms will be produced. But if the function of grammar is to assign a particular label or description to an already existing form, an optional form is not possible because we cannot assign to an utterance acceptability or unacceptability at the same time, nor at different times. This will make a given form sometime acceptable and sometime not, but will not give rise to two acceptable forms. To avoid this the option is now shifted to assigning a label to an underlying expression from which some effects automatically follow and two alternative expressions become available.

In the use of a productive operation a new difficulty crops up. Pāṇini lays down more than one suffix having the same function in the same sūtra or adds a new suffix in the next sūtra with the use of the conjunction *ca*; both having the same effect, if we leave aside other advantages got from these two methods. Such a procedure is called *yaugapadya* 'simultaneous use of suffixes' and *anvācaya* 'addition to suffixes'. If we now begin to construct words with such suffixes, a question arises: 'Are we to use all such suffixes at the same time or one after another, to the same base?'

To take a concrete example, P. iii. 1. 96 *tanyattavyānīyarah* prescribes three suffixes to form gerundives. Because of the linear nature of language we cannot add all three at the same time. The other alternative is to add them one after another to the same base which also is not desirable in this case even though the IE morphology allows a basic pattern like $R + S_1 + S_2 + S_3$ etc... The necessary limitation of this pattern is that S_1, S_2, S_3 cannot be the same suffix with the same meaning. That is what the subscript numbers mean. The Indian

Grammar states this restriction by saying that the suffixes come after the root and are immediately next to it. When the first suffix is added to a root, the resulting form generally ceases to be a root and the next suffix cannot be said to be immediately after it because of the intervening suffix. This however does not amount to making the first suffix a terminal or form-closing one. The first difficulty is solved by extending the scope of a *dhātu* to include also the derivative elements (*sannantā dhātavaḥ*) and the second by allowing suffixes of different meanings to follow each other. The use of suffixes of the same meaning in succession is avoided by using the present maxim. If the first suffix satisfies our semantic need we need not use another for the same purpose.

The most favourable situation for the application of this maxim is offered by cases in which suffixes of the same meaning and even of the same form are sought to be applied to the same base. In this context a mnemonic stanza cited by Patañjali twice in his Bhāṣya summaries three such situations in Sanskrit.

Śaiṣikān matubarthīyāc chāiṣiko matubarthikāḥ |
Sarūpaḥ pratyayo neṣṭaḥ sannantān na san iṣyate ||

Patañjali makes use of this maxim while dealing with two out of these three situations, the verbal suffix *san* and the possessive suffixes. The *śaiṣika* suffixes do not appear to have attracted his attention. Kaiyaṭa gives the following examples for them.

Sālāyām bhavaḥ śālīyo ghaṭaḥ tatra bhavaṁ udakam
iti punaścho na bhavati. virūpastu bhavati.

P. iii. 1. 7 enjoins the suffix *san* to express desire after a verb, where the action expressed by the verb constitutes the object of the desire and the subject remains identical. A question is raised whether we can add this suffix to a verb which is already having it at the end. For example can *cikīrṣa-* as a base take another *san* after it, to express the idea *cikīrṣitum icchati*? The answer is no, because the maxim states that this cannot be done. But an exception is found in case of an expression like *eṣitum icchati* giving rise to *eṣiṣiṣati*, obviously a rare form and a rare situation. However the difference between the two examples is clear. While in the permissible case, one of the desires is expressed by a root-morpheme, in the prohibited case, both are intended to be expressed by suffixal morphemes. This is indicated by the condition *śarūpa* having the same form (i. e. status).

On P. v. 2. 94, it is pointed out that one possessive suffix cannot follow another. The possessive suffixes form a group and include *in*, *mat* (*~vat*), *maya* and others. Naturally their meanings also show differences in the nuances and hence one can find two suffixes from them which can follow one another.

Patañjali gives examples like *daṇḍimatī śālā* (room having men carrying staves), *hastimatī upatyakā* [foot of a mountain having elephants (i. e. animals having trunks)] which can be easily understood. Then he takes another situation where the maxim applies. A person possesses men who in turn possess cows. But we cannot get a form like *gomanmān* because the suffix is the same with the same meaning and hence barred by this maxim. The maxim is applicable if it satisfies the conditions of *sarūpatva* and *samānavṛttitva*.

Another example is furnished by the rule of agreement between a noun and its adjective as regards number, gender and case which is so widespread in the IE classical languages. Patañjali takes up such a case in dealing with P.iv. 1.3 *striyām*, in which there is an agreement in gender. His example is *gārgyāyaṇī kāriṣagandhā kālitarā* where the referent is a single woman. Various reasons are given by Patañjali to avoid the use of this maxim by denying that all three express feminine, that the gender is expressed only once and the others are due to specific injunctions without semantic contents, or that the feminine concept, being generic in nature is realised differently in different individuals and conditions. Modern linguistics has added another solution by postulating a long component by making the morpheme discontinuous. Agreement is not a universal feature and this type of redundancy in language serves the purpose of clarity and ease of understanding more than any semantic purpose.

In P. iii. 1. 12 the suffix *kyan* is laid down after a number of words forming a *gaṇa* called *bhṛṣādi* to form denominative verbs. The meaning of the suffix is 'to become' and is used if a *Cvi* suffix is not used, and the final consonant of the word is dropped. The Vārttika defines the meaning more precisely by calling it *abhūtatadbhāva*, when a thing is treated as something else which it is not. The group of words contain simple words as well as words preceded by *prādis* as in *sumanas*, *durmanas* etc. A complicated and subtle argument leads to the conclusion that the meanings of the *prādis* can qualify and modify the meanings of the listed words or may qualify the meaning of the suffix itself, in spite of the fact that they are listed before the words.

If we decide to take them as qualifying the suffix *kyan*, their meanings will also be expressed by the suffix and hence they cannot be used in the denominative formation because of this maxim.

Patañjali's answer depends on the fact that many suffixes are used with the same noun as in the case of *manas* and the single form *manāyate* cannot express different meanings if they are not used. Therefore instead of postulating a large number of homophonous suffixes with different meanings, it is better to express the difference by using them before the nominal base. Avoidance of ambiguity is thus a reason for setting aside the maxim.

Patañjali appears to make use of this maxim without any restriction in his comment on P. ii. 1. 36 *caturthī tadarthārthabalihiitasukharakṣitaiḥ* which describes a Dative Tatpuruṣa. Tradition splits the long compound into six elements viz. *tadārtha* 'meant for the meaning of the word in the dative' and the words *artha*, *bali*, *hita*, *sukha* and *rakṣita*. Both Kātyāyana and Patañjali agree that the scope of *tādārthya* must be restricted to the relation of *prakṛti* (the material) and *vikṛti* (its modified form) in order to make the inclusion of the remaining words in the sūtra significant. This restriction then excludes a compound like *aśvaghāsa* 'fodder for a horse' which can be also taken as a genitive compound.

The word *artha* as a second member of the compound gives trouble. Hence Kātyāyana formulates two more rules one of which makes it a *nitya-samāsa* preventing its resolution and the other assigns to it all genders thus making it an adjective. This will explain compounds like *brāhmaṇārtham payaḥ* and *brāhmaṇārthaḥ sūpaḥ* as well. To avoid these rules Patañjali makes a number of suggestions most of which are too artificial to be acceptable. The last one is to make *artha* a substitute of the second member of such compounds. This approach proves to be not tenable and therefore Patañjali follows another approach and argues that because the meaning of the Dative is to express purpose, a word like *artha* cannot be used with it because of this maxim. As the expression is not available, no compound can be thought of. But the explicit statement of Pāṇini makes it possible. No difficulty on account of gender can be raised because gender in Sanskrit is, after all, arbitrary and based on usage.

The last use which Patañjali makes of this maxim is found in the course of a long discussion on P. ii. 1. 1. *samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*. While discussing *sāmārthya* of words having syntactic congruence, it is argued that synonyms like *śakra*, *indra* etc. cannot be used to form a *karmadhāraya* compound by putting them in apposition. The reason is, when the first word conveys the intended meaning, a second word of the same sense cannot be used. In this context a distinction is made between perfect synonyms and approximate ones. In the later case a compound is possible as seen in *bhṛtyabharanīya*.

The maxim *uktārthānām aprayogaḥ* is nothing but a strict application of the principle of economy applied to language. It stands in glaring contrast with the other characteristic of language called redundancy, which is considered as essential for efficient transmission of a message in any semiotic system including language. An adjustment between these two principles is thus a necessity of a language and the grammarian has to take note of this situation.

If we start with the theory that language consists of two articulations, one based on the other, it is obvious that redundancy plays an important role in the

first or lower articulation and the principle of economy is subordinated to it. Hence the present maxim has no relevance for the phonology of the language. But when we come to the second articulation in which meaning plays a prominent part and gets associated with the sounds of language, both principles have a vital role to play. The inevitable adjustment is expected to be different in different situations. Hence it is worthwhile to scrutinize the application of this maxim at different levels in language and in different types of morphemes. This approach is implicitly present in the treatment of this principle at the hands of Patañjali, which needs to be explicitly formulated.

Acceptance or rejection of such a principle *in toto* has no significance. A valid approach is to ascertain where it functions and where it does not. Patañjali's use of the maxim is casual and is applied to specific cases. We have to extract from his practice the way in which he would use it in relation to classes of linguistic elements of Sanskrit in order to generalise its nature.

By a close analysis of the Mahābhāṣya on the twelve sūtras of Pāṇini discussed above we can summarise the use of this maxim as follows.

This principle is not applied in the following situations : (1) the concept of number expressed by a numeral and by the grammatical category like singular, dual or plural, (2) when two words express a generic and a specific concept of the same nature, (3) to the law of agreement if it exists in a language, (4) if a distinction of meaning cannot be otherwise expressed in a language, (5) when an emphasis is to be placed on one of the two occurrences of the same idea. Here we can also include what can be called as a pregnant use of a word as in the famous line *ravikiraṇānugṛhītāni bhavanti kamalāni kamalāni*, which is often discussed by Sanskrit rhetoricians.

This maxim is allowed to function in the following situations : (1) if the concept is expressed by a case and a derivative suffix, (2) the use of a root when it expresses an action which is considered as having an abstract unity, (3) different suffixes having the same grammatical meaning, (4) two uses of a suffix like *san* with verbs, (5) two possessive suffixes having the same form and meaning, (6) a case suffix and a word expressing the meaning of that case, (7) absolute synonyms.

Looked at from the point of meanings involved, it may be observed that the maxim is applied to words having lexical meanings with stringent conditions like absolute synonymity or unity of an abstract concept which cannot be split into parts without destroying its unity. If forced to occur together, such words tend to develop some difference of meaning or some overtones. As applied to grammatical meaning, the maxim is generally applicable, and a difference in the

shape of such morphemes plays only a secondary part. It is generally observed that the development of a semantic difference in a grammatical category is rare and hard to conceive. When a lexical item comes in contact with a grammatical element, the rule is not generally applicable. It holds good among different types of grammatical categories.

We may conclude by saying that in spite of a difference in the methodology used and many decisions taken on the basis of expediency in polemic arguments, Patañjali's use of this maxim stems from a good grasp of the nature of language in general and of Sanskrit in particular.

The first of the four main divisions of the subject is the history of the movement. It is a history of a movement which has been going on for more than a century. It is a history of a movement which has been going on for more than a century. It is a history of a movement which has been going on for more than a century.

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THE GODS OF THE *GODĀNA* CEREMONY (AVŚ. 6, 68)

By

J. GONDA

In order to understand the part played by Prajāpati in the *godāna* ceremony (the first shaving of the beard) described at Kauś. 53, 17 ff. (cf. MG. 1, 21, 14) and requiring the use of the three stanzas of AVŚ. 6, 68 (cf. AVP. 19, 17, 13-15) it is necessary that the significance of this rite and the role of the other deities mentioned in these stanzas should be clarified beforehand. Like that of the tonsure usually performed in the third year of a child the purpose of this rite is prolongation of life¹ (cf. AVŚ. 6, 68, 2 *dirghāyutvāya*; AVP. 19, 17, 14 *āyusmān dirghāyur ayam astu*). That means that authorities were well aware of its being a passage rite.² Since, however, the hair is considered to be "the dead impure skin" (TS. 6, 1, 1, 2; MS. 3, 6, 2: 60, 17), which should be discarded in order to make the person concerned ritually pure (fit to sacrifice etc.) and since the shaving is said to purify the head (*ĀśvG.* 1, 17, 16; 1, 18, 5 etc.) and to free the person shaved from evil (misfortune, *pāpman*, MP. 2, 7, 12; cf. also ŚB. 3, 1, 2, 2 f.), the purificatory and eliminatory function of the rite is unquestionable.

Although it is at first sight not clear why the gods whose names occur in AVŚ. 6, 68 are said to be entrusted with the tasks mentioned, there is room for the supposition that all of them were deliberately chosen. "Savitar has come with the razor" (st. 1): the sun and the razor have one important property in common: they are "sharp" or rather they are characterized by or associated with derivatives of the root *tij-* "to be or become sharp" such as *tigma*, *tejas* (for tools see, e. g., RV. 6, 8, 5; VS. 5, 43; *kṣuratejas* *ĀśvG.* 1, 17, 16; for the fierce heat and glow of the sun³ AVŚ. 9, 2, 15; 10, 3, 17; 13, 1, 11; TB. 2, 1, 2, 9; cf. also RV. 6, 3, 5 "Agni sharpens his *tejas* like the blade of a knife"). Moreover, Savitar is repeatedly, and rightly, said to purify a person with the rays of the bright sun (e. g. TS. 1, 2, 1 k). As to the god of the moving air:

1. J. GONDA, Vedic ritual, Leiden 1980, p. 91 and compare N. J. SHENDE, The religion and philosophy of the Atharvaveda, Poona 1952, p. 104 ff. and J. C. HEESTERMAN, The ancient Indian royal consecration, Thesis Utrecht, 's-Gravenhage 1957, ch. XXVII.

2. See also *ĀśvG.* 1, 17, 12 f. (tonsure of a child).

3. See also C. J. BLAIR, Heat in the Rig Veda and Atharva Veda, New Haven Conn. 1961, ch. XXV.

"Come, O Vāyu, with hot water": according to ŚB. 13, 2, 7, 2 (cf. VS. 23, 13) Vāyu cooks the food ("inasmuch as the wind causes the fire to blaze up", commentator), according to 8, 2, 3, 5 rain follows to whatever quarter the wind goes: moreover, the wind blows most in the south (8, 1, 1, 7), and notice RV. 10, 142, 4 "when the wind (Vāyu) blows after thy (Agni's) flame thou shavest the earth like a shaver the beard."⁴ The Ādityas, Rudras and Vasus are besought to wet (i. e. to lather) and shave the person concerned, viz. king Soma: these three groups of deities, which are invoked together already in RV. 2, 31 and 10, 66, 12 (cf. also 7, 10, 4; 7, 35, 6), must be taken to represent the tripartite universe (cf. ŚB. 6, 1, 2, 10: the Vasus belong to the earth, the Rudras, created after Vāyu, to the intermediate space (their arrows are rain, VS. 16, 64; ŚB. 9, 1, 1, 35), the Ādityas to the sun; this is one of those places that attest to the belief that in performing an important task the assistance (of the representatives) of tripartite universe – or, as in this case, a reference to their mythical example – is required.⁵

Why should it be king (this epithet is already frequent in the Rgveda: 9, 48, 3 etc.) Soma who is shaved? One would perhaps be inclined to think that he as a divine king was considered the right figure to serve as the mythical example, as the central figure of the mythical event of which the rite is a repetition. However, I would rather draw attention to RV. 9, 78, 1, where the sheep, i. e. the woollen strainer, is said to take away the impurity (*ripram*, cf. RV. 10, 16, 9; 10, 17, 10; AVŚ. 6, 51, 2) from Soma's body. This impurity consists of the "fragments of the creeping plants that are pressed out and represent evil (*pāpa*), because they are unfit for use" (Sāyaṇa); "Stacheln" (GELDNER), "fibres" (RENOU⁶). RENOUE rightly observes that at 10, 17, 10 *ripra* is the opposite of *śuci* "pure" (that is not so much free from actual dirt as being released from evil, a state that implies the induction of good power or fresh fitness or potency);⁷ at AVŚ. 10, 5, 24 it is combined with *enas* "sin, evil" and *duritam* "mishap". Compare also RV. 9, 50, 3; 9, 61, 17; 9, 86, 25; 9, 91, 7; 9, 107, 22 and many other references to the well-known process of Soma's clarification or purification, to which the ceremonious first shaving of a youth might, I suppose, be considered analogous. The stubbles of his beard might be compared to the prickles (called *śaryāṇi* "arrows" in RV. 9, 14, 4; 9, 68, 2) which the Soma stalks are said to leave behind during the process of clarification.⁸

4. For VārG. 4, 1 (cf. KG. 40, 10; see KS. 2, 1: 8, 5) see below.

5. Cf. GONDA, Vedic ritual, p. 34; 36. See, e. g., SB. 12, 8, 1, 9.

6. K. F. GELDNER, Der Rig.Veda übersetzt, Cambridge Mass. III, p. 72; L. RENOUE, Études védiques et paninéennes, IX, Paris 1961, p. 26; 89.

7. See J. GONDA, Śuci, L. Sternbach Fel. Vol., Lucknow 1981, p. 119 ff.

8. See also RENOUE, E. V. P. VIII, p. 11; 64; IX, p. 17; 75.

As to Varuṇa who in AVŚ. st. 3, AVP. st. 14 is shaved also, he is RV. 10, 167, 3 mentioned together with king Soma, who 9, 88, 8 is compared to him and 9, 77, 5 is even identified with him.⁹

In AVŚ. st. 2; AVP. st. 15 (see also MG. 1, 21, 14) Aditi is requested to shave the beard. This is not the same as consenting to the action for which she is elsewhere (e. g. BhG. 1, 4) invoked. Has she perhaps, as the divine representative of *anāgastvam* "sinlessness, moral purity" (RV. 1, 24, 15; 1, 94, 15; 1, 152, 6; 1, 162, 22; 4, 12, 4 etc.), to safeguard the performers of the rite against sin and blame, to vouch for their innocence? I would rather suppose that Aditi, the mother of the gods (ŚB. 6, 5, 2, 21; cf. RV. 8, 47, 9), whose youngest son is Soma (RV. 10, 11, 1) – motherhood being one of her characteristic traits, cf., e. g., AVŚ. 2, 28, 5 – primarily acts as the careful mother of the person shaved. As a mother she can also act as a protectress (cf. RV. 4, 25, 5; 8, 18, 6; 8, 47, 9; MG. 1, 13, 16 "Aditi, giving good protection") preventing the one who shaves from doing harm to king Soma or the youth.¹⁰ May the text be taken to reflect a situation in which the mother had a more important part in the shaving than that described in PG. 2, 1, 5 f., where the mother has to bathe the boy, to put on him new garments (see also GG. 2, 9, 8) and to place him on her lap, and the father has to sacrifice whilst taking hold of her, or that mentioned in ĀśvG. 1, 17, 11, where the hairs that have been cut off are given to the mother, who has to put them down on a lump of dung?¹¹ This place deals, it is true, with the parallel rite of the tonsure¹² of a child's head, which, according to ĀśvG. 1, 17, 7; MG. 1, 21, 3; VārGS. 4, 8 requires the same mantra (with "hair" instead of "beard"). In PG. 2, 1, 6; JG. 1, 11: 9, 5 Vāyu is besought to approach with cold and warm water (which is mixed by the shaver) and Aditi to cut the hair ("beard" in the *godāna* ceremony), but the relevant acts are performed by the father himself, who states that the razor used is the instrument that Savitar had employed when he shaved king Soma and Varuṇa (§ 11; see also AVŚ. st. 3; AVP. st. 14; ŚG. 1, 28, 15; HG. 2, 6, 11 etc.). MG. 1, 21, 14 joins these texts in addressing the invitation to shave the beard to Aditi, although it is the father, not the mother who performs this task.¹³

9. For other relations between both deities in the R̥gveda see J. NOBEL, *Namen- und Sachregister zu Geldner, RV. übers., IV*, Cambridge Mass. 1957, p. 134 f.

10. For the possibility of harm see GONDA, *Vedic ritual*, p. 91.

11. GONDA, *Vedic ritual*, p. 92.

12. For details see also M. J. DRESDEN, *Mānavagṛhyasūtra*, Thesis Utrecht, 1941, p. 92 ff.

13. It is also worth noticing that the waters, being invited to purify the sacrificer who is about to perform a soma sacrifice are called "mothers" (TS, 1, 2, 1 f.).

In this atharvanic *godāna* ceremony Prajāpati is (AVŚ. st. 2) requested to cure¹⁴ (*cikitsatu*, probably the wounds) "that (the person concerned) may live long and be in full possession of his visual faculty". AVP. st. 15 and JG. 1, 11 : 9, 9 read instead : "Let Prajāpati hold (thee) again and again for good shaving", MG. 1, 21, 3 "... hold ... for prosperity (*svastaye*)". In a mantra quoted JG. 1, 11 ; 9, 11 this god is moreover said to have shaved (the head) for a class of Maruts with the razor that is used in the present ceremony. While it is clear that Prajāpati here is a god like the others, the matter in question is the function he is fulfilling. It would appear to me that there are reasons for assuming that the god here shows sides of his character which are, perhaps, not generally known, or might easily be overlooked when, basing ourselves on the extremely numerous passages that deal with him, we attempt to delineate his distinctive and essential qualities. Prajāpati is explicitly said to be the most energetic of the gods (ŚB. 13, 1, 2, 5) ; the term *vīryavattama* is not infrequently used with the implication "being in possession of the capacity to effect a definite, uncommon, result". The student (*brahmacārin*) is committed to the highest and most important deities Prajāpati and Savitar, "and thus he suffers no harm of any kind" (*na kāmcanārtim ārchati*, 11, 5, 4, 3) and that is why the teacher entrusts his pupil to these gods (PG. 2, 2, 21) or to Prajāpati alone (GG. 2, 10, 31). Prajāpati drives off evil (*pāpman*, ŚB. 8, 5, 1, 6), cuts off its root (*pāpmano mūlam*, 13), frees himself from it (8, 5, 2, 1) or tries to leave it behind himself (10, 4, 4, 1). He is able to deliver the creatures from Varuṇa's noose (5, 2, 4, 2). He may be supposed to be able to fill anything defective in the body because in the mythical past he had filled up the body of the great fireplace wherever it was defective (10, 2, 3, 16). And he is also invited to purify the sacrificer who is being consecrated (*punātu*, 3, 1, 3, 22).¹⁵ Elsewhere Prajāpati's protection is implored and the pertinent prayer is followed by the wish to attain old age : "With the mind we take hold of ... Prajāpati, who is the protector of the world. Let him save us from death, let him protect us from distress. Living long, may we attain old age" (TB. 3, 7, 7, 2 f. ; ĀpŚ. 10, 8, 9). In a formula that is employed on the occasion of an *aṣṭakā* ritual¹⁶ he is besought to give vigour, offspring and continuance of life (PG. 3, 3, 6 ; ĀśvG. 2, 4, 14 f. ; MG. 2, 8, 6). Prajāpati's syllable *hiṃ*, with which a man kisses his son, gives him thousand-

14. W. D. WHITNEY and Ch. R. LANMAN, *Atharvaveda Samhitā*, Cambridge Mass. 1905, p. 332 translate "nurse".

15. In VS. 4, 4 the Lord of Thought (*Citpati*) and the Lord of Speech (*Vākpati*) are besought for purification. In ŚB. 3, 1, 3, 22 they are identified with Prajāpati, but according to the Kāṇva recension (4, 1, 3, 22) the latter is *Vāyu*, according to Mahīdhara on VS., 1. c., *Bṛhaspati*.

16. GONDA, *Vedic ritual*, p. 450 ff.

fold life (PG. 1, 18, 3).¹⁷ In AVŚ. 17, 1, 27 (AVP. 18, 32, 10) the person speaking glories in being defended (or covered) by Prajāpati's *brāhman* (cf. AVŚ. st. 28), which, as the firm and sustaining principle par excellence, is a *varman*,¹⁸ i. e. a bulwark against evil powers.¹⁹ As to Prajāpati's holding the person who is being shaved (AVP. 19, 17, 15) attention may be drawn to the formula used in an expiatory rite: if the *agnihotra* milk is spilled, it is said to be "offered in the all-supporting (*viśvabhṛt*) body of Prajāpati" (MŚ. 3, 2, 5; ĀpŚ. 9, 6, 3; ĀśvŚ. 3, 11, 11 etc.). Places where the other gods are related to have recourse to Prajāpati are far from rare: TS. 2, 1, 4, 4; 2, 2, 8, 5 f.; PB. 12, 13, 4 f.; JB. 1, 283; 2, 100 etc. So the conclusion seems warranted that in AVŚ. 6, 68, 2 etc. Prajāpati is invoked as the protector god who, it is hoped, will save the person shaved from harm and a premature death. It may be remembered that shaving was – not without reason, in view of the material used, the inexpert shavers and the absence of antiseptics – regarded as a risky undertaking: the razor is called "the wounding" (ĀśvG. 1, 17, 16; PG. 2, 1, 19; cf. 21) and requested "not to do him harm" (ŚG. 1, 28, 14; also AVŚ. 8, 2, 17; ĀśvG. 1, 17, 16; 1, 18, 5 etc.) and, while "purifying his head", "not to take away his life" (ĀśvG. 1, 17, 16 etc.). The 'identification' of the participants in the operation with various divinities is therefore not intended to give it dignity (WHITNEY), but is to induce these deities to display, in and through the persons acting,²⁰ their readiness to fulfil, once again, *hic et nunc*, some of their functions by which they made the exemplary ceremony in the mythical past a success.

It is worth noticing that the gods who according to the descriptions of the *caula* and *godāna* ceremonies found in the *gṛhyasūtras* concern themselves with the actual shaving or are related to have been shaved in the mythical past are not always the same ones. Generally speaking, these manuals differ from AVŚ. 6, 68 in omitting a reference to the Ādityas, Rudras, and Vasus and in being silent on the part played by Prajāpati. Moreover, these authorities are far from agreeing in regard to the shaver and the gods shaved in the past. In PG. 2, 1, 6 f.; VG. 4, 8 Vāyu is still invited to come with water and Aditi to cut the hair (and the beard); Aditi is expected to perform this task also at MG. 1, 21, 3. In some texts Soma and Varuṇa are as in AVŚ. 6, 68 the gods shaved and then (MG. 1, 21, 6; KG. 40, 11; PG. 2, 1, 11; HG. 2, 6, 11) Savitar is the one who shaves (in ŚG. 1, 28, 15 he shaves Varuṇa, not Soma). Prajāpati is mentioned only in MG. 1, 21, 3, where he is asked to co-operate ("let him

17. Compare also TB. 1, 2, 1, 19; ĀpŚ. 5, 11, 5; MŚ. 1, 5, 3, 6.

18. Cf. WHITNEY and LANMAN, op. cit., p. 811.

19. J. GONDA, Notes on Brahman, Utrecht 1950, p. 43 ff.

20. Cf. GONDA, Vedic ritual, p. 216.

hold the boy again and again for prosperity ") and in KG. 40, 11, where he is one of the gods shaved. The mantras mention other shavers, viz. Dhātār (ĀśvG. 1, 17, 12; JG. 1, 11 : 9, 10; KG. 40, 11; in ŚG. 1, 28, 15 he is called Dhātār Brhaspati), the god who is also on other occasions requested to perform definite tasks (AVŚ. 4, 12, 2; 5, 3, 9; 6, 60, 3 and 14, 1, 59 he gives a husband; 7, 18, 1; Dhātār and Savitar (see above) are a pair at 9, 7, 10; 21; 14, 1, 33; cf. 8, 1, 15; ĀpŚ. 12, 6, 3 together with Brhaspati and Pūṣan); and Pūṣan (MG. 1, 21, 6, VG. 4, 16; VaiG. 3, 23; KG. 40, 11; GG. 2, 9, 16), the divine guide whose hand is often said to be the instrument by which a ritual action is performed and whose name is RV. 7, 39, 2; 10, 26, 1 (cf. ŚB. 14, 2, 1, 9) associated with that of Vāyu, being invited to approach or to help, who follows Savitar 10, 64, 7 and is a friend 8, 4, 15; 10, 26, 8 (for Savitar, Dhātār and Pūṣan see AVŚ. 11, 6, 3; 14, 1, 33). The predilection for triadic combination or arrangement is, here also, evident. Not only have three gods been shaved in the past – especially Brhaspati, Agni and Indra (ĀśvG. 1, 17, 12; HG. 2, 6, 11; VG. 4, 16; KG. 40, 11; JG. 1, 11; BhG. 1, 28; 30, 9), who may be taken to represent the three provinces of the universe,²¹ there is also evidence of a tendency to triplicate the groups of gods shaved. Whereas in MG. 1, 21, 6 Savitar has shaved the hair of Soma and Varuṇa and Pūṣan that of Brhaspati and Indra (who are friends or allies in RV. 2, 23, 18; 2, 24, 1; 12) KG. 40, 11 makes mention of the first group, of Dhātār having shaved Brhaspati, Agni, and Indra and of Pūṣan having shaved Prajāpati, Agni, and Sūrya. It would seem that the triads, like the parts played by Dhātār and Pūṣan, represent secondary variations of the theme which in more consistent and perhaps more original forms has been preserved in the Atharvaveda-Saṃhitā and the Pāraskara-Grhyasūtra.

21. As to Brhaspati, cf., e. g., SB. 5, 1, 1, 4.

Right in India and Left in China ?

ON I-CHING'S TRANSLATION OF THE
SUDHANAKUMĀRĀVADĀNA*

By

MINORU HARA

I

A student of Sanskrit literature is aware of the fact that the auspicious signs (*nimitta*) for a man appear on the right side of his body, whereas the reverse is true in the case of woman. The best known example is found in the well-known scene of the Abhijñāna-Śākuntala, where the happy encounter of the hero and heroine is first foretold by the throbbing of the right arm of the hero, Duṣyanta.

*śāntam idam āśrama-padam sphurati ca bāhuḥ kutah phalam ihāśya
atha vā bhavitavyānām dvārāḥ bhavanti sarvatra*

(Abhijñāna-Śākuntala 1. 15)¹

"This spot of hermitage is free from passions. Yet my arm throbs. What will this lead to here? But, yet, the gates of things to be happened are everywhere."

The same phenomenon, when it occurs in a woman, is indicative of evil. Thus Śākuntalā perceives the forth-coming tragedy by the throbbing of her right eye (lid).

* This is a by-product of my supervision of an M. A. thesis, submitted by my pupil, Mrs. Ming-Huey CHEN. Mrs. CHEN worked on the Chinese versions of the Sudhana-kumārāvadāna and pointed out several peculiarities of Chinese translation of Buddhist Avadāna texts from the third century to the eighth century A. D. Thanks are also due to Dr. R. F. YOUNG, who took trouble to read my original manuscript and to correct my English.

1. Cf. Raghuvamśa 12. 90 (*tasya sphurati... savyetare bhuje*), Kathāsaritsāgara 22. 106 (*cakṣuṣā dakṣinenāpi sūcitāgamānāmūnā...*), 51. 4 (*dakṣinenūkṣṇā sphuratokta-subhāgamah*), 67. 68 (*dakṣiṇam locanam vadati... prasphuran muhuh*), Mṛcchakaṭika 6. 24 (*aye śāstram mayā prāptam spandate dakṣiṇo bhujah*). An exceptional case I have ever met is found in the Mahābhārata 3. 176. 44 (*muhur muhuh prasphurati dakṣiṇo 'sya bhujas tathā*).

durnimittamabhinīya / ammo kiṃ ti vāmedaram ṇaṇaṃ vipphuraḍi
(Abhijñāna-Śākuntala 5. 12. 2)²

“(Indicating by gesture the evil omen) Oh, why does my right eye (lid) throb ? ”

In the case of a woman, on the contrary, the auspicious thing is forecasted by the throbbing of the left portion of her body. Thus, we read in the Meghadūta,

*vāmaś cāsyāḥ kararuha-padair mucyamāno madyair
muktājālaṃ cira-paricitaṃ tyājito daiva-gatyā
saṃbhogānte mama samucito hasta-saṃvāhanānām
yāsyaty īruḥ sarasa-kadalī-stambha-gaurāś calatvam*

(Meghadūta 2. 36)³

“ And her left thigh, pale as a succulent plantain stalk, lacking the marks of my fingernails, forced by the course of fate to leave off the long-cherished network of pearls, will now quiver-; the thigh that knew the stroking of my hands at the end of our embraces. ” (translation, by F. EDGERTON).

Whereas the man's ill luck is indicated by the throbbing of the left eye,

*skhalati caraṇaṃ bhūmau nyastaṃ na cārdratama mahī
sphurati nayanam vāmo bāhur muḥś ca vikampate*

(Mṛcchakaṭika 9. 13 ab)⁴

“(My) foot when laid down slips. Yet the ground is not at all wet. (My) left eye is throbbing and (my) arm is constantly trembling. ”

Further, in the stage-direction of the Sanskrit drama, we often meet the stereotyped phrases, *dakṣiṇākṣi-spandanam sūcayitvā* (indicating by gestures the throbbing of the right eye), meant to be a lucky omen for the hero (often followed *saharṣam*) and *vāmākṣi-spandanam sūcayitvā* for the reverse. Thus a happy union and tragic separation between the beloved are often foretold in the Sanskrit dramas by these signs of throbbing which appear in some part of

2. Cf. Raghuvamśa 14. 49 (*jugūha tasyāḥ paṭhi lakṣmaṇo yat saṃyetaṇa sphuratā tad-akṣiṇā*), Kathāsaritsāgara 117. 141 (*padmāvatyāś ca... paśpunde dakṣiṇam cakṣur akampata ca mānasam*), Mṛcchakaṭika 8. 14 prose (*phuradi dāhinam loṇam vevadi me hīam*).

3. Cf. Daśakumāracarita 5 (Nirṇaya Sagar ed., 1951, p. 194, line 10; *sāpi kim apy utkampinā romodbhedavatā vāma-pūrsvena sukhūyamānena...*).

4. Cf. Mṛcchakaṭika 7. 9 (*apāśyato 'dya tām kūtām vāmam sphurati locanam*), 9. 10 (*savyam ca netram sphurati prasahya mamānimittāni hi khedayanti*), 9. 15 (*savyam me spandate cakṣur virauti vīryasas tathā*).

body, either in the eye (*nayana, cakṣus, netra, akṣi*), arm (*bāhu, bhuja*), or thigh (*ūru*). In these cases the right side is invariably allotted to the male and the left to the female, as far as the auspicious indication is concerned.

II

This Hindu allotment of the preferred side, the right⁵ to the male and the left to the female, is further corroborated by the Hindu concept of the structure of the human body. According to them, the human body is composed of both male and female principles, the male principle governing the right side, while the left is controlled by the female principle. The most concrete example is shown in the images of the so-called *ardha-nārīśvara*, the right half of which is represented by the attributes of Śiva, while the left half by those of his consort Śakti.⁶ But this side allotment, the right for male and the left for female, is traced back to the Brāhmaṇa texts. In a ritual and allegorical context, it is suggested that the male lies on the right side of the female,⁷ and in a quasi-philosophical context Indra is believed to be situated in the right eye, whereas his consort, Indrāṇī or Virāj, is found in the left eye.⁸ We find its distant echo in the Kāma-sūtra (2. 6. 18), where it is suggested that a man should lie on the right side of the woman in the sexual position called *pārśva-samputa* (coitus paterae lateralis).⁹ We also read in the Kathāsaritsāgara that the prince is

5. One may refer to the etymology of the Sanskrit *dakṣiṇa* (right, able, dexterous) and *dakṣati, dakṣa*. Cf. M. MAYRHOFER, *Kurzgefasstes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen*, s. v., and J. von NEGELEIN, "Die Begriffe rechts und links in der indischen Mantik," *Beitrag zur Festschrift für E. Hultsch*, pp. 28 ff. (*pradakṣiṇa, apasavya*, etc.).

6. Cf. H. von STIETENCROON, *Gāṅgā und Yamunā, Zur symbolischen Bedeutung der Flussgöttinnen an indischen Tempeln* (Wiesbaden, 1972), p. 114 cum lit.

7. Cf. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 1. 1. 1. 20, 2. 5. 2. 17, (*uttarato hi strī pumāmsam upāsete*), 6. 3. 1. 30, 7. 5. 1. 6 (*dakṣinato vai vṛṣū yoṣām upāsete*) and Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa 1. 53. 3 (*tasmāt pumān dakṣinato yoṣām upāsete*). I owe this reference to H. OERTEL, "Contributions from the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa to the History of the Brāhmaṇa Literature," *Journal of the American Oriental Society (JAOS)*, 26 (1905), p. 188. Cf. also J. GONDA, "āyatana," *Selected Studies II* (Leiden, 1975), p. 225.

8. Cf. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10. 5. 2. 8-11 and Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4. 2. 2-3. I owe this reference to H. von STIETENCROON, *loc. cit.*, A. ROSU, "Les noms de la pupille en sanscrit," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung* 4 (1956), p. 354, and W. KIRFEL, *Die fünf Elemente, ins Besondere Wasser und Feuer* (Walldorf-Hessen, 1950), p. 17. KIRFEL connects this dualism of right and left to those of water and fire, coldness and heat, moon and sun, male and female, father and mother, heaven and earth.

9. Cf. R. SCHMIDT, *Beiträge zur indischen Erotik* (Darmstadt, 1901), p. 532.

seated on the right side of the princess on the royal throne¹⁰ as well as on the ordinary seat,¹¹

III

The same allotment of the right and left is further attested in the obstetrical description as found in ritual as well as medical treatises. First, let us look at the prescription of *pumsavana*, the rite to secure the birth of a male child, as applied to the woman in her second or third month of pregnancy. According to the Pāraskara Gṛhya Sūtra (1. 13. 1-1. 14. 3), a wife is requested to fast, to bathe and to put on two new garments which have not yet been washed, on a day when the moon stands in conjunction with a Nakṣatra that has a name of masculine gender. Then, in the same night, the husband crushes in water descending roots and ascending shoots of a Nyagrodha tree, and inserts that into her right nostril (*dakṣiṇasyām nāsikāyām āśiṅcati*).¹² The same custom seems to have continued up to the time of Susruta, who teaches,

*labdha-garbhāyāś caiteṣv ahaṁsu lakṣmaṇā-vaṭaśuṅgā-sahadevā-
viśvadevānām anyatamaṁ kṣīreṇābhiśutya trīṁś caturo vā bindūn
dadyād dakṣiṇe nāsāpūte putra-kāmāyai | na ca tām niṣṭhivet*
(Śātrasthāna 2. 32)

“In these days, having extracted with milk any of these herbs, *Lakṣmaṇā* the sheath of Banyan trees, *Sahadevā* and *Viśvadevā*, one should insert three or four drops (of juice) in the right nostril of the pregnant woman, if she wishes to have a male child. She should not spit the juice out.”¹³

Next, we cannot skip the oft-quoted passage of the Bṛhatsāmhitā, which describes the position of the embryo in the mother's womb.

*dakṣiṇa-pārśve puruṣo vāme nārī yamau ubhaya-saṁsthau
yad udara-madhyopagataṁ napuṁsakam tan niboddhavyam*
(78. 24)

10. Kathāsaritsāgara 110. 76-77 (*siṁhāsana-stham vāmārdha-tiṣṭhan-madana-māṇḍukam nara-vāhanadattam... abhyaśiṅcan maharṣayaḥ*).

11. Kathāsaritsāgara 111. 16 (*upaviṣṭaś ca vipule candrakānta-silūtale | pārśve kṛtvā mahādevīm vāme madanamaṇḍukam*).

12. Cf. A. HILLEBRANDT, *Ritual - litteratur* (Strassburg, 1897), p. 42, A. F. STENZLER, *Gṛhyasūtrāṇi, Indische Hausregeln* (Leipzig, 1876), p. 11, H. OLDENBERG, *The Gṛhya-Sūtras* (Sacred Books of East, 29), pp. 291-292, R. SCHMIDT, *Liebe und Ehe im alten und modernen Indien* (Berlin, 1904), p. 493 and R. B. PANDEY, *Hindu Saṁskāra* (Benares, 1949), pp. 100-101.

13. Cf. R. B. PANDEY, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

"A male child lies on the right side, a female on the left, and the twins stay on both sides. If found in the middle of the womb, it is to be known as a hermaphrodite."¹⁴

One is reminded here of the well-known story of Buddha's birth who descended from the Tusita heaven, entered his mother's womb from the right side and stayed there for ten months.¹⁵

Finally, we refer to the signs of a pregnant woman who conceives a male child as is described in the Susruta-saṃhitā,

tatra yasyā dakṣiṇe stane prāk payo-darśanam bhavati, dakṣiṇākṣi mahatvam ca, pūrvam ca dakṣiṇam sakthi utkarṣati..., tāṃ brūyāt putram iyaṃ janayiṣyati, tad-viparyaye kanyāṃ
(Śārīra-sthāna 3. 20)

"One may say that this woman will bear a son, if milk comes up first in her right breast, her right eye becomes large, and if she raises her right thigh first (when she walks)..., in the case of its opposite, a girl."¹⁶

IV

All these textual as well as iconographical materials, which testify to the Hindu preference of the right side for a male sex, now lead us to the central point of our discussion, that is, how and why I-ching translated a stock phrase peculiar to the Buddhist Avadāna literature. The phrase in question reads as follows,

pañcāveṇiyā dharmā ekatyē paṇḍita-jātyē mātṛ-grāme | katame pañca ? | raktaṃ puruṣaṃ jñāti viraktaṃ jñāti | kālāṃ jñāti ṛtuṃ jñāti | garbham avakrāntaṃ jñāti | yasya sakāśād garbham avakrāmati tam api jñāti | dārakaṃ jñāti, dārikāṃ jñāti | saced dārako bhavati, dakṣiṇaṃ kuṣṭhiṃ niśṛitya tiṣṭhati | saced dārikā bhavati, vāmaṃ kuṣṭhiṃ niśṛitya tiṣṭhati | sā ātta-manāḥ svāmina ārocayati | diṣṭyā vardhasva āryaputra, āpanna-

14. Cf. for example, J. JOLLY, *Medicin* (Strassburg, 1901), p. 55, H. OERTEL, *op. cit.*, p. 189, R. SCHMIDT, *op. cit.* (Erotik), p. 397, H. von STIETENCROON, *op. cit.*, p. 114 (note 328), and E. WINDISCH, *Buddha's Geburt und die Lehre von der Seelenwanderung* (Leipzig, 1908), p. 19 (note 1). Cf. also Agni Purāṇa 369. 21 (*madhye klības tu vāme strī dakṣiṇe pūṃsa-sthitiḥ*).

15. Cf. H. von STIETENCROON, *op. cit.*, p. 115 (note 330) and M. HARA, "A Note on the Buddha's Birth story," *Indianisme et Bouddhisme, Mélanges offerts à E. Lamotte* (Louvain, 1980), p. 146.

16. Cf. R. SCHMIDT, *Erotik*, pp. 396 ff., and *Liebe und Ehe*, p. 492.

*sattvāsmi samvṛttā | yathā ca me dakṣiṇam kukṣiṃ niśritya
tiṣṭhati, niyataṃ dārako bhaviṣyatīti.*¹⁷

“Five special qualities (*dharma*) belong to a certain group of wise women. What are these five? (1) She knows a man attached (to her) and a man not attached. (2) She knows the time (*kāla*) and the period (*ṛtu*). (3) She knows the embryo descended. (4) She knows also from where the embryo descends. (5) She knows (whether the embryo is) a boy or girl. If it is a boy, it stays on the right side of the womb. If it is a girl, it stays on the left side. Now the queen was delighted and told her husband: “Congratulations to you, oh my husband. I am now with child. Since it stays on the right side of my womb, certainly it will be a boy.”

This phrase is cited in the story of Prince Sudhana and the Kinnarī Manoharā, as preserved in the versions transmitted in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda* school.¹⁸ The complicated state of defusion of this popular story over Central Asia, China and South-east Asia has been carefully analysed by P. S. JAINI.¹⁹ Thanks to the studies carried out by eminent scholars,²⁰ here we are in a position to dispense with these textual details and to concentrate ourselves solely in I-ching's translation of the phrase in question.

In the Chinese rendering of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya-vastu*, I-ching truncates the opening portion of our passage, mentioning only the first item (*raktaṃ puruṣaṃ jānāti viraktaṃ jānāti*), but he translates faithfully its later half. We read in his translation as follows,

“(Now she) knew that she had gained the embryo. She told her husband, ‘Now I have conceived. Since it stays on the left side of my arm-pit, I know it is certain that it will be a boy.’”²¹

17. Léon FEER, *Avadāna-Āṭaka, cent légendes bouddhiques* (Paris, 1891), pp. 4 ff. (Lieux communs bouddhiques, 11, Manière d'obtenir des enfants). Though he lists tales 3, 21, 24, 36, 49, 73, 83, 98 under this heading, the tales 24 and 73 do not contain this portion. Cf. also *Divyāvadāna* (E. B. COWELL and R. A. NEIL ed. Cambridge, 1886), p. 2, lines 3ff. and p. 98, lines 22 ff.

18. *Divyāvadāna* p. 440, lines 16 ff., and *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya-vastu* (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 16, ed. by S. BAGCHI, Darbhanga, 1967), p. 81, lines 6 ff.

19. P. S. JAINI, The Story of Sudhana and Manoharā: An Analysis of the Texts and Borobudur Reliefs, “*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* (BSOAS), 29 (1966), pp. 533-558.

20. H. W. BAILEY, “The Sudhana Poem of Rddhiprabhāva,” BSOAS, 29 (1966), pp. 506-532, D. SCHLINGLOFF, “Prince Sudhana and the Kinnarī, An Indian Love-story in Ajanta,” *Indologica Taurinensia* I (1973), pp. 155-167. Cf. also A. METTE, “Vedhas in Lalitavistara und Divyāvadāna,” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 17 (1973), p. 27.

21. *Taisho Tripiṭaka*, vol. 24, p. 60, c.

It is curious for a reader of this Chinese translation to notice that here a male child resides on the left side of his mother's womb instead of the right. At first sight, we naturally incline to think that I-ching made an error in translation, because he translates *dakṣiṇam kuṣim* as the *left side* of the arm-pit. However, in view of I-ching's mastery over the Sanskrit language and his skilled rendering of Sanskrit passages into Chinese, we must ask ourselves whether he really made a mistake here, or whether some other motive was involved on the part of our translator. In this connection, let us cast a glance at the Chinese concept of male and female positions in the mother's womb.

Though the concept itself is not quite as firmly established as in the case with India,²² we occasionally come across passages where Chinese relate the left side to a male child and the right to a female.²³ In the well-known birth story of Lao Tzu, we read that this great founder of Taoism stayed on the left side of his mother's womb. This birth story of Lao Tzu is generally believed to have been modelled upon the famous birth story of the Buddha with an intentional replacement of the left for the right,²⁴ but we are quite certain that the legend was well-known already at the end of the second century A. D., that is long before the time of our translator.²⁵

We have another story in which we are told that the mother, both human and elephant, conceives a female offspring on the right side of their womb. Here is a story from the Chiu Tsa p'i Yu Ching, its translator being said to be K'ang Seng-Huei of the third century A. D.²⁶

"Two young men, who used to go to the same teacher, once went to a foreign country and noticed on their way a foot-print of an elephant. One of them who was wise said: 'This elephant conceives a female child and is one-eyed, upon whose back rides a lady pregnant again with a female child. His inference later proved true. The other who was ignorant wondered how was it known to his colleague, and asked his teacher. The teacher eventually summoned the wise pupil, who explained how he inferred. He said: 'I saw on the ground

22. Cf. B. SCHEUBE in PUSCHMANN'S *Handbuch der Geschichte der Medizin* I (1902), p. 34 (a stronger right pulse indicates male, a stronger left pulse indicates female offspring in China), as quoted by H. OERTEL, *op. cit.*, (JAOS, 26), p. 190.

23. Cf. J. J. MEYER, *Sexual Life in Ancient India* (Indian Edition, Delhi, 1971), p. 369 (note part).

24. Cf. Ed. CHAVANNES, *Cinq Cents Contes et Apologues, extraits du Tripiṭaka chinois* (Paris, 2nd ed., 1962) I, p. 380, note 1.

25. I owe these informations to Dr. H. KUSUYAMA, Professor of Oriental Philosophy (Taoism), at Waseda University.

26. *Taishō Tripiṭaka*, vol. 4, p. 514, ab. Cf. also E. CHAVANNES, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-381.

urine mark and knew that it was a mother elephant pregnant with a female child, because the surface of the ground was pressed down deeper on the right hand side. I also knew that she was blind in her right eye, because the grass on the right side of the road remained unmoved. Finally, I knew that a lady pregnant with a female child was on the elephant's back, because the surface of the ground was trodden upon deeper on the right hand side at the spot where she stopped the elephant and she passed water."

These two examples testify to the fact that the Chinese belief was the very opposite to the Indian one, as far as the embryo's position in the mother's womb is concerned. According to the Chinese belief, a male child stays on the left side of his mother's womb, while a female on the right side.

Now, if it was a common belief among Chinese that a male child is conceived in his mother's left side, our Chinese translator of the Indian text may have found himself here in a dilemma. The alternatives for him were either a literal translation of the original text with no regard to the common belief of his country-men, or intelligibility as a translation for his Chinese audience at the sacrifice of literality. If the translator had considered intelligibility to be the primary criterion of a good translation, he could easily have been compelled to intentionally twist the original reading. If this was the case, we should not blame I-ching for the mistranslation, because the important factor here is the difference between the beliefs, Indian and Chinese, about the position of a male child in his mother's womb, but not our translator.

Post Script

Despite all the effort above, I am now inclined to think that there is a misprint in our I-ching passage in question, that is, on page 60c, line 5, volume 24 of the *Taisho Tripitaka*. When I had completed this article, I invited my pupils here at the University of Tokyo to make further comments and criticism on my article. One of them, Mr. S. KARASHIMA, kindly took the trouble to collect passages comparable to ours from the remaining portions of I-ching's translation of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*. Thanks to his effort, it is now clear that in all other occurrences the text reads "*the right side of mother's womb*" instead of "*the left.*" These Chinese occurrences, which are more or less related to *lieux communs bouddhiques* (No. 11, *manière d'obtenir des enfants*) of Leon FEER, are as follows: *Taisho Tripitaka*, vol. 23, p. 628c, 631c, 691b, 724a, 887b, 1048c-1049a, and vol. 24, p. 255c and 298a.

Under such circumstances, the primary contribution of this article is now reduced to simply pointing out the misprint on page 60c, line 5, volume 24 of the *Taisho Tripitaka* (: read *the right side* in the place of *the left*)!

THE RITUALIST'S PROBLEM

By

J. C. HEESTERMAN

1

Ritual activity seems to be as universal as it is unexplained. Of course, many explanations can be put forward, but they are too various, too special and, generally, too many to be of much help in arriving at a general theory of ritual. Mostly such explanations are starkly utilitarian, concerned as they are with particular effects that the ritual actors are supposed to be aiming for, be it solidarity, communication, symbolic expression, emotional well-being or magic. Now ritual, properly executed, may or may not achieve many things, but the question whether it achieves anything or nothing hardly seems to affect adherence to it. The actors keep to their ritual whatever the result or the lack of it. If anything, this can only make the ritual phenomenon more puzzling.

In this perspective the importance of Vedic ritual far exceeds the specialist concerns of the vedicist. Not only do we find here an ancient corpus rituale, rare in its exhaustiveness and in its faithful transmission till the present day, but we also find, what is even rarer, a complete body of systematic thought about ritual. This system of ritualistic thought is the true achievement of the ancient Indian ritual experts. That this achievement is again receiving the attention it deserves is no small measure due to the consistent efforts of Professor R. N. DANDEKAR whose vedic scholarship speaks to the specialist and the non-specialist alike. It may, therefore, be a fitting tribute to show that his efforts in furthering the study of the Veda and its ritual are also fruitful in giving rise to a renewed questioning of the vedic achievement.

Such questioning will concern itself not only with the place of vedic ritual thought in Indian civilization, but also with what it may tell us about the phenomenon of ritual as part of the human heritage. A new debate has, in fact, already been opened by my co-contributor to this volume, Professor J. F. STAAL. Basing himself on the study of vedic ritual he launched the provocative thesis of "the meaninglessness of ritual."¹ The important point is not whether this thesis is right or wrong either in general or in the specific vedic case, but the perspective it opens for a new and potentially rich debate about the ritual phenomenon.

1. J. F. STAAL, *The Meaninglessness of Ritual*, *Numen* 26 (1979), 2-22; *The Search of Meaning: Mathematics, Music and Ritual* (Ann. meeting AAS., San Francisco, 1983, panel on Ritual).

The present essay, therefore, will not directly engage this thesis, but simply attempt further to prepare the ground for debate by looking at the nature and history of vedic ritual. My thesis will be that vedic ritual deals with the insoluble problem of death and destruction.

2

The first point to be kept in mind is that Vedic, or, more precisely, *śrauta* ritual is concerned with sacrifice. The fact is obvious, but far from trivial. It means that we are dealing with the junction of two different phenomena, sacrifice and ritual, that should be clearly distinguished. Obviously not all ritual is sacrificial, but we easily assume that sacrifice is always and rigorously embedded in ritual. However, can we really be so sure about the proposition that there is no sacrifice without ritual? The Christian tradition at least offers the example of sacrifice without benefit of ritual. When Christ's death on the cross is understood as sacrifice, sacrificial ritual is conspicuously absent. Indeed the very idea of a ritual event, however portentous, would despoil Christ's sacrifice of the crucial meaning attached to it. Here sacrifice stands out in stark, unmitigated awesomeness, breaking wide-open all order, all structure. Ritual has no place here. I do not intend to go into the vexed problem of sacrifice here. Suffice it to say that the element of death and destruction sets sacrifice apart from the gift with which it can easily be and often is confused. Sacrifice turns on destructive violence and thereby overthrows order. The point I want to stress, though, is that the nexus of sacrifice and ritual is not self-evident or necessary. They may even be at opposite ends from each other. Ritual must reduce to order what threatens to overthrow that same order. This, in short, is the ritualist's problem.

It may be argued that this paradox does not change the structural nature of ritual as outlined by Professor STAAL. It does, however, heighten the intensity and the urgency of the drive for subjecting sacrifice to the orderly structure of ritual. More specifically, I shall argue that it was the unsettling experience of sacrifice that stimulated the sharp awareness of ritual structure attested by the vedic ritual texts – an awareness that opened the way to the abstract, mechanistic construction we know as the classical system or “science” of ritual.² There is, then, a discontinuity, a definite change in quality. This change does not primarily affect the principles of ritual structure, but it did bring about

2. The consciously systematic character of Vedic (*śrauta*) ritual was clearly recognized by, among others, S. LÉVI, *La Doctrine du Sacrifice*, Paris 1898, p. 31. and H. OLDENBERG, who speaks of “vorwissenschaftliche Wissenschaft” (*Die Weltanschauung der Brāhmaṇa-Texte*, Göttingen, 1919, p. 1). W. CALAND's work is equally based on this recognition.

the rigour with which those principles are consciously applied in ritual construction. Once this construction was complete and sacrifice seemingly subdued to the rigorous order of ritual, the ritualist's problem proved still to be unsolved. It had merely shifted to another area - that of meaning. But there again, as we shall see, it remained intractable.

3

That violent death is the central problem is made abundantly clear by our texts. They evince what amounts to an obsessive concern about *himsā*, the killing required by sacrifice.³ This is already clear in the euphemistic technical terms. One "takes hold" of the victim (*ālabhate*) and "makes it consent" (*saṃjñāpayati*). Yet it is made perfectly clear that it is an unmitigated killing. "They kill this sacrifice when they perform it; and when they press out the "king" (i.e. Soma), they kill him; and when they make the victim consent, they kill it; by the pestle and mortar, by the two mill-stones, they kill the (cereal) substance."⁴ Here the euphemisms are given for what they really refer to: killing pur-et-simple. The answer to this undeniable fact is the contrivance of ritual. "Having killed the sacrifice, he pours it, as seed, into the fire as its womb, for, indeed, the fire is the womb of sacrifice; from there it is reproduced; therefore he should perform those ten burnt oblations for which the *vaṣaṭ*-call is uttered."⁵ Just pouring some little bit of the sacrificial substance into the fire, as "the womb of sacrifice", will not do. It has to be a series of *āhutis* correctly executed according to the intricate and well-known rules, accompanied by the emblematic *vaṣaṭ*-call. One may see in the "reproduction of sacrifice" a reference to a theory of cosmic regeneration and eternal return, such as we do indeed find in our texts. However, this point receives only passing attention and is quickly dropped again. The emphasis is on correct ritual procedure and the text continues with a discussion of the varying number of *āhutis* that compose the series.

The obsession about killing is replaced with an equally obsessive concern for meticulous ritual correctness. Nowhere this is clearer than in the elaborate rules for repairing mistakes of ritual procedure. The interesting point is that the

3. Cf. H. P. SCHMIDT, *The Origin of Ahimsā, Mélanges .. Louis Renou*, Paris, 1968, 625-55.

4. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 11. 1. 2. 1.

5. The same statement about killing occurs Śatapatha Br. 2. 2. 2. 1, where the remedy is in the dakṣiṇā gifts to the priests. In the latter case one might expect that the gifts would serve to transfer the guilt (as originally may well have been the case). According to 2. 2. 1. 7, however, they should ensure that the priests follow proper technical procedure to see the sacrificer through this critical phase of killing.

ritual mistake – what has faultily been done, recited or chanted – appears to be intimately connected with the central evil, with violence and killing. The transition between the two – mistake and killing – can be seen in the discussion of the barren cow (*vaśā*) that is sacrificed for Mitra and Varuṇa after the completion of the Soma sacrifice.⁶ “The head of the sacrifice was cut off; the sap that flowed out became the *vaśā* cow; that this *vaśā* cow is sacrificed afterwards serves to provide the sacrifice with sap.” Then our text shifts its perspective. “Mitra took of the sacrifice what was well offered (*sviṣṭa*), Varuṇa what was badly offered (*durīṣṭa*); by afterwards sacrificing this cow he frees (the sacrifice) from both Mitra and Varuṇa and hands it over to the sacrificer.” Next a third theme is introduced. “In the same way that one cuts open the field with the plough the sacrifice is cut open by verse (*ṛc*) and melody (*sāman*); as one afterwards evens the field with the harrow, so the cow is sacrificed; the cow sacrifice is for atonement (*śāntyai*).”⁷ Three themes are combined here: killing, ritual mistake and the comparison of *ṛc* and *sāman* with the plough that cuts up the field.⁸ Interestingly, the *durīṣṭa* is not yet the fully technical mistake that can and should be avoided or, in an equally technical manner, corrected. According to our passage it belongs of right to the sacrifice, as do the killing and the violence or evil that is attached to the combined action of *ṛc* and *sāman*. Against this background it is understandable that the evil that is an integral part of sacrifice can only be atoned by further sacrifice and so on in a virtually unending succession. The shift to the purely technical meaning is, however, indicated – even though the remedy is still sacrifice – where a parallel passage winds up the matter by stating that “what has been faultily chanted, faultily recited, done in deviation of the proper order, that he puts right by means of this (cow).”⁹

4

Of particular interest is the theme of severing “the head of the sacrifice”, that is: killing the victim by decapitation. In itself this sacrificial procedure is not surprising. We may safely surmise that there were and are other ways too of putting the victim to death, for instance by suffocation, but up till the present day beheading seems to be the normal procedure in popular or “village” sacrifices. Equally the Vedic ritual texts do not tire of invoking the theme of the sacrifice’s severed head, but the surprising point is that the ritual

6. W. CALAND – V. HENRY, *L’Agniṣṭoma*, Paris, 1906, para. 256.

7. Kāṭhaka-Saṃhitā 29. 4 : 172. 5–10.

8. The idea of a transgression is often associated with the combination of *ṛc* and *sāman*, cf. Vrātya and Sacrifice, *Indo-Iranian Journ.* 6 (1962), 21.

9. Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitā 4. 8. 6 : 114. 10.

itself does not know of immolation by cutting off the victim's head. Such a procedure is even rejected.¹⁰ But even so, it can hardly be doubted that originally the animal was beheaded at the sacrificial post. The ritual as we know it, however, provides only for killing the victim by keeping its mouth and nostrils closed. Even after the killing, when the victim is cut up, there is no rule for or even a mention of the severing of the head. Apparently a change has intervened.

This change in sacrificial procedure would hardly call for special attention, if it had not created a curious aporia. I refer to the five heads – one human and four animal heads – that have to be buried in the foundation of the brick-built “Altar of Fire”. The question is how these heads have to be procured. The obvious answer is : by way of sacrifice and this is indeed the answer given by the texts. But here – still apart from the unpleasant matter of human sacrifice – the ritualist finds his way blocked. The sacrificial ritual, as we saw, does not provide for cutting off the head either during or after immolation. Confronted with this aporia the texts give a wide variety of possible answers ranging from the introduction of a special rule for cutting off the victim's head to the use of artificial heads made of gold or clay. But none of the answers provides a satisfactory solution in terms of the ritual system.¹¹

The most detailed and systematic text, the Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra, is also the most interesting. Since the Śrauta system does not provide for the heads, he prescribes a separate sacrifice of a different nature. “They play dice, they cook a bull, a ram and a he-goat.”¹² The wording suggests a popular non-śrauta sacrifice, where indeed the heads may and usually are cut off. At a certain moment these heads are then transferred to the parallel śrauta sacrifice. This solution is far from perfect, for the animals have not been properly consecrated and integrated in the closed śrauta system. Their heads have to be introduced, somewhat surreptitiously, as corpora aliena – a procedure that in fact forms a breach in the system. But even at this price we only have three of the five heads – bull, ram and he-goat. We still lack the human and the horse's heads. It is here that the carefully devised śrauta system cracks, giving us a glimpse of a previous and entirely different state of affairs. According to Baudhāyana the two remaining heads should be those of a horse and of a vaiśya killed in battle.¹³ To obtain such heads there is no way – short of head repre-

10. Satapatha Brāhmaṇa 3. 8. 3. 11, 28-29.

11. For a detailed discussion of the varying answers to the problem cf. The Case of the Severed Head, *Wiener Zs. für die Kunde S. - und O. - Asiens* 11 (1967) 22-43 (esp. 31-34).

12. Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra 10. 9 : 8. 8.

13. Ibid. 10. 9 : 8. 7 (*saṃgrāme hatayor aśvasya ca vaiśyasya ca*).

hensible body-snatching – but to go oneself into battle and fight for them. And this seems indeed to be the case. On further investigation the human head seems to have been the head of the vaiśya who guarded the pit where the clay for the fire pot and the altar bricks have to be fetched. The innocuous procession that goes to fetch the clay has originally been a raiding expedition.¹⁴

What at first sight looked like a fairly indifferent change of procedure which normalized killing by suffocation and ruled out beheading (as well as other possibilities), now appears full of weighty consequences. Briefly, the story of the severed heads lights up a lost heroic world where violently agonistic sacrifice was the ever renewed catastrophic turning point in the never ending contest for the goods of life. The sacrificial area was not the meticulously regulated ritual emplacement of the single unopposed sacrifices, but the battle ground, where the parties contended for each other's heads, lives and cattle.¹⁵

Against this background we may gauge the magnitude and urgency of the ritualist's problem. His mission was to reduce the violence and destruction of agonistic sacrifice and subject it to the rigorous control of an exhaustive ritual order. We should now try and look at the way the ritualist dealt with his mission.

5

We already came across the link between sacrificial killing and ritual mistake. We further noticed how the killing was further aggravated by agonistic violence. In view of this latter feature it is not surprising that one of the gravest "mistakes" – one that called for a more than usually elaborate correction – is *saṃsara*, the sacrificial competition that is said to arise, when two places of sacrifice are too near to each other.¹⁶ The atonement in this case is to outdo the other party by a more important sacrifice accompanied by greater gifts (*dakṣiṇās*). This clearly harks back to the ancient potlatch-like proceedings which were not a "mistake" but the essence of sacrifice. It was exactly against such proceedings with their attendant risk of run-away violence and destruction that the ritualists' reaction was directed. The more important it was, therefore, to rule out the *saṃsara*. That the thought of such self-defeating competitive violence was very much alive seems to be overwhelmingly illustrated by the epic nightmare of the Mahābhārata war, which, in the words of Marcel MAUSS, is

14. Cf. Severed Head (above n. 11), 35–41.

15. Cf. Vedisches Opfer und Transzendenz, in G. OBERHAMMER (ed.). *Transzendenz-erfahrung*, Vienna, 1978, 29–44; Householder and Wanderer, *Contrib. to Indian Sociology* 15 (1981), 251–71.

16. *Āpastamba Śrautasūtra* 4, 19–20.

"l'histoire d'un gigantesque potlatch".¹⁷ Against this tale of catastrophe stands the vision of the ritualists.

This vision is concisely expressed in the mythic story of the contest between Prajāpati, the Lord of Life, and Mr̥tyu, Death.¹⁸ The "weapons" of Prajāpati were the standard elements of the classical ritual – chant, recitation and (orderly) act (*yad yajñe stūyate, yac chasyate, yat pracaryate*). Those of Death, on the other hand, were typically non-śrauta elements – song, dance and wanton act (*yad vīṇāyām gīyate, yan nr̥tyate, yad vr̥thācaryate*). The latter are characteristic of the mahāvratā festival that preserves these as well as many agonistic and orgiastic reminiscences intercalated in the paradigm of a regular Soma sacrifice.

For a long time, we are told the battle between Prajāpati and Mr̥tyu remained undecided, neither gaining an advantage over the other. The breakthrough came, however, with Prajāpati's "seeing" or discovering of *sampad* and *samkhyāna*, numerical equivalence and "counting up" (of liturgical and cosmic elements). This enabled Prajāpati to identify the weapons of Death with his own and thereby master them. In other words, through identification he transformed the panoply of Death into the apparatus of the classical system of ritual. In this way Prajāpati, as the representative of the classical system or "science" of ritual, conquered and integrated Death. Our text then concludes with the triumphant assertion: "Now there is no *samsara* anymore, for the second sacrifice withered away; there is only the one sacrifice, Prajāpati alone is the sacrifice" (*naitarhi samsavo'sti, yo hi dvitīyo yajña āsid āśucyat sa, eka eva yajñah, prajāpatir yajña eveti*).

This brāhmaṇa-passage shows a keen awareness of the discontinuity between the two sets of ritual; the systematized or mechanistic as against the popular or organicist ritual. The two sets are given as somehow parallel to each other, but it took Prajāpati's discovery of identification, based on reasoned equivalences, to turn the vague parallelism into an operational system. Prajāpati, then, did not conquer his opponent by showing himself a better warrior in the agonistic game of sacrifice but by the intellectual, reflexive content of his ritual. Seeking its strength in identification – that is: in rational reflection – this ritual is of a different nature. How different it is, comes out clearly in the

17. Essai sur le Don, repr. M. MAUSS, *Sociologie et Anthropologie*, Paris, 1950, 243. G. J. HELD, *The Mahābhārata, an ethnological Study*, thesis Leiden 1936, elaborates this idea.

18. Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa 2, 69–70 (CALAND, *Auswahl*, no. 128); cf. Brahmin, *Ritual and Renouncer*, *Wiener Zs. für die Kunde S.- und O.-Asiens*, 8 (1964), 1–31 (esp. 12–14).

pointe and conclusion of the story: "Now there is no *samsara*, no sacrificial contest, anymore. Identification – the premier intellectual tool of the ritualists – is pointedly aimed at integrating and thereby eliminating the opposite party, who is viewed as the representative of Death. The result is the single, unified and systematized *śrauta* ritual. This, then, is the way the ritualists viewed and sought to solve the problem of strife and violent death. In this they are conscious of serving a high purpose.

6

The exclusion of the other party from the sacrificial arena also brought with it another, no less weighty consequence. The sacrificial contest certainly knew rules and structure, even though we are not so well informed about them. But this structure and its rules were concerned with the interaction of two parties and its uncertain outcome. They were conventions setting the pattern of the game; they were not the game itself. The exclusion was no longer co-determined by the opponent's countermove, the result could only be either total loss of structure or maximal regulation. It may be hard to find traces of a total destructuring. Such traces, in order to be preserved in an observable manner would still have to show some structure. But perhaps we may see its result in the rejection of the Veda by the heterodox movements which then set their own, deviating course. Maximal regulation, however, can be clearly observed in the ritual system. The place vacated by the opponent was filled by the mechanistic contrivance of ritual. At the same time this lent to ritual structure a rigour and absoluteness that were not there before. The ritual rule, the *vidhi*, had become itself the game to the extent that it could be executed *manasā*, internally, by memorizing its intricacies, that is: not executed at all in any real sense.

Let me try to illustrate this change in the nature of ritual. For this purpose I take the use of the war and racing chariot (*ratha*) as an example.¹⁹ Now the chariot clearly belongs to the agonistic scenario. It is still around in some of the grand rituals, such as *vājapeya*, *rājasūya*, *āśvamedha* and *mahāvratā*, but its place in the ritual has understandably become problematic. Only in the *vājapeya* a full-scale race is still prescribed. But even there it is brought fully under the sway of ritualistic regulation and presents the distinct oddity of a race with a ritually prescribed outcome. The point, however, to which I want to draw attention is another one. The critical feature of the chariot race is the rounding of the post at the end of the race course, where the competitors crowd in on each other in their attempt to get round the post first by the shortest and swiftest turn.

19. Cf. M. SPARREBOOM, *Chariots in the Veda* (Leiden thesis, 1983). I am indebted to Mr. SPARREBOOM for discussions on the chariot and its use.

At that point also the chance of fatal mishaps is greatest. The Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra has preserved some perfectly sensible instructions for the manoeuvre of rounding the post. It is, however, interesting to see what all this becomes in the hands of the ritualist.

Here ritualistic regulation starts to interfere. There is a stated rule that requires a clockwise turn to be matched by a counterclockwise one, or vice versa.²⁰ For instance, on completion of the brick-built fire altar, water is to be poured around it. This has to be done thrice while moving from left to right and thrice in the opposite direction. W. CALAND who studied this feature gives many instances of this rule from the ritual.²¹ Even so it is clear that the rule is not an absolute one. As CALAND points out the clockwise turn is auspicious and associated with the gods, its counterpart with inauspiciousness and the deceased ancestors. The double turn is, therefore, not everywhere relevant. Now the usual way for the racing chariot to round the post was by a left turn, as it was in the Roman circus. Perhaps this may reflect an original association with funerary games, but we have no clear testimonia to support this supposition. However, the relevant point for our purpose is that the inauspicious left turn was bound to cause problems in a ritual that had banned all associated with death and inauspiciousness. Apart from simply changing the direction of the turn and prescribe a clockwise rounding of the post, a more sophisticated solution was to apply the rule of matching turns, so as to neutralize the left turn by a turn in the opposite direction. This is indeed what a supplement to the Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra prescribes.²² Referring to the instructions of the charioteers in the vājapeya race this text tells us that, according to Baudhāyana, they should first make a turn to the right (*pradakṣiṇam āvṛtya*), then make for the post and round it with a turn to the left (*amuto'pasalair āvarteran*). Another authority, Śāliki, prescribes the same curious manoeuvre but reverses the directions, first left then right. In terms of ritual symmetry this solution is a satisfactory, even elegant one. It is, however, hard to see what this should mean in terms of chariot racing. In fact, it is perfectly meaningless.

What this intricate detail illustrates is the ritual's willful divorce from reality. It is a closed system that has meaning only in itself, in its own inner order—an order that is as strict as it is artificial. In this sense one may agree with Professor STAAL's thesis of the meaninglessness of ritual. But this meaninglessness is the unwanted result of the break with reality. It did not satisfy the ritualists.

20. Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra 1. 4. 24 : *vīṛtyāvṛtya vetarathāvṛttiḥ*.

21. W. CALAND, Een indogermaansch illustratie-gebruik, *Mededelingen Kon. Ak. van. Wetenschappen*, 1898, 275-325 (esp. 295-301).

22. Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra (dvaidhasūtra) 22. 14 : 137. 20 (referring to 11. 7 : 76. 3).

The construction of the ritual system had eliminated agonistic violence and death from the sacrificial area.²³ But when this had been achieved, the ritualists found themselves confronted with the problem of meaning. That is : they had to construct a way back to the lived - in world of mundane reality. Here they were to some extent helped by the same meaninglessness they had contrived by emptying sacrifice of its reality content but now had to overcome again. It facilitated the ascription of any meaning to any element or combination of elements of the ritual. Thus, for instance, there is a particular one-day Soma sacrifice, the *viśvajicchilpa*.²⁴ Its particular feature is that it is "wheeled". This being wheeled refers to the second and third *pavamāna-stotras* which are both eighteen-versed and identified with chariot wheels. That, originally, the being "wheeled" was not so meaningless can easily be seen. The *viśvajicchilpa* belongs to a group of Soma rituals where the real chariot is still present albeit in the somewhat marginal function of carrying the herolds when they go out to invite the priests. There is even the suggestion of a chariot race on this occasion. However, in the *viśvajicchilpa* the chariot has been completely "identified away" and replaced with abstract liturgical "wheels". Incidentally, that is exactly the way *Prajāpati* dealt with *Mṛtyu's* sacrifice.

One might, of course, as Professor STAALL does, compare the identification of stotras and wheels with the ascription of meaning in programmatic music. The comparison immediately shows the essential difference. The wheels, the chariots and everything they stood for in the agonistic context originally were a threatening reality and, for that reason, had to be abstracted away. The "Cathédrale engloutie" or the "Exposition de Tableaux", on the other hand, are certainly not meant to be abstracted and put out of the way by the music so named. Programmatic music has no difficulty whatsoever with the reality it is said to represent. For ritualism, however, it is a serious problem that is the more serious for being insoluble. The break with reality has been decisive.

This comes out clearly in an episode of the *agnicayana*. Before being installed on the brick altar the fire has to be carried in its fire pot during a certain period of time. On alternate days the sacrificer is enjoined to take up the fire pot, make three steps and put the pot back in its place. On the intervening days this rite is replaced by the recitation of the *vātsapra-hymn*.²⁵ The explanation given for this rite is that it represents in liturgical terms the setting out on a

23. It is significant that the immolation (by suffocating the victim) takes place in a separate shed to the North, outside the sacrificial area.

24. *Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa* 16. 15.

25. *Āpastamba Śrautasūtra* 16. 11. 7.

trekking expedition with one's fire (and belongings) on carts, while the vātsapra hymn is said to be the unyoking at the resting places. In view of the abundant references to such raiding and transhumance trecks, there is no reason to doubt that this was indeed the original reality. However, all contact with such cumbersome and, all told, risky realities is broken here. Instead there is only the purely abstract rite of the three steps and the vātsapra recitation. Generally the texts are satisfied to leave it at that. But this is exactly what the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa will not have.²⁶ It re-instates a wheeled vehicle and doubles the abstract rite with driving about the fire on a real cart. The interesting point is the reason given for this return to mundane realities. The abstract symbolization is said to be the divine form. By performing the rite in both forms one makes the ritual complete, so that it encompasses both the divine and the human worlds. For Prajāpati is both the world of men and the world of the gods. The reasoning is compelling and deeply sincere. But one fails to see how the injunction of aimlessly driving about with the fire could in any meaningful sense re-establish the lost contact with reality. The intended encompassment cannot be validity achieved. The ritual remains an abstract "Glasperlenspiel".

In the last resort this is acknowledged by ritualistic doctrine itself. For this doctrine holds that, however plausible and sincere, all explanation of the ritual is merely *arthavāda* and as such lacks ultimate authority. Only the *vidhi*, the transcendent injunction, has such authority. It stands by itself in sovereign fashion, independent of any meaning that may be ascribed to it. The quest for meaning founders on the rock of the *vidhi*'s transcendence.

8

Even though the śrauta ritual has no meaning it clearly has a history. The texts are replete with scattered but telling references to the origins of this ritual. These references point to a heroic world that found its climatic center and turning point in the destructive violence of agonistic sacrifice. Whatever the intrinsic meaning of sacrifice may be thought to be, it gave meaning and coherence to the still unitary world of gods and men, even if it did so at the awesome price of an ever repeated cycle of violence. The vedic ritualists put an end to all that. Eliminating the other party, Death, from the sacrificial arena they constructed out of the disassembled pieces of the broken cycle the rigorous order of the single sacrificer's ritual. What ritual there was before obviously derived its meaning from sacrifice. But under the new ritual the relationship was reversed. Sacrifice was deprived of its meaning-giving function. Even if it is maintained in our texts that the world turns on sacrifice, this is merely *arthavāda* and not ultimately

26. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 6. 8. 1-4.

authoritative. Sacrifice, then, could only derive its meaning from ritual. But since ritual had irreversibly been broken loose from reality it has no other meaning to offer than its structure to which sacrifice had been definitively subjected to the point of disappearance.

Given the specific history of the 'śrauta ritual it seems questionable whether we can generalize from this to ritual in general. This is not to deny the primacy of structure over meaning. What sets vedic ritual apart from ritual *tout court* is the intense intellectual effort of the ancient Indian ritualists. They can be said to have, in a way, "discovered" ritual structure. Lifting it out of its organic context they maximized its potential for restraining disruptive tendencies and developed it into a well-thought out, internally coherent system that replaced the disruptiveness of violence and sacrifice with the ideal construct of perfect rational order. Unreflective ritual was pushed to the extreme limits of reflective ritualism. While ritual does not engage the conviction of its adherents, ritualism demands no less than absolute faith – or otherwise principled rejection. Thus the word *śraddhā* – etymologically equivalent with "credit" – originally meant the reasonable expectation that the other party is able and willing "to play the game" and honour his obligations, whatever the daunting risks; it had now come to mean no less than unreasoned, absolute faith in the validity of the ritual construct.²⁷

9

It may be too early to judge whether and in how far ritual elsewhere, in other civilizations, has known similar or at least comparable avatars. Apart from specialist knowledge, this question will require an adequate comparative perspective. At this point a suggestion may be offered. It may be worthwhile to consider ritual in terms of play and games. I refer to J. HUIZINGA's *Homo Ludens*.²⁸ HUIZINGA sees the origin of culture in play, more specifically in the play of emulation. Play can be observed both in the case of animals and in all human culture. It can, therefore, not be placed in any rational context. It has a reality all its own, independent of belief, world view or intellectual content. It does indeed depend solely on its autonomous structure. Ritual, it would seem,

27. On the word *śraddhā*, see the study by H. -W. KÖHLER, *Śrad-dhā in der vedischen und altbuddhistischen Literatur*, Wiesbaden, 1973. In the Rigveda this term refers to trust in the gods, especially Indra (o. c., 64); at any rate, it seems to imply (the expectation of) reciprocity, as seems to be indicated by its derivation *śraddha*, the funerary feast (which implies a counterprestation on the part of the invited guests). This social content is, however, eliminated in favour of feeding only one learned brahmin, cf. Brahmin, Ritual and Renouncer (above n, 18), 19.

28. First published Haarlem, 1938; English translation by R. F. C. HULL, London, 1949.

fits effortlessly into this perspective as the structured "rules of the game". At the beginning, then, stands emulous play. How playful emulation develops into the destructive violence of agonistic sacrifice, the epic "sacrifice of battle" (*raṇayajña*), is not clear, but the development itself is plausible. The critical element seems to be sacrifice, the catastrophe that overturns the order of the game. This is the self-defeating violence of the heroic age which Greek imagination intercalated between the third and the last world age in the same way that the epic Mahābhārata war is said to be the turning point between the tretā- and kali-yugas. While the ancient Greeks turned the heroic contest into the cultivated classical agōn, the Vedic Indians excluded the contest and maximized its rules into pure ritualism. The ritualistic break-through formed the beginning and the nucleus of Indian civilization when it started its rich deployment.

This may well be the reason why the Veda and its ritual are vested with transcendent authority. The achievement of the Vedic ritualists was that they forged a way out from the archaic cycle of destructive violence. They could, of course, not change reality, nor did they attempt to do so. In fact, they resolutely turned their back to reality and its outbreaks of disruptive conflict and violence. Here ritualism was as powerless as the ideal brahmin should be, except for one significant aspect. The realities of violent strife and destruction were deprived of the ultimate value and justification they had derived from agonistic sacrifice. Instead of the "sacrifice of battle", ritualism proposed to man to strike out all by himself and to construct a perfectly ordered transcendent universe entirely his own. This created the insoluble problem of meaning and the way back to mundane reality. But herein lies equally the troubling and unique sense of Vedic ritual.

THE ROLE OF BOUNDARIES IN THE *AṢṬADHYĀYI*

By

S. D. JOSHI

In Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* we do not find any term for "boundary" in the sense of pause between two units. But the role of boundaries can be inferred on the basis of phonological effects on surrounding segments by various rules depending on whether a particular segment is *aṅga* or *pada* or *bha* or whether the utterance is finished (*avasāna*). This leads to the assumption that the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* makes a distinction between various types of boundaries.¹

The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* defines the technical terms *aṅga*, *bha*, *pada* and *avasāna* which refer to elements associated with a boundary. In Pāṇini's system five different kinds of boundaries can be easily distinguished: (1) boundary associated with derivational or inflectional suffixes (which is called *aṅga* and which can be marked as +); (2) boundary associated with *taddhita* and case suffixes beginning with a consonant other than *y* (which we can call *pada* B² and which we will denote by the symbol =); (3) boundary associated with *taddhita* and case suffixes beginning with a vowel or the consonant *y* (which is called *bha* and which we will mark by the symbol ||); (4) boundary associated with finished words (*Pada* A³, which we symbolise as #); and (5) boundary associated with the termination of utterances (which is called *avasāna* and which we will mark by the symbol # #).

First we will explain rules dealing with the boundaries one by one. Pāṇini defines the term *aṅga* 'formative boundary' as follows: P. 1. 4. 13, *yasmāt pratyayaividhis tādādi pratyaye 'ṅgam* '(an element) beginning with that after which a suffix has been added and occurring before that suffix is called *aṅga*'. The rule amounts to saying that the *aṅga* boundary appears between the final element of a stem and the initial element of the following suffix. For instance, (*bhū* + *a*) is an *aṅga* before the finite suffix in the sequence (*bhū* + *a*) +

1. For the notion of 'boundary' I am indebted to N. CHOMSKY and M. HALLE, *The Sound Pattern of English*, New York, 1968. The term 'formative boundary' is introduced by the authors and defined at p. 66 as 'occurring between the final segment of one formative and the initial segment of the following formative'. Also for the type of approach to the boundary phenomenon that has been adopted in generative phonology, see Richard STANLEY, "Boundaries in Phonology", in *A Festschrift for Morris Halle*, edited by S. R. ANDERSON and P. KIPARSKY, New York, 1973.

2. By *pada* B I mean a boundary occurring inside the finished word.

3. By *pada* A I mean the word-final boundary.

mi. Similarly, *bhū* is *aṅga* before the *vikaraṇa* suffix *a* in the sequence *bhū* + (*a* + *mi*). At the stage *bhū* + *a* + *mi* the *guṇa* rule (P. 7.3.84) conditioned by the presence of the *aṅga*-boundary applies. Then at the stage (*bhū* + *a*) + *mi* the lengthening of *a* (P. 7.3.101) conditioned by the presence of the *aṅga*-boundary takes place. Here we find a double occurrence of + (*aṅga* or formative boundary). We can have more than three formative boundaries within a single word, e. g. (((*jūhāv* + *ay*) + *iṣa*) + *a*)) + *ti*)).

The *aṅga* boundary has a special status. The section-heading *aṅgasya* (P. 6.4.1) states that the *aṅga* boundary forms an essential condition for the application of rules mentioned in the section *aṅgasya* which extends upto P. 7.4.97. But absence of the *aṅga* boundary is never a special condition for the application of any phonological rule. That is to say, a phonological rule is never blocked by the presence of the *aṅga* boundary. We can apply a phonological rule like (P. 6.1.77), *iko yaṇ aci* ‘((in the case of immediate sequence), *i*, *u*, *ṛ*, *ḷ* are replaced by *y*, *v*, *r*, and *l* (respectively, when a vowel follows))’, to the string containing the *aṅga* or formative boundary. For instance, *nadī* + *as* (Nom. pl.) → *nadyas*.

Pāṇini defines the *pada*-boundary as follows :

P. 1.1.14, *suptīnantam padam* ‘that which ends either in *suP* ‘case endings’ or *tiN* ‘finite verb endings’ (is called) *pada* A. This *pada* boundary (#) appears after a finished word. For instance, in *vāma* + *sU* # P. 6.2.66 conditioned by the presence of the *pada* boundary replaces *s* in word-final position by *rU*. But this rule does not apply, when the *pada* boundary is not present, for instance, *yaśas* † *ā*. Here *-s* is not replaced by *-rU*.

P. 1.1.15 *svādiṣv asarvanāmasthāne* ‘(a noun stem before the inflectional suffixes or *taddhita* suffixes (both beginning with a consonant other than *y*) excluding *sarvanāmasthāna* suffixes (is called) *pada* B)’. For instance, in the word-internal position *yaśas* = *bhyām* in the presence of the *pada* B boundary P. 8.2.66 replaces *s* by *rU*. This gives us *yaśar* = *bhyām*. Then *r* is replaced by *u* (P. 6.1.114) and finally applying the *guṇa sandhi* (P. 6.1.187) we get *yaśo* = *bhyām*. Words frequently contain several internal occurrences of *pada* boundaries. For instance, (((*jāyā* # (*prati* # *grāhita* #)) (*gandha* # *mālyā* #))) # + *am*)))).⁴ Here we have several internal occurrences of *pada* A boundaries which are subsequently deleted by the *samhitā* rules (P. 1.4.109) in order to form a close union of several words (i. e. *samhitā*).

Pāṇini does not make any distinction between word-boundary (*pada* A, i. e. #) and internal word-boundary (*pada* B, =) which occurs between a stem

4, *Raghuvaṃśa* 2. 1,

and a suffix in certain situations. Pāṇini's *pada* rules apply at word-boundaries as well as to *padas* which occur within a word also. For instance, P. 8. 2. 66 which replaces *s* by *rU* applies at the external-*pada* boundary ($rāma + s \# \rightarrow rāma + r \#$), and at the internal-*pada* boundary ($vapus \pm bhyām \rightarrow vapur \pm bhyām \#$). Thus Pāṇini gives the common name '*pada*' to both: boundaries occurring within finished words and boundaries occurring across the words. The reason behind this is that the *sandhi* operations, which are applicable to a sound in the final position of finished words (*pada* A) are also applicable within a word (*pada* B) in certain situations.

Pāṇini defines the *bha* boundary as follows :

P. 1. 4. 18 *yaci bham* ' (a noun stem) which is followed by (the *taddhita* and case suffixes both beginning) either with a vowel or with *y* (excluding the *sarvanāmasthāna* endings) is called *bha*'. For instance, at the stage $rājan \pm as$ (acc. pl.), P. 6. 4. 134 ((*a* of (the stem-final) *an* is deleted (at the *bha* boundary)) deletes *a*. That gives us $rājñ \pm as$. The rules conditioned by the *bha*-boundary apply only when that *bha*-boundary occurs.

The *pada* and *bha* boundaries have different phonological effects on stems. A rule conditioned by presence of the *pada*-boundary applies except when it is blocked by the *bha*-boundary.

Consider the following examples :

P. 8. 2. 7, *nalopah prātipadikāntasya* '*n* occurring at the end of a noun stem is deleted (at the *pada*-boundary)'. This rule deletes *n* before weak case endings. For instance, $rājan = bhyām \rightarrow rājabhyām$. But this rule does not apply, when the *bha*-boundary appears. In such cases, P. 6. 4. 134 conditioned by the presence of the *bha*-boundary becomes applicable. For instance, in $rājñ \parallel as$ the deletion of *n* by P. 8. 2. 7 does not take place, but deletion of *a* by P. 6. 4. 134 takes place. Thus the *bha*-boundary rule (P. 6. 4. 134) blocks the application of the *pada*-boundary rule.

A rule conditioned by the *aṅga*-boundary applies whenever that boundary is present. This boundary is not blocked by a *pada* or *bha*-boundary.

Consider the following examples :

At the stage *sarpiḥ + ka* we apply two rules, P. 7. 2. 117, *kiti ca* ' (the first vowel of a stem takes *vṛddhi*) before (*taddhita* suffixes) marked by the *anubandha* *K* (at the presence of the *aṅga*-boundary)', and P. 8. 2. 39, *inaḥ ṣaḥ* ' (a *visarga* occurring at the *pada*-boundary is preferably replaced by *ṣ* when it (*h*) is preceded by a vowel other than *a* (and followed by guttural and labial class consonants)'. Here both the rules, the *vṛddhi* rule conditioned by the

aṅga-boundary, and the *ṣ*-replacement rule conditioned by the *pada*-boundary, apply. This gives us the form *sārpiṣka*.

Consider further the following example :

At the stage *babhru* + *ya* we apply the following two rules : P. 7. 2. 119, *taddhiteṣv acām ādeḥ* 'the first vowel (of a stem takes *vrddhi*) before a *taddhita* suffix (marked by the *anubandha* $\tilde{N}$ or $\tilde{N}$)', and P. 6. 4. 146 or *guṇaḥ* '(a stem ending in) *u* (occurring at the *bha*-boundary) takes *guṇa* (before a *taddhita* suffix)'.⁵

Here both the rules, the *vrddhi* rule (P. 7. 2. 119) conditioned by the *aṅga*-boundary, and the *guṇa* rule (P. 6. 4. 146) conditioned by the presence of the *bha*-boundary, apply.⁵ This gives us the form *bābhravya*.

The derivation of secondary words (*taddhita*) and compound forms (*samāsa*) starts from *pada*-s 'case-inflected words'. For instance, *bābhravya* is derived from (*babhru* + $\tilde{N}$ as) + *ya* $\tilde{N}$ (P. 4. 1. 106) in the sense of *tasya apatyam* 'his offspring'. Here the *taddhita* suffix is added to the case-inflected word *babhru* + $\tilde{N}$ as. In *sarpiṣka* also, the *taddhita* suffix *thaK* (P. 5. 1. 19), that is *ka* (p. 7. 3. 51), is added to the case-inflected word *sarpis* + *am* # *ka* (P. 5. 1. 63). The internal case-ending is deleted by P. 2. 4. 71. Similarly, the compound form *mahārājam* is derived from the case-inflected word [(*mahat* + *sU* #) (*rājan* + *sU* #)] # + *am*. The internal case-endings are deleted by P. 2. 4. 71. The occurrence of # after a noun stem before *taddhita* suffixes and the occurrence of # after a compound stem before case-endings are reduced to the formative boundary. Therefore the *pada* rules conditioned by the *pada*-boundary depending on deleted internal case-endings are not applied before *taddhita* and case-suffixes.⁶ For instance, in (*parama* # *daṇḍin* #) + *am* or *rājan* # + *yu* (P. 4. 1. 137) the deletion of *n* by P. 8. 2. 7 conditioned by the *pada*-boundary does not take place, because here the *pada*-boundary # is simply reduced to the formative boundary +.

Pāṇini defines the *avasāna*-boundary as follows : P. 1. 4. 110, *virāmo 'vasānam* 'the absence (of a succeeding unit) is called *avasāna*'. Thus the word *avasāna* means 'pause' or 'termination of utterance.'

There are rules which are applicable at the utterance-final boundary. But they are not applicable at the word-final boundary.

5. The examples *sārpiṣkaḥ* and *bābhravyaḥ* are quoted by Patañjali on *Vārtika* III on P. 1. 4. 1 to indicate co-application of the *aṅga*- and *pada*- boundary rules.

6. This is noted by *Vārtika* VI on P. 1. 1. 63. The *vārtika* gives the example *paramavṛcā*. In (*paramā* # *vṛc* #) + *ā* the *pada*-boundary before *ā* is eliminated. Therefore *coḥ kuḥ* (P. 8. 2. 30) which prescribes *c* → *k* conditioned by the presence of the *pada*-boundary is not applied.

Consider the following example : P. 8. 4. 57, *aṇo 'pragṛhyasyānūnāsikaḥ* 'a, i, u, which are not *pragṛhya*, are preferably replaced by a nasalized vowel at the utterance-final boundary.' For instance, *uttamaṁ madhū*, *uttamaṁ dadhī*. But this rule does not apply at the word-final boundary when it does not coincide with the utterance-final position. E. g. *madhu bhuṅkte*.

In certain cases the same type of suffixes give rise to two different kinds of boundaries. The possessive suffixes *vat* and *vin* are associated with the *bha*-boundary, when the stem ends in *t* and *s* (P. 1. 4. 19). For instance, *vidyut* || *vān*. Here the *pada*-boundary rule (P. 3. 2. 39), which prescribes *t* → *d*, is not applied. Similarly, in *yaśas + vin* the *pada*-boundary rule (P. 8. 2. 66), which prescribes *s* → *r*, is not applied. But when the stem does not end in *t* or *s*, the *pada*-boundary occurs before the possessive suffixes. For instance, in *vāc + gmin* (P. 5. 2. 124) the *pada*-boundary rule *coḥ kuḥ* (P. 8. 2. 30), which prescribes *c* → *k*, and *jhalām jaśo 'nte* (P. 8. 2. 39) which prescribes *k* → *g* at the *pada*-boundary are applied.

Some phonological rules do not require any particular boundary. In that case, these rules are common to the *aṅga*-, *pada*- and *bha*-boundaries.

Consider the following rules : P. 6. 1. 77, *iko yaṇ aci* ' (in the case of immediate sequence) *i, u, ṛ* and *ḷ* are replaced by *y, v, r* and *l*, when a vowel follows', and P. 6. 1. 78, *eco 'yavāyāvaḥ* ' (in the case of immediate sequence), *e, o, ai* and *au* are replaced by *ay, av, āy* and *āv* (respectively, when a vowel follows) '.

P. 6. 1. 77 is applicable at the *aṅga*-boundary, e. g. *nadī + as* → *nadyas*, at the *bha*-boundary *nadī* || *ai* → *nadyai*, and at the *pada*-boundary *nadī* # *asti* → *nadyasti*. P. 6. 1. 78 is applicable at the *aṅga*-boundary, e. g. *gau + au* → *gāvau*, at the *bha*-boundary *go* || *e* → *gave* and at the *pada*-boundary *gāvau* # *āgatau* → *gāvāv āgatau*.

Consider again the following rule : P. 8. 4. 53, *jhalām jaś jhaśi* 'stops and fricatives are replaced by the third letter before non-nasal stops and fricatives'. This rule is applicable at the *aṅga*-boundary, e. g. *ruṇadh + dhi* → *ruṇad + dhi* and at the *pada*-boundary, e. g. *kṣudh* # *bhyām* → *kṣud* # *bhyām*. But this rule cannot be applicable at the *bha*- and *avasāna*-boundaries.

The rules mentioned in the *Samhitā* section are not to be applied, if the speaker intends to make a break between word-finals and word-initials and between two segments within a word.

The term *saṁhitā* is defined by P. 1. 4. 109 as *paraḥ saṁnikarṣaḥ saṁhitā* 'the close junction (of segments) is called *saṁhitā*'.⁷ 'The close

7. According to the traditional interpretation, P. 1. 4. 109 means that a close junction of phonemes is called *saṁhitā*. Since a boundary is possible only between two

junction of segments and that of words have one common feature, namely, *samhitā* 'close union'. Therefore, *samhitā* can only eliminate boundaries occurring between two adjacent segments. *Samhitā* removes the occurrence of boundaries in order to establish a close union of segments and words.

Consider the following example : (*deva* # *datta* #) # + *h* # *odana* + *am* # *kāṣṭha* † *ais* # ((*pac* + *a*) + *ti*)) ##. Here we have thirteen boundaries. In order to establish the close phonological union, all boundaries, are eliminated. The *sandhi* rules, which apply in this context of close union, are mentioned in the *samhitā* section.

In conclusion, we may say that the terms *aṅga*, *bha* and *pada* in Pāṇini's system refer to boundaries between stems and suffixes and between finished words. The term *avasāna* refers to the boundary occurring at the termination of utterance.

To make clear which rule is applicable at which boundary, Pāṇini has mentioned the relevant rules under the respective section headings, *aṅgasya*, *bhasya*, *padasya*. Once the phonological and morphophonemic rules have been applied, boundaries are eliminated by the *samhitā* rules.

In the *Padapāṭha* the internal and external *pada*-boundaries are indicated by means of orthographic symbols, namely, *avagraha* and *daṇḍa*. During recitation the reciters actually introduce a pause at these boundaries. But the *aṅga* and *bha* boundaries are not indicated by symbols, nor is a pause introduced here during recitation. The introduction by Pāṇini of the *aṅga*-boundary, of which the *bha*-boundary is a special form, must be regarded as a major step in linguistic analysis supplied by him.

The aim of the present paper is merely to give an indication of the existence of a frame work of boundaries in Pāṇini's grammatical system. The paper should be followed up by more detailed investigation.

(Continued from the last page)

segments, it would be appropriate to say that *samhitā* eliminates boundaries between two segments. The consequence is that, rules dealing with a combination of phonemes not involving any boundary are not mentioned in the *samhitā* section.

ON THE MILITARY CODE OF HONOUR IN THE MAHĀBHĀRATA

By

V. I. KALYANOV

During the *Mahābhārata* (*M*) times the chariot-mounted warriors were of paramount importance in wars. This is witnessed by the high title, which was given to the most outstanding and illustrious warrior-heroes: *mahāratha* and *atiratha*.¹ Numerous examples given in our composition also speak of the high debt of honour of the warrior-heroes. The success of a combat, which was usually decided in a duel, often depended upon the means and techniques (of combat) used by each of the opponents, conforming to the combat-ethics.

The terrible duel fought by two glorious and peerless heroes – the Brahmin Rāma, son of Jamadagni, and his worthiest disciple, the Kṣatriya Bhīṣma – for the fate of illstarred Ambā is a graphic example of the high knightly sense of honour (of the warriors), convinced in their righteousness, both of whom fought a hard battle, scorning their lives (*M* 5. 179–186).² One stood for the honour of an insulted girl, the other stood to defend the moral code of his caste.³ Though Rāma failed to conquer his disciple in the exhausting chariot-combat lasting for 23 days (*M* 5. 183. 27), he, a great ascetic, said most lovingly to Bhīṣma, when the latter came up to greet him (after the combat): “No Kṣatriya alive can match you in this world. O, Bhīṣma, you have given me enormous pleasure through this combat.” (*M* 5. 186. 34–35).⁴

Another example of high martial honour is the duel between king Jarāsandha, the ruler of Mathurā, and Bhīma, the second of the Pāṇḍava

1. V. I. KALYANOV, “Some war problems in ancient Indian epic”, in book (in Russian translation): *Mahābhārata*, Book 4. Virāṭaparvan or Book about Virāṭa. Translation from Sanskrit and commentary by V. I. KALYANOV (Editor-in-chief Acad. V. V. Struve), Leningrad 1967 (Series: Literary Monuments), p. 145.

2. The *Mahābhārata*, vol. VI, The Udyogaparvan, being the fifth book of the *Mahābhārata*, the great epic of India, for the first time critically edited by Sushil Kumar DE, Poona, BORI, 1940. Russian translation: *Mahābhārata*, Book 5, Udyoga-parvan or Book of Endeavour. Translation from Sanskrit and commentary by V. I. KALYANOV (Editor-in-chief Corresponding member of AN SSSR M. N. Bogolyubov), Leningrad, 1976 (Series: Literary Monuments), pp. 348–386.

3. V. I. KALYANOV. “The Image of the Indian woman in the *Mahābhārata*”. *ABORI* (Diamond Jubilee Volume), Poona, BORI, 1977–1978, p. 172f.

4. *Mahābhārata*, Book 5, Udyogaparvan or Book of Endeavour, p. 351,

brothers. On turning down Kṛṣṇa's demand of freeing eighty-six kings, languishing in his prison, Jarāsandha had to fight a single combat with one of the three visitors – Kṛṣṇa, Arjuna and Bhīma – who had come with such a demand. Jarāsandha chose Bhīma, the strongest among them. "O, Bhīma," he said, "I shall fight with you. It is better to be defeated by a superior (warrior)" (M 2. 21. 7).⁵ And when Jarāsandha was killed in a fight with the strongest, his glory did not fade; for the Indians still hold in remembrance this legendary event.⁶ But for this (event) infamy would have been the lot of Jarāsandha.

Yet another example of high martial honour and equally high nobleness, generosity and humanism is the act of aged Bhīṣma, the supreme commander of the Kaurava troops. In a battle between him and Arjuna, the latter found himself unable to conquer his opponent and put Śikhaṇḍin, the prince of the Pāṇḍavas, in his front (as a shield). Bhīṣma, true to his vow never to be up in arms against a woman (M 5. 169. 16-20),⁷ refused to use weapon against Śikhaṇḍin, because he continued to see in him a woman. Arjuna took advantage of Bhīṣma's nobleness and pierced him with several arrows.⁸ Thus the illustrious Bhīṣma proved to be faithful to the warrior's debt of honour, even in the face of fatal danger, whereas his opponent (though also an illustrious hero) showed traits of treachery, incompatible with the concept of a warrior's debt of honour.

Side by side with this, we find the same Arjuna showing true generosity even to the son of Duṣṣāsana, who had killed his (Arjuna's) beloved son Abhimanyu with a club during a brave single-handed combat, fought by the latter with six mighty chariot-mounted warrior heroes (M 7. 48. 12-14).⁹ Though Arjuna is filled with inconsolable grief over irretrievably dead youth, he does not

5. The *Mahābhārata*, Vol. II, The Sabhāparvan (parts 1-2), being the second book of the *Mahābhārata*, the great epic of India, for the first time critically edited by Franklin EDGERTON, Poona, BORI, 1943-1944. Russian translation: *Mahābhārata*, Book 2, Sabhāparvan or Book about the Assembly. Translation from Sanskrit and commentary by V. I. KALYANOV (Editor-in-chief Acad. AN Lithuanian SSR B. A. Larin), Moscow-Leningrad, 1962 (Series: Literary monuments). p. 50.

6. V. I. KALYANOV, "On the Military Ethics in the *Mahābhārata*", *Sanskrit and Ancient Indian Culture* (articles and papers presented by the Soviet scholars to the IV World Sanskrit Congress, Weimar. GDR, 23-30 May, 1979). I. Moscow, 1979 (Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences, USSR). p. 235.

7. *Mahābhārata*, Book 5, Udyogaparvan or Book of Endeavour, p. 333f. See also: V. I. KALYANOV, "On the Military Ethics in the *Mahābhārata*", p. 236.

8. V. I. KALYANOV, "The Image of the Indian woman in the *Mahābhārata*", p. 172 f.

9. The *Mahābhārata*, vol. VIII-IX, The Droṇaparvan, being the seventh book of the *Mahābhārata*, the great epic of India, for the first time critically edited by Sushil Kumar DE, Poona, BORI, 1958.

avenge the killer Duḥśāsana. He considers Jayadratha, the ruler of Sindhu, to be the real culprit, guilty of his son's death. He takes a solemn oath to kill Jayadratha the next day (M 7. 51. 20): "If tomorrow I do not kill that villain before sunset," he declares, "I will consign my body to the flames." (M 7. 51. 37).

As our composition testifies, a promise on oath was considered inviolable in those times. It had to be fulfilled at any cost; all the more so in this case, where a warrior's prestige and honour was involved. Kṛṣṇa realised this. Perturbed by Arjuna's hasty decision he condemns him. "This", he says, "was a very rash act (on your part). Without consulting me you have taken upon yourself a very onerous burden. Alas, how can we avoid being a laughing stock?" (M 7. 53. 2-3). In support of these apprehensions Kṛṣṇa informs Arjuna of the retaliatory measures, which the opposite side had taken to protect the ruler of Sindhu: Six warrior-heroes would guard and protect Jayadratha. Without defeating these warrior-heroes together with their adherents, it would be impossible to approach Jayadratha. Deciding to think of a suitable diplomacy for this situation Kṛṣṇa enters Arjuna's palace, spreads a magnificent bed of holy straw, *darbha*, on the floor and asks Arjuna to be down on it wishing him luck and well-being. Then he goes to his own tent, lies down on his bed to think over what should be done (M 7. 56. 6-15, 22).

At this time Dhanañjaya [Arjuna] pondering over his oath falls into oblivion. And in his dream he sees Keśava [Kṛṣṇa] in all his glory. Guessing his thoughts Kṛṣṇa says: "Do not lose heart, O Pārtha! for Time is insurmountable!" (M 7. 57. 6). Arjuna expresses his doubt in the possibility of fulfilment of the oath by him. All the mighty warriors of the Kauravas together with their troops would prevent him from killing Jayadratha. Here Kṛṣṇa reminds Arjuna of the age-long royal weapon Pāśupata with the help of which Mahēśvara killed all the demons-daityas. If the thought of this weapon occurs to him (Arjuna) he can kill tomorrow Jayadratha. In order to recognise him, he must have recourse to the great god, Mahādeva. Then both of them extolled Śiva and asked for the protection of that deity. Śiva was pleased and gave Arjuna a boon for the fulfilment of his vow and also gifted to him the terrible weapon Pāśupata, after showing him how to use it: (M 57. 75-76, 79). This dream inspired in Arjuna a firm belief in his victory. In a hard fight he breaks through the formations of enemy troops guarding Jayadratha, and enters into a duel with him. And when the sun is about to set, Arjuna, on Kṛṣṇa's advice, beheads Saindhava (i. e. Jayadratha) (M 7. 121. 30-33) using an arrow specially consecrated with *mantras*. Thus Arjuna's vow and debt of honour, which he valued so much were fulfilled though the conditions under which they were fulfilled and the means used have a mythological colouring.

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that it is this mythological colouring of the depicted events that contains an ideological shade of our composition. As our friend Prof. R. N. DANDEKAR has convincingly shown, the following fact deserves particular attention. Though the *Mahābhārata* is usually interpreted in favour of Viṣṇuism [Vāsudevism-Kṛṣṇaism] and Kṛṣṇa himself is presented as almost the *primo motore* of the great epic, it is the Śiva-cult¹⁰ which is very expressively glorified. Many contemporary scholars¹¹ have questioned the validity of the opinion that the *Mahābhārata* is predominantly Vaiṣṇavite in character. The influence of Śiva-cult in the *Mahābhārata* can be traced even in another context. Thus, while destroying the Kaurava troops Arjuna saw an unusual man with raised spear (*śūla*) advancing in front of him. Shining in fiery brilliance he was walking without touching the ground. And wherever he turned with raised spear, emitting thousands other spears, Arjuna's enemies were destroyed. Treading on his heels Arjuna merely burnt the troops, which are burnt by this unusual man (*M* 7. 172).¹² As the great sage Vyāsa explained later to Arjuna, this was Rudra-Śiva himself i.e. the great god Mahādeva. It was he who gave Arjuna various weapons, with the help of which he (Arjuna) destroyed *dānavas*. It was he who always showed benevolence to Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa. As we see here, side by side with the Viṣṇu-cult prevalent in the *Mahābhārata*, there are evident traces of Śivaization.

The most vivid example of nobleness and high martial honour is (the behaviour of) the hero Karna, the illegitimate son of Kuntī. Insulted sometime in the past by Bhīṣma for eulogizing his own virtues, Karna laid down his arms, loathing battle. Like Ahils insulted by Agamenon, he would enter into combat only when the insulter is struck dead (*M* 5. 61. 13). However, when Bhīṣma was treacherously struck down in the duel with Arjuna, Karna was the first to hurry to him. In reverence he bent down before him greeting him in deep grief (*M* 5. 3. 7-8, 9-10). He asks Bhīṣma's permission to enter into a fatal combat with the enemy Arjuna, for victory or death (*M* 5. 3. 23).

Karna's faithfulness to his debt of honour is seen in his other acts as well. Thus, he turns down Kuntī's request to take upon himself, as the first-born son, the burden of power in the entire kingdom. He turns the request down because he was to fight a duel with Arjuna. But he promises his mother to spare all her sons in battle, except Arjuna. They will always be five:

10. R. N. DANDEKAR, "Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism." *Ramakrishna Gopal Bhattacharya as an Indologist: A Symposium*, edited by R. N. DANDEKAR, Poona, BORI, 1976, p. 77.

11. See, for example: Alf HILTEBEITEL, *The Ritual of Battle: Krishna in the Mahābhārata*. Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1976, p. 355f.

12. On this see also: R. N. DANDEKAR, op. cit., p. 77f.

"..... either without Arjuna but with Karna, or with Arjuna but without Karna " (M 5. 144. 20-22).¹³ And Karna kept his promise. Subsequently, when Karna was treacherously killed in the duel with Arjuna, Kuntī was left with five sons.

The study of the *Mahābhārata*, where we find descriptions of numerous combats shows that various rules of conducting a war were dictated by the noble feelings of humanism and chivalry. According to our friend, the late Dr. P. V. KANE, these rules, though ideal and not strictly observed in all cases, were all the same very humane.¹⁴ However, the humane and knightly rules of the conduct of a war were often violated. And the fact that our composition itself speaks of such violations, shows the real state of things, which was far from ideal as is glorifyingly mentioned in the epic and the law-giving books.¹⁵

Let us be allowed to give some other examples. In a close fight between Bhūriśravas, the son of Somadatta, and Sātyaki who was siding with the Pāṇḍavas, both the warriors exhausted their weapons and entered into a bare-handed single combat. Bhūriśravas threw the exhausted Sātyaki to ground by striking him unsheathed the sword and kicked him in the chest (M 7. 117. 53). But here Arjuna, though himself tired, cuts off Bhūriśravas' hand on Kṛṣṇa's advice (M 7. 117. 62). Then Bhūriśravas censures Arjuna condemning him for an act unworthy of a warrior (M 7. 118. 4-5, 7-9). In answer Arjuna reminds him of his (Arjuna's) vow taken after the treacherous killing of Abhimanyu (M. 7. 118. 23-26). Indignated by Arjuna's behaviour Bhūriśravas, as a sign of protest, throws to him the severed right hand with the left (M 7. 118. 27). And here Sātyaki completes Pārtha's cruel act by cutting off Bhūriśravas' head when the latter is preparing to die on the battlefield according to his '*Prāya*' vow i. e. the vow of asceticism (M 7. 118. 36).

Further, when the Pāṇḍava troops were suffering heavy losses at the hands of Droṇa, the Supreme Commander of the Kauravas, Kṛṣṇa devised a cunning plan (for the Pāṇḍavas could not have conquered Droṇa by force) to spread a false rumour about the death of Droṇa's son Aśvatthāman (M 7. 164. 68-69). Bhīma killed with his club an elephant, also named Ashvatthāman, and loudly proclaimed in Droṇa's vicinity that Aśvatthāman was dead. Droṇa thought that it was his son about whom Bhīma proclaimed. But he was sure of the invincibility of his son and therefore, disbelieving Bhīma, he turned

13. *Mahābhārata*, Book 5, Udyogaparyan or Book of Endeavour, p. 286f. See also: V. I. KALYANOV, "On the Military Ethics in the *Mahābhārata*", p. 237.

14. P. V. KANE, *History of Dharmaśāstra* (Ancient and Mediaeval religious and civil law), vol. III, Poona, BORI, 1946, p. 210. See also: V. I. KALYANOV, "Some war Problems in ancient Indian epic", p. 152f.

15. V. I. KALYANOV, "On the Military Ethics in the *Mahābhārata*", p. 238.

to king Yudhiṣṭhira for the confirmation of the news (M 7. 164-95)... Yudhiṣṭhira under Kṛṣṇa's influence confirmed the false rumour (M 7. 165. 116). On hearing the confirmation of the sad news Droṇa was greatly depressed and could not fight as before. And when Droṇa, realising his fate, laid down his arms and had recourse to yoga so as to die according to the *Prāya* vow, Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna the prince of the Pāṇcālas cruelly beheaded him with a sword (M 7. 165. 47-123).¹⁶

Thus the moral responsibility of Droṇa's death lies on king Yudhiṣṭhira, the just, who was guilty of the misuse of truth. In the case of Bhīṣma's defeat, he had been guilty of the misuse of vow. This onus lies on Yudhiṣṭhira, though one of his duties as a king was to decipher the often riddle-like character of "subtle (*śūkṣma*) dharma."¹⁷ Summing up Yudhiṣṭhira's behaviour in the case of Bhīṣma's defeat as well as in the case of Droṇa's death, Prof. A. HILTEBEITEL says: "This illustrates the main point: similar to the way that he caused Bhīṣma's death by a misuse of the vow, Yudhiṣṭhira slays Droṇa by a misuse of the truth, in this case an actual lie."¹⁸

These examples do not exhaust the cases of violation of rules of conduct of a war; acts incompatible with the concept of knighthood and warrior's debt of honour. The unexcelled warrior Karna, distinguished for his honesty and nobleness was slain against all the rules of knighthood and humanism, when he had alighted from his chariot and was unarmed.¹⁹ Yudhiṣṭhira and Śalya, the king of the Madras, had agreed beforehand that the latter would become Karna's charioteer in the forthcoming combat with Arjuna and would give him contradictory and disastrous advice, so that it would be easier to kill him (M 5. 8. 29-31). And when during the battle the wheel of Karna's chariot had sunk in a rut, and Karna himself, almost defeated in this disastrous situation, was engaged in freeing the wheel, he was killed by Arjuna on Kṛṣṇa's advice.

Duryodhana reminds Kṛṣṇa of this (M 9. 60. 36)²⁰ and other dishonest acts (M 9. 60. 27-38) when he (Duryodhana) himself lies fatally wounded after receiving a treacherous blow on the thigh from Bhīma (also on Kṛṣṇa's advice). Rules of club combat (*gadāyuddha*) forbade striking "below the navel" (*adho*

16. See also on this: V. I. KALYANOV, op. cit., p. 240.

17. Alf HILTEBEITEL, *The Ritual of Battle: Krishna in the Mahābhārata*, p. 248.

18. Ibid., p. 252.

19. D. D. KOSAMBI, "Social and Economic Aspects of the Bhagavad Gita", *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Leiden, vol. IV, part 2, 1961, p. 209.

20. The *Mahābhārata*, vol. XI, The Śalyaparvan, being the ninth book of the *Mahābhārata*, the great epic of India, for the first time critically edited by Ramachandra Narayan DANDEKAR, Poona, BORI, 1961.

nābhyāh) (*M* 9. 59. 6).²¹ Kṛṣṇa's side would not have been victorious in a just and honest fight against Duryodhana and other unsurpassed heroes (*M* 9. 60. 37).

When Kṛṣṇa was accused of these acts he answered in sharp words. The only justification given by Kṛṣṇa is that Duryodhana was also guilty of numerous violations of moral duty and rules of knightly conduct of war.²² He says (*M* 9. 60. 57-62) that all the mighty warriors (Bhīṣma, Drōṇa, Karna and Bhūriśravas) mentioned by Duryodhana and Duryodhana himself, who were highly skilled in wielding weapons, had displayed highest courage in war. These noblest heroes were considered *Atirathas*, unexcelled in the world. It was impossible even for the gods - protectors of the world - to kill these warriors in a just and honest battle.²³ " Therefore, O, ruler of men ", declares Kṛṣṇa, " these cunning devices were used. Otherwise the Pāṇḍavas would never have won.... When the enemies are too numerous, they must be killed treacherously by cunning schemes." (*M* 9. 60. 58, 61)

These reasonings of Kṛṣṇa are incompatible with advancement of any truly moral doctrine in the epic. Glorious champion of such a doctrine is Bhīṣma, the other most respected personage of the epic. All through his long and devout life he showed examples of highest morality and nobleness, fascinating valour and unmatched knighthood.²⁴ So far as Kṛṣṇa's behaviour is concerned, in every individual case his startling advice enables winning a critical battle by the crookedest of means.²⁵

His new political doctrine, which insistently demands urgent attainment of ends (which are considered right) by any means even though they were not always right, draws near to the doctrine of Kauṭilya who lived rather earlier.²⁶ It is impregnated with the calculated treachery of the *Arthaśāstra*.²⁷

Thus, to conclude, the military code of honour in the *Mahābhārata* was developed out of considerations of highest ethical norms, noble feelings of human-

21. See also on this: P. V. KANE, op. cit., p. 210; V. I. KALYANOV, " Some war Problems in ancient Indian epic ", p. 153f.

22. P. V. KANE, op. cit., p. 211; V. I. KALYANOV, op. cit., p. 153f.

23. See also on this: D. D. KOSAMBI, op. cit., p. 209.

24. D. D. KOSAMBI, op. cit., p. 209.

25. Ibid.

26. R. N. DANDEKAR, " Vaiṣṇavism and Saivism ", p. 147. See also: V. I. KALYANOV, " On Kṛṣṇa's Diplomats in the Mahābhārata ", *Indologica Taurinensia*, Official Organ of the International Association of Sanskrit Studies, Vol. VII: Dr. Ludwik Sternbach Felicitation Volume, Part 1, Edizioni Jollygrafica, Torino (Italy), 1979-80, p. 282.

27. D. D. KOSAMBI, op. cit., p. 209.

ism and knighthood. However, these norms were often violated²⁸ for attaining victory by any means. Consequently all the epic reflects the true state of things of that epoch.²⁹

28. V. I. KALYANOV, "On the Military Code of Honour in the *Mahābhārata*", *Summaries of Papers Presented by Soviet Scholars to the V World Sanskrit Conference* (Varanasi, India, October, 21-25, 19881), Moscow, 191 (Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences, USSR), p. 111.

29. V. I. KALYANOV, "On the Military Ethics in the *Mahābhārata*", p. 241.

VĀRĀHA ŚRAUTASŪTRA III. 1. 1-2. 2 :
VAJĀPEYA AND DVĀDAŚĀHA
A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL STUDY

By

C. G. KASHIKAR

The Vārāha Śrautasūtra (= VārŚS) belonging to the Maitrāyaṇī recension of Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda was published by CALAND and RAGHUVIRA (Lahore 1933). The edition was based on the manuscript No. 11234 called "Press Copy" of the Sūtra-text deposited in the M. S. University Oriental Institute, Baroda. This manuscript was really a transcript of manuscript No. 680 in the same library. I had the privilege of procuring another manuscript of the same Sūtra-text.¹ Even though both these manuscripts belong to one and the same tradition, the manuscript procured by me exhibits a few better readings. I have called the manuscript No. 680 as B and the other manuscript as N. With the help of these two manuscripts in particular, I have already presented a critical and exegetical study of VārŚS I and II.²

The study is continued in the following pages in which corrections and emendations to the text of VārŚS III. 1. 1.-2. 2 covering the Vājapeya and Dvādaśāha have been suggested. In spite of the efforts being made to improve the text, there still remain certain corrupt readings which can be corrected only with the help of new manuscripts-material, if any, and a close comparison with

1. For a description of the manuscript cf. "A Rare Manuscript of the Vārāha School", *Kaviraja Abhinandana Grantha*, pp. 14-16, Lucknow 1967.

2. (i) "The Revised Sautrāmaṇī-text of the Vārāha Śrautasūtra (III. 2. 7-8)", *JBBRAS* Vol. XXVI, No. 1, pp. 10-20, Bombay 1950.

(ii) "A Critical and Exegetical Study of the Vārāha Śrautasūtra I. 1-3" *Adyar Library Bulletin Silver Jubilee Volume*, pp. 229-241, Madras, 1962.

(iii) "Further Notes on the Vārāha Śrautasūtra I. 1-3" *V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume*, pp. 193-198, Delhi 1975.

(iv) "A Critical and Exegetical Study of the Ritualistic Sūtras : Vārāha Śrautasūtra I. 4-5" *Vimarśa*, Vol. I, part 3, pp. 85-88, Tirupati 1972.

(v) "A Text-critical Study of the Vārāha Śrautasūtra I. 6" *Vishweswaranand Indological Journal* Vol. XII, Nos. 1-2, pp. 162-167, Hoshiarpur 1974.

(vi) "Vārāha Śrautasūtra I. 7 : Cāturmāsyaṇī, A Critical and Exegetical Study", *Baburam Saksena Felicitation Volume, Rtam*, Lucknow, 1983.

(vii) "Vārāha Śrautasūtra II : Agnicayana, A Critical and Exegetical Study" *ABORI* Vol. LXIV, 233-240, Pune 1983.

the text of other Śrautasūtras. I propose to prepare a revised edition of the VārSS. Any help in this regard from interested scholars will be gratefully appreciated.

Vājapeya

III. 1. 1. 4 — कृते वरे दक्षिणस्य हविर्धानस्य पश्चादक्षमुपयामेभ्यः खरं करोति. The editors have rightly suggested the emendation खरे instead of वरे. The sūtra prescribes that after the mound (for the Soma-goblets etc.) has been prepared, another mound for Surā-cups should be prepared towards the west of the axle of the southern Havirdhāna cart. cf. ĀpSS XVIII. 1. 11 : खरकाले ... द्वितीयं खरं करोति ।

III. 1. 1. 9 — रशनाकाले सप्तदशभिर्वसाभिर्वेष्टयति. N. has the correct reading वासोभिः instead of वसाभिः. The Adhvaryu winds round the sacrificial post seventeen pieces of cloth at the region where the cord is wound. Cf. सप्तदशभिर्वसोभिः in MānSS VII. 1. 1. 10; ĀpSS XVIII. 1. 12.

III. 1. 1. 14 — षोडशिपात्रं प्रयुज्य खादिराणि वायव्यानि सप्तदश मात्तिकानुपयामान्. N. has षोडशिपात्रं instead of षोडशिपात्रां which is probably a printing mistake. Cf. ĀpSS XVIII. 1. 15.

III. 1. 2. 18 — यो यः पर्येति तं तमभिपर्यावर्तेत. It would be reasonable to emend यो यः पर्येति as यो योऽर्पयति. Cf. the preceding sūtra ... विश ऊषपुटेर्यजमानमर्पयन्ति. ĀpSS. XVIII. 5. 19 reads हन्तारं हन्तारमभिपर्यावर्तेते ।

III. 1. 2. 19 — स्वर्देवा अगामेत्यूर्वाव्यधिस्त्रिनयति. The editors have remarked that the sūtra is "hopelessly corrupt". N. has °व्याधि°. Looking to the context and following MānSS VII. 1. 3. 5 it would be reasonable to suggest the bold conjecture स्वर्देवा अगामेति यूपमारुह्य जपति ।

III. 1. 2. 26 — अत्रैवास्य श्वेतं छत्रं धारयन्त्याजिशरेण वा. The word आजिशरेण does not give the suitable meaning. I would suggest आजिसरणे. Cf. आजिसुरभ्यः VārSS III. 1. 2. 44. A white umbrella should be furnished for the sacrificer at this stage (i. e. after his consecration through sprinkling) or when the sacrificer approaches (his chariot) for the race.

III. 1. 2. 28 — उपाकृते ब्रह्मसाग्नि सरस्वतीप्रभृतीनां वपाः संस्कुर्वन्ति. The word सरस्वतीप्रभृतीनां does not accord with the ritual pertaining to the animals. VārSS III. 1. 1. 20 prescribes the offering of the following animals : a goat for Agni, a goat for Indra-Agni, a ram for Indra, a female sheep for Sarasvatī, a male sheep for Sarasvant, a spotted barren cow for the Maruts, seventeen black hornless goats of similar form for Prajāpati, and a female sheep, whose teeth are not yet fallen, for Sarasvatī. The next sūtra prescribes the offering of the omenta of the first four animals — the fourth one being the female sheep for Sarasvatī. The

present sūtra is, therefore, expected to prescribe the offering of the omenta of the remaining animals, beginning with the male sheep for Sarasvant. It is, therefore, proper to read सारस्वतप्रभृतीनां instead of सरस्वतीप्रभृतीनां. N. reads तारसारस्वती°. MS I. 11. 9 mentions the Vājapeya animals. MānSS VII. 1. 2. 2-3 differs from VārSS in respect of the procedure of offering the omenta of the animals; ApSS XVIII. 6. 7 reads सारस्वतप्रभृतीनुत्तरानालभन्ते ।

III. 1. 2. 44 — उपहृतायामिडायां वशाया यान्यवदीयान्यङ्गानि तान्युत्विग्भ्यो हरन्ति सोम-ग्रहोश्च यान्यनवदानीयानि तान्याजिसुग्भ्यः सुरो [पर्यामोश्च] पर्यावताजनीनां प्रतिहितः प्रस्तन्ति. About the ending portion of the sūtra the editors have said that it is “hopelessly corrupt”. N reads प्रस्तौति instead of प्रस्तन्ति. The only thing I can suggest is that the syllables [पर्यामोश्च] supplied by conjecture may be formed out of equal number of syllables which succeed them. It is, however, difficult to conjecture the correct words to substitute नीनां and प्रस्तन्ति. The last portion probably formed a separate sūtra mentioning the part of the person who represented the sacrificer in the chariot-race (*pratihita*) in consuming the remaining flesh of the barren cow. Cf. MānSS VII. 1. 3. 33.

Dvādaśāha

III. 2. 1. 1 — इष्टिप्रथमयज्ञानां द्वादशाहेऽहीनस्यापि वा सूत्रे गृहपतिरेवेष्टप्रथमयज्ञः. The text requires to be modified a little, and also the sūtra requires to be divided into a number of sūtras : इष्टप्रथमयज्ञानां द्वादशाहः ॥ १ ॥ अहीनस्यापि वा ॥ २ ॥ सन्ने गृहपतिरेवेष्टप्रथमयज्ञः ॥ ३ ॥ Cf. MānSS VII. 2. 1. 1 — द्वादशाहः सन्नेमहीनश्च । ApSS XXI. 2. 1 — सर्वे इष्टप्रथमयज्ञाः । अपि वा गृहपतिरेव । ŚāṅkhSS VIII. 14. 1 — आहितास्रवं इष्टप्रथमयज्ञाः.

III. 2. 1. 2 — ब्राह्मणानां सप्तदशानां सतामेको गृहपतिः षोडश ऋत्विजो यजमानाश्चैव कर्ण्याश्च. The editors have suggested यजमानाश्चैककार्याश्च instead of यजमानाश्चैव कर्ण्याश्च. In view of MānSS VII. 2. 1. 6 गृहपतिसप्तदशाः समानकल्पाः it would be proper to emend as यजमानाश्चैककल्पाश्च. Cf. ApSS XXI. 2. 3 — गृहपतेरेव सामिषेनीकल्पेनावदान-कल्पेनेति प्रक्रामेयुः ...

III. 2. 1. 5 — आनुपूर्वेण should be corrected as आनुपूर्व्येण. Cf. ŚāṅkhSS XIII. 14. 3 — दीक्षणानुपूर्व्येण.

III. 2. 1. 9 — दीक्षिष्यमाणाः (सं) निवपन्ते. The syllable सं which is supplied by the editors is found in N.

III. 2. 1. 11-12 — द्वादश दीक्षा द्वादशोपसदोऽमावास्यां यजनीये इति वा ॥ ११ ॥ गृहपति-मुख्यान् मध्यतःकारिणोऽध्वर्युर्दीक्षयते प्रतिप्रस्थाता पत्नीः ॥ १२ ॥ The word अमावास्या should be emended as अमावास्यायां. The correct separation of the two sūtras should moreover be : द्वादश दीक्षा द्वादशोपसदः ॥ ११ ॥ अमावास्यायां यजनीयेऽइति वा गृहपतिमुख्यान् मध्यतःकारिणोऽध्वर्युर्दीक्षयते । प्रतिप्रस्थाता पत्नीः ॥ १२ ॥ There should be twelve Dīkṣā-days and twelve Upasad-days (in the Dvādaśāha sacrifice). On the new-moon day or on the day

of sacrifice the Adhvaryu should initiate the *madhyatahkārīn* priests beginning with the Gr̥hapati. The Pratiprasthātṛ should initiate their wives.

III. 2. 1. 13 — Read नेष्ट instead of नेष्टः which is probably a printing mistake.

III. 2. 1. 17 — अदीक्षित उन्नेतारमध्युन्दनेन समेत्य पर्यञ्जनेन समीयात्. This requires to be cut into two sūtras : अदीक्षित उन्नेतारम् and अध्युन्दनेन समेत्य पर्यञ्जनेन समीयात्. The procedure of a Sattrā is being laid down in the present section. In a Sattrā all the sixteen officiating priests act both as officiating priests as well as sacrificers. Even then one among them is chosen as the Gr̥hapati who performs the duties of the sacrificer. The preceding sūtras 12-15 lay down the rules as to who among the sixteen should initiate whom. The Unnetṛ, one of the priests of the fourth category, is asked to initiate the remaining three priests of the fourth category together with their wives. But who should initiate the Unnetṛ himself? The sūtra अदीक्षित उन्नेतारम्, therefore, prescribes that one (outside the sixteen) who is not initiated should initiate the Unnetṛ. Cf. MānSS VII. 2. 1. 23 — अन्यो ब्राह्मण उन्नेतारम् ।

N. reads अभ्युन्दनेन in place of अध्युन्दनेन. The N. reading is supported by MānSS VII. 2. 1. 23 — अभ्युन्दनप्रभृति पावनानामेकैकस्य. The MānSS here refers to the rites beginning with the sprinkling of water and ending with the purifying by means of darbha-bunches in respect of the sacrificer and his wife as prescribed in Agniṣṭoma. Cf. MānSS II. 1. 1. 21-43. The VārSS also refers back to the similar rites obviously prescribed in connection with the Agniṣṭoma. Unfortunately the Agniṣṭoma - portion of the VārSS has not become available so far. The sūtra says, "having gone through the sprinkling (of each sacrificer and his wife and also the subsequent rites), the Adhvaryu should go through the rite of collyrium in eyes."

III. 2. 1. 24 — एकै रूक्मं सर्वे प्रतिमुञ्चन्ति तिव्यपासं च क्रमान् क्रामन्ति. The word तिव्यपासं may be emended as व्यत्यासं. Cf. VārSS III. 2. 1. 32.

III. 2. 1. 27 — अतिग्राह्याणां प्रयुक्तेऽग्रायणे पात्रप्रयोजनं प्रातःसवने ग्रहणे च माहेन्द्रमु होमः. The words प्रयुक्तेऽग्रायणे may be emended as प्रयुक्त आग्रायणे. Cf. VārSS III. 2. 2. 40.

III. 2. 1. 47 — माहेन्द्रस्य स्तोत्रमुपाकरिष्यन् विधुमुद्रात्रे प्रयच्छति. About the word विधुम् the editors have said in the foot-note that "the word though corrupt should mean 'a fan'." The word may be emended as वीजनम्. Cf. MānSS VII. 2. 2. 13 — उपवीजनेन स्तोत्रमुपाकरोति । ĀpSS XXI. 6. 17 — बहिःस्थान आधावेन माहेन्द्रस्य स्तोत्रमुपाकरोति ।

III. 2. 1. 54 — अग्रेष्व त्वा ब्रह्मणश्चेत्यतिग्राह्यं हुत्वाम् आयुष्करेति भक्षयति. Read आयुष्का instead of आयुष्कर. Cf. MS IV. 7. 10.

III. 2. 1. 60 — Read ओजस्कार instead of ओजस्कर. cf. MS. IV. 7. 3.

III. 2. 2. 1 — ...अग्निना पिवतं नूनं दीद्यग्नी शुचिवन्ता ... N. MānSS VII. 2. 2. 29 and ApSS XXI. 7. 16 read शुचिवन्ता instead of शुचिवन्ता. In place of नूनं MānSS ibid. has मधु and ApSS ibid. has सुतं.

III. 2. 2. 4 — सूर्यस्य च त्वौषधीनां त्वेत्यतिग्राह्यं हुत्वा सूर्यं ब्राजस्करेति भक्षयति. Instead of ओषधीनां त्वा N and MS IV. 7. 3 read ओषधीनां च. Read ब्राजस्कार instead of ब्राजस्कर.

III. 2. 2. 5 — [तृतीय] सवने वालखिल्यान्मैत्रावरुणो विहरति — वृषाकपि ब्राह्मणाच्छंसी शंसेत्येवयामरुतमच्छावाकः शिष्ये प्रतिगरः. N reads शंसति instead of शंसेति. By the word शंसेति the editors seem to be inclined to deem वृषाकपि ब्राह्मणाच्छंसी शंस as a call. The word शंसति, however, indicates that it is not a call. The sūtra is a straight statement of the three Śāstras to be recited by the Hotrakas. It says that in the third pressing the Maitrāvaruṇa, recites the Vālakhilya Śāstra by resorting to *viharāṇa*, the Brāhmaṇācchamsin recites the Vṛṣākapi Śāstra, and the Acchāvāka recites the Evayāmarut Śāstra. The word शिष्ये may be emended as शिल्पे. Cf. MānSS VII. 2. 2. 34 : तृतीयसवन उक्त्येषु शिल्पं प्रतिगरः.

III. 2. 2. 21-26 lays down the conversation between the Hotṛ and the Adhvaryu — आमन्त्रयते होता - अध्वर्यो ब्रह्म वदिष्याव उच्चैस्तरां होतरित्यध्वर्युः ॥ २१ ॥ चित्तिः सुगध्वर्यो होता चित्तमाज्यमध्वर्युरामन्त्रयते होतर्ब्रह्म वदिष्याव इत्युच्चैस्तरां तथाध्वर्यो इति तिष्ठति ॥ २२ ॥ ओ श्रावयेति चतुरक्षरम् । अस्तु श्रौषडिति चतुरक्षरम् । यजेति द्वयक्षरम् । ये यजामह इति पञ्चाक्षरम् । द्वयक्षरो वषट्कारः । एष वै होतः प्रजापतिः सप्तदशः ॥ २३ ॥ उपयथा होता येषां वै होतः प्रजापतिः सप्तदशो यज्ञेऽन्वायत्तः ॥ २४ ॥ यद्यनुवाक्याया एति यदि याज्याया अतश्चेदेव नैति । नास्य यज्ञो व्यथते प्रजापतौ यज्ञेन प्रतितिष्ठति ॥ २५ ॥ अरात्स्म होतरिति ॥ २६ ॥ The last utterance of the Adhvaryu covers a Brāhmaṇa passage from MS I. 4. 11. In the light of this passage, MānSS VII. 2. 3. 12-22 and the text of N, the sūtras may be reconstructed as follows : आमन्त्रयते होता अध्वर्यो ब्रह्म वदिष्यावः ॥ २१ ॥ उच्चैस्तरां होतः इत्यध्वर्युः ॥ २२ ॥ चित्तिः सुगध्वर्यो होता ॥ २३ ॥ चित्तमाज्यम् । अध्वर्युरामन्त्रयते होतर्ब्रह्म वदिष्यावः इत्युच्चैस्तरम् ॥ २४ ॥ तथाध्वर्यो इति तिष्ठति ॥ २५ ॥ ओ श्रावयेति चतुरक्षरम् अस्तु श्रौषडिति चतुरक्षरम् । यजेति द्वयक्षरम् । ये यजामह इति पञ्चाक्षरम् । द्वयक्षरो वषट्कारः । एष वै होतः प्रजापतिः सप्तदशोपयथा होता येषां वै होतः प्रजापतिः सप्तदशो (the portion पयथा ... सप्तदशो seems superfluous) यज्ञेऽन्वायत्तः । यद्यनुवाक्याया एति यदि याज्याया अतश्चेदेवं नैति । नास्य यज्ञो व्यथते प्रजापतौ यज्ञेन प्रतितिष्ठति । अरात्स्म होतः इति ॥ २६ ॥

III. 2. 2. 28 — अर्वाञ्चमथ यथ्यं नृवाहणं ... Read यथ्यं instead of यथ्यं. Cf. RV II. 37. 5; MānSS VII. 2. 2. 30; ApSS XXI. 7. 17.

III. 2. 2. 34 — उप स्वजा वरुणमित्यौदुम्बरीमन्वारभन्ते. The editors have rightly suggested the emendation of the mantra-portion herein as उपसृजन्वरुणम्. Cf. ApSS XXI. 9. 14.

III. 2. 2. 36 — वाचं विसृज्य ..इति श्वो भूत उदयनीयोऽतिऽरात्रः. The sūtra should be divided into two sūtras, the first ending with इति. cf. MānSS VII. 2. 3. 29.

III. 2. 2. 40 — व्यूढस्यैन्द्रवायवाग्रौ प्रायणीयोदयनीयौ । इतरेषां दशानामैन्द्रवायवाग्रं प्रथम-
महः । अथ द्वे आग्रायणाग्रे अथैन्द्रवायवाग्रमथ द्वे शुक्राग्रे अथाग्रायणमथ द्वे ऐन्द्रवायवाग्रे. In the Vyūḍha Dvādaśāha each of the twelve pressing days is characterised by the priority of a particular Soma-cup belonging to a specific deity being filled in first. The first and the last days, namely, Prāyaṇīya and Udayanīya, are here properly characterised. For the remaining ten days, we have in the present sūtra only nine characteristics. N supplies the tenth characteristic when after प्रथममहः it adds अथ शुक्राग्रम्. N also makes another correction when it reads अथाग्रायणाग्रम् instead of अथाग्रायणम्. Cf. ĀpSS XXI. 14. 3, MānSS VII. 2. 4. 2-4 prescribes rather differently.

III. 2. 2. 46 — अजमाग्नेयमुदयनीयः. Read मुदयनीये. Cf. MānSS VII. 2. 4. 10; ĀpSS XXI. 14. 9.

III. 2. 2. 48 — पृष्ठव्यसने पृथगवसानीयाभिरिष्टा. N correctly reads पृथगुदवसानीयाभिरिष्टा.

A COMPOSITIONAL APPROACH TO VEDIC WORD ACCENT

By

PAUL KIPARSKY

Inflectional and derivational accent patterns are customarily treated in separate ways. The former are characterized by means of a set of accentual *paradigms* (sometimes termed "curves" or "types"), while the latter are dealt with by stating how stems are accented when they have a given derivational suffix or belong to a given class of compounds. HALLE and I (KIPARSKY 1973, KIPARSKY and HALLE 1977, HALLE and KIPARSKY 1981), and independently GARDE (1976), have sought to develop a more unified analysis, based on associating accentual properties with morphemes in such a way that the accent of words is derivable compositionally by general phonological rules that do not refer to specific morphemes or classes of morphemes. What recommends this approach over the more traditional one is its ability to reveal structural unity at several levels. Within each Indo-European language that retains the original accent mobility, a parallel categorization emerges at each level of morphological organization, showing the fundamental identity of the inflectional and derivational accent patterns on the one hand, and of the nominal and verbal patterns on the other. The similarity between the languages, particularly between Balto-Slavic on the one hand and Sanskrit and Greek on the other, becomes more apparent, permitting a firmer grip on the problem of reconstructing the accent system of Proto-Indo-European and its development in the individual branches of the family. And finally, the type of organization we propose is found in a number of even quite unrelated languages, sometimes down to minor details.

The essential features of the Vedic (and Indo-European) system are as follows. In the *inflection* of nouns and verbs, there are two classes of alternating stems, *fixed* and *movable*, and two classes of inflectional endings, *accented* and *preaccenting*. Fixed athematic stems are accented throughout the inflectional paradigm, e. g. the noun *gó* 'cow' (nom. pl. *gāvas*, ins. sg. *gāvā*) and the verb *tákṣ* 'fashion' (3. sg. *tāṣṭi*, 3. pl. *tákṣati*). By contrast, movable athematic stems are unaccented when followed by the accented class of endings (in the "cas faibles" and have stem final accent before preaccenting endings (the "cas forts"), e. g. the noun *pad* 'foot' (acc. sg. *pādam*, ins. sg. *padā*) and the verb *i* 'go' (3. sg. *éti*, 3. pl. *yánti*). The accentual patterning can be derived by

1. For elaboration of this approach to Vedic accentuation and its extension to inflection and compounding see KIPARSKY (1983, MS.).

associating accentual properties with the stems and endings in the following way. The stems with fixed accent can be assumed to bear a lexical accent on the appropriate syllable, in some cases inherently in their underlying representation, in others assigned in the derivation of the stem by some suffix or accent rule. The stems with movable accent have all syllables unaccented. The endings which appear as accented after movable stems are accented in their underlying representation. The endings which appear as unaccented with movable stems assign an accent to the last syllable of the stem. We shall call these endings *preaccenting* and symbolize them with a double accent mark (S). The word accent (*ictus*) is then derivable from the juxtaposition of stem and ending by part (ii) of the following "Basic Accentuation Principle" (BAP).²

- (1) (i) If there is no accented syllable, the first syllable receives the ictus.
 (ii) The first accented syllable receives the ictus.

The resulting system is illustrated in (2) :

(2)	Inflectional			
	Stems	Endings :	Preaccented	Accented
	Unaccented		pad + ^{''} ās <i>pādas</i>	pad + ^ˆ ā <i>padā</i>
			ai + ^{''} tī <i>ēti</i>	ai + ^ˆ ānti <i>yānti</i>
	Accented		gāx + ^{''} ās <i>gāvas</i>	gāv + ^ˆ ā <i>gāvā</i>
			tākṣ + ^{''} tī <i>tāṣṭi</i>	tākṣ + ^ˆ ānti <i>tākṣānti</i>

Derivational suffixes can also be accented or preaccenting. Unlike inflectional suffixes, however, they usually impose their accent pattern not only on unaccented stems, but also on accented stems. We shall term such suffixes *dominant*, as opposed to the minority of derivational suffixes and all inflectional suffixes, which are *recessive*. Accent differences in stems are thus neutralized before dominant suffixes. An example of accented dominant suffix is the noun-forming suffix *in* :

(3a)	<i>rātha</i>	'chariot'	<i>rathin</i>	'charioteer'
	<i>āśva</i>	'horse'	<i>aśvin</i>	'horseman'
	<i>mitrā</i>	'friend'	<i>mitrīn</i>	'befriended'

The resulting stems pattern as accented, e. g. ins. sg. *rathinā*. An example of a preaccenting dominant suffix is *tā*, which forms abstract nouns :

2. The function of part (i) of (1) will be explained directly below. In earlier treatments HALLE and I considered the BAP to be a single rule. However, the problem of combining its two parts in a unified formulation has not been satisfactorily solved (see PRINCE 1983 for discussion). I shall argue below that BAP (i) and (ii) apply at different levels in the lexical phonology of Sanskrit and must therefore in any case be treated as separate processes,

(3b)	<i>pūruṣa</i>	'man'	<i>puruṣātā</i>	'human nature'
	<i>bāndhu</i>	'relative'	<i>bandhūtā</i>	'kinship'
	<i>mitrá</i>	'friend'	<i>mitrátā</i>	'friendship'

The dominant suffixes can be assigned the same accentual properties as the corresponding recessive suffixes, except that they have the effect of deaccenting any stem to which they are added. We symbolize this property graphically by double underlining ($\underline{\underline{S}}$); phonologically it may be interpreted as a rule feature, triggering the process formally represented in (4):

$$(4) \quad \acute{V} \rightarrow \overset{x}{\underline{\underline{V}}} / - X + \underline{\underline{S}}$$

by virtue of which the ictus is correctly located onto the first accent by rule (1), as shown in (5):

$$(5) \quad rātha + \underline{\underline{in}} \rightarrow (4) \quad ratha + \acute{in} \rightarrow (1) \text{ rathín}$$

$$pūruṣa + \underline{\underline{tā}} \rightarrow (4) \quad \overset{\downarrow}{puruṣa} + \overset{\downarrow}{\underline{\underline{tā}}} \rightarrow (1) \text{ puruṣātā}$$

In addition to these four accentual classes of suffixes, there are two others. "Neutral" suffixes have no accentual effects whatever on the stems to which they are added. If they are added to an unaccented stem, the result is an unaccented stem. If they are added to an accented stem, the resulting new form is accented on the same syllable as the original stem. Examples are the present active participle *ant* (6a) and the feminine *ī* (the formative of the "devi-declension," 6b):

(6a)	ad	'eat'	ad + ant	'eating'	(gen. pl. <i>adatām</i>)
	tákṣ	'fashion'	tákṣ + at	'fashioning'	(gen. pl. <i>tákṣatām</i>)
(6b)	śvan	'dog'	śun + ī	'bitch'	(gen. pl. <i>śunīnām</i>)
	rājan	'king'	rājñ + ī	'queen'	(gen. pl. <i>rājñīnām</i>)
	dev + á	'god'	dev + ī	'goddess'	(gen. pl. <i>devīnām</i>)
	dāsa	'slave'	dās + ī	'female slave'	(gen. pl. <i>dāsīnām</i>)
	aśv + in	'horseman'	aśvin + ī	'wife of aśvin'	(gen. pl. <i>aśvīnīnām</i>)

The same regularity is maintained when several neutral suffixes are stacked:

$$(7a) \quad ad + ant + \bar{ī} \rightarrow adatī \text{ 'eating' (fem.) (gen. pl. } adatīnām)$$

$$tākṣ + ant + \bar{ī} \rightarrow tākṣatī \text{ 'fashioning' (fem.) (gen. pl. } tākṣatīnām)$$

If neutral suffixes are assigned no underlying accent, their patterning is properly derived by rule (1):

$$(7b) \quad ad + ant + \bar{ī} + nām \rightarrow adatīnām$$

$$tākṣ + ant + \bar{ī} + nām \rightarrow tākṣatīnām$$

Given that we require a class of recessive unaccented suffixes, the question arises whether there are any dominant unaccented suffixes. Since there are no

suffixes which always form movable stems, this combination is ostensibly uninstan-
tiated.³ On the other hand, there does exist a sixth type of suffix, which assigns
initial accent to the stem, regardless of whether the stem is itself accented or
unaccented. In other words, this kind of suffix is dominant but it forms not
unaccented stems but initially accented stems. Examples of such suffixes are the
desiderative (*i*) *sa* and the infinitive (*i*) *tum* :

(8a) *ci + kār + áy + iṣa + ti* → *cīkārāyīṣati* 'wants to cause to make', (cf.
kārāyati, 'causes to make').

(8b) *kār + áy + itum* → *kārāyitum* '(in order) to cause to make'.

Now, given rule BAP (i), which assigns initial accent to unaccented strings, we
can identify these dominant initial-accenting suffixes as dominant unaccented to
get the fully cross-classified array shown below :

(9)	Recessive	Dominant
Accented	Cas faibles	-in -ī (vṛkī)
	Dual and Plural	-áy (caus.)
	person endings	-tár (see fn. 3)
	-tára, -táma	-tvá (abstract N)
	-mánt, -vánt	-ká tá (pp.). -tavyà tvá.
Preaccenting	Cas forts	-tā
	Sing. person endings	-āna -trā
	Subjunctive -á	-vān
Unaccented	-ant	-sa (desid.) -īyas
	-ī (devī), -a	-tum (inf.) -tar (see fn. 3)
	optative -yā/-ī	

On these assumptions, we derive *cīkārāyīṣati* as follows. The causative
stem is *kār + áy*, the causative morpheme áy being dominant accented. Adding

3. Apparent cases arise by a rule which deaccents the final syllable of sonorant
stems. For example, accented dominant -tár yields unaccented (movable) stems by
this rule (e. g. *codayitr ī* 'impeller (fem.)'), while unaccented dominant -tar yields
initially accented stems (e. g. *sāṃgrbhītar* 'governing') by BAP (i) as discussed in
the text.

to it the dominant unaccented desiderative suffix $(i)sa$ (with reduplication), we get by rule (4) the unaccented $ci + kār + ay + isa$, which then receives initial accent by BAP (i). Additional recessive morphemes such as the personal endings will have no overt accentual effects, e. g. 3. sg. $cī + kār + ay + isa + ti$ 'wants to cause to do'. In this way the otherwise anomalous category of initial-accenting suffixes fills the otherwise empty sixth cell in (9).

To realise this idea, however, we have to solve the following difficulty. In the derivation of stems consisting entirely of unaccented morphemes, BAP (i) must not be allowed to assign initial accent, as for example $ad + ant \rightarrow *ád + ant$, $ad + ant + i \rightarrow *ád + ant + i$. Unless this is blocked, all movable paradigms, such as those in (7), will wrongly come out carrying a fixed accent on the first syllable.

The movable paradigms could be dealt with on the assumption that BAP (i) applies to the stem only after all inflectional suffixes have been added, that is, that BAP (i) is a word-level rule. Since all inflectional suffixes are either accented or preaccenting, a complete inflected word will always have at least one accent in its underlying representation, so that BAP (i) cannot at that point apply to assign initial accent. Thus, if BAP (i) applies at the word level, the movable paradigms such as $ad + ant + á$, $ad + ánt + am$ are correctly derived. But unfortunately, then we cannot sustain the account of initial-accenting suffixes just proposed, for these too will generate movable paradigms if they are classified as dominant unaccented and BAP (i) applies at the word level, giving such wrong forms as desid. 3. sg. $*ci + kār + śá + ti$, 1. pl. $*ci + kār + śā + máh$, with movable instead of fixed initial accent. The problem is that BAP (i) must indeed apply cyclically, but only to strings which *become* deaccented by virtue of dominant unaccented suffixes, not to strings which never *were* accented to begin with.

The key to the solution lies in the morphological positioning of the different accentual suffix classes. From a positional point of view, the initial-accenting and neutral types play a quite different role in word structure. Initial-accenting suffixes are strictly derivational, and stand closer to the root or stem in the Indo-European "morpheme order chart" than the neutral suffixes. The latter are inflectional or semi-inflectional in character (present participles $-ant$, $-ōna$, fem. $-i$ (*devī*-type), optative $-yā/i$). Hence initial-accenting suffixes can routinely be followed by neutral suffixes in a word, e. g.

- (10) $práticyavīyasī$ (comp. $īyas + \text{fem } i$)
 $dīdhiṣema$ (desid. $sa + \text{optat. } i$)
 $būbhūṣan$ (desid. $sa + \text{pres. part. } ant$)
 $jānitri$ (agent $tar + \text{fem. } i$)

while the reverse is never true. There are no sequences where a neutral suffix comes before an initial-accenting suffix in Vedic.


The regularity is actually more far-reaching. No dominant suffix is permitted to follow *any* recessive suffix in a Vedic word, whatever their accentual type. As a glance at the suffixes listed in (9) shows, such sequences are for the most part trivially excluded because most recessive suffixes are inflectional, and derivational suffixes do not attach to inflected words. More surprisingly, the generalization appears to retain its validity even for *derivational* recessive suffixes. We do not encounter in the Vedic language such words as **paśumalt-vām*, **akṣaṇvāttā*, containing combinations of level 2 suffixes (-*mant*|-*vant*) followed by level 1 suffixes (*tva*, *tā*). Similarly, level 1 denominal suffixes do not attach to the level 2 -*ī* suffix (*devī*): there is no **devītā* (cf. *devātā*). However, level 2 denominal suffixes do, e. g. RV. *śiprīṇīvant* 'mustached (?)', *sārasvatīvant* 'accompanied by Sarasvatī.'

Consequently we may state the following generalizations about Sanskrit (and, presumably, Indo-European) word structure :

- (11) a. Initial-accenting suffixes may precede but never follow neutral suffixes.
 b. Dominant suffixes may precede but never follow recessive suffixes.
 From the viewpoint of our proposed analysis, (11a) is simply a special case of (11b), since initial-accenting suffixes are dominant and neutral suffixes are recessive.

Such a correlation between word structure and phonology becomes understandable in the framework of Lexical Phonology (Kiparsky 1982, Mohanan 1982). In this conception of generative grammar, the lexicon of a language includes its morphology and phonology, each organized into a hierarchical set of correlative levels.


(12)



The idea is similar to the distinction between primary and secondary suffixes well-known from treatments of Sanskrit and other languages, though we shall develop it in a somewhat different way.

For Vedic, then, we can postulate two levels of suffixation, on the basis of the convergence of morphological and phonological criteria noted above. Level 1 contains all the dominant suffixes, including the initial-accenting ones, while level 2 contains all the recessive suffixes. The fact that dominant suffixes come before recessive suffixes in the morpheme order comes from the precedence of level 1 affixation over level 2 affixation, and the accentual differences between them are accounted for by putting the rules of Accent Deletion (4) and BAP (i) at level 1, while BAP (ii) applies at level 2 :

(13a)



The functioning of this system is illustrated with the following derivations of gen. pl. *puruṣātānām*, *adātīnām*, *sārasvatīvātām*.⁴

4. These derivations are laid out on the assumption that verb roots are not cyclic domains, for reasons explained in KIPARSKY 1982, p. 146.

(13b) Undersived lexical entry

/ puruṣa /

/ ad /

/ sar /

Level 1

phonology : Accent Deletion

BAP (i)

—

puruṣa

morphology : suffixation

puruṣa + tā

phonology : Accent Deletion

puruṣa + tā

BAP (i)

—

sar + as

Level 2

phonology : BAP (ii)

—

morphology : suffixation

puruṣa + ta + nām

phonology : BAP (ii)

puruṣa + tā + nām

morphology : suffixation

puruṣa + tā + nām

phonology : BAP (ii)

puruṣa + tā + nām

morphology : suffixation

puruṣa + tā + nām

phonology : Ablaut, BAP (ii)

puruṣa + tā + nām

morphology : suffixation

puruṣa + tā + nām

phonology : Ablaut, BAP (ii)

puruṣa + tā + nām

Output

puruṣātānām

adātīnām

śarvasatīvatām

As shown in the derivation of *pūruṣa*, no underlying accent need be specified in the lexical entry of barytone stems, as it will automatically be supplied on the first cycle by BAP (i). Rather, it is the *unaccented* and *oxytone* stems which on this analysis are supplied with special accentual information in their underlying representations, which will block BAP (i) from assigning initial accent to them.

To sum up : the ictus is derivable compositionally from the elementary accentual properties of the component morphemes by BAP (i, ii) and Accent Deletion (4). Morphemes may be accented, preaccenting, or unaccented, and in addition they may trigger Accent Deletion or not (dominant vs. recessive). The resulting six types are sufficient to account for all derivational and inflectional accent patterns in Sanskrit. We suggested that initial-accenting suffixes are dominant unaccented, yielding unaccented strings to which BAP (i) assigns initial accent. This solution requires that BAP (i) is cyclic and is restricted to "early" suffixes, i. e. applies at level 1 in the cyclic word phonology of Sanskrit. This yields additional advantages. First, by locating Accent Deletion likewise at level 1 we eliminated the arbitrary rule feature [+ Accent Deletion] by which we otherwise would have to distinguish recessive from dominant suffixes. The resulting system therefore directly explains why no initial-accenting suffixes are recessive : a suffix is recessive if and only if it is at level 2, where BAP (i) does not apply. Second, the barytone pattern can now be treated as unmarked, being assigned by BAP (i) to stems that contain no marked lexical accent.

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INTERPRETATION OF THE MAHABHARATA HEROES MADHVĀCĀRYA'S PERSPECTIVE

By

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

I

Western scholars are so surprised at the total absence in ancient Indian literature of what they call 'history' that they pronounce the judgement that Indians lacked historical sense. Whatever Indians have is more or less of the nature of mythology, theology and legendary lore. Nonetheless, it is true that the Indian idea of *itihāsa* as handed down from the Brāhmaṇa period up to the end of the age of epics and Purāṇas is well worth a study, for its own sake; and it has not received the attention it deserves.

The first indigenous writer to note the general characteristics of Indian *Purāṇas* and *Itihāsa* is Rājasekhara (c. 900 A. D.). He categorically describes both in his *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, after bringing *itihāsa* under the general head of *upaveda* or ancillary Veda, in his second chapter. He states that *purāṇa* is of human authorship and its eighteen texts are mostly recapitulations of Vedic legends and myths :

Pauruṣeyaṁ tu purāṇam; tatra vedākhyānopanibandhanaprāyaṁ
purāṇam aṣṭādaśadhā.¹

He also quotes an earlier saying to the effect that *purāṇa* is that genre which treats of creation, destruction, aeons, ages, dynasties of kings etc. of this world.²

Turning next to *itihāsa*, he first records the view of some who hold that *itihāsa* is only a special type of *purāṇa* itself :

Purāṇa-pravibheda eveti hāsaḥ ityēke.

Apparently, this is not the view acceptable to Rājasekhara. Anyway, he does not offer any argument to refute the aforesaid view. He hastens to note two

1. G. O. S. Edn. p. 3.

2. Sargaḥ pratisamhāraḥ kalpo manvantarāṇi vaṁśavidhiḥ /
jagato yatra nibaddham tadvijñeyaṁ purāṇamiti // loc. cit.

varieties of *itihāsa*, viz., (1) *parikriyā* which describes a single hero, and (2) *purākalpa* which describes many heroes. He quotes an older saying in this context :

parikriyā purākalpa itihāsagatirdvidhā /
syādekanāyakā pūrvā dvitīyā bahunāyakā //

Without any hesitation, whatsoever, he adds that the *Rāmāyaṇa* belongs to the former category, while the *Mahābhārata* illustrates the latter :

“ tatra Rāmāyaṇam Bhāratam codāharāṇe.”

All the *itihāsa-purāṇas* claim with one voice that they are in the nature of *upabṛṃhaṇas* or extended explanations of what is implicit in the Veda or ancient store of wisdom.

“ Itihāsapurāṇābhyām vedam samupabṛṃhayet /
bibhetyalpaśrutād Vedo mām ayaṁ prahariṣyati ” //

is their keynote, so to say. This indicates that they were treating not merely of past historical events, but also drawing out their significance for all time.

II

What is this core of Vedic wisdom which the *itihāsa-purāṇa* tradition claims to elaborate in the only right way? We seem to have lost the key somewhere. Not all the Herculean researches of the Western Indologists for over a century and a half have brought us anywhere nearer the core or essence of the Vedic mythology or religion, whether of the philological school or of the ritualistic school or of the historico-critical school. We have a plethora of speculations, hypotheses; and theses; but no firm conclusions. It is against this back-ground that Madhvācārya's *Tātparyā-nirṇaya* of our *itihāsas* and *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* merits consideration. While modern scholarship is bedevilled with doubts unending, Madhva is almost unbelievably cocksure. He is convinced that he is a super-naturally endowed genius, born of divine essence. He announces his perfection of intellect and unfailing grasp of the tradition, taken as a whole. His is an integral approach which seizes in one grasp the entire mass of Vedic, Purāṇic and epic literature and attempts an integrated explanation; often in the words of the originals themselves. The result is the unique *Mahābhārata-tātparyā-nirṇaya* of which the *Bhāgavata-tātparyā-nirṇaya* may be taken as a supplement.

III

In his *Contributions to the Science of Mythology* (Vol. I, Longman, London, 1897, p. 473), MAX MÜLLER says :

To Yāska deity (*devatā*) means something different from what it means with us. Every object that is praised by a poet in a hymn or even in a single verse, is, in his technical language, a *devatā* a deity. We should say simply it was the object of worship or praise. Thus if a horse is praised or a bird or frogs or a stone, a chariot, a bow, a bowstring, a whip, or a mortar, they are all put down as *devatās*. This should settle down once for all the existence of fetish worship in the Veda.

This theory of fetish-worship can fare no better than his pet theory of nature-worship. These are exploded by other scholars, both Indian and Western. To form an idea of Vedic religion by the *names* of deities, whether abstract like *śraddhā*, *aramati* and *medhā*, or in feminine gender like *sūryā*, *aranyāni* etc. or etymology of major names like *Agni* and *Indra*, is, to say the least, neither convincing nor comprehensive. To think that the Indians had no unbroken tradition regarding their religious myths to date the Vedic and *Purāṇa-itihāsa* periods with a yawning gulf of a thousand years to support the break in tradition is a kind of research which goes against the spirit of genuine knowledge, though perfected and propagated by prestigious scholars. Nothing but prejudice can blind us into recognising the merits of the traditionists who tried to understand the tenets of Vedic thought in terms of the *itihāsa-purāṇa* tradition as understood in their age and times.

IV

Amidst the apparent chaos of conflicting material in the vast bulk of this post-Vedic *itihāsa-purāṇa* genre, one thing arrests our attention. Their number is always fixed at eighteen. Even the later *upapurāṇas* are said to be eighteen. The *smṛtis* are eighteen. The number of books in the *Mahābhārata* is eighteen. The geographical regions recognised are eighteen. The number of chapters in the *Gītā* is eighteen. The number of army-divisions that fought at Kurukṣetra is eighteen. The war lasts for eighteen days. The number of castes is eighteen. This may be further extended; but I shall desist from doing so. What I want to drive at is the irresistible conclusion that there is some order in whatever Vyāsa is said to have done. This literature is not an arbitrary mass, but an orderly collection with some key-principle. As I indicated earlier, today we have lost the key. The situation was not very much different even in the days of Madhvācārya (c. 1200). But he made an all-out attempt at a break-through; and has given us some clear and concise conclusion of his studies in this vast field. My object in this paper is only to highlight these so that it might be subjected to further examination by specialists in mythology.

According to Madhva, all the Vedas have one underlying principle; and that is the supreme glory of one universal Godhead, viz. *Viṣṇu*. He governs this vast universe by appointing a hierarchy of deities with well defined duties and powers. There is a strictly determined hierarchy of higher and lower divinities in the Veda, their divinity being more or less functional in the divine order. They may preside over certain moral virtues also; they may be male or female. The same hierarchy of the Vedic pantheon assumes different names in the *itihāsas* and the *Purāṇas*; but the order of importance and gradation remains absolutely unchanged.

Thus in the *Mahābhārata*, Kṛṣṇa represents the supreme Viṣṇu of the Vedas; next to him is Lakṣmī, then Bhīma, the replica of Brahma; next to him is Balarāma, the elder brother of Kṛṣṇa and the replica of Śeṣa; next to him is Aśvatthāman who represents the Vedic Rudra. Among Pāṇḍavas themselves, Bhīma is elder than Arjuna who represents the god Indra, king of heaven, lower in status to Brahma, Śeṣa and Rudra who have their own *lokas* or residential regions above even heaven. Indra himself being superior to all other heavenly deities, it follows that Bhīma, the aspect of Marut in the role of Brahma is higher than all the heavenly gods.

The divine plan of Viṣṇu is to remove the unbearable burden of mother Earth caused by overpopulation of mostly evil-doers. This is the main theme of the entire *Mahābhārata* also; and Vyāsa leaves us in no doubt about it, since he highlights most the slaughter of Jarāsandha, etc. on the one hand and the slaughter of Duryodhana on the other, in which the role of Bhīma alone is uppermost. Kṛṣṇa's ally in fulfilling the divine plan is always Bhīma.

The thesis of Madhva goes against the *smṛti* principle that the eldest brother is always highest in status, according to which Yudhiṣṭhira should have been higher than Bhīma. But Madhva anticipates this objection and counters it by saying that the *smṛti* law, which governs human social order has no applicability to the divine, and even at the human level, among the ruling class of *kṣatriyas*, superior might alone decides one's superiority in status also. In the divine order, superiority belongs only to him who helps most the supreme God's will by purest devotion. Generally, both go together – might and devotional service; the former is grossly visible while the latter is noticed only by acute minds of sages. All *avatāras* too are governed by this underlying principle. Hence there may be *avatāras* of Viṣṇu like Kṛṣṇa and Rāma where might is supreme; but when divine wisdom is to be propagated he will assume *avatāras* like Datta and Vyāsa. Viṣṇu himself takes the form now of Matsya, now of Kūrma, now of Varāha etc. including Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana-Vyāsa.

Lower than Indra among gods are Garuḍa, Kāma, Aniruddha, Sūrya, Candra, Bṛhaspati, Dharma – and their wives. Beneath them are Manus like

Dakṣa, sons of Manu and Ṛṣis like Nārada, and divinities like Agni. In the epics, emperors like Bharata, Kārtavīrya and Vainya, associates of Viṣṇu like Gaya, Lakṣmaṇa, Bharata, Śatrughna, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, and Arjuna enjoy a divine *āveśa* or possession though they are not *avatāras* as such. This *āveśa* is less in characters like Vālin and Sāmba.

This principle of *tāratamya* or hierarchy in status - one in respect of might and the other in respect of knowledge - helps us to interpret not only the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* in a new light but also all the major Purāṇas like the *Bhāgavata*. Thus in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Rāma is supreme Viṣṇu and his consort Sitā is equally divine. His greatest devotee is Hanūmān (representing Vāyu) who is above all the others in the epic in might as well as knowledge. That is why extraordinary feats like crossing the ocean, lifting up mountains and carrying them on his palm to distant places are all ascribed to him by Vālmīki. Next to Hanūmān comes Lakṣmaṇa (representing Śeṣa) and next to him Bharata typifying Kāma and Vālin, the replica of Indra. While Bharata had ample scope to render Lord Rāma's service, Vālin did not have it, as he was shortlived. Hence, to compensate for it he was born as Arjuna in the *Mahābhārata* where he could serve the Lord for long. On the other hand, those that had a longer opportunity for the Lord's service in the *Rāmāyaṇa* are given less opportunity in the *Mahābhārata*. For example, Lakṣmaṇa and Aṅgada have a comparatively less part in this epic as Balarāma and Abhimanyu respectively, since the former becomes elder to Kṛṣṇa and loses the privilege of saluting him; while the latter's opportunity is cut short by his premature death. There are some like Karna here who has a fuller measure of action in both the epics. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* his service to Rāma as Sugriva is crucial; and in the *Mahābhārata* his service to Kṛṣṇa as helping the divine plan by bolstering up the enemy's resistance is equally significant. This lot befalls him because of his lapse in service to the *guru* Paraśurāma during his studentship. The twin-gods, viz. Aśvins assume the form of the money-heroes Mainda and Vivida in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and become Nakula and Sahadeva in the *Mahābhārata*. The measure of sorrow that overtakes the *pratināyakas* of both the epics is governed by the measure of their hate of the Lord. Thus Vādirāja observes in his commentary on Madhva's text that since *Mahābhārata* is latter than the *Rāmāyaṇa* and written by the omniscient Vyāsa, omniscient because of his *avatāra*-hood in turn, both the supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu and the hierarchy of status among gods can be conclusively established from the later epic itself :

Bhagavadavatāreṣu Rāmakṛṣṇāvatārāveva bhūbhāraharāṇa-vyājena
Harisarvottamatva-devatātāratamyādisakala-sāstrārtha-nirṇayāya
pravṛttau.

For want of a better word, we might regard this as a theological explanation of the epic mythology.

V

According to the text-transmission tradition of Kerala recorded by Madhva and Vādirāja, the invocatory verse of the *Mahābhārata*, now not extant in any version, is :

Nārāyaṇaṁ suragurūṁ jagadekanāthaṁ
bhaktapriyaṁ sakala-loka-namaskṛtaṁ ca /
traiguṇyavarjitaṁ ajaṁ vibhūm ādyam īśaṁ
vande bhavaghnāṁ amarāsurasiddhavandyaṁ //

Commenting on this, Vādirāja states :

Idam ādyam padyaṁ asahamānāḥ kecidādaṁ na likhanti. Kerala-
deśastha-purātana-pustakeṣu adyāpi dṛṣyate.

If this be conceded, Madhva's theology would get an added confirmation by the testimony of text-tradition also. Vyāsa's intention is declared to be dividing the epic characters into two camps viz., – those who are with the Lord like Bhīma and those who are ranged against Him like Duryodhana ; so that the over-all supremacy of the Lord gets uniform emphasis throughout. The Lord need not assume human forms and undergo untold sufferings ; but if he chooses to do so, it is only in his unaccountable but all-pervasive, *līlā* or sport.

VI

From the statement of Vyāsa himself, viz.

“ Manvādi kecid bruvate hyāstikādi tathāpare /
tathoparicarādyanye bhārataṁ paricakṣate //

Madhva draws out the implication that there are three layers of poetic current in the *Mahābhārata* : (1) *Manvādi* or that which relates to the noble characters who deserve to be styled ‘Manu,’ viz., the five Pāṇavas and Draupadī ; (2) *Āstikādi* or that which narrates the careers and exploits of Kṛṣṇa or Draupadī and only religious believers, i. e. Pāṇavas, to the exclusion of rivals, and (3) *Uparicarādi* or that portion throughout the epic which relates exclusively to the glorious deeds of the Lord Himself, who is literally above all else- *uparicara*. The layers of epic language too are three : (1) *samādhi* (esoteric), (2) *guhya* (obscure), and (3) *darśana* (delusive). The first invariably declares the supremacy of Viṣṇu, the second is obscure like *kūṭa-śloka*s, while the third embodies ideas of rival theistic schools.³

3. Cf. bhāṣāstrividhāḥ : samādhi-guhya-darśana-bhāṣābheda trividhāḥ. Yab Viṣṇormahimā uktaḥ spaṣṭamuktaḥ sa tu samādhinā uktaḥ ; samāhitamanasā cittaikāgratayā

(Continued on the next page)

In this deep analysis of epic intent, Bhima becomes an embodiment of *dharma* covering ten aspects, viz. devotion (*bhakti*), wisdom (*jñāna*), detachment (*vairāgya*), intelligence (*prajñā*), insight (*medhā*), steadiness (*dhṛti*), composure (*sthiti*), discipline (*yoga*), vitality (*prāṇa*) and might (*bala*).

In the same way Draupadī becomes the prototype of Sarasvatī, the presiding deity over all branches of learning. Duryodhana, the rival, is an embodiment of evil whose essence lies in ignorance of the Lord. Perverse thought is represented by Duṣṣāsana. Agnosticism becomes Śakuni and the other sins assume the forms of other Kauravas. Egoism is Aśvatthāman. The presiding deities of five sense-organs, viz., Bṛhaspati, Sūrya, Agni, Candra and Aśvins become respectively Droṇa, Karna, Bhīṣma, Abhimanyu, Nakula and Sahadeva. The mind-god Indra takes the form of Arjuna. Sinful sensations become soldiers of Duryodhana, while those who fight on the side of Pāṇḍavas are good moral forces.

Evam adhyātma-niṣṭhaṁ hi bhāratam sarvam ucyate /
durvijñeyamataḥ sarvairbhāratam tu surair api // (II. 151)

such is the inner allegorical meaning underlying the whole structure of the *Mahābhārata*, including its plot, characters and tone. It is so hidden that it eludes the grasp of even heavenly gods according to Madhva.

This thesis of Madhva throws indeed a new light on the continuity of tradition underlying the allegorical significance of Vedic as well as epic mythology. The whole story of the *Mahābhārata* acquires a unity of plot when deemed as Kṛṣṇa-centred primarily. The main emphasis falls on his becoming Arjuna's charioteer, and delivering the *Gītā* discourse, and revealing his omniform (*viśvarūpa*) more than once. Incidental stories of Rukmiṇī and Satyabhāmā related to performance of great sacrifices gain increased importance. Balarāma and the five Pāṇḍavas with Draupadī thus become characters of central importance in the epic whose fortunes determine the structure of the entire work. It is indeed the genius of Madhva who derives all these conclusions even from the initial invocatory verse of the epic :

Nārāyaṇam namaskṛtya naram caiva narottamam /
Devīm Sarasvatīm vācam tato jayamudīrayet //

(Continued from the last page)

kathitātvaḥ... darśanāntarasiddham Vaiṣṇava-darśana-viruddha-pāśupatādi-darsanāntara-siddham yat kathyate.. tad darśanabhāṣyoktamity arthaḥ. Anyathā yad bhavet.. "atthasūlā janapaḍā" ityādāviva gūḍhārthaka-pada-ghaṭanayocyate iti yāvat, sā guhya-bhāṣetyarthah. - Vādirāja's com. on *Mahābhārata-tātparyanirṇaya*, II, 125-127.

Such interpretations might appear indeed farfetched and ingenious to modern scholars. But the fact remains that epic mythology will yield its secrets only when subjected to the *adhyātma* or allegorical method of understanding, which is indeed a traditional legacy of the past. So construed, the epics become not historical diaries or chronicles of a dead age, but living esoteric records of the ever-present struggle of forces of good against those of evil, wherein God reassures the victory of good over evil. The Indian epics thus assume an all-time relevance and can command an all-time reverence too.⁴ Religious faith in its pure form makes us realise the cosmic plan of the Godhead undrelying all events in time and space and brings hope to humanity, otherwise lost. This message of reassuring hope in the ultimate victory of good against evil has sustained the Indian masses down the centuries in the direst of trials and tribulations. And may our scholarship make use of the tools of research in such a way that this core of traditional heritage is highlighted in all its grandeur ! This is being realized in the West also today. As ELIADE observes – “ Religious man always believes that there is an absolute reality, the sacred, which transcends the world, but manifests itself in the world. ” (Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, New York, 1961, p. 202). A detailed examination of post-Vedic documents might yet reveal the hidden mystery surrounding Vedic myths also.

4. Dr. V. S. SUKTHANKAR has spoken highly of Madhva's perspective in his lectures on the “ Meaning and Message of the Mahābhārata. ”

WAS THE *PUTĪKA* A MUSHROOM ?

By

F. B. J. KUIPER

I

In *JAOS* 95 (1975), p. 229ff. Professor Stella KRAMRISCH discussed Santali *putka* (as she spells it) 'puff-ball', for which she referred to an article by Roger HEIM and R. Gordon WASSON. The Santals, who constitute one of the most important Munda tribes, live in districts of Bihar, Bengal and Orissa and speak one of the principal Northern Munda languages.

Prof. KRAMRISCH explained *putka* as an early borrowing from Sanskrit *pūtika*, name of plant that was used as a substitute for Soma. She argued that the latter had not been unequivocally identified but that in her opinion it must have been a mushroom. And since the *pūtika* was one of the foremost substitutes for the Soma plant, whenever the latter was not available, her conclusion seemed indirectly to corroborate Gordon WASSON's identification of Soma as the *Amanita muscaria*— the fly agaric—, an identification which KRAMRISCH fully accepts.

The article, which dealt with many other problems, was a profound one but on the linguistic side its weak points seemed too apparent to call for a detailed refutation. Besides, in the light of the 'rich accolade' which WASSON in his 1979 survey enthusiastically accorded her for this unexpected support, and which he recently repeated (1982, 596), any critical note could easily smack of *livida invidia*. It seemed a reasonable guess that in the course of time the theory would die its natural death. This, however, was a miscalculation. In a recent study of the last meal of the Buddha, WASSON (1982, 592) argues as though the identification '*pūtika*' = '*putka*' is a certain fact: 'No one had ever known what plant it was. We now know that, like Soma, it was a mushroom, but a common mushroom...' (1982, 596). In the light of these words some words of comment should no longer be withheld.

II

What kind of plants served as surrogates for Soma ?

Apart from the *pūtika* some other plants are mentioned (see also *Śrautakośa* II, 1, pp. 607-608, Wendy Doniger O'FLAHERTY, *Soma*, pp. 95-100). The following remarks are only meant to be illustrative.

Most explicit is Jaim. Br. I. 354-355 : if one cannot get the Soma plant, the following alternatives, which are enumerated in order of preference, should be pressed instead : (a) brown-tufted *phālgunas* (b) *pūtikas* (c) light-coloured grass (*śuklāḥ śādaḥ*) (d) *parṇa* (= skin of the *palāśa* tree?) (e) if one cannot get any of the preceding surrogates, all herbs whatsoever will serve the purpose (*yā eva kās cauṣadhīr abhiṣṇuyuh*). More specific is ĀpŚS. XIV. 24. 12 *yāḥ kās cauṣadhīḥ kṣīrīṇīḥ* 'all herbs whatsoever provided they contain a milky sap'. Kāth. Samh. 34. 3 (37, 14) and Pañcav. Br. IX. 5. 3 prescribe as substitutes the *pūtikas* 'a kind of creepers' (comm. on PB *latāviśeṣān pūtikasamjñakān*) or else, if these are not available, *arjunāni* 'dark grass' (comm. *śyāmalāni tṛṇāni*).

According to Taitt. Br. I. 4. 7. 5, if the Soma, after being bought, is stolen, *ādārāḥ* or *phālgunāni* should be pressed instead. The *ādārāḥ* are said to be 'a kind of creepers that contain a milky sap' (comm. *kṣīrayuktavallīviśeṣāḥ*). The decision whether or not *ādārā* denotes the same plant as the name *pūtika* (EGGELING 1900, 451 n. 2, CALAND 1931, 212) depends entirely upon the question as to whether EGGELING's translation of ŚB. XIV. 1. 2. 12 *ātha yāt pūyann ivā 'śeta tasmāt pūtikās* as 'and because he lay there stinking, as it were, therefore (they are also called) Pūtika' is correct. If it is (it is certainly the most plausible rendering), then the *pūtika* must also be a creeper that contains milky sap.

ŚB. IV. 5. 10. 1-6 prescribes the brown-flowering *phālgunas* (*aruṇāpuṣpāṇi phālgunāni*), or else the *śyenāhṛīa*, or else the *ādārās*, or the brown *dūrvā* grass (*aruṇadūrvā*) or, finally, any kind of yellow *kuśa* grass (*yān eva kāmś ca hāritān kuśān*), which however must be atoned for. Note that at V. 3. 3. 4 the *śyāmākā* millet is said to be most manifestly (*pratyakṣatamām*) Soma's own.

As for the *pūtika* itself, it was also used as a substitute agent for the curdling of milk (just as well as jujubes, rice grains, the skin of the *palāśa* tree, etc.). See *Śrautakośa* I, 1, p. 249 and Taitt. Samh. II. 5. 3. 5. According to the commentary on this passage *pūtikāḥ* means 'parts of a creeper which resembles the Soma creeper' (*somavallisamānāyā latāyāḥ khaṇḍāḥ*). In passing it may be noted that the commentary on KātyŚS identifies the *pūtika* as the Rohiṣa plant (Guilandina, or Caesalpinia, Bonducella, see EGGELING 1900, 451 n. 2).

These facts have long been known and it was a matter of common consent that none of the substitutes is a mushroom. To ZAEHNER, who stressed this point, this was the main argument against the mushroom theory. As for the *pūtika* in particular, it was, according to most commentators, a creeper (*latāviśeṣa*, *somavallisamānā latā*, perhaps also *kṣīrayuktavallīviśeṣa*). Prof. KRAMRISCH was,

of course, aware of this fact – she refers to the commentary on PB – but she did not think it had conclusive force: ‘The wrong identifications of the *Pūtika* plant are proportionate to those of the Soma plant, which is fair as the former is only a substitute for Soma’ (1975, 227).

What exactly does this mean? What reason was there to discard *a priori* the statements of the commentators as regards the nature of the *pūtika*? This is not clearly stated but it may be surmised, as a reasonable guess, that the line of her thoughts was as follows:

- (a) Soma is a mushroom (WASSON).
- (b) ‘*pūtika*’ is a substitute for it.
- (c) ‘*putka*’ (in the HEIM-WASSON article) calls to mind Skt ‘*pūtika*’.
- (d) ‘*pūtika*’, accordingly, is also a mushroom.
- (e) this identification is, it is true, contradicted by the statements of the commentators but since they are not authoritative with respect to the Soma, one need not bother about them in this case either. The situation is the same.

It will be noted that all hinges on the correctness (or otherwise) of the points *a* and *c*. Since the discovery ‘*Pūtika* = *putka*’ is not disclosed before p. 229, the reason for discrediting the commentaries remains unclear. The real motive, however, as far as I can see, must be that the equation of the two names is here already silently presupposed and anticipated. The discovery will be discussed below. The only question that arises at this point is: is it correct to say that the statements of our commentaries in respect of Soma and *pūtika* are equally worthless?

There may have existed much uncertainty regarding the identity of Soma – primarily a mythical and ritual notion inherited from the proto-Aryan prehistory but what would have been the use of prescribing substitutes if their identity was unknown? As for the commentators, they were specialists, fully acquainted with the tradition of the ritual practice. As such, they were different from the authors of the learned commentaries on classical literary works. The latter were more conversant with *kośas* than with facts of every-day life, and it is in this light that the gloss *karañjaka* ‘*Pongamia glabra*’ for *pūtika* in the commentary on Yaśastilaka II, 177, 4 should be viewed. Cf. *pūti-karañjaka*, *pūti-karajaka*, id.

Prof. KRAMRISCH has overlooked the fact that Dārila in his commentary on Kauśikasūtra 22. 15 writes *pūtikāḥ*: *trṇāni prasiddhāni* ‘the well-known kind of herbs.’ (For *pūtikāḥ*, the reading of the corrupt ‘Berlin conde’, see below).

III

On the word *pūtīka*

There are four points in Prof. KRAMRISCH's interpretation of the *pūtīka* plant which call for some comment :

(a) the name of the plant is not *pūtīka* (as she consistently writes) but *pūtīka*, which is (as will be argued below) of some consequence. The form *pūtīka* only occurs in some late texts.

(b) *pūtīka* does not mean 'stinking' (1975, 227).

(c) the meaning 'mushroom', which she attributes to it, is only based on her conviction that Soma was a mushroom. Those who think that her identification of *pūtīka* has 'immeasurably fortified' Wasson's mushroom theory (WASSON 1979, 102) must have failed to recognize the circular argumentation in her article. Cf. 1975, 228 : 'the Soma plant, identified by Wasson as the fly agaric, *Amanita muscaria*', p. 229 (after a description of the Santali '*putka*') : 'Is not *putka* the Sanskrit *Pūtīka*?' ; p. 230 : '*Pūtīka*, the foremost, and possibly the only direct [? K.] surrogate for Soma, is a mushroom' ; *ibidem* : 'The identification of *Pūtīka*, the Soma surrogate, supplies strong evidence that Soma indeed was a mushroom.' Can it be said that the *pūtīka* has here really been identified 'with finality' (WASSON, 1979, 102) ?

(d) the Santali name for the puff-ball is not *putka* (as WASSON and Prof. KRAMRISCH consistently write) but *putka* (*putka*) and the Munda evidence shows that the Santali word cannot possibly be a borrowing from Sanskrit.

As for the first point, the form *pūtīka* occurs, for the first time, it seems, in ĀśvŚS. 6. 8. and Mhbh. III. 36. 32 *pūtīkān iva somasya tathe 'dām kriyatām iti*, further twice, if the reading is correct, in Suśruta (according to PW), and in commentaries. In the older texts the name is without exception *pūtīka*.

Among the words in *-ika* (DEBRUNNER 1954, 428f.) there are a few names of demons, such as AthS. *ṛkṣīkā*, *kumbhīka*, *dūṣīka* ; cf. also TB. ĀpŚS. *lohinīka*. These are evidently Indo-Aryan words. Many other words in *-ika*, however, are clearly of foreign and among these DEBRUNNER mentions *ūika* and *pūtīka*.

Ever since PW. IV, 833 *pūtīka* has, with greater or lesser confidence, been derived from *pūti* 'stinking', see MONIER-WILLIAMS, UHLENBECK (but not MAYRHOFER, KEWA II, p. 321), In formal respect, however, *-ika* presents difficulties, whereas semantically this etymology lacks any support. It should be

noted that the brāhmaṇas connect *pūtīka* with *ūtī*, e. g. KāthS. 34. 3 (37, 1) *yo 'mśur amucyata sa pūṭīko 'bhavad, ūtikā vai nāmaite, yad ūtikān abhiśuvanty ūtim eva yaṣṇāya kurvanti*, TĀr. V. 2. 10 *ūtīm vai me dhā iti tād ūtikānām ūtikatvām*. Only once (ŚB. XIV. 1. 2. 12) has *pūtīka* been connected with *pūyan* 'stinking' but, characteristically, not because the plant itself stinks but because Viṣṇu, in an aetiological myth, is said to have been stinking in a certain situation.

Since *pūtīka* cannot be explained from Indo-Aryan (DEBRUNNER 1954, 429, MAYRHOFER II, 321), the possibility of its being of foreign origin, like the many other words in *-ika*, deserves mention. In a plant name such an origin would be quite natural.

IV

pūṭikā 'Basella lucida, etc.'

A few words may here be inserted about another plant name, which has sometimes been identified with *pūtīka*, viz. *pūṭikā* 'a culinary plant, *Basella lucida* or *rubra*, ' according to lexicographers ' *Basella cordifolia* '.

The following variant forms occur: *potikā*, *potakī*, *śāka-pota* (?), *u-potī*, *u-podikā*, *u-podikā*, *u-podikā-śāka*, *u-podaka* and *u-podakī*. As for *pūṭhikā*, see PW. IV, 110.

The word group is still extant in New Indo-Aryan, but it is difficult for non-botanists to decide which words may possibly continue *pūtīka*: cf. on the one hand Panjabi *poi* f., Oriya *poi*, *pui*, Hindi *poi* f. 'the potherb *Basella alba*, *B. rubra*, etc.' and, on the other, Pkt *poiā*, *poiā* 'a soporiferous creeper' (Deśīnāmamālā 6. 63), Sindhi *pūi* f. 'a species of *Andropogon* (a sweet-smelling grass growing in tufts), Bengali *pūi* 'an edible creeping herb', Gujarati *poi* f. 'a kind of creeper', Marathi *pān-poi* f. 'a scandent shrub (used medicinally for cattle)'. TURNER, CDIAL no 8325 has made no attempt to separate the descendants for *pūtīka* and *pūṭikā* but botanists will have to decide whether this is permitted or not.

The words *upodaka* must have been re-interpreted as 'near to water' (TURNER nr. 2337) but *upotī* by the side of *potikā* shows that this group contains a prefix *u-* and that the word family of *pūṭikā* must have been borrowed from a prefixing (hence probably Munda) language. See KUIPER 1959, 211 and 1964, 324 and cf. *u-draṅga*, *u-draṅka*, also *avadraṅga*, *avaḍaṅga* 'town' (: *draṅga*, lex. *traṅga*), *u-ccitiṅga* 'crab' (: *ci-ccitiṅga*), *u-ṭkaṭa* 'Saccharum Sara' (: *ṭkaka*, *ikkaka*, *kaṭa*, *khaka*?), *U-dumbura* and, e. g., Mundari, Ho *uru'b* 'to turn': Kharia *rum* (unless *u-* before nouns is historically connected with the Khasi 'article' *u*).

It remains to note that HILLEBRANDT in the first edition of his *Vedische Mythologie* (I, p. 24 n. 3) took *pūtīka* as the name of the *Basella Cordifolia*—an idea that he has given up in the second edition.

V

The Munda names of the puff-ball.

It has long been known that in Kherwari (the main group of the Northern Munda languages) there are a number of curious loanwords, which must stem directly from Sanskrit or Middle Indian. S. K. CHATTERJI 1925, 255 n. may be the first to have pointed to Santali *datrom*. As for the few remarks in BODDING's *Santal Dictionary* I (1932), p. xiv and vol. IV (1935), p. 242, it is my guess that they are due to Sten KONOW, who saw the work through the press. MORGENSTIERNE, who had also for some time studied Santali, referred to CHATTERJI's note in an article dating from 1931 (reprinted in *Irano-Dardica* 1973, p. 10). See also J. HOFFMANN 1950, ii. Later I discussed the historical implications of some cases in greater detail (1958, 239-40; 1959, 212; 1962, 83). Clear instances are Santali, Mundari *matkom*, Ho, Birhor *madkam* 'Bassia latifolia' (from Skt *madhuka*) and Sa. *datrom* 'sickle' (from Skt *dātram*).

As for Sa. *puṭka*, Prof. KRAMRISCH (1975, 229 n. 36) rightly stressed the need of comparing possible cognates in Northern and Southern Munda, to verify her discovery in Santali. Such evidence as was not accessible to her shows beyond doubt that the Munda names for the 'puff-ball' are not borrowings from Sanskrit. The forms known to me are not exhaustive but they are sufficient to settle this point:

Northern Munda

Santali *puṭka* 'a puff-ball, a fungus (of the Lycoperdaceae). The Santals very much relish eating them, naturally only in their early stage' (BODDING 1935, 242. See also CAMPBELL 1933, 535; 560). HEIM has now identified it as *Scleroderma*. There three or four 'species'. viz. *erok' puṭka*, *har' puṭka*, *seta puṭka* and *roṭe puṭka*. Mundari (Naguri dialect) *puṭka*, *puṭkuni*, (Hasada dialect) *puṭku'*. Also with svarabhakti vowel: *puṭūka*, etc. (*Encycl. Mund.* 3452, the spelling adapted to PINNOW's notation). HOFFMANN's long description will be given as an excursus at the end of this section.

Central Munda

Kharia *puṭ u'd* 'small mushroom'. In Sadani, the regional Aryan dialect, the name is *puṭu*. FLOOR 1934, 26; 108. See also H.J. PINNOW 1965, 175.

Southern Munda

Sora *puḍ*-, with regular *d* for Munda /ṭ/. This word form, the last trace of Munda **puṭ* in Sora, has come to serve as the compositional short form for *bati*- 'mushroom'. See RAMAMURTI 1931, 45 and 70; 1938, 218.

Since *-ka* is a common derivational element in Kherwari (e.g. Santali *moṭka* 'stout, corpulent' : *moṭa muṭi*, id.), it is clear that the basic element is Munda **puṭ*, to which in Kherwari *-ka*, *-ku'j*, *-kuñ* have been added.

Munda **puṭ* can be connected with Santali *puṭi* 'to swell, bloat, puff up'. Ho *puṭi* 'to swell', etc. In any case, there can be doubt about the native Munda character of these words for the 'puff-ball'.

Since the *Encyclopaedia Mundarica* will not everywhere be easily accessible, I here quote, for those who may be interested in the puff-ball for other than linguistic reasons, the description given in the *Enc. Mund.*, p. 3452 :

'any kind of puffball, Lycoperdon sp. The first puffballs to appear, at the end of June are the white *roṭepuṭkuṭ* or *coke leṭer uḍ* in the gardens and on manured ground, and the brown *jarapuṭkuṭ* or *jatipuṭkuṭ*, in the forest and especially on clearances. The first is eaten stewed, not raw, all the other are eaten both raw or stewed. The *roṭepuṭkuṭ* comes up three times more during the rains. After the *jarapuṭkuṭ*, in the jungles, appears the *setapuṭkuṭ* followed by the *simrōḍpuṭkuṭ*. The last to come out, also in the jungles, is the *gẽrẽ* or *gẽrẽpuṭkuṭ*, in the first half of August. The *jarapuṭkuṭ*, *setapuṭkuṭ* and *simrōḍpuṭkuṭ* are true puffballs, full of black dust when old. The *roṭepuṭkuṭ* and *gẽrẽ* must be some other species; they do not fill with dust, but rot like mushrooms. The *gẽrẽ* moreover has milky juice. Grammatically all five kinds are generally in the pl [ural] and are always treated as liv [ing] b [eings], except the *roṭepuṭkuṭ*, which is as often treated as an inan [imate] o [bject]'.

VI

'Endowed with a soul'

In Santali *putka* is not the only plant name that belongs to the animate category. Also *janum* 'thorn' is treated as an animate noun, when the thorn it denotes pricks (BODDING 1929, 30; 1935, 266). Since in the case of *janum* one can easily imagine why it is animate, the animate character of the *putka* raises questions. It should not be forgotten, however, that it is a grammatical fact, a detail of noun classification, for which one tries to find an explanation outside the linguistic system. At the moment when it became clear that the

informants had no answer to WASSON's question why *putka* 'was endowed with a soul' the situation had become quite the same as when one would ask such questions in other linguistic areas. If one would ask a German why the words for 'chair' and 'table' are masculine in his language (*der Stuhl, der Tisch*), or a Frenchman, why in his language the equivalents are feminine (*la chaise, la table*), they would shrug off the question as senseless. The native speaker, who uses his grammatical categories correctly and with ease, does not bother about their rationale. If, however, the idea is impressed upon him that there *must* be an answer and that it is his moral obligation, as a native speaker, to find it, the most fanciful 'explanations' may be brought up, just to satisfy the inquirer.

This is what apparently happened at WASSON's last meeting with his informant, Mrs. Ludgi MARNDI. WASSON, without being quite aware of it, was asking for a justification of a *grammatical* feature of her language, which she could not provide. From the vivid account which he, with his strong sense of dramatic moments in human life, gives of that last talk (WASSON 1979, 102) there emerges the picture of a curious psychological situation, due to the fact that he kept pressing her for an answer, while there was not one. The guess which Mrs. MARNDI finally produced could not, by the nature of the case, be any better than what a German speaker might suggest in explanation of *der Stuhl*. To the question 'Why is your language as it is?' there is no answer.

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THE TEACHING OF A CLASSICAL LANGUAGE : AN INTEGRATED METHOD FOR THE TEACHING OF SANSKRIT

By

S. D. LADDU

(0) NEED OF A METHOD FOR TEACHING SANSKRIT

Study of a classical language usually catches the imagination of the modern society from any part of the world, and the more so if the particular society itself happens to be the heir to that language and the direct recipient of the literary and cultural heritage embodied in the language. Naturally, attempts to evolve a more and more efficient method of teaching it are ever being undertaken. The case of Sanskrit, with its vast as well as varied literature carrying importance for the littérateur, sociologist, mythologist and linguist alike, is broader still, and the question of a teaching method for it is of significance to people from all countries. Thus, apart from those in English containing the largest number of Grammars written on Sanskrit, we find Grammars and Readers written in French, German, Italian, Spanish, Rumanian, Russian and Japanese, a very recent one being in the Teach Yourself Books Series in English.¹

As early as 1958, the methods used in its teaching till then in India were considered by the Sanskrit Commission set up by the Government of India, which finally stressed the need for evolving a suitable method to teach it 'at different levels'.² Lovers of Sanskrit and Educationists from various parts of India have all along been struggling with experiments in that direction. Time has come to assess the merits or demerits these experiments have exhibited and to build up a method that could be at the same time scientific, efficacious, and practical. To do this a review of the methods employed in India and abroad should prove of great guidance and help.

1. Michael COULSON, *Sanskrit : an Introduction to the Classical Language*, Hodder and Stroughton, London, 1976.

2. RSC, p. 248.

(I) A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF SANSKRIT TEACHING³1) *The Traditional Method of Teaching Sanskrit*

This may be a cover term for : (1) the Ancient Indian *Svādhyāya* method used in the *Pāṭhaśālās*, insisting upon rote learning of the paradigms, drilling and recapitulation of the points of grammar, and a line-to-line (*pāñkta*) study of the text, using both the Synthetic (*Daṇḍānvaya*) and Analytical (*Khaṇḍānvaya*) modes of construing a passage,⁴ and (2) The Grammar-Translation method introduced in India chiefly by R. G. BHANDARKAR and practised till recently, with deductive explanations of the forms of the language.

These methods are purported to secure perfection in grammar, which aim they achieve at the cost of the student's interest, allowing only the luckiest few to stick till the end of the Course. If at all one is tenacious enough through the whole training then alone one's labours might be rewarded with gaining an insight into the beauties of the text-contents, not earlier.

2) *Modern Principles of Language Teaching*(a) *Teaching of a Language :*

Revolutionary changes in the language teaching method may be said to have started with the publication in 1882 of VIÉTER's pamphlet, *Der Sprachunterricht muss umkehren*. He stressed use of the Inductive process in learning, study of complete sentences, and teaching through the target language itself (and not through the mother tongue).

(b) *Teaching of a Second Language :*

By the same time of this dawn of the Direct or Conversational Method, GOUNIN, in his remarkable book, *L'Art d'Enseigner et d'Étudier les langues*, and his fellow thinkers advocated extension of the Direct Method in the teaching of the Second Language as well.

(c) *Teaching of a Classical Language :*

In the teaching of Classical languages like Latin or Greek also, experiments using the Direct Method were conducted with fair success at the beginning of this century by W. H. D. ROUSE in the Perse School at Cambridge (U. K.). The alertness and interest with which the students received this method was

3. There is recently published a study made by N. K. SHARMA of Sanskrit Education during the British Rule in India (— see under 'References' —), which, however, does not devote attention to the methods employed in the teaching of the language.

4. See HUPARIKAR, pp. 348f., and RSC, p. 129.

praised highly by the visiting Commission appointed by the U. K. Government, which however went on in its Report to point out some defects that they felt were also inherent in this method. Chief of those were that real learning was seen generally with the more intelligent students, and that through this method no incidental information of great value (literary, historical, cultural etc.) could be acquired by the student.⁵ Recently again, a serious attempt was made by the linguist W. E. SWEET (1957), advocating the teaching of Latin by "hearing it, speaking it, reading it, and writing it."

3) *Experiments in the Teaching of Sanskrit*

(A) *In Ancient India :*

During the period of Muslim Rule (when Sanskrit was no longer current in speech) a few experiments were made to teach Sanskrit the easy way.⁶ Varadarāja, in the 17th century, exhibits in his *Gīrvāṇapadamāñjarī*⁷ many modern principles of language teaching such as the Direct or Conversational style, use of simple expressions etc.

(B) *In Modern Times :*

Apart from the Elementary Grammars of Sanskrit continually being written practically all over the world, after the pioneering work of R. G. BHANDARKAR (1864-68), a number of experiments in the simplification of Sanskrit have been and are being carried on in India in recent time.

But by far the most important attempt made in this connection was by V. P. BOKIL and N. R. PARASNIS in 1942 who tried to work out the Direct Method which was adopted for Latin by W. H. D. ROUSE and to elaborate it with slight modifications for Sanskrit (1956). There was also an exhaustive study made along similar lines and by the same time by G. S. HUPARIKAR (1949). And, unaware of these earlier efforts, was yet another one in 1965, sponsored by the Sanskrit Education Society (Madras) addressing itself to finding improved methods of making Sanskrit learning easy and popular. This has come from another educationist, K. Rama Varma RAJA, who does not claim to be an exponent of any new theory but only an interpreter of the accepted theories in new ways; and, after examining the traditional method, the Direct method and the Substitution method, he leaves it to the resourcefulness of the teacher to employ "the proper method at the proper stages".⁸

5. Vide BOKIL and PARASNIS, pp. 37-41.

6. Reference may be made to RSC, p. 130.

7. Ed. U. P. SHAH, M. S. Uni. Ori. Ser. No. 4, Baroda, 1960. (Originally, pub. in *JOI* VII : 4-IX : 1-3, June 1958- Mar. 1960.)

8. Vide Ref. below : pp. ix, 43.

These attempts which have been seriously upheld in the Teacher Training Institutions in some parts of India at present and are followed by a number of well-meant experiments carried in different parts of India till this moment,⁹ in general, lay stress upon using the Direct Method with its principles of Psychology. This has given rise (largely in Maharashtra) to preparation of a number of graded text-books useful for the purpose and has proved to be a harbinger of reform in the teaching of Sanskrit.

The aim of these, in general, was the simplification of Sanskrit at the initial stage of study.¹⁰ No finality, however, is reached in their attempts, and the entire activity can be put to assessment by Linguisticians, who should reasonably have some say in this question of equal moment to them.

(B') *The London Experiment :*

Attention must be drawn to an idealistic experiment being carried out by the Independent Educational Association (a charitable Trust) at the four schools conducted by it in London : St. James and St. Vedast Independent Schools (for Boys and for Girls). The purpose of the Schools is "to provide a finely balanced education to encourage the unfolding and development of the whole person." So the Curriculum is "devised to promote from the outset a balanced spiritual, mental and physical development" of children between the ages of 4½ and 18, and is planned to provide a programme which cares for such a development. At all stages of education, great importance is attached to the teaching of language, since "command of language is a key factor in every aspect of life."

Towards fulfilling the aims of these Schools, it is felt that Sanskrit has a unique part to play : "The study of language is based on Sanskrit, which is acknowledged to have the finest grammatical system, besides possessing an incomparable literature. Most European and Asiatic languages are directly linked to Sanskrit which provides the young person with a key to them all.—Greek is taught as a second language because it leads naturally from Sanskrit into Western culture ; and Latin provides the final link with English."¹¹

9. For a detailed notice of such, see the long footnote at RSC, pp. 221-23. To these can be added activities being carried, among others, by :

Sanskrit Education Society, Madras;
E. P. Bharati Pisharoti (Kāmadhenu Method), Kerala;
Sri Sura Saraswati Sabhā, Bangalore;
Vishva Hindu Parishad, Bangalore;
Sārvabhauma Samskrita Prachāra Kāryālaya, Varanasi;
Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, New Delhi.

10. For the main lines along which this was advocated, vide RSC, p. 218, para 66.

11. For the information obtained through talks based on personal experience and for the Pamphlets provided (from which quotations are drawn), I am greatly indebted to Mr. S. P. THOMPSON, lately of SOAS of the London University.

Here then is probably a first-ever experiment pursued with a scientific (i.e. linguistic) awareness as well as a cultural vision. The results of it depend much upon the training and the skill of the teachers handling the whole programme, and surely deserve to be watched with great interest by all having to do with a proper method for the teaching of Sanskrit.

(II) A CRITIQUE ON APPLICATION OF THE DIRECT METHOD
TO A CLASSICAL LANGUAGE (SANSKRIT)

Every effort at formulating a method to teach a Classical Language must be based on fixing the Aims of study of the language. Surely, in the case of Sanskrit there can be no difference on the Aims being :

1. Understanding and Appreciation of Literature, and
2. Acquiring an insight into the Culture treasured in the literature (including the Ancient Indian contributions in the fields of Philosophy, Religion, Ethics, Law, and many Positive Sciences like Medicine, Mathematics, Architecture, Zoology etc.).

One more is very much needed in the present context of studies :

3. Attaining the first two with an object to facilitate studies in the Middle and Modern Indo-Aryan languages.

These call for some observations.

(A) *From Psychology :*

Admittedly the medium of instruction in any subject, according to the principles of Psychology, has to be the Mother Tongue. However, for the teaching of a Second Language, as was seen above, a strong plea was made by the end of the 19th century for adopting the Direct Method which aimed at connecting the student 'directly' with the structures of the new or the object language which is a living one by making use of that language alone as the medium. But, this mode, which is prescribed in the case of a living language and which can put to service a variety of constructions on the spur of the moment from out of the large living stock of usages, cannot be borrowed in the teaching of a Classical language, and this for obvious reasons of non-availability of such a rich stock on the lips of the modern teacher of that language. That again makes this activity of teaching and learning an artificial process, and the whole thing goes against the principles of Psychology. No paltry concessions are also happy for using the mother tongue just for removal of vagueness and for better understanding.¹²

12. Also compare the following finding (RSC, p. 133, para 17) of the Sanskrit Commission (although the Commission agreed with the suggestion of some witnesses

(Continued on the next page)

(B) *From Linguistics :*

There can be a number of grievances from the side of Linguistics against this procedure.

1. For a Classical language, Understanding and Appreciation cannot be the aims in mutual conflict, as literary appreciation here is entirely based on proficiency in the language i.e. in the variety of constructions contained in it. Appreciation cannot have an *upper hand* relegating grammatical thoroughness to *later* stages and still expecting to attain the same degree of appreciation before that. Otherwise a more expertly translated version of the text could be a good substitute for the original if equal kind of appreciation can be had through eitherway study. Thoroughness in understanding becomes the *first step* to proper appreciation of literature; and, to be a thorough grammarian or philologist thus becomes a definitely viable qualification to become 'a force for social regeneration,' on the strength of knowledge of the culture embedded in the Classical literature.¹³

2. For mastering the rich inflexion usually to be met with in a Classical language, the Inductive Method falls far short and becomes time-consuming and uneconomical for that reason. This conforms to an observation of R. G. BHANDARKAR.¹⁴ Resort, therefore, is necessary to be made to the Deductive Method though by developing some skills in working it out.

3. It makes a lot of difference when a language under study has long fallen out from everyday use and no more remained spoken, when it is to be learnt out of some kind of regard and antiquarian interest. Under this circumstance, the independent and arbitrary natures of the First Language and the Target Language have to be considered as Denis GIRARD¹⁵ points out and further refers to the fact that "grammatical categories suitable for Greek and Latin are not necessarily appropriate for French and English." Ashok R.

(Continued from the last page)

that Sanskrit should also be used now and then in the teaching, as part of the direct and conversational method to be employed) :

"On the question of medium of instruction, the Commission made extensive enquiries.... The consensus was that the mother tongue or the regional language should be used for this purpose. In fact, the young student would learn Sanskrit quicker and in an easier and more natural way if the mother tongue was employed as the medium of instruction."

13. Cp. remarks by BOKIL and PARASNIS, p. 13.

14. "Experience, however, both as a learner and a teacher, has taught me that Sanskrit Grammar learnt according to the latter method is more easily and longer remembered than if learnt empirically," - Ref. below : p. xii, dated 15-4-1873,

15. Ref. below : p. 7.

KELKAR¹⁶ has also remarked in this connection : " Since the opportunities for meeting a live speaker are small or non-existent, naturally greater attention is paid to the written medium and specific literary or religious styles." When dealing with a Classical language, idioms and synthetic structures are no more freely invented on the spur of the moment or otherwise disfavoured in some cases. They are there as a frozen or solidified part of the store of that language, and have only to be understood thoroughly by waging a fight against the habits of the mother tongue which have become firmly entrenched in its user. Thus there is no choice of learning only the simplest structures *first* and postponing the difficult ones to a *later* stage. The only allowance that can be made for 'simplification' in grammar would be in respect of grammatical usages of least frequency in Sanskrit literature itself, as e.g. all the seven varieties of the Aorist.

4. This further means that the modern speaker has to consider the type of linguistic relationship and cultural affinity that his own speech possesses through history with the target Classical language. In other words, in his study and mastery of the Classical language, he has to give a thought to the Language Families and the Cultures to which the Classical language and his speech belong, and accordingly has to face the difficult or easy situations in his learning process. These linguistic and cultural connections determine the nature of interest that a learner may have in the Classical language and also his aim of studying it.

5. As Linguistic connections or differences cannot be dissociated sharply from Cultural connections or differences, gradations could be observed in the ease or difficulty with which a Classical language can be studied, depending upon the degree of Cultural affinity it bears with the learner's First language. Preconceived notions relating to the structures of own speech get filtered through a variety of misinterpretations about the patternings in the language under study, as LADO¹⁷ has shown, and thus can get transferred to the speech with a culture differing in varying degrees from one's own, and this causes a serious obstacle in mastering the new language. SWEET¹⁸ has offered a pertinent lexical example in this connection for Latin as compared with English.

(III) POSSIBLE TYPES OF TEACHING METHODS FOR SANSKRIT

Awareness of these perspectives of Historical Linguistics and Cultural Affinities, that is awareness of the degree of Linguistic and Cultural connections

16. Ref. below : p. 84.

17. Ref. below : pp. 114, 120.

18. Ref. below : p. 1.

a learner may have between his First Language and the Classical language, implies setting up of not just *one* type of blanket method as serviceable for a learner with *any* kind of linguistic and cultural background, but of *more* as needed and answering both these backgrounds and thus leading him across the *changed* Culture and the *changed* Linguistic habits in a smooth and efficient manner. This principle expects of the teacher's thorough acquaintance with the two Cultures and the two Linguistic Families. The following Table can illustrate these statements for speakers of some families, in a broad manner.

TABLE OF

Types of Cl. Lg. Learners and Types of Corresponding Methods

[Note : C, F, M stand respectively for Culture, (Linguistic) Family and (Teaching) Method]

	Of Same Lg. Fam.	Of Different Lg. Fam.
Of Same Culture	C_1F_1 (cf. Indo-Aryan) M_1	C_1F_2 (cf. Dravidian) M_2
Of Different Culture	C_2F_1 (cf. non-IA Indo-European) M_3	C_2F_2 (cf. non-Indo- European) M_4

(IV) NEED TO EVOLVE AN INTEGRATED METHOD FOR THE TEACHING OF SANSKRIT

The new pattern of a Classical language teaching, thus, has to be devised in such a way that it shows an enlightened awareness simultaneously of : (1) the affiliations of Culture, (2) the principles of (Historical) Linguistics, and (3) the principles of Psychology.

Realisation of the scientific importance particularly of the second component, viz. Historical Linguistics, also possesses the merit of making the study of Sanskrit smooth and natural for studies in (1) Indo-Aryan mother tongue and (2) Prakrit and Pali.

Just how the principles of Psychology (which are rightly dear to the Educationist) as well as those of Linguistics can be put to service simultaneously would form the subject of an independent study devoted to detailing the Application aspect of the method suggested here.

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DEVALADHARMASŪTRA ON VARṆAS AND JĀTIS

By

LALLANJI GOPAL

The *Dharmasūtras* represent a determined effort to systematise and codify social laws and rules and, hence, are of great significance for the reconstruction of the social history of ancient times. A number of texts seem to have been composed under this category, but unfortunately only a few are available in their full original form. There being no traditional list of the *dharmasūtras*, we do not know the number and names of the texts which have been lost. From Śaṅkarācārya's commentary on the *Vedāntasūtra*¹ we get the name of the *Devala-dharmasūtra*. The many quotations from Devala, scattered in the medieval commentaries and digests, confirm the actual existence of this text.

Śaṅkara makes a pointed reference to the emphasis on Sāṅkhya ideas characterising the *Devaladharmasūtra*. From the available quotations it is clear that the text was an extensive one and dealt with all those topics which generally form the subject matter of a *dharmasūtra*. Our opinion about the details on these topics has necessarily to be conditioned by the nature and extent of the surviving quotations.

The provisions about the *Varṇa* system are a significant contribution of the *dharmasūtras*. The chapter dealing with this topic in the *Devaladharmasūtra* also seems to have been among its important portions. When compared with the account of *Varṇas* in other *dharmasūtras* and the *Smṛtis*, the quotations from the *Devala-dharmasūtra* acquire great historical value.²

We do not have a connected or consolidated quotation giving a complete account of the *Varṇas*. The passages are to be collected from the *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, *Gr̥hastha-ratnākara*, *Prāyaścittaviveka*, *Aparārka*, *Mitākṣarā*, *Smṛtimuktāphala* and *Vivādārṇavasetu*. It is not difficult to determine the inter-relationship and sequential order among these passages and to form some idea of some of the passages not preserved in the quotations.

The extant passages do not indicate the title of the chapter dealing with *varṇas*. We hazard a guess that possibly it was called *varṇadharmasūtra*.

1. I. 4. 28.

2. KANE, *History of Dharmasāstra*, II, p. 121 takes notice only of the passage describing *sūdradharmasūtra* as quoted in the *Mitākṣarā*.

The beginning of the chapter (Fragment I) is found in an extract quoted in the *Kṛtyakalpataru*.³ It says : ' There are four *varṇas* : Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra. And the *anulomas* are four : Savarna, Ambaṣṭha, Pārasava and Ugra. The *pratilomas* are six : Ayogava, Kṣatta, Caṇḍāla, Māgadha, Vaidehaka and Sūta. The *antarālas* are six : Kukkuṭa, Pulkasa, Vena, Kuśīlava, Vandi and Śvapāka. We are describing their characteristics after referring to their origin.'⁴ Then follow four verses in which the *varṇas* and the *anulomas* are explained in terms of their birth. ' The son of a Brāhmaṇa from a Brāhmaṇa woman, after the performance of the sacraments, becomes a Brāhmaṇa. In this manner the Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra are to be known as born out of the womb of their respective *Varṇas*. The son of a Brāhmaṇa from a Kṣatriya woman is a Savarna. The son of a Brāhmaṇa from a Vaiśya woman is known as an Ambaṣṭha. Of a Brāhmaṇa (*vipra*) from a Śūdra wife is born a Niṣāda ; he is also known as a Pārasava. A person born of a Kṣatriya from a Vaiśya woman is named as a Savarna. The twice-born call him, who is born of a Kṣatriya male and a Śūdra female, an Ugra. By a Vaiśya in a Śūdra's daughter a Śūdra alone is born.'⁵ It can be easily surmised that there were many other verses in which the six *pratilomas* and the six *antarālas* were likewise explained in terms of their birth out of the union of males and females of specified *varṇas* and *jātis*.

After describing the origin of the *varṇas* and *jātis* the text mentions their duties. Obviously in the first instance it listed the six duties of a Brāhmaṇa,⁶ but the relevant *sūtra* has not been quoted in any source. The *Prāyaścittaviveka*⁷ quotes *sūtras* defining *adhyayana*, *adhyāpāna*, *yajana* and *yājana* (Fragment II). *Adhyayana* is acquiring a knowledge of the three Vedas and

3. XII, pp. 811-12.

4. (Fragment I) चत्वारो वर्णा ब्राह्मणक्षत्रियवैश्यशूद्रा इति । अनुलोमाश्चत्वारः सवर्णान्निष्ठ पारश्वोय्या इति । प्रतिलोमाः षड् आयोगवक्षत्तचण्डालमागधवैदेहकसूता इति । अन्तरालाः षट् कुकुटपल्क- सवेनकुशीलवन्दिश्वपाका इति । सर्वेषां लक्षणानि विधानानुपूर्व व्याख्यात्यामः ।

5. ब्राह्मण्यां ब्राह्मणाज्जातः संस्कृतो ब्राह्मणो भवेत् ।

एवं क्षत्रियविदशूद्रा ज्ञेयास्तेभ्यः स्वयोनिजाः ॥

ब्राह्मणाक्षत्रियायां तु समुत्पन्नः सवर्णकः ।

वैश्यायां ब्राह्मणाज्जातः पुत्रोऽम्बष्ठ इति स्मृतः ॥

विप्रान्निषादः शूद्रायां जातः पारश्वोऽपि सः ।

वैश्यायां क्षत्रियाज्जातः सवर्णः स च संज्ञया ॥

शूद्रायां क्षत्रियाज्जातं प्रादुरग्रमिति द्विजाः ।

वैश्याच्छूद्रस्य कन्यायां शूद्र एव प्रजायते ॥

6. It would appear from a later passage describing the Caṇḍāladharma (quoted below) that they were possibly mentioned as *pradhānakarma*.

7. Page 153.

the sciences from the teacher through vows, duties and service. *Adhyāpāna* is imparting this knowledge to an initiated student endowed with conduct, lineage, endeavour, ability, devotion, disposition and service.⁸ *Yajana* is the performance of fortnightly and other sacrifices (periodically fixed or *nitya*), optional (performed for some particular object) and occasional (performed for some cause) sacrifices, with prescribed donations. The definition contains further details in terms of the oblations (*havir*), fuels (*samidh*), implements for material (*dravyopakaraṇa*) and priests (*ṛtvij*). The oblations specifically mentioned are *paśu* (animal), *kṣīra* (milk), *ājya* (clarified butter), *puroḍāśa* (oblation made of ground rice), *soma* (the name of a plant whose identification remains a subject of controversy), *oṣadhi* (plant) and *caru* (oblation of rice, barley and pulse boiled together); the fuels are Khadira, Palāśa, Aśvattha, Nyagrodha and Udumbara; the implements for material include *sruc* (a wooden ladle for pouring clarified butter), *sruva* (a sacrificial ladle), *udūkhala* (mortar), *muśala* (pestle), *kuthāra* (axe), *khanitra* (spade), *yūpa* (sacrificial post), *dāru* (wood), *carma* (hide), *darbha* (Kuśa grass), *grāva* (stone), *pavitra* (sieve or strainer)⁹ and *bhājana* (vessel); and the priests named are *udgātṛ* (who chants the hymns of the *Sāmaveda*), *hotṛ* (who recites the prayers of the *Rgveda*), *adhvaryu* (who repeats the hymns of the *Yajurveda*)¹⁰ and *brahman*.¹¹ *Yājana* is said to be explained by this.¹²

Clearly the later portions of the chapter contained similar definitions of *dāna* and *pratigraha*. It seems that the *Devaladharmasūtra* had a full chapter on different aspects of *dāna*. Possibly on account of this fuller and more detailed account the later commentaries and digests did not quote its *sūtras* on *dāna* and *pratigraha*.

8. (Fragment II) आचार्यादि व्रतनियमशुश्रूषादिभिस्त्रयीविधोपादानमध्ययनम् । तस्याचारा-
न्वयोपक्रमसामर्थ्यमक्तिशीलशुश्रूषोपनताय शिष्याय प्रदानमध्यापनम् ।

9. Other meanings of the term are : a vessel in which the *arghya* is presented, two blades of Kuśa grass used in purifying and sprinkling ghee, a ring of Kuśa grass worn on the fourth finger, and the sacred thread.

10. He did so while performing his duties of measuring the ground, building the altar, preparing the sacrificial vessels, fetching wood and water, lighting the fire, and bringing the animal and immolating it.

11. The most learned among the priests, he was required to know the three Vedas to supervise the sacrifice and to set right mistakes. At a later period his functions were based especially on the *Atharvaveda*.

12. पशुक्षीराज्यपुरोडाशसोमोषभिचरप्रभृतिभिर्हविर्भिः खदिरपलाशाश्वत्थन्यग्रोद्योदुम्बरप्रभृतिभिः
समिद्धिः सुक्षुब्धोदूखलमुषलकुठारखनित्रयूपदारुचर्मदंभावपवित्रभाजनादिभिर्द्रव्योपकरणैरुद्गातृहोत्रध्वर्यु-
ब्रह्मादिभिर्ऋत्विग्भिः काम्यनैमित्तिकानां पक्षादिपूर्वकानां यथोक्तदक्षिणानां यज्ञानां समापनं यजनम् । एतेन
याजनं व्याख्यातम् ।

...31

In a passage (Fragment III), which occurs with certain variant readings in the *Kṛtyakalpataṛu*¹³ and the *Gṛhastha-ratnākara*,¹⁴ the *dharma*s of Kṣātras and Vaiśyas are enumerated in continuous *sūtras*. The *Kṣātradharmā*¹⁵ is the worship of gods and ancestors through study, sacrifice and gift; service of the Brāhmaṇas, protection of the Vaiśyas and Śūdras; subsistence on *bali* (tribute), *kara* (tax), *śulka* (toll) and *ṣaḍbhāga* (one-sixth of the production), establishment of the *Varṇas* and *Āśramas*; curbing of sin; favouring the meritorious; abandoning trade; keeping up righteous disposition; practice of the instructions about the war¹⁶ of elephants, horses and chariots; adopting the expedients prescribed by the *śāstras*¹⁷; guarding treasury and army; supremacy characteristic of a warrior acquired by warding off the enemy's realm, market, forest, thief, poison and the honoured, trustworthy and well-born superintendents;¹⁸ fortitude; perseverance;¹⁹ heroism; competence and not subsisting on begging (Fragment III A).

In the following *sūtra* (Fragment III B) the *Vaiśyadharmā*²⁰ is described as being: accomplishment of *dharma* through study, sacrifice and gift; service of the Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas; abandoning sins; maintaining the wife; cultivation; cattle-rearing and subsistence on carrying load, trade in commodities, dancing, singing, acting and painting.

13. II, pp. 254-55.

14. p. 470.

15. (Fragment III) क्षत्रधर्मोऽध्ययनेज्यादानैर्देवपितृपूजनम्, ब्राह्मणशुश्रूषणं वैश्यशूद्रपरिपालनम्, बलिकरशुल्कपट्टभागोपजीवनम्, वर्णाश्रमसंस्थापनं पापनिग्रहो गुणवत्परिग्रहो व्यवहारवर्जनम्, धर्मचारित्रानुपालनं हस्त्यश्वरथप्रहरणशिक्षाऽभ्यासः, शास्त्रोपायाश्रयत्वं कोशदण्डावेक्षणं परचक्रापणाटवीतस्करदूष्यमान्यासकुलीनाध्यक्षप्रतिषेधलब्धशूरनिजैश्वर्यं धैर्यमुत्साहः शौर्यं शक्तत्वमयाचनमिति । (Fragment III A). Besides the variant readings noted below the *Gṛhastharatnākara* reads — निजैश्वर्यदण्डप्रणयनं धर्मविशुद्ध्यै चाधैर्यं... and the *Kṛtyakalpataṛu* has ... निजैश्वर्यधैर्यमुत्साहशौर्यं.

16. *Gṛhastharatnākara* reads *pravaṇa* meaning 'devoted to' in place of *praharaṇa*.

17. The texts on statecraft mention four expedients (*upāyas*) for success against an enemy: *sāma* (conciliation), *dāna* (bribery), *bheda* (sowing dissensions) and *daṇḍa* (punishment or open attack). Some texts add three more: *māyā* (deceit), *upekṣā* (neglect) and *indrajāla* (conjuring). *Gṛhastharatnākara* reads *śāstra* in place of *sāstra*.

18. The expressions, particularly the words grouped in a compound, appear to be a little faulty. *Gṛhastharatnākara* has *dahyamānāpta* in place of *dūṣyamānāpta*.

19. *Utsāha* is one of the three *śakti*s of a ruler, the other two being *mantra* and *prabhāva*.

20. वैश्यधर्मोऽध्ययनयजनप्रदानैः धर्मानुष्ठानं ब्राह्मणक्षत्रियशुश्रूषा पापवर्जनं कलत्रपोषणं कर्षणं पशुपालनं भारोद्धहनपण्यव्यवहारनर्तनगायनतालावतरणरङ्गोपजीवनम् चेति । (Fragment III B). *Kṛtyakalpataṛu* has *vaiśya* in place of *vaiśya* and *Gṛhastharatnākara* replaces *śuśrūṣaṇam* for *śuśrūṣā*.

The passage listing *Śūdradharmā* (Fragment IV) occurs in the *Mitākṣarā*,²¹ *Aparārka*²² and *Smṛtimuktāphala*.²³ It specifically mentions service of the twice-born ; abandoning sins ; maintaining the wife, etc., cultivation, cattle-rearing, carrying load, trade in commodities, painting-work, dancing, singing and playing on flute, lute, drum and tabor.²⁴

The *Caṇḍāladharma* (Fragment V) is preserved in a passage occurring in the *Aparārka*,²⁵ *Kṛtyakalpataru*²⁶ and *Prāyaścittaviveka*.²⁷ It includes cleansing according to one's caste, bowing to all people, forbearance, purity of conduct, not disrespecting others, maintaining one's servants and avoiding the principal acts.²⁸

The passages collected here reveal the following important features of the social system :—

1. The text mentions four *Varṇas* (Frag. I). Though the expression *Cāturvarṇya* does not occur, it is clear that the basic characteristics of the *Cāturvarṇya* system were accepted by Devala.

2. The earlier portions of the chapter introducing the social system are missing, hence we cannot be sure whether there was a reference to the wider social organisation of *Varṇāśrama*. But, it seems that by Devala's time the *Varṇāśrama* concept had been clearly formulated to cover the totality of the social life, considering the man both as an individual and also as a member of a group. This can be seen in Frag. III A where the maintenance of the *varṇāśrama* (*varṇāśramasamsthāpanam*) occurs as an important duty of a Kṣatriya.

21. On *Mitākṣarā*, I. 120.

22. Page 162.

23. *Varṇāśramadharmā*, p. 67.

24. (Fragment IV) शूद्रधर्मो द्विजातिशुश्रूषा पापवर्जनं कलत्रादिपोषणकर्षणपशुपालनभारो-
द्भिनपण्यव्यवहारचित्रकर्मनृत्यगीतवेणुवीणासुरजमृदङ्गवादिनादीनि । The variant readings in *Smṛti-*
muktāphala are *śaudro'yaṁ* for *śūdradharmo*, *varjyaṁ* for *varjanaṁ* and *viṣṇūmrdaṅgavādanāni*
for *veṇuvīṇāmuraṅgamrdaṅgavādanāni*.

25. Page 118.

26. XII, p. 834.

27. Page 12.

28. (Fragment V) स्वजातिशोचनं सर्वजनप्रणामस्तितिक्षा व्यवहारशुद्धिरपरावमानं स्वमृत्यु-
पोषणं प्रधानकर्मपरिवर्जनमिति चण्डालधर्मः । The variant readings are *śodhanaṁ* (*Aparārka*)
and *jivanaṁ* (*Kṛtyakalpataru*) in place of *śocanaṁ*; *-pramāṇa-* (*Kṛtyakalpataru*) for *jana-*
pramāṇas; *parapramāṇaṁ* (*Kṛtyakalpataru*) for *suddhiraparāvamānaṁ*; *-pamāṇaṁ-* (*Prā-*
yaścittaviveka) for *-vamāṇaṁ* and *varjanaṁ* (*Aparārka*) for *parivarjanaṁ*. *Pradhānakarma*
possibly refers to six duties of a Brāhmaṇa.

3. For Devala the *Varṇas* did not refer to a theoretical division of society into four functional groups with the possibility of change on the basis of qualities or functions. They had become fixed as castes determined on the basis of birth. For belonging to any of the four *varṇas*, one had to be born of father and mother of the same *varṇa* (Frag. I).
4. Though the text believed in the fourfold division of society, possibly it had to admit the existence of a fifth *varṇa* of the *Caṇḍālas*. The existing passages do not refer to the additional fifth *varṇa*, but, the way the *Caṇḍālādharma* (Frag. V) has been enumerated, on equal footing with the *dharma* of the four *varṇas*, it is not unlikely that a *sūtra*, now missing, provided for the fifth or *Caṇḍāla varṇa*.
5. The passages present the *Caṇḍālas* in two different forms. In Frag. I, they are mentioned as one of the six *pratiloma* castes along with the *Āyogava*, *Kṣatta*, *Māgadha*, *Vaidehaka* and *Sūta*. But in Frag. V they have been given more importance than is ordinarily expected to be assigned to one of the many mixed castes. They enjoy the position of a fifth *varṇa*.
6. Devala gives fuller details about the *dharma* of different *varṇas*. He does not merely enumerate the six principal duties of a *Brāhmaṇa*, but explains them with summarised details of their important features.
7. In the account of the *dharma*s of the *Kṣatriyas*, *Vaiśyas*, *Sūdras* and *Caṇḍālas* also we have fuller details about their principal duties, means of livelihood, things and acts which they are to avoid, their obligations towards other *varṇas* and other family members, and the qualities which they are to cultivate.
8. It is significant that many details of the *dharma*s of the *Vaiśyas* and *Sūdras*, particularly their means of livelihood, are common.
9. Though the term *varṇasaṅkara* does not occur in the fragments, Devala formulates the theory of inter-*varṇa* and inter-caste marriages to explain the emergence of social groups outside the classification of the four *varṇas*. But, he does not elaborate the process of permutation and combination of such marriages. He confines his list of mixed castes to *anulomas*, *pratilomas* and *antarālas*. One can see from the explanation given in the verses that the *anulomas* were castes born of the union of males with females of lower *varṇas*. Likewise, the *pratilomas* refer to castes created by the union of males with females of higher *varṇas*. The *antarālas* were begotten by an *anulomaja* male on another *anulomaja* female. Though Devala does not consider it, there will be a category of castes begotten by a *pratilomaja* male on another *pratilomaja* female. The process of combination can be extended further by considering the union of *anulomaja* and *pratilomaja*, of these two with the remaining two categories, and

of the four *varṇas* with castes belonging to these four categories. Evidently Devala represents an early stage in the formulation of the castes through inter-*varṇa* and inter-caste marriage.

10. An inter-mixing of the *varṇas* in the *anuloma* order yields six names which are recognised in many *dharmasūtra* and *smṛti* texts. But Devala names only three *anuloma* castes. The son begotten by a Brāhmaṇa on a Kṣatriya female or by a Kṣatriya on a Vaiśya female alike is termed by him as *savarṇa* (meaning possibly that they belong to the *varṇa* of their respective father and do not form a separate caste). He, however, does not use the name *savarṇa* to refer to the son of a Vaiśya from a Śūdra female. He says that such a progeny becomes a Śūdra.

11. Among the *antarālas* mentioned by Devala, Kuśīlava and Vandi do not occur in any other text.

Thus, we see that the surviving passages contain very useful information about the *Varṇa* system. They reflect the social systems of the times and also provide us with an insight into Devala's own views about social realities existing outside the narrow limits of the four *Varṇas*. The details appearing in the passages yield valuable data for reconstructing the social history of ancient times and add to the fullness of our view about the treatment of the *Varṇa* system in the *dharmasūtras*. In view of its very useful account and distinct contribution to the formulation of the social system the *Devaladharmasūtra* deserves to be ranked among the earliest and foremost *dharmasūtra* texts.²⁹

29. Our views on the date of the *Devaladharmasūtra* will appear shortly.

of the four varnas with the same degree of sanctity. The Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras are all equally sacred and equally entitled to the same rights and duties.

10. Another point of view is that the four varnas are not equally sacred. The Brahmins are the most sacred, followed by the Kshatriyas, then the Vaishyas, and finally the Shudras. This view is based on the fact that the Brahmins are the only varna who are entitled to perform the most sacred duties, such as the sacrifice, and who are also the only varna who are entitled to receive the most sacred gifts, such as the oblation. The Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras are all considered to be less sacred than the Brahmins, and are therefore entitled to fewer rights and duties.

11. Another point of view is that the four varnas are all equally sacred, but that they are entitled to different duties. The Brahmins are entitled to perform the sacrifice, the Kshatriyas to fight, the Vaishyas to trade, and the Shudras to serve.

Thus, we see that the four varnas are not equally sacred, and that they are entitled to different duties. This view is based on the fact that the Brahmins are the only varna who are entitled to perform the most sacred duties, such as the sacrifice, and who are also the only varna who are entitled to receive the most sacred gifts, such as the oblation. The Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras are all considered to be less sacred than the Brahmins, and are therefore entitled to fewer rights and duties.

GHATAKARPARA UND MEGHADŪTA : EINIGE BEMERKUNGEN ZUM ALTER DES BOTENGEDICHTS

von

SIEGFRIED LIENHARD

Ein verhältnismässig frühes Gedicht, welches das Thema der Regenzeit aufgreift und mit erotischer Stimmung durchsetzt, ist das *Ghaṭakarpāra* (*kāvya*).¹ Das 20 bis 24² Strophen umfassende Werkchen wird, wie der *Rtusamhāra*, gern mit der Autorschaft Kālidāśas verbunden oder gilt als von Ghaṭakarpāra (kavi) verfasst, dessen Name sowie auch den Titel der Dichtung die Ueberlieferung aus der letzten Strophe herauslesen will: Der Autor gibt dort das kühne Versprechen, dass er einem grösseren Meister des Reims als er selber es ist Wasser in einem zerbrochenen Krüge (*ghaṭa-karpāra*) derreichen würde. Die Legende macht Ghaṭakarpāra zu einem Zeitgenossen Kālidāśas und einem der neun Dichter und Gelehrtenjuwelen an König Vikramādityas Hof. Leider ist dies ebenso wenig beweisbar wie die Tatsache, dass eine Dichterpersönlichkeit namens Ghaṭakarpāra wirklich gelebt hat. Sicher ist das kleine Gedicht, das gewisse thematische Ähnlichkeiten mit dem *Meghadūta* aufweist, nicht ein Werk Kālidāśas. Abgesehen davon, dass das *Ghaṭakarpārakāvya* nicht die Höhen der Kālidāśischen Wortkunst erreicht, scheint wenig wahrscheinlich, dass es die Absicht des grossen *kāvya*-Meisters gewesen sein konnte, zwei in ihrer Art einander so nahe stehende Werke zu schaffen.

Das *Ghaṭakarpāra* wird von Abhinavagupta als ein *kulaka* vorgestellt,³ worunter dieser bedeutende Kenner klassischer Dichtung jedoch nicht eine zusammenhängende Strophenreihe von fünf bis fünfzehn Versen versteht, sondern eine besondere Gattung gesungener Dichtung, ein *gītakāvya*, das – wie alle Mehrstrophendichtung – ein einheitliches Thema behandelt, doch vorzugsweise in musikalischer Form, d. h. vermittels Gesang, Tanz und instrumentaler Begleitung interpretiert worden war. Das *Ghaṭakarpāra* ist in fünf verschie-

1. Lit.: S. L. KATRE, *The Ghaṭakarpāra Problem*, Vikrama Vol., Ujjain 1948; S. K. Ramachandra RAO, *A Forgotten Sanskrit Poet*, AP XXXI (1960), p. 115f.; Ch. VAUDEVILLE, *A Note on the Ghaṭakarpāra and the Meghadūta*, AIOC II (1959), p. 37 ff. und JOIB IX (1959/60), p. 125 ff., B. PARLIER, *La Ghaṭakarpāravivṛti d' Abhinavagupta, texte traduit et commenté*, Paris 1975 (= Publications de l' Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Série in -8°, Fasc. 39).

2. Die kaschmirische Rezension, die auch von Abhinavagupta kommentiert wird, umfasst 21 Strophen.

3. *Vivṛti ad Ghaṭakarp.* 1.

denen Metren geschrieben, und wie der Dichter in eben der Schlusstrophe deutlich hervorhebt, waren sein besonderer Stolz die kunstvollen *yamaka*-Reime, die er am Schluss jeder einzelnen halben und ganzen Strophe angebracht hat. Das Gedicht beschreibt die beginnende Regenzeit sowie das Bild einer jugendlich Schönen, deren Geliebter, ein Reisender, noch immer nicht heimgekehrt ist. Während die erste und letzte Strophe Worte des Dichters enthalten, sind die Mehrzahl der Strophen (oder vielleicht sämtliche Strophen) in den Mund der Geliebten (*nāyikā*) gelegt, die überwältigt von Sehnsucht und Trennungsschmerz, bald ihre Vertraute (*sakhī*) anredet, bald die aufsteigenden Wolken (Strophe 2 und 3), den fern weilenden Freund ihres Herzens (Strophe 4) oder einzelne für die Regenzeit typische Bäume wie den Sarja- (Strophe 11), den Kuṭaja- (Strophe 12) oder Nīpa-Baum (Strophe 13) anspricht. Konfiguration und Struktur des Gedichtes sind locker. Nach Abhinavagupta, welcher das *Ghaṭakarpara* als ein *oeuvre* Kālidāsas erachtet und es als ein Meisterwerk vor allem der unausgesagten Bedeutung auslegt, treten als Sprecher der einzelnen Strophen nicht allein der Poet und die *nāyikā* auf, letztere in den Strophen 2-5 und 8-14; Sprecherin der Strophen 6-7 ist nach der Meinung Abhinavaguptas die von der *nāyikā* entsendete Botin (*dūti*), Sprecherin von 15-19 die Gegenbotin (*pratidūti*), die Worte des *nāyaka* überbringt. Es empfiehlt sich, das Gedicht in zwei Teilen zu interpretieren: während im ersten und längeren (Str. 2-14) die Klage der *nāyikā* vorgebracht wird, enthält der zweite (Str. 15-19) die Antwort der Freundin (*sakhī*), welche mit ihren die Regenzeit schildernden Versen auf die Ursache des langen Ausbleibens des *nāyaka* hinweist. Genauere Prüfung erweist freilich, dass der dritte Viertel der Dichtung (Str. 10-14) eine Art Zwischenspiel darstellt. Der Kontext legt zwar nahe, dass wir diese Verse – gemeinsam mit 2-9 – als Äusserungen der *nāyikā* lesen, doch lässt der Aufbau der Strophen, was ihre Sprecherin angeht, an einen ganz bestimmten Frauentyp denken: die verlassene, in ihrem Kummer fast geistesgestörte (*unmattā*) Geliebte, die durch die Landschaft irrend, Pflanzen und Tiere anredet⁴ (Str. 10: Beschreibung des Ketana-Baums, 11-13: Anrede des Sarja, Kuṭaja und Nīpa, 14: Beschreibung der Biene):

tat sādhu yat tvām sutarum sasarja

prajāpatiḥ kāmanivōsa sarja |

tvam mañjarībhiḥ pravaro vanānām

netrotsaviś cāsi sayauvanānām⁵ || (11)

4. Auch der Kommentar Abhinavaguptas sieht die Liebende von Baum zu Baum gehen.

5. Die *yamaka*-Reime sind durch Unterstreichung kenntlich gemacht.

„Prajāpati hat gut getan, Dich, schönen Baum, zu erschaffen, oh Sarja (-Baum), (Du) Stätte der Liebe.⁶ Mit Deinen Blütenbüscheln bist Du der schönste im Wald, bist ein Augenfest für die jungen (Frauen).“

navakadamba śiro 'vanatāsmi te
vasati vo madanaḥ kusumasmite |

kūṭaja kiṃ kusumair avahasyate
praṇipatāmi ca duḥprasahasya te || (12)

„Junger Kadamba (-Baum), ich neige mich (hier) vor Dir. In Deinen Blütenlächeln wohnt Liebe.⁷ Warum, Kūṭaja (-Baum), lachst Du mit Deinen Blüten mich aus? (Auch) vor Dir, schwer ertragbarem, neige ich mich.“ Wir finden ähnliche, doch künstlerisch sehr viel reifere Strophen im 4. Akt des Dramas *Vikramorvaśīya*, die jedoch dort in den Mund nicht einer Liebenden, sondern eines – ebenfalls verwirrten (*unmatta*) – Geliebten gelegt sind. Der genannte Akt ist stark lyrisch gehalten und besteht hauptsächlich aus einem langen Monolog des unsterblich verliebten Purūravas, der, allorts seine verschwundene Urvaśī suchend, verschiedene Pflanzen und Tiere befragt und bald heir und bald dort ein Zeichen der Liebsten zu sehen vermeint. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass die Strophen 10–14 des *Ghaṭakarpāra* solche Beschreibungen des geistesgestörten Geliebten nachahmen, die, in indischer Poesie, vielleicht unter Vermittlung des Volkslieds, eine sicher schon frühe Ausbildung fanden. Von übrigen Inkongruenzen sei hier nur genannt, dass unsere Dichtung, obwohl sie die Regenzeit schildert, in Strophe 14 zugleich mit dem Regen auch die Frühlingszeit (*madhunaḥ kāla*) und darum auch die honigsuchende Biene erwähnt. Wir sehen aus solchen und ähnlichen Zügen, dass die Strophenfolge nicht ganz so natürlich verläuft, ja in einzelnen Teilen einen geradezu anthologischen Eindruck vermittelt. Vielleicht hat der Dichter, in geschickt veranstalteter Wahl, allein eine Reihe von gereimten Liebesgedichten zur Regenzeit vortragen wollen? Oder schrieb er wenigstens einige Strophen zu Anfang als freistehende *muktakas* nieder, die er erst später ins *Ghaṭakarpāra* inkorporiert hat?

Die meisten Literaturgeschichten verfechten hartnäckig die Meinung, dass eben dieses kleine Gedicht einen frühen Vertreter des Boten (*dūtakāvya*) oder Botschaftsgedichtes (*sandeśakāvya*) darstelle. Meine Darlegung hat, wie ich glaube, erwiesen, dass diese Auffassung unhaltbar ist. Die *nāyikā* des *Ghaṭakarpāra* richtet ihre Liebesklage nicht bloss an eine Wolke, sondern die Wolken der Regenzeit überhaupt, spricht aber, wie wir oben festgestellt haben, nicht nur die Regenwolken an, sondern auch ihre Freundin, den fernen Geliebten

6. Oder: Wohnung des Liebesgottes.

7. Oder: der Liebesgott.

und einzelne Bäume. Keine dieser Erscheinungen wird mit einer dem *nāyaka* zu überbringenden Botschaft (*sandēśa*) beauftragt, noch sind die einzelnen Strophen des *Ghatakarparakāvya* durch eine – auch nur vage erkennbare – Hintergrund-story verbunden.

Im echten, zur Gattung des *khaṇḍakāvya* gehörigen *sandēśakāvya* sind diese Elemente jedoch immer vorhanden: Teils konstatiert der Poet zu Beginn des Gedichts, dass zwei junge Menschen einander sehr lieben, doch auf Grund eines Missgeschicks, einer Verbannung, der Entführung der Geliebten oder dgl., eine schmerzliche Trennung erleiden; teils sendet in der Zeit des Exils, um die Trennungsschmerzen zu lindern und dem zurückgebliebenen Partner Nachricht zu geben, der Liebende an die Geliebte (oder umgekehrt) eine längere Botschaft, die, im Gedicht zumeist mitgeteilt, durch die verschiedensten Wesen überbracht werden kann. Im *Meghadūta* Kālidāśas wird als Bote (*dūta*) eine Regenwolke beauftragt, im *Pavanadūta* Dhoyīs der Wind, im *Mayūrasandēśa* des Udaya ein Pfau, in anderen *dūta*-Gedichten der Mond, ein Papagei, eine Cakravāka-Ente, eine Biene usw. Die Dichtungen zerfallen im allgemeinen in zwei klar unterscheidbare Teile: einen ersten Abschnitt (*pūrvabhāga*), in welcher der/die Liebende dem Boten den meistens sehr langen Reiseweg darlegt, und einen zweiten Abschnitt (*uttarabhāga*), der die Beschreibung der Ankunft des Boten am Ziel, die Schilderung der Person, der Wohnung, des Zeitvertreibs usw. des Botschaftsempfängers und, meist kürzer gehalten, die Botschaft enthält.

Das berühmteste und zugleich älteste Botengedicht ist bekanntlich der *Meghadūta* Kālidāśas, der zwar unzähligen späteren *dūta*-Gedichten als das grosse Vorbild gedient hat, jedoch nicht, wie so gerne geglaubt wird, die Gattung des *dūta*-Gedichts erstmals in die *kāvya*-Literature eingeführt hat. Die Dichtungsform des *dūtakāvya* wurde ohne Zweifel, wie auch andere Formen der stark im Volkslied verhafteten Jahreszeitdichtung, schon lang vor Kālidāśa gepflegt, vermutlich mit Vorzug im Prākṛit, nur tritt diese Form, da ältere Proben verlorengegangen sein müssen, das erste Mal in eben dem lyrischen Meisterwerk Kālidāśas entgegen. Wir werden annehmen dürfen, dass das Botschaftsgedicht, eine wohletablierte Gattung des *kāvya* schon vor der Zeit Kālidāśas, bereits vom ersten Beginn mit Beschreibungen der Natur (Reiseweg), einer Jahreszeit und des Liebesschmerzes verknüpft war und es die Praxis bereits der frühesten Dichtungen war, als den poetisch ergiebigsten Hintergrund die Zeit des Monsuns, und als den geeignetsten Boten die Regenwolke zu wählen. Der in einem Botengedicht beschriebene Liebesaspekt ist nicht die glückliche Liebe (*sambhogaśṛṅgāra*), sondern die Trennung (*viraha*). Es ist deshalb wenig wahrscheinlich, dass, wie der Kommentator Mallinātha dafürhält, Kālidāśa die Inspiration zu seinem Gedicht aus dem *Rāmāyaṇa* Vālmīkis

geschöpft haben sollte. Gewiss, im *Yuddhakāṇḍa* (112 f.) des *Rāmāyaṇa* sendet Rāma seinen treuen Hanumat als Botengänger zu Sītā, die, aufs ferne Laṅkā entführt, dort nicht allein von Kummer verzehrt, sondern auch ärgstens von Rāvaṇa, dem Entführer und Herrn über Ceylon, bedrängt wird. Die Parallele ist indessen von bloss zufälliger Art. Schwerlich kann der Abschnitt im *Yuddhakāṇḍa*, obwohl der *Meghadūta* auch zahlreiche Hinweise auf gerade Vālmīki enthält, die Vorlage dargestellt haben, nach der Kālidāsa sein eigenes *dūta*-Gedicht konzipiert hat.⁸ Kālidāsa war sicherlich nicht der Begründer dieser späterhin so beliebten literarischen Gattung. Die Geschichte des Genres vor Kālidāsa liegt leider im Dunkel, doch basierten auch die frühesten, uns nicht erhaltenen Botengedichte auf zweifellos anderen als episch-rhapsodischen Quellen⁹. Nachrichtenüberbringer, besonders weibliche Boten (*dūti*), spielen eine bedeutende Rolle auch in der Konfiguration früher einstrophiger Liebesgedichte. Die ersten Anfänge des Botengedichts sind zweifellos hier und in der Erweiterung älterer, ihrem Umfang nach kleinerer Formen der Lyrik zu sehen.

Wie alle *sandēśa*-Gedichte sind bekanntlich auch die ca. 110 Strophen des *Meghadūta* in eine Art Rahmengeschichte gebettet: Ein Yakṣa, ein halb göttliches Wesen und Hüter der Schätze des Gottes Kubera, hat ein Vergehen begangen, weswegen sein Herr ihn aus der hoch im Norden, auf dem Berg Kālidāsa gelegenen Götterstadt Alakā in das ferne Rāmgiri ("Rāma-Berg") in Zentralindien verbannt, und zwar für die Zeit eines Jahres. Da der Yakṣa, im achten Monat der Trennung, die ersten Zeichen der Regenzeit sieht, beauftragt er eine am Himmel aufziehende Wolke, ihm den Freundschaftsdienst eines Boten zu leisten; Sie soll nach Alakā reisen und seiner dort traurig verweilenden Gattin eine tröstende Nachricht vom fernen Geliebten erbringen. – Tatsächlich besteht Kālidāsas Gedicht, mit Ausnahme von nur wenigen Strophen (die Echtheit der letzten Verse ist ausserst umstritten), aus nichts anderem als dem vom Yakṣa gegebenen Auftrag. Im *Pūrvamegha* beschreibt es die Einzelstationen des gewaltigen Wegs, den die Wolke nun antreten soll, im *Uttaramegha*¹⁰ die Herrlichkeit der Götterstadt

8. Wir finden das Motiv der Botenentsendung übrigens auch in der im *Mahābhārata* enthaltenen Sage von Nala und Damayanti (Entsendung einer Gans) und in Jātaka Nr. 297, dem *Kāmaṇḍikā-Jātaka* (Entsendung einer Krähe). Auf Hanumats Ueberbringung von Rāmas Botschaft an Sītā weist Kālidāsa in einem Vergleich in *Meghad.* II, 40.

9. Beachtung verdient, dass in der klassischen Tamil-Literatur das Genre des Botengedichts (*tūtu*, Skt. *dūta*) in embryonaler Form schon zur Zeit des III. Caṅkam vorliegt; s. K. V. ZELEBIL, *Tamil Literature*, HIL X, 1, Wiesbaden 1974, p. 205.

10. Die Kerala-Kommentatoren Pūrṇasarasvatī (P) und Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara (RP), die beide dem 14. Jahrhundert entstammen, bezeichnen den ersten Teil nicht als *Pūrvamegha*, sondern *Pūrvasandēśa* (P) bzw. *Prathamāvśvāsa* (RP), den zweiten Teil nicht als *Uttaramegha*, sondern *Uttarasandēśa* (P) oder *Dvītiyāvśvāsa* (RP).

Alakās, die verschiedene Zeichen zur Wiedererkennung des eigenen Hauses, das, nördlich des Palastes Kuberas gelegen, mit einem buntfarbenen Bogentor, einem Garten und einem Künstlichen Teiche geschmückt ist, und, am Schluss, in besonders ergreifenden Bildern, die nur mit Mühe die Tage verbringende Yakṣa-Gemahlin. Die an sich befremdende Tatsache, dass ein vernünftiges Wesen (wie es ein die Schätze Kuberas behütender Yakṣa doch sein soll) ein so lebloses Ding wie gerade eine Wolke als Bote entsendet, begründet der Dichter in einer der Einleitungsstrophen (I, 5) :

*dhūmajyotiḥsalilamarutāṇi saṁnipātāḥ kva meghaḥ
sandeśārthāḥ kva paṭukaraṇaiḥ prāṇibhīḥ prāpaṇīyāḥ |
ity autsukyād aparigaṇayan guhyakas tam yayāre
kāmarṭā hi prakṛtikṛpaṇāś cetanācetaneṣu ||*

“ In seiner (wilden) Sehnsucht nicht damit rechnend, dass eine Wolke – eine (blosse) Ansammlung aus Rauch, Licht, Wasser und Wind – unvereinbar ist mit dem Gehalt einer Nachricht (*sandeśa*), beauftragte der Guhyaka diese (Wolke) : Liebeskranke sind ja von Natur aus erbärmlich, (wenn es gilt), zwischen Unbewusst und Bewusst (zu unterscheiden).” Nun wendet Kālidāsa in dieser Strophe den Ausdruck “ liebeskrank ” nicht von ungefähr an, denn der *nāyaka*-Typ des *Meghadūta*, ja der *nāyaka* bzw. die *nāyikā* des *sandeśa*-Gedichts überhaupt, ist gerade der trauernde Liebende, der (oder : die) aus verzweifelter Liebe gleichsam Verrückte (*unmatta*). Es ist ein Liebender am Rand der Verzweiflung, der nur mit Not die ihm auferlegte Trennung erträgt. Beachtung verdient, dass der Poetiker Bhāmaha (etwa Ende des 7. Jahrhunderts), ein vielleicht nicht sehr grosser Liebhaber von *dūta*-Gedichten, in seinem Werk *Kāvya-lamkāra* (I, 42-44) ausdrücklich erwähnt, dass – im *kāvya* seiner Zeit – eine Wolke, der Wind, der Mond, eine Biene, ein Hārīta-Vogel, eine Cakravāka-Ente, ein Papagei u- dgl. als Bote (*dūta*) auftreten können, Bhāmaha betrachtet diese Praxis einiger Dichter allerdings als einen poetischen Fehler (*doṣa*), und zwar als *ayuktimat*, als etwas nicht Passendes. Da die genannten Wesen nicht sprechen oder bestenfalls nur unartikulierte Laute hervorbringen können, ist es nicht richtig, sie als Boten auftreten zu lassen :

*ayuktimad yathā dūtā jalabhṛnmārutendavaḥ |
tathā bhramarahārītacaḥkravākaśukādayaḥ || (I, 42)
avāco 'vyaktavōcāś ca dūradeśavicāriṇaḥ |
katham dūtyaṁ prapadyerann iti yuktyā na yujyate || (I, 43)*

Doch, so führt Bhāmaha weiterhin aus, sei diese Praxis erlaubt, wenn der Sprechende, d. h. der (oder : die) Botschaft Aussendende, ein *unmatta* (*-nāyaka*), ein auf Grund unbändiger Sehnsucht verwirrter Liebhaber ist :

yadi cotkanṭhayā yat tad unmatta iva bhāṣate |
tathā bhavatu bhūmnedam sumedhobhiḥ prayujyate || (I, 44)

Nun übt diese Stelle bei Bhāmaha nicht, wie so gerne gemeint wird, strenge Kritik am Botengedicht überhaupt aus; die zitierten Strophen bezeugen vielmehr die grosse Beliebtheit der Gattung zu Bhāmahas Lebzeit und beweisen, zumal wir eine gewisse Zeitspanne der Entwicklung des Genres annehmen müssen, ein längeres Bestehen des *sandēśakāvya* bereits vor Bhāmaha. Kālidāsa hat mit dem *Meghadūta*, wie schon oben gesagt, diese Kunstform keineswegs selber geschaffen, sondern sie der Tradition der Epoche entnommen, sie jedoch weiter verfeinert und, wie wir annehmen dürfen, nach eigenem Geist zurechtgemacht hat. Kālidāsa hat künstlerisch ausgewertet, was eine reizvolle, bereits fest etablierte Gattung an Möglichkeiten zur Weiterentwicklung und, wie immer im *kāvya*, an aus veränderter Sicht neu Gestaltbarem bot. Es sei beachtet, dass sowohl Bhāmaha als auch Kālidāsa in der oben zitierten Begründung die gleichbedeutenden Ausdrücke *utkanṭhā* und *autsukya*, " (wild gesteigerte) Sehnsucht ", verwenden und beide Texte den Botenentsender als *unmatta*, " geistesgestört ", bzw. *kāmārta*, " liebeskrank ", charakterisieren. Auch gebrauchen beide Verfasser den zentralen Begriff, welcher die ganze Gattung als eben *sandēśa*- oder *dūtakāvya* bezeichnet : Kālidāsa erwähnt in der Strophe des *Meghadūta* den Ausdruck *sandēśa*, Bhāmaha in *Kāvyaḷamkāra* I, 42 das Schlüsselwort *dūta*.

NOTES ON CENTRAL ASIAN BUDDHIST ICONOGRAPHY

By

LOKESH CHANDRA

The exhibition of the treasures of Central Asian art from the West Berlin State Museums held at The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, has awakened fresh interest in understanding this important phase of Buddhist art. Several items call for more precise identification.

1. Śiva

A head from Khocho, dated to the 7th century, evidences Indo-Iranian work. It is identified as 'the head of a devatā'. It has half-open eyes, with a 'dreamy look': this is a yoga posture of intense meditation in which the eyes are concentrated on the tip of the nose. The shallow incision between the eyebrows represents the third eye. The hairdo has the centre partings "while the rest of the hair is swept up in tresses that disappear under a lozenge-patterned chaplet" (AASR 1982: 158 no. 96). This hairstyle is associated with Śiva: "the hair parted in the center and then swept up on the sides into a topknot is found on other Śiva heads" of the eighth century from Afghanistan. A marble face from Afghanistan is illustrated in DEBORAH (1982: 101 pl. 22). It is remarkably identical with the Khocho head, which in all probability represents Śiva.

Two painted clay heads from the Cave of the Statues, Kizil (AASR 1982: 70-72 nos. 11, 12) are dated to the sixth century and have the third eye painted on the forehead. They were made from moulds. A great number of stucco moulds have survived and bear Sanskrit names of craftsmen on the reverse. Both have been identified as "head of a bodhisattva." The crown is similar to the aforesaid Khocho head. The style of the crown and the third eye confirm it as a representation of Śiva.

2. Nīlakanṭha Avalokiteśvara

A fragment of a wall-painting was found in the rubble of Temple 9 at Bezeklik (lit. "place of paintings"). It has been identified as the head of a brahmin "with long strands of hair, apparently wind-blown, the thick beard ... This fragment, unlike most of the other paintings found at the site, shows the influence of the Indian school" (AASR 1982: 147 no. 81). The identification follows LE COQ (1913: pl. 39d). The third eye between the eyebrows raises

new possibilities. The Bezeklik monastic complexes were situated on high cliffs on the right bank of the Sengim River. Winding paths lead to the top of the cliff where several hundred temples have been preserved. These geographic features recall the description of Mount Potalaka of Avalokiteśvara in Hsüan-tsang (BEAL 1884: 2. 233): "To the east of the Malaya mountains is Mount Po-ta-lo-kia (Potalaka). The passes of this mountain are very dangerous; its sides are precipitous, and its valleys rugged. On the top of the mountain is a lake; its waters are clear as a mirror. From a hollow proceeds a great river which encircles the mountain as it flows down twenty times and then enters the southern sea. By the side of the lake is a rock-palace of the Devas. Here Avalokiteśvara in coming and going takes his abode. Those who strongly desire to see this Bodhisattva do not regard their lives, but, crossing the water (fording the streams), climb the mountain, forgetful of its difficulties and dangers; of those who make the attempt there are very few who reach the summit. But even of those who dwell below the mountain, if they earnestly pray and beg to behold the god, sometimes he appears as Tsz' -tsai-t'ien (Īśvara-deva), sometimes under the form of a yogī (a Pāśupata); he addresses them with benevolent words and then they obtain their wishes according to their desires." The hair of the Bezeklik head are in typical ascetic style, he wears the thick ear-rings of a yogin, and has the third eye on the forehead like Maheśvara. The trifoliate ornament around the ear-rings symbolises the trifoliate leaf of *bilva* or wood-apple tree, *Aegle marmelos*. This tree is sacred to Śiva: its leaves are dedicated to Śiva and its fruit is the *avyakta* form of Śiva (LIEBERT 1976: 43). The mural seems to represent the Potala Avalokiteśvara.

Avalokiteśvara appears as the metamorphosis of Śiva, the great yogin in the Nīlakantha-sūtra. There are eight translations of this text into Chinese:

A. D.	translator	K	T	Nj
624-649	Chih-t'ung	K 292	T 1057b	Nj 318
650-661	Bhagavaddharma	K 294	T 1060	Nj 320
709	Bodhiruci	K 293	T 1058	Nj 319
731-736	Vajrabodhi	K 1270	T 1061	—
—	"	—	T 1112	—
723-	Amoghavajra	—	T 1111	—
723-	"	—	T 1113b	—
14th cent.	Dhyānabhadra	—	T 1113a	—

Bhagavaddharma translated the sūtra at Khotan, as we are informed by the colophon of its Chinese scroll from Tun-huang (STEIN 3793 at the British Library). Thus the Nīlakaṇṭha Avalokiteśvara was popular at Khotan in the first half of the seventh century. Twelve scrolls have been found at Tun-huang (GILES 1957 : 105-106) which indicate his vogue at Tun-huang as well.

The version of Amoghavajra is most popular in China, Japan and Korea to this day. It is a Chinese transliteration of the lost Sanskrit text. It speaks of Nīlakaṇṭha as the ascetic (siddha), the great ascetic (mahāsiddha), the lord of ascetic yogins (siddha-yogīśvara) : *siddhāya svāhā* / *mahā-siddhāya svāhā* / *siddha-yogīśvarāya svāhā* / *Nīlakaṇṭhāya svāhā* (LOKESH CHANDRA 1979). The Bezeklik head is a remarkable portrayal of a great ascetic yogin.

The version of Chih-t'ung is the earliest and fuller than the vulgate version of Amoghavajra. Chih-t'ung's version invokes Nīlakaṇṭha with additional epithets, like : *kṛṣṇa-jatā-mukuta e* 'oh one with a diadem of black matted locks', and as unique in the fury of his laughter (*aṭṭahāsa*). The Bezeklik head "seems agitated, as if taking part in a discussion.... the slightly opened mouth in which a few teeth are visible all strengthen the impression of a heated argument". (AASR 1982 : 147). This posture represents the *aṭṭahāsa*, or furious laughter of Nīlakaṇṭha. The Bezeklik head in all likelihood is Nīlakaṇṭha Avalokiteśvara as the great ascetic yogin, the mahā-siddha-yogīśvara.

3. Vasiṣṭha and Arundhatī


Fragment of a mural painting from the Second Domed Cave, Kumtura has been identified broadly as a brahmin. The painting belongs to the early Indian-influenced phase, dated around A. D. 500. He has the typical dress of an ascetic and holds a flask (kamaṇḍalu) in his right hand. Behind him is a devatā, to which a rosary of beads appears to have been added later (AASR

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那	𑖦	悉	𑖦	摩	𑖦	悉	𑖦
囉	𑖦	陀	𑖦	訶	𑖦	陀	𑖦
謹	𑖦	喻	𑖦	悉	𑖦	夜	𑖦
堀	𑖦	藝	𑖦	陀	𑖦	夜	𑖦
同五十五		二十		夜		婆	
婆	𑖦	室	𑖦	婆	𑖦	訶	𑖦
婆	𑖦	幡	𑖦	訶	𑖦	法	𑖦
訶	𑖦	伽	𑖦			語	𑖦
六十五		羅	𑖦				
		耶	𑖦				
		婆	𑖦				
		婆	𑖦				
		訶	𑖦				
		三十五					

1982 : 80 no. 18). This seems to be a representation of Vasiṣṭha followed by Arundhatī. Vasiṣṭha is the owner of the wish-fulfilling cow Kāmadhenu and the leader of brahmarṣis : as such his attribute is the kamaṇḍalu, the gourd jar of ascetics with a narrow neck. Arundhatī is renowned for her faithfulness to her husband Vasiṣṭha. She is the inseparable consort of the Sage. When a ṛṣi is accompanied by his spouse, they are most likely to be Vasiṣṭha and Arundhatī. The question arises : does the couple occur in Buddhist art ? Vasiṣṭha and Arundhatī are in fact depicted in the Sino-Japanese Garbhadhātu maṇḍala. They are represented together (Esot. 206, 207) in the external quarter of vajras, wherein deities of the Hindu pantheon are shown. They head the deities on the East, followed by the Sun (Sūrya), Ketu, Mithuna, Vṛṣa, Meṣa and so on. Arundhatī is a personification of the morning star, which precedes sunrise, and thus she naturally comes before Sūrya in the maṇḍala. Their Sino-Japanese names are Basu-sen (Vasiṣṭha-ṛṣi) and Basusen-kō (the consort kō of Vasiṣṭha ṛṣi). Vasiṣṭha has a bloomed lotus in the right hand while his left turns a rosary. Arundhatī holds a leaf and bud of a lotus in her right and a lotus flower in the left hand. The Sino-Japanese maṇḍala can be dated to the eighth century. It is based on the Mahāvairocana-sūtra, which was translated into Chinese by Śubhakarasiṃha and I-hsing in A. D. 725.

婆藪仙后尊白肉
此八婆藪仙及尊大赤
肉已「青全軌三時斯
仙



4. Tukhāra Melody

A divine musician was painted on the walls of the Prayer-Wheel Cave at Kizil, dated around A. D. 600-650 (AASR 1982 : 93 no. 29). Chinese records mention the introduction of melodies and musical instruments from Kucha since 138 B. C. to the eighth century A. D. (Liu MAU-TSAI 1969 : 99-108). Among the instruments from Kucha was the four-stringed lute. It can be seen in

the hands of Sarasvatī in the Sino-Japanese Garbhadhātu maṇḍala (Esot. 331). Sujīva, a member of the royal house of Kucha, came to China in A. D. 568 and introduced the seven keys of Kucha music : sādharita, kaisika, śadja, śadja-grāma, śādava, pañcama, vṛṣabha.

Chang Ch'ien brought back musical instruments and melodies from Kucha to the Chinese capital Ch'ang-an in 138 B. C. "Only the name of these melodies has come down to us : it is *Mo-ho-tou-le*. *Mo-ho* is clearly the Chinese transcription of *mahā* (great). As far as *tou-le* is concerned, the last word still remains to be spoken ; it is perhaps a variant of Tou-k'u-le, or Tochara. The name of this melody suggests an Indian origin. Possibly this originally Indian melody was first known at Kucha, where, as we know, Tocharian was spoken in later days. It was the center of Indian-influenced music in Central Asia, which later spread to China. At that early date Kucha must already have been under Indian cultural influence. In China, a son-in-law of Emperor Wu-ti (140-87 B. C.) wrote twenty-eight new tunes based on the *Mo-ho-tou-le* melody, which were played as military music" (translation of Liu MAU-TSAI 1969 : 100 in AASR 1982 : 93). We do not find any Tukhāra melody in Sanskrit texts, except Turuṣka-Gauḍa rāga in Saṅgīta-ratnākara 3. 383, or Turuṣka-Toḍī rāga in Rāga-vibodha of Somanātha 247. It is a strange coincidence of a historic leap that the Rāg Tukhārī should occur in the Guru Grantha of the Sikhs (pages 1107-17). In the Tukhārī rāg (or *chant* = Skt. *chandas*), the first piece is the *Bārāh māhā* 'twelve months' by Guru Nanakdev, the second by the fourth Guru Ramdas (p. 1113), and the third and last piece by the fifth Guru Arjundev. This affirms that the Chinese transcription of the melody *Mo-ho-tou-le* is indeed *Mahā-Tukhāra*.

5. Diñnāga

The silk-painting of an 'Angry Arhat' was found by the Third German Expedition at the lower end of the Cave of Eightyfour Siddhas on the foothills near Turfan. It has been dated to the 8-9th century. The figure represented is not an 'Angry Arhat' but Diñnāga, the celebrated master of Buddhist logic. He is in a violent mudrā of disputation, vanquishing the heretics. A similar Tibetan painting can be seen in the Prof. Raghu Vira Collection at the International Academy of Indian Culture. Diñnāga is one of the Six Jewels (Tib. *rgyan drug*) of Mahāyāna in the Tibetan tradition. The 84 Siddhas as well as the Six Jewels are well-established in Tibetan iconography. The fact that the painting was recovered from the Cave of 84 Siddhas lends support to its identification as that of Diñnāga. If so, it would be the earliest representation of Diñnāga in a militant mudrā : at Nālandā he had defeated Brāhmaṇa Sudurjaya (lit. invincible) and other Tīrtha dialecticians. Since he refuted the

Tīrthikas, he was called a 'Fighting Bull in Discussion.' "His whole life was passed in giving blows and receiving counterblows. ... Kālidāsa, the prince of poets, warns [in] his poem to avoid the 'rugged hand' (*sihūla-hasta*) of Diñnāga. ... Mallinātha compares him with a 'rock' (*adri-kalpa*)" (VIDYABHUSANA 1920 : 273). The Buddhists were conscious of the awe-inspiring power of their knowledge. Their belligerent attitude against the heretics was expressed in violent terms, for example, in the Ratu Boko inscription of A. D. 792/3 : "I pay homage to Him who is the fire of noble Dharma, who shines forth quashing the prevailing beliefs of outstanding heretics, struck by whose majesty the heretics [strong like] bulls panic away in fright, who in an instant reduces to ashes the numerous attachments to heresy and who burns out all bondages" (LOKESH CHANDRA 1980 : 7).

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GRAMMATICALITY AND MEANINGFULNESS

By

BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL

Professor R. N. DANDEKAR is really the doyen of the Indologists of our country. For about half a century he has been associated with the Sanskrit and related studies and researches. All-India Oriental Conference has flourished and still flourishes under his leadership. Nobody can deny that he has been the living inspiration for numerous students, scholars and professors. And above all, his charming personality has endeared him to us all. Professor DANDEKAR has published extensively in many fields of Sanskrit studies: Vedic, Pāṇinian, Hinduism, philosophical systems and what not. As a token of my love and respect for Professor DANDEKAR, I wish to present a paper which falls in the borderline of philosophy and linguistics. There is, in my mind, an autobiographical association of this topic with Professor DANDEKAR. For, nearly five years ago, I gave a lecture on this topic at the University of Poona, in which Professor DANDEKAR was kind enough to accept the chair.

In a previous publication¹ I have suggested that the notion of *śābdabodha* can be taken to correspond to the notion of the 'meaning' of a sentence. I wish to develop this point here. This may explain the rather difficult notion of *śābdabodha* and throw some light upon the rather obscure notion 'meaning'.

Sanskrit philosophers of language have generally talked about three or four different concepts to explicate the notion of 'meaning' (*artha*) of a sentence. They are *ākāṅkṣā* 'syntactic expectancy', *yogyatā* 'competence' or 'possibility', *āsatti* ' (physical, i. e., spatio-temporal) proximity', and *tātparyā* 'intention'. Of these, I will not talk about the last concept. I shall try to concentrate upon the first three. Preliminary explanation of these terms has been given by various modern authors. My article mentioned in footnote 1 may be consulted. K. KUNJUNNI RAJA gave a very brief but lucid account of them in his *Indian Theories of Meaning* (Adyar, 1969), pp. 157-187. Looking at the analysis and definition of these three concepts given over the centuries in the writings of both philosophers and grammarians, I believe the following to be one of the clear ways of understanding these concepts: The first tries to ensure the grammatical correctness of a sentence, the second its significance or meaningfulness while third its 'physical' unity. I am aware that this view of mine will

1. MATILAL, B. K. "Indian Theorists on the Nature of the Sentence (*vākya*)". *Foundations of Language*, 2 (1966), pp. 377-393.

be controversial. Even some Sanskrit authors may be quoted to controvert it. But if it has any credence, it can throw a great deal of light upon some intricate issues of modern philosophy of language as the following piece will show.

Śābdabodha is a piece of knowledge that arises in the hearer from the utterance of a sentence. Sometimes it is translated as 'verbal testimony' or rather 'knowledge derived from verbal testimony' (in traditional terminology), as opposed to knowledge based upon perception and inference. For short '*śābdabodha*' may be translated as 'verbal knowledge' provided we are careful so as not to contrast the word 'verbal' with 'real'. For, sometimes it may be claimed that somebody has only "verbal" knowledge but no "real" knowledge. Verbal knowledge is indirect knowledge as much as inferential knowledge is indirect, but this cannot weaken its claim to knowledge-hood.

Common sense takes verbal knowledge to be less reliable than perception and inference. For in acquiring verbal knowledge we have to depend essentially upon the reliability of the speaker, upon his honesty, competence and authority, and these criteria are proverbially uncertain. Traditionally, a reliable or trustworthy speaker should have the following virtues: freedom from error or illusion, lack of the intent to deceive, and lack of any defect in his sense-faculties (cf. *bhrama-vipralipsā-karaṇāpātava*). Such a person is called *āpta*. Vātsyāyana has said under Nyāyasūtra 1. 1. 7 that any person can be an *āpta*, irrespective of his caste, creed or religion. Contrary to our common belief, one should note that neither perception nor inference should be in any way better than verbal knowledge as far as reliability or certainty is concerned. For reliability of the sense-organs, adequacy of the evidence or reason (for inference) and trustworthiness of the speaker – all sail by the same boat. As far as Nyāya is concerned none of them would be infallible. Each of them can, on occasion, mislead and generate error. But, nevertheless, knowledge is generated from all these sources.

The hearer's knowledge, or the cognitive episode arising in the hearer from the utterance of a sentence, is said to grasp the 'meaning' (*artha*) of the sentence uttered. Most Indian philosophers of language agree on this point, viz., on such an interpretation of the term *artha* (meaning) in the context of a sentence. What this episode *grasps* has a 'structured content' (cf. *viśayatā*) which we can make more intelligible by calling it the structure of a thought. When we say that a particular hearer *a* understands the meaning, we mean thereby that *a* has a particular 'structured' thought. It may be said therefore that the Indian philosophers were concerned with the 'hearer's meaning' rather than the 'speaker's meaning'. Meaning is not what is (or happens) in 'the head of' the speaker, and arguably, it is not also what happens 'in the head of' the hearer. For the hearer may hear and not understand the meaning at all or misunderstand it. Sometimes one may say, "I have heard what you said, but I

have not comprehended (or *fully* comprehended) the meaning." Presumably we have access to the 'inner world' of the mind of neither the speaker nor the hearer. But the hearer is conceived here to be an 'ideal hearer', who is any competent language-user. The structured thought that is supposed to arise in such an ideal hearer is something that is intersubjectively available: it is presumably shared by any competent language-user who hears the sentence uttered. In this way, it is claimed that an attempted account or analysis of the knowledge of such an ideal hearer would be an account of the *meaning* of the sentence. To be sure, the knowledge-episodes of all the individual hearers may be distinct and different as episodes, but they all share the same structured content. Obviously, we have to exclude a lot of other variables from this concept of the knowledge-episode of the ideal hearer. Various implications and presuppositions of the statement made, may be understood by the hearers, and they may be understood differently by different hearers at the same time. But these would not be our concern here. The ideal hearer is like a computing machine, where the input would be the utterance and the output would be a corresponding uniquely structured thought or knowing episode.

In this style of philosophising, or in this way of doing the philosophy of language, the structured content of the ideal hearer's knowledge is regarded as giving the so-called semantic interpretation of the sentence heard. It is maintained that each grammatico-syntactic element along with the lexical items contributes in some way or other to such a semantic interpretation captured in the knowledge-episode of the hearer. Such a knowledge-episode arises in the ideal hearer as soon as he understands what is said, although there are no observable behavioural criteria, until and unless the hearer acts accordingly or does something in reply. We assume that the hearer has the knowledge-episode, provided he has been an attentive hearer and is a competent language-user.

The grammatico-syntactic elements of the uttered sentence can be conveniently mapped into the analysis of the structured-content of the said knowledge-episode of the hearer. The term *śābdabodha* or *anvayabodha* is sometimes used to mean simply the description of this mapping. This knowledge of the hearer is propositional or qualificative in the sense that its structured content admits of a qualificand-qualifier analysis.²

The Nyāya theory of *śābdabodha* obviously allows that the domain of 'possible' combinations excludes the so-called impossible combinations, but it would include, besides the actual or 'true' combinations, a large number of combinations or word-clusters that would pass the test of physical proximity

2. For more on this point, consult the article in footnote 1, and see also my *The Navyanyāya Doctrine of Negation* (Cambridge, 1967), pt. 1.

(*āsatti*), that of the syntactico-grammaticality (on our interpretation of *ākāṅkṣā*), and also that of possibility or compatibility (*yogyatā*), but would still fail to generate a true cognition or knowledge in the ideal hearer. Why? Predominance of false sentences uttered by deceitful or ignorant or incompetent persons is a matter of common experience. Hence the hearer, no matter whether or not he is aware of the speaker's intention or his qualifications, would have a false awareness (a false belief) with a structured content similar to that of a piece of knowledge. In such cases, we usually say that the uttered sentence is meaningful, but false. In view of this problem, further conditions were imposed upon the situation giving rise to an episode of verbal knowledge, viz., the speaker must be an *āpta*, a reliable person.

What then are these 'possible' falsities? How do they differ from the impossible ones? For, to be sure, the tendency in Nyāya has been to push most of the so-called unactualized possibles, the flying horse or the rabbit horn, into the domain of the 'impossibles' (i. e., the incompatibles, *a-yogyā*). This leads to the discussion of the intricate problems of modal notions, which I wish to skip in this connection. There is, however, one easy way to distinguish the 'possibles' from the 'impossibles' in the Nyāya theory. If our ideal hearer would have an awareness, true or false, from the utterance concerned, then the combination (uttered) would be pushed into the domain of possibility. Truth or falsity would be determined in this theory by the speaker's qualifications etc. Our ideal hearer may be ignorant whether the awareness that he has, is a true one or a false one, until and unless he makes further investigations: he may check the speaker's qualifications, or the situation in which the supposed combination has been stated to be actual, or use some other means. As long as the awareness arises in him in the required fashion without any further investigation, we have to accept the said combination as belonging to the domain of the possibles. If, in spite of the utterance's passing the test of proximity and syntactico-grammaticality, i. e., *āsatti* and *ākāṅkṣā*, the required awareness does not arise in the way it has been described, then the combination would belong to the domain of the impossibles.

Some modern philosophers (e. g., W. V. QUINE) have raised doubts about the intelligibility of the analytic-synthetic distinction.³ It has been argued that the criterions for a clear-cut distinction cannot be formulated without involving one into circularity, and hence it is a dogma of empiricism to maintain that the distinction is intelligible. If this is true then a consequence of it seems to be that a clear-cut line of demarcation between the unactualized possibles and the impossibles would vanish, or would be ever elusive. For, to be sure, what

3. QUINE, W. V., *From a Logical Point of View*, Cambridge (1961), pp. 1-19. For several very interesting examples of 'unactualised possible' or even 'impossibles' see Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka* (B. Indica edn.), p. 533.

would be an 'impossible' combination in the Nyāya theory is a mirror-image of what would be roughly *analytically* false: "Bachelors are married." Arguments in the fashion of QUINE can be given to show that the combinations, such as the rabbit-horn, sprinkling with fire, the barren woman's son and the water-lake having fire, are all, strictly speaking, impossible, for no satisfactory criterion can be formulated to show that some of them are 'possible' while the others are not. The idea behind this is sometimes expressed by the claim of some modern Naiyāyikas that if horns started growing on rabbits, the new creatures would not be rabbits any more! In fact, it has been reported that some rabbit-like creatures have been found with horns on them. Probably Nyāya would say that these are not rabbits but belong to a (slightly) different species.

In fact, Nyāya would contend that the domain of the unactualized possibles (presumably referred to by such 'possible' but unactual combinations of words) should be restricted to the domain of false possibilities. Being guided by various considerations, we do assume a lot of things and facts to be actual. Most of them, however, after further investigation and further consideration, turn out to be unactual, false. When even such initial assumption is not made by us although we are confronted with some presumably grammatically combinable word-cluster, we have passed beyond the domain of the 'possibles' and hovering over the domain of the impossibles. 'A rabbit-horn' would be an item of this kind. For had we not been informed about rabbits in the way we are actually informed, or had we even been differently informed, we would have assumed the said combination to be a 'possible' one. And in that case, Nyāya would concede, an awareness would have arisen in us from the relevant utterance: the rabbit's horn.

I shall now comment briefly on a related problem: that of determining a fixed borderline between syntactic and grammatical acceptability and what may be called semantic acceptability. The issue is connected with the problem of defining grammaticality. The task of defining grammaticality is viewed by moderners as involving some intricate problems.⁴ Indian philosophers sometimes discussed the issue about where the domain of *ākāṅkṣā* ends and the notion of *yogyatā* takes over. For example, why, it may be asked, cannot the requirement of a liquid or water as an instrument for sprinkling or wetting the ground be a matter of *ākāṅkṣā* rather than of *yogyatā*? Some Navya-nyāya writers resolved the issue by saying that the concept of *yogyatā* 'possibility' should be restricted to the lack of such verbal contradiction or patent (analytical?) impossibility as is expressed in "What is without fire has fire" (cf. *nirvahnir vahnimān*).

⁴. LYONS, J., p. 152. (*Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics*. Cambridge 1968).

Water as an instrument of sprinkling would be included in this view in the domain of *ākāṅkṣā*. If this is a step towards the right direction, it would support my attempt to connect *ākāṅkṣā* with syntax and grammaticality, and *yogyatā* with semantics.

We can reformulate the previous question and ask: where lies the line where syntax-and-grammar ends, and semantics takes over? In other words, why 'a noun must take a verb' or 'a transitive or object-taking (cf. *sa-karmaka*) verb must take an object-noun', would be considered only syntactic requirements, while 'the verb *sprinkling* needs a liquid or watery substance as its instrument' and 'the verb *eating* needs somewhat solid food as its object' would be considered semantic requirements? Somewhat in the manner of N. CHOMSKY (in *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*), one can introduce sub-categorisation and selection rules of nouns and verbs in the syntactic theory, and thereby the domain of syntax and grammar may be extended to include a lot of consideration which we ordinarily take to be semantic consideration. It may be noted that the Chomskian view (in *Aspects*) was that while syntax can take care of numerous problems which have been traditionally regarded as semantical, the notion of analyticity and contradictions are to be regarded as matters of semantics.⁵

The classification of grammatical elements and lexical items and the system of rules dealing with them can be made progressively more detailed and thereby the notion of grammaticality can be redefined. The general idea here is probably this: grammaticality is, in the last analysis, to be defined by reference to a particular system of rules, although it might not always be possible to formulate these rules explicitly and exhaustively. A string of words is grammatical (and *sākāṅkṣa*) if it is generated by such rules. But this idea may go against CHOMSKY, who would maintain that the notion of grammaticality is intuitively determined by the native speaker.

The Nyāya theory, according to the interpretation that has been suggested here, can be presented in the form of the following (inverted) tree-diagram:

S_1 = the set of word-clusters that generate the verbal knowledge passing all the four tests.

S_0 = the set of combinations that generate false awareness (the speaker is not *āpta*).


S_2 = the set of the possibles, acceptable grammatically and syntactically.

S_3 = the set of the impossibles, acceptable grammatically and syntactically.

5. CHOMSKY, N. specially pp. 148-163. CHOMSKY concludes: "... the syntactic and semantic structure of natural languages evidently offers many mysteries, both of fact and of principle, and that any attempt to delimit the boundaries of these domains must be quite tentative." (p. 163). (*Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

- S_4 = the set of those acceptable grammatically and syntactically.
 S_5 = the set of those unacceptable grammatically and syntactically.
 S_6 = the set of those that pass only the 'physical proximity' test.
 S_7 = the set of those which fail even the 'proximity' test.
 S = the set of word-combinations of all forms.

(Input)



(Output)

Diagram I

The usual Nyāya discussion, however, does not envision such a rigid system or model. The traditionally understood model is more like something given below :




Diagram II

Here the nine regions should be interpreted as follows:

- 1 TRUE (i. e., the set of those that generate knowledge in the ideal hearer. The speaker is *āpta*).
- 2 FALSE (i. e., those that generate a (false) awareness). The speaker is not *āpta*.
- 3 Grammatical (syntactically acceptable) and Possible.
- 4 Possible and (physically) Proximate.
- 5 Grammatical (syntactically acceptable) and (physically) Proximate.
- 6 Grammatically (syntactically) acceptable.
- 7 Possible.
- 8 Proximate (physically).
- 9 Non-proximate combinations, if any.

Circle I is for Proximity, Circle II for Grammaticality, and Circle III for Possibility.

The above way of conceiving grammaticality and meaningfulness may face two very common objections. First, we do meet a lot of grammatically incorrect expressions (e. g., a language-learner's first exercise in composition), of which we seem to understand the 'meaning'. These expressions will fail the test of *ākāṅkṣā*, according to our above model. Do we have a *śābdabodha* in such cases? Our answer would be that we do not have a verbal knowledge *directly* from the utterance in such cases. The incorrect expression reminds us (due to similarity etc.) of the correct one, which then generates the required verbal knowledge.

Second, there are indeed numerous expressions in our language forming part of poetry, riddle, fiction and fantasy, where the so-called incompatible or impossible combinations do frequently occur. And we do seem to understand their meaning or significance. They do not pass the test of *yogyatā*, according to our above model. Do they generate *śābdabodha*? For it cannot be denied that "sprinkling with fire" could be part of a metaphor or a poetic expression, and even "green ideas sleep furiously" may be a line of a so-called non-sense poem, or a riddle. In reply we must say that the notion of compatibility or possibility here is relative to the actual world we live in and to the non-poetic everyday language. When we enter into the realm of fiction or the fantasy-world, such 'possibility' test will not be needed. For the unactuals and the impossibles, the improbables, except, perhaps, the *properly* impossible one (such as the same part of a wall being red and blue all over at the same moment for the same

observer in the same sense), can form part of the furniture of our fantasy-world or some suitably chosen 'possible' world. We can even perceive them in dreams, and communicate them in language or through some other media, paintings (illustrations of "puzzle" paintings are numerous). However, the fantasy-world is founded necessarily upon the actual world, and the non-actuals can shade off gradually from the possibles to the impossibles. We can understand such expressions only when we cast sidelong glances towards the actual world. We understand something to be impossible because we understand what could have been or is possible, and we understand the possibles because we understand the actual. It cannot be the other way around.

NEMESIS AND SOME MAHĀBHĀRATA EPISODES*

By

M. A. MEHENDALE

The Ādiparvan of the Mahābhārata (214-225) tells us about the burning of the Khāṇḍava forest. Once, when Kṛṣṇa was spending a few days with the Pāṇḍavas at Khāṇḍavaprastha, he and Arjuna asked for Dharmarāja's permission to go to the river Yamunā to spend there a day. While they were there Agni, in the form of a Brāhmaṇa, approached them and expressed his desire to burn the neighbouring Khāṇḍava forest. He requested them for help in fulfilling his desire. As Takṣaka Nāga, the friend of Indra, lived in that forest, the latter had foiled Agni's earlier attempts to burn down the forest. Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna asked Agni to supply them with the weapons necessary to achieve this end and when that was done, Agni started to burn the forest. Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna vigilantly guarded the outskirts of the forest and brutally killed all the Dānavas and other beings, as well as the beasts and the birds, that tried to flee for their lives from the forest. Those seeking escape were helplessly crying and weeping, but to no avail. Indra, as before, tried to extinguish the fire with the help of rain, but Arjuna had fully covered the forest with his arrows so that not even a drop of rain could reach the burning forest. Indra started to battle with Arjuna, but was told by the celestial voice that since his friend Takṣaka was safe in Kurukṣetra he should desist from further fighting. Indra, therefore, left the scene and the forest burned without any hindrance. It was burning for six days. Thousands lost their lives either through the fire or at the hands of Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna. The denizens of the forest are so listed in the epic :

*dānavā rākṣasā nāgās tarakṣvṛkṣavanaukasah |
dvipāḥ prabhinnāḥ śārdūlāḥ siṃhāḥ kesariṇas tathā ||
mṛgāś ca mahiṣāś caiva śataśaḥ pakṣiṇas tathā |
samudvignā viśasṛpus tathānyā bhūtajātayaḥ || (1.219.1-2).*

Almost all of them died in the holocaust. Only seven remained alive : (1) Nāga Takṣaka; (2) his son Aśvasena; (3) Asura Maya; (4-7) four young birds (Śāringas). The first, because he was not present in the Khāṇḍava, the rest, because they could, or were allowed to, escape.

* This is an English version of the authors's original article in Marathi published in the *Navabharat*, November 1982.

Dr. Mrs. Iravati KARVE was perhaps the first to call attention¹ to this cruel slaughter of the denizens of the Khāṇḍava forest. She has tried to explain the slaughter in two ways : (1) The birds and beasts killed were not really birds and beasts but were human beings with certain birds and beasts for their totems (*devakas*). The forest was burnt down for farming, and it was necessary to see that none of the natives living in the forest survived to claim the ownership of the land. Hence every one had to be killed.² (2) In her second explanation, Mrs. KARVE suggests that Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna did not feel any scruples in killing the residents of the forest since they looked upon them as aliens. The rules implicitly adopted by the Kṣatriyas for fairness in war – such as prohibition of killing one who has no weapons, who is running away for life, who is crying for help³ – need be observed only within one's in-group, i. e. while fighting with those who were looked upon as 'one's own', and not with the aliens. But this explanation, as noted by Mrs. KARVE herself, is not satisfactory since the Nāgas at any rate could not be looked upon as aliens by those born in the house of the Kurus. Mrs. KARVE, then, asks a question, but fails to come up with a clear answer : Did Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna feel that the people and the animals living in the forest were fit to be burned down or butchered by powerful weapons? It is time the answer 'yes', however unpalatable, is explicitly stated. Instead of trying to save living beings from fire, these two heroes did everything to throw them back into it. The author of the Mahābhārata is outspoken in his description. He records that Arjuna laughed smugly when he saw pieces of birds, cut down by his arrows, fell into the fire (1. 217. 11). This was an extremely cruel act. It is strange that none of the women who went to the river-side with Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna objected to what the two were doing. Even Yudhiṣṭhira, who permitted Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna to spend a day at Yamunā, did not ask them on return why they stayed away for six days, and if he knew what had happened, as he must have, ask the two an explanation. The question about the justness of this act has apparently never been raised in our history.

One wonders whether the persons responsible for such heinous acts escaped without punishment. We have been tirelessly told in our moral exhortations that

1. In the chapter on Mayasabhā in her book *Yugānta* (in Marāṭhī) pp. 128ff.
 2. Mrs. KARVE has not made it clear why she disfavours this explanation. We may think of a few grounds to reject this theory. (1) First, the forest was so large, it took six days to burn down. Hence it was not impossible to preserve a part of it and burn the rest for agriculture ; (2) Aśvasena, the only Nāga who escaped, never came forward to claim his land ; (3) It does not appear that the area surrounding the Khāṇḍavaprastha was so thickly populated that it was necessary to burn down a big forest for making land available for agriculture ; (4) Finally, if the forest was burnt for using it as a farm-land why did the author of the Mahābhārata not say it so plainly ?

3. These are, e. g., made explicit in Mbh. 6. 1. 26 ff.

one has to suffer the fruits of one's bad conduct. Did this law of retribution remain suspended in the case of these two powerful persons? No, it does not seem so. The events in the Mahābhārata show that the Pāṇḍavas had to suffer for the misdeeds of Arjuna connived at by them — they suffered almost the same way, perhaps, even more cruelly. We cannot possibly overlook the connection between the events — the one narrated above and those to be narrated below.

* * *

Duryodhana fell on the battle-field when he was struck down by Bhīma. He was no more able to stand on his feet. From the point of view of the Pāṇḍavas the war had ended. Yudhiṣṭhira felt that he was now the ruler of the earth.

All the warriors on the side of the Pāṇḍavas went to Duryodhana's camp and looted it. All of them then decided to spend the night in the camp of the Pāṇḍavas; but Kṛṣṇa suggested that he, together with the Pāṇḍavas and Sātyaki, stay away as they had to perform some auspicious ceremony. The Mahābhārata does not tell us what this ceremony was, and how it was performed. It makes only a casual reference to it in the following words:

*athābravīn mahārāja vāsudevo mahāyasaḥ |
asmābhir maṅgalārthāya vastavyam śibirād bahiḥ ||
tathety uktvā ca te sarve pāṇḍavāḥ sātyakis tathā |
vāsudevena sahitaṁ maṅgalārtham yayur bahiḥ || (9. 61. 35-36).*

Although Kṛṣṇa suggested that the Pāṇḍavas should stay away for the performance of an auspicious ceremony, it is quite clear that this was only a pretext. He was aware that Aśvatthāman was up to some evil design. He told this clearly to Dhṛtarāṣṭra when he was deputed by the Pāṇḍavas to console Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Gāndhārī.⁴ He said:

*āprcche tvām kuruśreṣṭha mā ca śoke manaḥ kṛthāḥ |
drauṇeh pāpo 'sty abhiprāyas tenāham sahasotthitaḥ |
pāṇḍavānām vadhe rātrau buddhis tena pradarsitā || (9. 62. 68).*

When Aśvatthāman, Kṛpa, and Kṛtavarman meet Duryodhana lying wounded on the battle-field, Aśvatthāman, in a fit of anger, vows to kill the Pāṇcālas. At the instance of Duryodhana, Kṛpa consecrates Aśvatthāman as the commander of Duryodhana's forces, which means that from the point of view of the Kauravas the war had not ended. While Aśvatthāman anxiously ponders

4. One only does not know why he did not caution the Pāṇḍavas against the possible danger to their lives.

over how to fulfil his vow, the way is shown to him by an owl who kills the crows in their nests at night. *Aśvatthāman* then decides to kill the *Pāṇḍavas* and the *Pāṇcālas* at night while they are asleep in their camp. *Aśvatthāman* enters the camp of the *Pāṇḍavas* and *Kṛpa* and *Kṛtavarma* stand guard at the gate of the camp. *Aśvatthāman* is now on his killing-spree, his first victim being *Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna*. He then starts killing others who are unarmed and not properly prepared for a fight. In the darkness, he finds out his victims by their cries for help. Those that try to escape from him are taken care of at the gate by *Kṛpa* and *Kṛtavarma*. Their victims too are unarmed and unprepared and are, in fact, seeking for mercy with folded hands. But all this is of no avail. No one escapes them. All the principal warriors on the side of the *Pāṇḍavas* and the *Pāṇcālas*, including the sons of *Draupadī*, are slain; no one who slept in the camp that night remained alive to see the light of the day next morning.

When *Aśvatthāman* finally leaves the camp it is quiet, exactly as it was when he entered it the previous night – albeit with a difference.

The only ones who remain alive on the side of the *Pāṇḍavas* are those who were not in the camp (*Kṛṣṇa*, *Sātyaki*, and the five *Pāṇḍavas*), and, in addition, the charioteer of *Dhr̥ṣṭadyumna* who, apparently, had a miraculous escape.

This charioteer relates to *Yudhiṣṭhira* about the cruel killings in the camp. One just cannot imagine the condition of the *Pāṇḍavas* on hearing this ghastly news.

This incident in the camp runs parallel to the incident in the *Khāṇḍava* forest. It is hardly necessary to comment on them. The similarities between the two stare us in the face.

(1) *Agni* alone entered the *Khāṇḍava* forest and burnt the living beings that came his way; *Kṛṣṇa* and *Arjuna* stood outside and killed those who tried to escape.

Aśvatthāman alone entered the camp of the *Pāṇḍavas* and killed those he could lay his hands on; *Kṛpa* and *Kṛtavarma* stood out and killed those who tried to escape from *Aśvatthāman*.

(2) *Agni* does not seem to have told *Kṛṣṇa* and *Arjuna* to kill the beings running out to save lives; his only request to the two heroes was that they should foil *Indra*'s attempt to extinguish the fire.

Aśvatthāman also has not told his companions to kill those who might try to run away from the camp. In fact he boasts that no one will escape him. He may have, however, expected *Kṛpa* and *Kṛtavarma* to stop any one who tried to enter the camp to help those inside it.

(3) Only six beings escaped alive from the holocaust – Aśvasena, Maya, and the four young ones of Śārṅga; and one more, the Nāga Takṣaka, remained alive as he was not present in the forest – a total of seven.

Only one could escape alive from the holocaust at the camp; and seven others – Kṛṣṇa, Sātyaki, and the five Pāṇḍavas – remained alive as they were not present in the camp – a total of eight.

(4) The Khāṇḍava forest enjoyed the protection of Indra; Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna defeated his attempt to extinguish the fire.

God Śaṅkara, in the form of a gigantic being, protected the camp of the Pāṇḍavas; Aśvatthāman himself praised Śaṅkara and obtained entry into the camp.

(5) Kṛṣṇa receives from Agni the famous Sudarśana disc, and Arjuna the famous Gāṇḍīva bow and two inexhaustible quivers.

Śaṅkara himself enters the body of Aśvatthāman to confer on him super-human strength and also presents him an excellent sword.

(6) The author of the Mahābhārata says that when the fire began to burn the forest it appeared as if the age had come to an end (*yugānta* 1.216.32)

The author says that one had exactly similar feelings when killing took place in the camp (10.8.137).

(7) A Celestial Voice which dissuaded Indra from continuing his fight with Arjuna also indicated that the destruction of the Khāṇḍava forest was 'predestined' (*diṣṭam* 1.219.18).

God Śaṅkara tells Aśvatthāman that the Pāṇcālas have been humbled by Kāla and can no longer remain alive (*abhibhūtās tu kālena* 10.7.63).

These similarities between the incidents related to the forest-fire and the camp-killings are so striking that they lead one to suspect that there is some relation between the two. The author of the Mahābhārata, presumably, indicates this relationship by comparing Aśvatthāman, about to enter the camp of the Pāṇḍavas with the fire burning down a forest of dried up trees (*lakṣam dīpta ivānalaḥ* 10.3.28). The Pāṇḍavas fought the Kauravas with a view to regaining the kingdom that was theirs and incidentally, fulfil the vows they had taken on various occasions. The joy and the satisfaction which they may have felt at the fall of Duryodhana turned out to be too short-lived. Yudhiṣṭhira's sense of total frustration is reflected in his words: "although we conquered the enemies, it is

we who are defeated" (10.10.9). The author of the epic observes on the catastrophic episode as: "undoubtedly the destined course of events cannot be changed" (10.8.143).⁵

Every reader of the Mahābhārata is moved by the destruction in the camp. That is as it should be. But no one seems to have any tears to shed for those numberless victims from the Khāṇḍava forest who were either burnt down or killed by the weapons for no fault at all. Aśvatthāman is rightly criticised for his cruelty, but it can be said that he wanted to wreak vengeance for the killing of his father. But the acts of Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna can in no way be motivated, let alone justified. But no one apparently has found fault with them, either in the epic or elsewhere in the course of the history. Shall we say that the people, since the time of the Mahābhārata, gained in antiquity but not in moral sensibility?

But whether one has asked or not Kṛṣṇa or Arjuna for explanation of their action, the law of retribution had run its regular course. The Khāṇḍava forest was mercilessly burnt down and those responsible for it invited on themselves punishment. Arjuna laughed when he cut down the birds and let them fall into the raging fire; with incomparable grief he heard the killing of those near and dear to him.

* * *

In burning down the Khāṇḍava forest Agni was helped by Kṛṣṇa. The Mahābhārata tells us that this mighty personage of the epic did not escape the working of the law of *karman*.

The third unfortunate incident is narrated in the Mausala Parvan of the epic. It took place outside Dvārakā, near Prabhāsa. That incident may not be called cruel but it was certainly tragic.

Kṛṣṇa, Balarāma and many Yādavas, accompanied by their wives and children, went for pilgrimage to the sea-shore. Under the influence of intoxicant drinks they began to abuse one another. This took a serious turn leading to a massacre. It is significant to note that the mutual recrimination began with a reference to the incident that took place in the camp of the Pāṇḍavas described above. Sātyaki first reproved Kṛtavarman for killing the persons who were asleep.⁶ And the killing which started at this charge stopped only when all the Yādavas assembled on the sea-shore, including Sātyaki, Pradyumna, and

5. *asaṁśayaṁ hi kūlasya paryāyo duratikramah*

6. As a matter of fact, this blame should go to Aśvatthāman. But one has to remember that Sātyaki was under the influence of wine while blaming Kṛtavarman.

Aniruddha, were slain. The Yādavas were so far intoxicated and furious that while killing one another the father did not spare the son, nor the son the father. Like the animals who died in the Khāṇḍava forest, or the heroes who were butchered in the camp of the Pāṇḍavas, the Yādavas too were goaded to this fate by Time (*kālaparyāyacoditāḥ* 16. 4. 29).

No one from outside Dvārakā had come to carry out the killings. There was therefore no question of any one trying to flee (16. 4. 41).

Only two Yādavas remained alive - Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma. Balarāma met with his end when a Nāga (cobra) left his body and entered the ocean. Kṛṣṇa's life came to an end when a hunter, mistaking him to be a deer, struck him on the sole of his foot with an arrow.

The river Yamunā stood witness to the conflagration in the Khāṇḍava, the ocean to the destruction of the Yādavas. Kṛṣṇa had to helplessly suffer the sight of annihilation. It is highly ironical that Kṛṣṇa, who was responsible for killing the animals of the Khāṇḍava, was himself mistaken to be a deer and killed. His last wish to end his life while practising penance remained unfulfilled.

The Yādavas had to suffer yet another ignominy. As desired by Kṛṣṇa, Arjuna left with the remaining Yādavas and the women-folk for Hastināpura. On way, they were attacked by the Ābhīras. Arjuna could not protect those in his charge. The Ābhīras kidnapped the Yādava women, and what was worse, some women even lusted and willingly went with them (16. 6. 17).

The Mahābhārata says that the Yādavas were destroyed due to the curse of a sage. It also is on record that Gāndhārī had cursed Kṛṣṇa to that effect. But one gets the feeling that Kṛṣṇa, very much like Arjuna, invited on himself the punishment as an act of retribution. The Yādavas are described as *devadaṇḍanipīḍitāḥ* (16. 2. 5).

It this way, one supposes, that one ought to interpret the three harrowing episodes in the Mahābhārata.

CHAPTER I : THE HISTORY OF THE YAKHATS

The Yakhats are a people of the Himalayas, and their history is a subject of much interest to the student of the history of the Himalayas. The Yakhats are a people of the Himalayas, and their history is a subject of much interest to the student of the history of the Himalayas.

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VĀC

By

JUAN MIGUEL DE MORA

For a felicitation volume in honour of Professor Doctor Ramchandra N. DANDEKAR, who has a more than excellent mastery of Sanskrit culture, which is based on the word, one is tempted to refer precisely to the word, although within the limits dictated by the nature of this paper.

No human culture understood the decisive importance of the word as soon as did the Sanskrit culture. Hymn 125 of the *Rgveda*'s tenth *maṇḍala* is the first important proof of what we claim, followed by hundreds of references to Vāc in various types of Sanskrit texts. To prove the awareness *rigvedic* man had of the word, to prove that in India's ancient culture "in the beginning was the Word", it is not even necessary to deal with the whole of Hymn 125. It suffices to recall one of its stanzas, the seventh :

अहं सुवे पितरमस्य मूर्धन् मम योनिरप्स्व^१न्तः समुद्रे ।
ततो वि तिष्ठे भुवनानु विश्वोतामूं द्यां वर्ष्मणोप स्पृशामि ॥ ७ ॥

For ancient and modern orientalists, Western and Indian alike, the word is what "brings forth" the Father, that is Brahman, that is, God.

On the world's summit I bring forth the Father,
my home is in the waters, in the ocean.

Thence I extend o'er all existing creatures, and
touch even yonder heaven with my forehead.

is what an Englishman, Ralph T. H. GRIFFITH, translates in 1889.

And on the summit I bring forth the Father,
my home is within waters, in the ocean,

From where I extend to all existing worlds,
and yonder heaven I touch with my forehead.

is what an Indian, Abinash Chandra BOSE, interprets in 1965.

And C. G. KASHIKAR narrows the sense down by pinpointing that Vāc is co-extensive with Brahman and that just as the latter is all pervasive, so is Vāc in all places in the form of consciousness. And सुवे does not mean "I create" or "bring forth" but rather "pervade". Thus Vāc pervades the waters, the horizon, Brahman....

The authors of the Veda were fully aware of the importance of the word, awareness which took many centuries – sometimes millennia – to reach other parts of the world.

In a profound and clear sense, from the point of view of man, of the human being, it is indeed Vāc who is the creator of Brahman. Brahman may or may not exist by and of Himself, but for human beings He would not exist if they did not have the word at their disposal. Or put another way, one may say that they would not be conscious of the existence of Brahman if they did not have the word as a means of communication. Protagoras of Abdera was not far from the truth when he said that “man is the measure of all things”, if one understands that the intention of the phrase is that this is so “with respect to man himself”. Man in the measure of his conscience, of his liberation, of his life and of his *karman*. With very rare exceptions (what some describe as “the way of the cat”), those who aspire to liberate themselves from *samsāra* must do so by themselves. They themselves are the measure of their relationship with the infinite, with Brahman. It is in that context that we assert that Brahman would not exist, for man, were it not for Vāc, with which man studies, analyzes, defines and interprets Brahman.

Therefore, aside from various interpretations, of stanza 7, Hymn 125, one can state that Vāc is the one who has created the Father at the summit of this world. And not only has she created Brahman : the word, in all cultures, among all peoples and at all periods in history, has created all the gods.

Certainly the word must arise from the waters, it must have its home within them because it is from the waters that life arose and the word is a consequence of life. Where there is no life there is no word. But this is not difficult to state now that science has proved that life was originated in the waters, now that we know that the oldest fossils known to man correspond to sea creatures and now that the results of scientific research confirm that the sea is the cradle of all life. It was far different for the authors of the *Rgveda*, who made this statement over and over again (X. 82. 5; X. 121. 7, 8; X. 9. 3, etc.) so very long ago.

How can Vāc not extend herself to all the existing worlds if, for us, there are no worlds beyond those we can mention or name. As soon as we can conceive the existence of other worlds, we must use words to express our conception. If we say, “there are other, infinitely remote, worlds we do not know”, Vāc, by virtue of that sole phrase, has already extended herself to all imagined worlds just as she names and describes the existing ones.

And how is she not to touch heaven if all that is to be said of heaven is through the word?

To create, the word is indispensable.

सोऽकामयत द्वितीयो म आत्मा जायेतेति । स मनसा
वाचं मिथुनं समभवदशनाया मृत्युस्तद्वदेत आसीत्स संवत्स-
रोऽभवत् । न ह पुरा ततः संवत्सर आस तमेतावन्तं काल-
मभिभः यावान्संवत्सरस्तमेतावतः कालस्य परस्तादसृजत तं
जातमभिव्याददात्स भाणकरोत्सैव वागभवत् ॥ ४ ॥¹

He joined with Vāc and the year appeared. Another great truth : without the word there would be no year, no months, no days, no notion of time. And as soon as *bhān* appeared, Vāc was born. Vāc is born of Vāc. Upon his joining with Vāc, Vāc is born and this is an every-day truth for all men. After the creation, after the cosmogonies, it is still true that Vāc is born of Vāc. And once again the infinite wisdom of the Sanskrit culture is before our eyes, prominent and magnificent.

Who but Vāc could be the wife of Ātman or Prajāpati, from the beginning ? But not only was she Ātman's wife when He was alone, but also man's when he is alone.

आत्मैवेदमग्र आसीदेक एव सोऽकामयत जाया मे
स्यादथ प्रजायेयाथ वित्तं मे स्यादथ कर्म कुर्वीयेत्येतावान् वै कामो
नेच्छंश्चनातो भूयो विन्देत्तस्मादप्येतर्ह्येकाकी कामयते जाया
मे स्यादथ प्रजायेयाथ वित्तं मे स्यादथ कर्म कुर्वीयेति स याव-
दप्येतेषामेकैकं न प्राप्नोत्यकृत्स्न एव तावन्मन्यते तस्यो कृत्स्नता
मन एवास्यात्मा वाग्जाया प्राणः प्रजा चक्षुर्मानुषं वित्तं चक्षुषा
हि तद्विन्दते श्रोत्रं देवः श्रोत्रेण हि तच्छृणोत्यात्मैवास्य कर्मा-
त्मना हि कर्म करोति स एष पाङ्को यज्ञः पाङ्कः पशुः पाङ्कः
पुरुषः पाङ्कमिदं सर्वं यदिदं किंच तदिदं सर्वमाप्नोति य
एवं वेद ॥ १७ ॥²

Because the *Rgveda* is the word (*vāg eva rg vedah*), because from the word do all names arise, she is equal to all names and bears them.

त्रयं वा इदं नाम रूपं कर्म तेषां नाम्नां वागित्येतदेपा-
मुक्थमतो हि सर्वाणि नामान्युत्तिष्ठन्ति । एतदेपां समैतद्धि सर्वै-
र्नामभिः सममेतदेपां ब्रह्मैतद्धि सर्वाणि नामानि विभर्ति ॥ १ ॥³

With superb precision, the *Mahābhārata* calls Vāc "the mother of the Vedas". She is that in *every* sense. The Vedas would not have existed without the word, but neither would all of man's knowledge have, nor all his wisdom or the culture which humanity has accumulated for thousands of years.

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* I, 2. 4.

2. *Ibidem*, I, 4. 17.

3. *Ibidem*, I, 6. 1.

The extraordinary insight of the authors of Sanskrit culture, which manifests itself in the diverse branches of human knowledge, reaches one of its most important levels in the philosophy of the word, in the recognition of the definitive significance the word has for the existence and progress of the human race and for all its creations.

Millions of beings have been born – throughout time – who have known a language and have used it to communicate without becoming aware of the ineffable importance language – the word – has.

The first Aryans entered history with the *Rgveda* already in their power, with that awareness already gained, already masters of knowledge (although grazing their flocks), of a knowledge vaster, greater and deeper than that of other peoples who, nevertheless, have seemed to be more advanced. India has always given more importance to the spirit than to technics, and spirit needs the word more than technology does. This is a hazardous – and debatable – affirmation we put forward remembering that instead of plans and projects, numbers and calculations, tools and machines (indispensable requisites of technology), the word is what the spirit requires in order to grow and develop.

And the splendid work of the man to whom this felicitation volume is dedicated, Professor Doctor Ramchandra N. DANDEKAR, is the result of having dedicated his entire life to the word, to Vāc.

Let us recall, then, that through her we have reached the stage at which we find ourselves and let us harbour the hope that she will one day confer upon us the contents of the last words of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad which synthesize man's most fervent wish : ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः.

VIŚVASRĪ, VIŚVASRĪJAH AND THE PROBLEM OF CONTINUITY IN INDIAN RELIGIOUS HISTORY

By

KLAUS MYLIUS

I. Introduction and preliminary works

The following study originally had the limited purpose of helping to define what we know of the Vedic Viśvasrĭjah. But by necessity, the investigation then spread to other areas and periods which had nothing to do with Veda, and brought light into aspects which had in the past been partly or totally ignored. This shows how necessary such special research is for understanding the universal features of Indian history.

This study started from the fact that treatises are available on many of the principal Vedic gods. Even deities who make a minor appearance in the *Ṛksamhitā*, such as Bṛhaspati, Mitra or Aryaman, have been researched in great detail. On the other hand, almost all of the secondary deities, i. e. in this case those who only rarely appear in the *RV*, or only post-*ṛgvedic*, have still not been investigated with any thoroughness. However, in the following pages I hope to show that the required effort can be very rewarding, and to encourage younger scholars to attempt similar exercises.

The leading researchers in our field have merely glossed over the Viśvasrĭjah in their reference books. H. OLDENBERG,¹ A. HILLEBRANDT,² and even A. A. MACDONELL³ do not mention them at all. In the Petersburg Sanskrit Dictionaries, O. BÖHTLINGK and R. ROTH describe them merely as "Schöpfer des Alls, Bezeichnung nicht näher bestimmter schöpferischer Wesen". A. B. KEITH⁴ notes briefly: "A class of Viśvasrĭ gods, all-creators, is just alluded to in the *Brāhmaṇas*." Therefore I also have had to limit myself to a rather vague definition⁵: "... unbestimmt sind die Viśvasrĭ, die als Schöpfer und satträ-Teilnehmer in Erscheinung treten."

1. Die Religion des Veda. Berlin 1894.

2. Vedische Mythologie. Breslau 1891-1902.

3. The Vedic Mythology = Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde, vol. III, part 1 a. Strasbourg 1897. Reprint Varanasi 1963.

4. The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads. Vol. 1. Harvard Oriental Series XXXI, p. 207. Cambridge (Mass.) 1925. Reprint Delhi 1970.

5. Die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung Indiens in jungvedischer Zeit nach den Sanskritquellen. III. Der ideologische Überbau. Ethnographisch-Archäologische Zeitschrift 14 (1973), 3, pp. 449-450, Berlin.

This certainly justifies an attempt to study the role of the *Viśvasrjaḥ* in Indian literature, in order to define then their position in mythology in more detail than has been possible in the past. First of all, we will let the sources speak for themselves, and subsequently we will summarise the knowledge which emerges from these.

II. The Vedic Sources

The earliest mention of the *Viśvasrjaḥ* comes in *Atharvaveda* XI, 7, 4, where the ritual significance of the sacrificial remains (*ucchiṣṭa*) is glorified and mystified :

ḍḍho ḍḍmha sthiro nyo brahma viśvasrjo daśa /
nābhimiva sarvataścakramuchiṣṭe devatāḥ śritāḥ //

[Being firm, stand firm, steady, nya, brahman, the ten all-creators. As the wheel (encircles) the hub, so are the deities contained in the sacrificial remains.]

Of greater importance, because it is often used in later literature, is *Maitrāyaṇī-Samhitā* IV, 14, 1 :

taveme lokāḥ pradiśo diśaśca parāvato nivata udvataśca /
prajāpate viśvasrg jīvadhanya idam no deva pratiharya havyam //

[To you (belong) these worlds, the parts of the world and the directions, the distant lands, the netherworlds and the heavens. O Prajāpati, all-creator (are you), bringing treasures to all living creatures. Take this our offering, o god !]

This text, along with *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa* II, 8, 1, 4, accompanies the *kāmyeṣṭi* of a goat to Prajāpati for someone wishing offspring or cattle. In *Āśvalāyana-Śrautasūtra* II, 14, 12, the *hotṛ* recites this during the *idādadha*-sacrifice to Prajāpati. In *Āpastamba-Śrautasūtra* XX, 20, 9, one of the passages belonging to the *āśvamedha*, the *adhvaryu* recites it after the unction.

A major source for the ritual centred around the *Viśvasrjaḥ* is the *Pañca-vimśa-Brāhmaṇa*, where they are the object of a *sattra*. This is also noteworthy for its exposed position, because the PB treats the Thousand-year festival for Prajāpati as the second-last *sattra*. It is only then, in other words in the sense of a higher extolment, that the *sattra* for the *Viśvasrjaḥ* follows at the end of the *sattra* series and of the entire PB. Here is the complete version :

PB XXV, 18

1. pañca pañcāśatastrivṛtaḥ samvatsarāḥ pañca pañcāśataḥ pañcadaśā
pañca pañcāśataḥ saptaśaśāḥ pañca pañcāśata ekavimśā viśvasrjāṃ
sahasrasamvatsaram /

[Five times fifty years in the trivṛtstoma way (9 verses) five times fifty years in the pañcadaśastoma way (15 verses), five times fifty years in the saptadaśastoma way (17 verses), five times fifty years in the ekaviṃśastoma way (21 verses), (that is), the Thousand-year sattra for the Viśvasrj.]

2. etena vai viśvasrja idam viśvam asrjanta yadvīśvasrjanta tasmād viśvasrjaḥ /

[By this (sattra) the Viśvasrjaḥ created this all. Because they created all, they (are called) Viśvasrj.]

3. viśvamenānanu prajāyate ya etad upayanti /

[After them emerges the universe, who celebrate this (sattra).]

4. tapo grhapatirbrahma brahmerāpatnyamṛtamudgātā bhūtaṃ prastotā bhaviṣyatpratihatartava upagātāra ārtavāḥ sadasyāḥ satyaṃ hotārtam maitrāvaruṇa ojo brāhmaṇacchamsī tviṣṣcāpacitīṣca neṣṭṛpotārau yaśo 'cchāvāko 'gnirevāgnīdbhago grāvastudūrgunnetā vāksubrahmanyāḥ prāṇo 'dhvaryurapānaḥ pratiprasthātā diṣṭirviśāstā balam dhruvagopam⁶ āśāhaviṣyeṣyahorātrāvidhmavāhau mṛtyuḥ śamitaite dīkṣante /

[Asceticism was the householder, the brahman (n.) was the brahman (m.), Īrā was the lady of the house, Ambrosia was the udgātṛ, the past was the prastotṛ, the future was the pratiharṛ, the seasons were the additional singers, the divisions of the year (according to Sāyana, the cool, hot and wet seasons) were the sadasyas, the truth was the hotṛ, the law of the world the maitrāvaruṇa, strength was the brāhmaṇacchamsin, splendour and veneration were neṣṭṛ and potṛ, fame was the acchāvāka, fire was agnīdh, happiness was the grāvastut, food was the unnetṛ, voice was the subrahmanya, inhalation was the adhvaryu, exhalation was the pratiprasthātṛ, (ritual) command was the carver, strength was the dhruvagopa, hope was he who prepared the sacrifice, day and night were the two who carried the firewood, death was the butcher. These carry out the act of consecration.]

5. tadeṣu śloko viśvasrjaḥ prathame sattramāsata sahasrasamaṃ prasutena yantaste ha jajñe bhuvanasya gopā hiraṇmayāḥ śakuno brahmanāmeti /

6. W. CALAND already pointed out that this must be omitted.

[About this (there is) this verse : " The all-creators were the first to sit down at a sattra, by offering pressed (soma juice) for a thousand years. Thus was born the protector of all, the golden bird, named Brahman. "]

6. Brahmanāḥ salokatām sarṣṭitām sāyujyāṁ gacchanti ya etad upayanti /

[Those who attend this sattra achieve a place in the same world, equality and union with the brahman.]

7. tadetadviśvasrjām sahasrasamvatsarametena vai viśvasrjaḥ sarvāmṛd-
dhimārdhnuvan sarvāmṛddhimṛdhnvanti ya etadupayanti /

[This is the thousand-year (sattra) of the all-creators. The all-creators thrived and achieved prosperity through this. Those who attend this (sattra) will achieve this prosperity.]

In short, this means the following : kaṇḍikā 1 gives the audgātra ritual, 2 describes the Viśvasrjaḥ as creator gods, 4 makes the identifications concerning this sattra, and 5 and 6 establish links with the brahman.⁷

Another very important source is the Taittirīya-Bhrāhmaṇa. In TB III, 12, 9, the Viśvasrjaḥ are connected with the building of the sacrificial fire-altar, the cayana ritual. These chapters of TB, derived from the Kāṭha-school, form the conclusion of the whole work, like the aforementioned Viśvasrja passages in the PB. The main content is the collection of mantras recited by the brahman priest. Here are the most important passages :

TB III, 12, 9

2. ādarśamagnim cinvānāḥ / pūrve viśvasrjo 'mṛtāḥ / śatām varṣa-
sahasrāṇi / dīkṣitāḥ sattramāsata iti //

[Building a large sacrificial fire-altar, the all-creators (were) the first to become immortal. Consecrated, they sat down to a sattra for 100 000 years.]

- 3.-6a. tapa āsīdgrhapatīḥ / brahma brahmābhavatsvayam satyam ha hotaiṣā-
māsīt / yadvīśvasrja āsata iti / amṛtamebhya udagāyat / sahasram
parivatsarān / bhūtam ha prastotaiṣāmāsīt / bhaviṣyatprati cāharat //
prāno adhvaryurabhavat / idam sarvam siṣāsātām // apāno vidvānā-
vrtaḥ / pratiprātiṣṭhadadhvare ārtavā upagātāraḥ / sadasya rtavo
'bhavan / ardhamāsāśca māsāśca / camasādhvaryayo 'bhavan /

7. Other texts from Sāmaveda literature – Ārṣeyakalpa XI, 10 e and Nidānasūtra X, 13 – do not provide us with any further relevant information.

āśānsadbrahmanastejaḥ / acchāvāko 'bhavadyāsaḥ / ṛtameṣāṁ pra-
śāstāsīt / yadvīśvasrja āsata ūgrājānamudavahat / dhruvagopaḥ
saho 'bhavat / ojobhyaṣṭaudgrāvaṇaḥ / apacitiḥ potṛiyāmayajat /
neṣṭṛiyāmayajattviṣiḥ / āgnīdhṛādividuṣī satyam / śraddhā haivāya-
jatsvayam / irā patnī vīśvasrjām ākūtirapinaddhaviḥ / idhmaṁ ha
kṣuccaibhya ugre / tṛṣṇā cāvahatāmubhe vāgeṣāṁ subrahmanyāśīt /
chandoyogān vijānati / kalpatantrāṇi tanvānāhaḥ / samsthāṁśca
sarvaśaḥ // ahorātre paśupālyau / mūhūrtāḥ preṣyā abhavan /
mr̥tyustadabhavaddhātā / śamitogro vīśāṁ patiḥ /

[Asceticism was the householder, the brahman (n.) was the brahman (m.) himself. The truth was their hotṛ, when the all-creators sat down. Ambrosia served them as their udgātṛ for a full thousand years. The past was its prastotṛ, the future served as pratiharṛ. Inhalation was the adhvaryu for them who wished to achieve this all. Exhalation, perfected, used in (ritual) served as pratiprasthātṛ in the soma festival. The divisions of the year were the additional singers, the seasons were the sadasyas (the reverse in PB), the half-months and the months were the priests of the drinking vessels. Splendour served as brāhmanācchamsin, fame was the acchāvāka, justice was its prasāstr (= maitrāvaruṇa), when the all-creators sat down. Sap and strength caused the king (Soma) to arise. Strength was the dhruvagopa. The grāvastut served as power. Veneration was spoken by the potṛ-yājyā, splendour by the neṣṭṛ-yājyā; the belief, knowing the truth from the āgnīdhra, spoke the yājyā himself. Irā (sic!) was the wife of the Vīśvasrjaḥ, Akūti carved the offering. The firewood brought to them hunger and thirst, the two terrible ones. The voice was their subrahmanya, knowing the use of the metres, the guidelines of the ritual, broadcasting everywhere the ritual day's events and the basic form of the sacrifice. Day and night were the two cowherds, the time spans of 48 minutes were the attendants, death was the creator, the terrible butcher was the lord of the vassals.]

- 6b.-8a. vīśvasrjaḥ prathamāḥ sattramāsata / sahasrasamaṁ prasutena yantaḥ /
tato ha jajne bhuvanasya gopāḥ / hiraṇmayāḥ śakunirbrahmanāma /
yena sūryastapati tejaseddhaḥ / pitā putrena pitṛmān yoniyonau /
nāvedavinmanute taṁ bhāntam / sarvānubhūtmātmānaṁ samparāye /
eṣa nityo mahimā brāhmanasya / na karmaṇā vardhate na kaṇīyān /
tasyaivātmā padavittam vīditvā / na karmaṇā lipyate pāpakena /

[The all-creators were first to sit down at a sattra, proceeding with pressing soma-juice for a thousand years. From this came the prote-

ctor of the world, the golden bird called Brahman. That, by which the sun warms us, blazing with splendour, and the father has a father through the son by his birth in the mother's womb, - he who is ignorant of Veda does not recognize this in death as the great, all-penetrating self. This eternal greatness of the divine principle is neither enlarged nor diminished by the ritual. The self recognises it; he who has known it will no (longer) be sullied by evil acts.]

- 8b. pañcapañcāśatatrivṛtaḥ saṁvatsarāḥ / pañcapañcāśataḥ pañcadaśāḥ / pañcapañcāśataḥ saptaśāśāḥ / pañcapañcāśataḥ ekaviṁśāḥ / viśvasrjāṁ sahasrasaṁvatsaram / etena vai viśvasrja idāṁ viśvam asrjanta yadvīśvamasrjanta tasmādvīśvasrjaḥ / viśvamenānanuprajāyate / brahmaṇaḥ sāyujyaṁ / salokatāṁ yanti / etāsāmeva devatānāṁ sāyujyam / sārṣṭitāṁ samānalokatāṁ yanti / yā etadupayanti /

[Five times fifty years in the trivṛtstoma way, etc., see PB XXV, 18, 1. Through this (sattrā) the Viśvasrjaḥ created the universe. Because they created all, (they are called) the all-creators. All exists because of them. They achieve union with the brahman and a place in the same world. Those who attend this (sattrā) achieve union with these deities, equality and a place in the same world.]

So the significance of the Viśvasrjaḥ ritual is here even greater than in the PB. The sacrifice lasts not a thousand, but a hundred thousand years, at least according to one of the evidences in the text. In addition the TB uses an even more detailed identification system. By the way, the quotation of eṣa nityo mahimā is out of place here, but is much more suited to the Upaniṣads, where it really appears in BU IV, 4, 23. The conclusion of the section is similar, and some of it exactly the same as the basic ideas of PB XXV, 18, 2.

In the Aranyakas the Viśvasrjaḥ reappear within the frame-work of a citi cult, that is the building of the Arunaketu sacrificial fire-altar in the Taittirīya-Aranyaka I, 22, 11 :

kamagnim cinute / vaiśvasrjamagnim cinvānaḥ / śarīraṁ pratyaksena

[What kind of sacrificial fire-altar is he building? The Viśvasrja sacrificial fire-altar (and thus) really the body.]

Sāyana makes the following important explanation : śarīraṁ - Hiranyagarbhasya deham. So once again he establishes a link with an aspect of Prajāpati as the central creative potency.

Until this point, the Viśvasrja have appeared exclusively in the plural (it is only in the TĀ that one cannot make any definitive judgement, because of the

text). The term exists in the singular for the first time in the Upaniṣads. The following quotation is derived from the Maitri-Upaniṣad VI, 8 :

esa hi khalvātmeśānaḥ śambhurbhavo rudraḥ prajāpatirviśvasrḥ
hiranyagarbhaḥ satyaṁ prāṇo himsaḥ śāstā viṣṇurnārāyaṇo 'rkaḥ
savitā dhātā vidhātā samrādindra induriti /

[The same self (is called) Īśāna, Śambhu, Bhava, Rudra, Prajāpati, Viśvasrj, Hiranyagarbha, satya, prāṇa, haṁsa, śāstr, Viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa, Arka, Savitr, Dhāt, Vidhāt, samrāj, Indra, Indu.]

A similar list can be found in the MU VII, 7; the position of Viśvasrj is precisely the same : again right next to Prajāpati.

In the Nṛsiṃhapūrvatāpanīya-Upaniṣad, which is one of the viṣṇuistic-orientated Atharva-Upaniṣads, the Viśvasrjaḥ appear again in the plural, within the nārasimha formula (concerning Viṣṇu as a half-man, half-lion, nṛsimha). The beginning is along the same lines as PB and TB.

NṛptU I, 7, 1-3

viśvasrjaḥ etena vai viśvam asṛjanta / yad viśvam asṛjanta tasmād
viśvasrjo / viśvam enān anu prajāyate // brahmaṇaḥ sāyujyam
salokaṭām jayati / tasmād idaṁ sāṅgaṁ sāma jānīyāt // yo jānīyāt
so 'mṛtatvaṁ ca gacchati /

[Thus (i. e. by using the Nārasimha formula) the all-creators created this whole world; because they created all, (they are called the) all-creators. All exists because of them, and they achieve life companionship and world companionship with the Brahman. That is why one should recognize this sāman (= nārasimha formula) with its components. He who recognizes it will then gain immortality.]

The Śrautasūtras of the Rgveda, the Black and White Yajurveda, deal several times with the Viśvasrjaḥ ritual. We will look only at the most important sections.

AśvSS XII, 5, 19

etaireva stomair^s viśvasrjāṁ sahasrasamvatsaram ekaikenārdha,
tṛtīyānyardhatṛtīyāni varṣasatāni /

[With these very stomas (comes about) the thousand-year sacrifice of the Viśvasrj, of two and a half centuries each.]

8. This refers to the usual stomas, which were here taught in Sūtra 15 at the prajāpatērdvādaśasamvatsara.

In the Śāṅkhāyana-Śrautasūtra, the viśvasrjāmayana is at the end of the sattras, as in the PB; only the special category of the sārvasvatānāmayana comes after it. The text uses PB XXV, 18, 1 as a model.

ŚāṅkhŚS XIII, 28, 8

eteṣāmevaikaikena pañcapaṇca pañcāśato viśvasrjām sahasrasam.
vatsaram //

[For the thousand-year (sattra) of the Viśvasrj, (they sacrifice)
with each of these (four stomas) five times fifty (years) each.]

One of the incidents in the middle of ekāhas ŚāṅkhŚS XIV, 72, 1 is irrelevant for our discussion.

Āpastamba deals in great detail with the Viśvasrj ritual. We can omit Ap XX, 20, 9 (= Āśv II, 14, 12), as this parallels MS IV, 14, 1, and all that should be said here has been said. Ap XIX, 15 concerns the viśvasrccayana and gives the ritual to the Mantras taught in TB III, 12, 9, 1-8. Thereafter the passage runs as follows :

ApŚS XIX, 15, 7

rātrisattreṣu śatarātrānteṣu samahāvrateṣu triṣu ca sārvasvateṣu
sattreṣu kāthakacāturmāsyeṣu sādhyānām ṣaḍahavarjiteṣu viśva-
srjāmayane prajāpateḥ sahasrasamvatsarayosca vaiśvasrjo 'gnir-
niyataḥ /

[The Viśvasrj sacrificial fire-altar is limited to the sattras including the mahāvrate day up to a limit of one hundred nights, to the three Sārvasvatasattras, to the tertial offerings traditional in the Kātha-school, to the sattra of the Sādhyas apart from the six-day one, and the two thousand-year festivals : the ayana of the Viśvasrj and the thousand-year festival of Prajāpati.]

Here too, a close connexion is established with Prajāpati. In Ap XXIII, 14, 14 the Viśvasrj cult is at the end of the sattras, even after the Prajāpati-sattra. The ritual is that of TB III, 12, 9, 8b. Later, it is similar to this and to the PB :

ApŚS XXIII, 14, 15-16

etena vai viśvasrja idam viśvasasrjanta / yadvīśvasasrjanta tasmād
viśvasrjāḥ / viśvamenānanuprajāyate / tatra ślokaḥ / viśvasrjāḥ
prathamāḥ sattramāsata sahasrasamam prasutena yantaḥ / tato ha
jajñe bhuvanasya gopā hiraṇmayāḥ śakunirbrahmanāmeti //

[By this (sattra) the all-creators created all, therefore (they are called) all-creators. All exists because of them. About this (there is) a verse : " The all-creators were the first to perform the sattra, bringing the thousand-year offering of soma. From this came the protector of the universe, the golden bird, named Brahman."

This verse also appears in MānSS IX, 5, 4, 43.

The Baudhāyana-Śrautasūtra once again goes through a comprehensive series of identifications which partly deviates from that of the PB and TB.

BaudhSS XVII, 19 :

tapo gr̥hapatirirā patnī brahmaiva brahmā satyam hotāmṛtam udgātā
bhūtam bhaviṣyacca prastotrpratihatārāvṛtam maitrāvaruṇa ṛtavaḥ
sadasyā ārtavā upagātārastejo brāhmaṇacchamsi yaśo 'cchāvākastvi-
ṣīcāpacitiśca neṣṭāpotārāvagnirevāgnīdhro vāksubrahmanyō bhago
grāvastudūrgunnetā balaṁ dhruvagopo mano 'dhvaryuścakṣuḥ
pratiprasthātā sedīcāsānaya cedhnavāhau diṣṭirviśastā mṛtyuḥ śami-
taite vai viśvasrjaḥ prathamāḥ sattramāsām cakrire / teṣām śatam
samā dīkṣā āsānchatamupasadaḥ sahasraṁ prasutāstadeṣābhivadati
viśvasrjaḥ prathamāḥ sattramāsata sahasrasamam prasutena yantaḥ
tato miśadamiṣatsambabhūva tato ha jajñe bhuvanasya gopā /

[Asceticism (was) the householder, Irā (was his) wife, the brahman (n.) (was) the brahman (m.), the truth (was) the hotṛ, Ambrosia (was) the udgātṛ, past and future (were) prastotr and pratiharṭṛ, the law of the world (was) the maitrāvaruṇa, the seasons (were) the sadasyas, the divisions of the year (were) the additional singers, splendour (was) the brāhmaṇacchamsin, fame (was) the acchāvāka, pomp and reveration (were) neṣṭṛ and potṛ, fire (was) the āgnīdhra, voice (was) the subrahmanya, happiness (was) the grāvastut, food (was) the unnetṛ, strength (was) the dhruvagopa, spirit (was) the Adhvaryu, the eye (was) the pratiprasthātṛ, sluggishness and hunger (were) the two who carried the firewood, (ritual) command (was) the carver, death (was) the butcher. These all-creators were the first to perform a sacrificial session. There consecration lasted a hundred years, the (symbolic) sieges a hundred, the extraction of soma juice a thousand; it is thus that the Viśvasrjaḥ were the first to attend a sattra, by extracting soma juice for a thousand years. This led to the opening and the closing of the eyes, from that the protector of the universe was born.]

For the building of the sacrificial fire-altar, BaudhSS XIX, 9 gives the total of 42 Mantras - to be used for the three levels, thus 18+15+9 (cf. Āp

XIX, 15, 3.), which, however, we do not need to look at in any greater detail here.

In the Kātyāyana-Śrautasūtra XXIV, 5, 24 the 1000-year festival of the Viśvasrjaḥ follows the sādhyāyana, described in sūtra 23 as lasting a hundred years. This concludes our consideration of the Vedic sources.

III. Epic, Smṛti, and Purāṇa Sources

In the Mahābhārata the concept we have discussed here only appears occasionally. As in the Upaniṣads, the singular and the plural are both present. In the Abhimanyuvadha passage of the Droṇaparvan Mbh VII, 1464 (= VII, 33, 12) - and this is very important for our investigations - Viśvasrj (sing.) is equated with Govinda (= Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa). However, the plural reappears in the Aśvamedhikaparvan Mbh XIV. 1435. 1437 (= XIV, 51, 11.13). The first verse mentioned runs as follows :

sarve svabhāvataḥ sṛṣṭā na kriyābhyo na kāraṇāt /
ete viśvasrjo viprā jāyantiha punaḥ punaḥ //

[All creators have been created by themselves, not by (other) acts, causeless. These all-creators are born here again and again as Brahmins.]

The Mānavadharmasāstra XII, 50 links the Viśvasrjaḥ with the creator of the world, Brahman, again :

brahmā viśvasrjo dharmo mahānavyakta eva ca /
uttamām sātṭvikīmetām gatimāhurmanīṣiṇaḥ //

[The wise men describe brahman, the All-creators, the Law, the Great and the Unrecognizable as the highest group of beings created by the deities.]

After the quotation from the Nṛsinhatāpanīya-Upaniṣad, it is scarcely surprising that viṣṇuitic sectarian literature knows the Viśvasrj concept. More precisely, the Pañcarātra-Saṁhitā of Nārada, a Vaiṣṇava tantra, says in II, 2, 95 :

evam dīmbodarasthānca viśvaṁ viśvasrjā kṛtam /
dīmbhastallomakūpe ca mahāviṣṇuśca nārada //

[Just as the universe was created by the creator of the world as the ovum in the womb, so is the great Viṣṇu, o Nārada, like a bud in a pore.]

In the most representative work of Purāṇa literature, the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa, which I would like to concentrate on here, Viśvasrjaḥ appear very frequently, characteristically again in a piece of literature which is orientated towards Viṣṇuism.

BhāgP I. 3. 2 is spoken by Sūta in depicting the incarnations of Viṣṇu :

yasyāmbhasi śayānasya yoganidrām vitanvataḥ /
nābhīhrdāmbujādāsīdbrahmā viśvasrjām patih //

[While he (Bhagavat) was resting on the water, prostrate, for the sleep of meditation, there sprouted forth a lotus from his navel as from a pond, from which was born Brahman, the lord of the all-creators.]

So here Brahman is known as the lord of the all-creators (plural). In BhāgP II, 1, 26 the word appears in the singular again, identified with Puruṣa, who is of course not to be understood here in the Sāṃkhya sense, but is to be equated with Viṣṇu :

pātālametasya hi pādāmūlāṃ paṭhanti pārṣṇiprapade rasātalam /
mahātalam viśvasrjo 'tha gulphau talātalam vai puruṣasya jaṅghe //
[(Hell) Pātāla is his tarsus (= himself), one is taught ; (Hell) Rasātala is the heel and the tips of the toes ; (Hell) Mahātala forms the ankle of the Puruṣa, the creator of all things, and (Hell) Talātala his legs.]

In BhāgP III, 5, 9 Śuka identifies the all-creator with Nārāyaṇa, therefore with Viṣṇu :

yena prajānāmuta ātmakarmarūpābhidhānām ca bhidāṃ vyadhata /
nārāyaṇo viśvasrgātmayoniretacca no varṇaya vipravarya //
[And by giving the creatures each a nature, action, shape and name, Nārāyaṇa, the all-creator, this tell us, oh best of Brahmins !]

In BhāgP III, 6, 10, Maitreya names another aspect of Viṣṇu, that is, Adhokṣaja, as the lord of the all-creators :

smaran viśvasrjāmīṣo vijñāpitamadhokṣajaḥ /
virājamatapatsvena tejasaiṣām vivṛtaye //
[Adhokṣaja, lord of the all-creators, remembering that which had been promised to him, radiated warmth on the virāj for her unfolding.]

The concept of the thousand-year sattra of the Viśvasrjaḥ, with which we are familiar from Vedic sources, is also mentioned in the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa. Maitreya in IV, 2, 34 says, after a definite reference to the Veda, and before mentioning the Vedic ritual of the final bath (avabhṛtha) :

te 'pi viśvasrjaḥ sattraṃ sahasraparivatsarāṃ /
sāmvidhāya maheṣvāsa yatrejya ṛṣabho hariḥ //

[Thereafter, oh ye skilled bowmen, the all-creators performed the sacrificial session for a full thousand years, where Hari (Viṣṇu) is to be venerated as the most noble.]

In BhāgP IV, 24. 72 Bhagavat, also a name of Viṣṇu, is described as the lord of the all-creators. BhāgP VI, 3, 15 is also interesting, because here one of the all-creators is mentioned by name. This is Bhṛgu, who is also known as Ṛṣi and the precursor of a Brahman family :

anye ca ye viśvasṛjo 'mareśā bhṛgvādayo 'sprṣṭarajastamaskāḥ /
yasyohitam na viduḥ sprṣṭamāyāḥ sattvapradhānā api kiṁ tato 'nye //

[When even the other all-creators, the lords of the immortal, such as Bhṛgu and the other wise ones, who are untouched by passion and darkness, and in whom good is supreme, (when) we cannot recognise his intentions, because we are dazzled, how could others achieve this?]

The following quotation shows the special power granted to the all-creators and their connection with Hari (= Viṣṇu) :

BhāgP VII, 15, 71-72

ekadā devasattre tu gandharvāpsarasām gaṇāḥ /
upahūtā viśvasṛgbhirharigāthopagāyane //
aham ca gāyamstadvidvān strībhiḥ parivṛto gataḥ /
jñātvā viśvasṛjastanme helanam śepurojasā /
yāhi tvam śūdratāmāśu naṣṭaśrīḥ kṛtahelanaḥ //

[But one day the troops of Gandharvas and Apsarasas were invited by the all-creators to a sacrifice by the gods, to sing hymns in honour of Hari. I, knowing of this (invitation), nevertheless went away singing, surrounded by women. Learning of this lack of respect, the all-creators cursed me through their power : Go at once into the Śūdra position and be robbed of your happiness for this insult !]

In BhāgP VIII, 3, 26 Gajendra describes Brahman as Viśvasṛj in the singular :

so 'ham viśvasṛjam viśvamaviśvam viśvavedasam /
viśvātmānamajam brahma praṇato 'smi param padam //

[I bow down before the all-creator, before he, who is this whole, which he is totally different from, who owns all riches, who is the universal soul, the uncreated being, Brahman and the highest of the high.]

The next two verses show once again the connection with Hari and with Viśvaksena, also a denomination of Viṣṇu; this is spoken by Śuka :

BhāgP VIII, 13, 23-24

tatrāpi janma bhavati harerviśvasrjām grhe /
 āmūrtiriti vikhyāto yenāpyāyeta vai jagat //
 viśvakseno visūcyām tu śambhoḥ sakhyam karisyati /
 jātaḥ svāmśena bhagavān grhe viśvasrjo vibhuḥ //

[In this (manvantara) the birth of Hari will also take place in the house of the all-creators. This incarnation will be called Amūrti; through this, the world will prosper. Become the son of Visūci, being born through a part of his substance in the house of the all-creator, the blissful Viśvaksena, the over-lord, will be the friend of Śambhu.]

Finally, the following speech by Śuka shows that Brahman (ātmabhū) is seen here as an all-creator.

BhāgP XII, 4, 4 :

eṣa naimittikaḥ proktaḥ pralayo yatra viśvasrk /
 śete 'nantāsano viśvamātmasātkṛtya cātmabhūḥ //

[This end of the world is described as being caused, with the all-creator, after having all go back into him, resting on Ananta, which serves him as a couch, and (on which) he exists through himself.]

BhāgP II, 9, 17; III, 4, 11. 6, 5. 7. 10, 27, 11, 22. 18, 3; VIII, 1, 1; X, 75, 32. 84, 16. 85, 6 are also relevant, but do not provide any information beyond what is contained here.

IV. Classical Sources

Some, but not many relevant clues can in fact be found in classical Sanskrit literature. In the Kumārasambhava I, 49 Kālidāsa says that Pārvatī, the daughter of Himālaya and Menā, was created by the Viśvasrj :

sarvopamādravyasamuccayena yathāpradeśam viniveśitena /
 sā nirmīṭā viśvasrjā prayatnādekasthasaundaryadidṛkṣayeva //

[By gathering together all of the standards for measurement and combining them at the place in question, she was created with great pains by the all-creator, as if he wanted to see beauty (concentrated) in one place.]

In Kumārasambhava III, 28, too, there is only a vague reference to Viśvasrj as the creator. Much more important than this is a passage from Kālidāsa's Raghuvamśa. In X, 16, the gods are speaking to Viṣṇu :

namo viśvasrje pūrvam viśvam tadanu bibhrate /
 atha viśvasya saṁhartre tubhyaṁ tredhāsthitātmane //

[Veneration to you, who first created all, who then is lord of all and destroys the world (again), to you, who have divided yourself into three parts.]

However, in the Śiśupālavadha IX, 80, the creator is spoken about again generally :

tadayuktam aṅga tava viśvasrjā na kṛtaṁ yadīkṣaṇasahasratayam

[It is certainly not just, that you were not given a thousand eyes by the creator.]

V. Conclusions for Religious History

So much for the sources, to which we have so far only added a few words of comment. However, we have now reached the point where we must gather together cardinal features of religious history from the wealth of information drawn from the literal sources. This leads us to the following main traits, some of which are extremely interesting.

1. The Viśvasrjaḥ originally appeared as a horde or group. The first time they appear is in the Atharvaveda, and AV XI, 7, 4 is the only passage to say that they number ten. We are kept in ignorance of their names; it is only in the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa VI, 3, 15 that one of them is named as Bhṛgu. The concept of Viśvasrj appears for the first time in the singular in the Maitrāyaṇī-Upaśad. In the epics, Purāṇas and in classical literature, singular and plural are used together, but with the singular becoming more predominant.

2. The Viśvasrjaḥ played a major role in middle and later Vedic times, especially in rituals, and previously this role has not been given the attention it deserves. In the major sources, the Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa and the Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa, as well as the Āpastamba- and Śāṅkhāyana-Śrautasūtra, the vaiśvasrja ritual as a sattrā or cayana is made a definite highlight, by its very position in the text. In addition, PB, TB and the Baudhāyana-Śrautasūtra use an unusually extensive identification system in connection with this ritual.

3. This great significance of the ritual is in contradiction to the negligible mythological tradition concerning the Viśvasrjaḥ. This can only be explained by the Viśvasrjaḥ being overshadowed by another figure in mythology of a similar type, and being eclipsed by him.

4. It is possible to identify the deity concerned. To do so, one must bear in mind that the Viśvasrjaḥ are clearly identified as the *creators* of the universe, both by their names and by the source texts – PB XXV, 18, 2; TB III, 12, 9, 8b; ApŚS XXIII, 14, 15 etc. Only Prajāpati can be considered as the focus of such attention. This can be proved not only by logic, but also from information in the

sources. As early as in the AV, Prajāpati appears next to the Viśvasrjaḥ. The passages concerning the Viśvasrjaḥ, MS IV, 14, 1 and TB II, 8, 1, 4 deal with a *kāmyeṣṭi* to Prajāpati. One of the phrases there recurs in AśvŚS II, 14, 11; the *hotṛ* uses it at the *idādadha* sacrifice to Prajāpati. In the PB, the *viśvasrj sattrā* immediately follows the 1000-year-festival of Prajāpati. Viśvasrj is also referred to just next to Prajāpati in the lists contained in the Maitrī-Upaniṣad. There are similar details in the ĀpŚS XIX, 15, 7; XXIII, 14, 14.

5. On the other hand, Prajāpati develops in two ways, as can be proved in detail by his links with Viśvasrj. The first leads to the Brahman, first to the impersonal universal soul of the Upaniṣads, and then to the personal creator god. In Āśvalāyana-Gṛhyasūtra III, 4 Prajāpati is directly identified as Brahman. Hiranyagarbha, identified as Prajāpati in the Taittirīya-Saṁhitā V, 5, 1, 2 is later used frequently as a title for the personal Brahman. The above quotation from PB XXV, 18, 5 and TB III, 12, 9, 6, which recurs in ĀpŚS and BaudhŚS, again connects the *viśvasrj-sattrā* with the "golden bird named Brahman". In the Maṇusmṛti XII, 50 the Viśvasrjaḥ are closely connected with Brahman. In the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa I, 3, 2 Brahman is known as the lord of the Viśvasrjaḥ; in VIII, 3, 26 Ātmabhū, i. e. Brahman, is called Viśvasrj.

6. The other, even more explicit connection is between Prajāpati and the post-Vedic Viṣṇu, from the Prajāpati cult to Viṣṇuism. Different incarnations of Viṣṇu are experienced by Prajāpati.⁹ One example of this is when he assumes the form of a tortoise in JB III, 272 and ŚB VII, 5, 1, 1-5. The incarnation of Viṣṇu as a boar originates as early as in RV I, 61, 7; VIII, 77, 10; TS VI, 2, 4, 2-3; ŚB XIV, 1, 2, 11. The cosmogonic boar is identified as Prajāpati in TS VII, 1, 5, 1, thus showing a direct connection between the Prajāpati cult and the veneration of Viṣṇu.

7. This link is now shown to be totally authenticated by the Viśvasrjaḥ, who, as demonstrated above, were closely connected with Prajāpati and took part in his evolution – although with a much better defined protection of their independence. The Viśvasrjaḥ are connected with Viṣṇu as early as in the Nṛsiṁha-pūrvatāpanīya-Upaniṣad I, 7, 1-3. In the Mahābhārata VII, 1464 (= VIII, 33, 12) Govinda (= Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa) is equated with Viśvasrj. Nārada in the Pañcarātra-Saṁhitā II, 2, 95 regards Viṣṇu as Viśvasrj. There are many other examples of this in the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa. In II, 1, 26 Puruṣa (another name for Viṣṇu) is equated with Viśvasrj. In III, 5, 9 is Viśvasrj = Nārāyaṇa (also identical with Viṣṇu). In III, 6, 10 Adhokṣaja (= Viṣṇu) is the lord of the

9. A. B. KEITH, p. 111 of the aforementioned text, points to the "transfer of myths from Prajāpati to Viṣṇu", without, however, drawing the necessary consequences from this observation.

Viśvasrjaḥ. In IV, 24, 72 Bhagavat (= Viṣṇu) is the lord of the all-creators (viśvasṛkpati). VII, 15, 71 and VIII, 13, 23 establish a link with Hari (= Viṣṇu), while VIII, 13, 24 does likewise with Viṣvaksena (also = Viṣṇu). Finally, the gods in the Raghuvamśa X, 16 describe Viṣṇu as Viśvasrj.

8. The above help us to answer the question of whether there has been only a limited tradition in Indian spiritual history, or whether there has been a living continuation of this. Just as the development of the metrics can be followed from the triṣṭubh to the indravajrā, upendravajrā and upajāti, from the jagatī to the indravamśā and from the anuṣṭubh to the śloka, so the Viśvasrjaḥ bridge a gap in religious history, between the Vedic-Samhitā era and the late Purāṇas (where, for example, BhāgP IV, 2, 34 speaks of the Vedic 1000-year sattra of the Viśvasrjaḥ and directly uses it to revere Hari) and Sāyana (compare his comments on TĀ I, 22, 11) and which establishes the link through Prajāpati to the post-Vedic Brahman and to Viṣṇu in particular. Thus, even if some material is missing concerning the Vedic period, and unknown already to some of the early exegetes, such as Yāska, there is nevertheless no longer any doubt, in general, about the direct continuity of Indian religious history.

SUR UN MANUSCRIT MÉDICO-DÉMONOLOGIQUE EN PROVENANCE DE BĀMIYĀN

Par

YUTAKA OJIHARA

Dans le courant de l'année 1974, semble-t-il, une grande feuille de manuscrit a été découverte dans le bras gauche du Grand Buddha (35 m.) à l'est de Bāmiyān, alors en réparation.¹ Aucun compte-rendu n'a jusqu'ici été fait de cette découverte, la région ayant été depuis lors dans une situation confuse qu'on ne peut que déplorer. Il y aura, partant, intérêt à signaler l'existence d'une photo du manuscrit en question, photo détenue par la Mission Archéologique en Afghanistan de l'Université de Kyoto, dont le chef à l'époque, M. T. HIGUCHI, eut la chance fortuite d'être autorisé à photographier le manuscrit à peine parvenu à l'Institut Archéologique Afghan de Kaboul. Or, il y a un an seulement, cette photo eut l'heur d'attirer l'attention de mon jeune ami M. H. NAKATANI, qui, tout en poussant ses propres recherches, notamment paléographiques, sur ce document,² eut aussitôt l'obligeance de me faire bénéficier des renseignements que l'on trouvera ci-dessous.

La photocopie, qui ne permet certes de déterminer ni la dimension ni les matériaux du feuillet original, en atteste du moins le format qui est allongé, une dizaine de fois plus étendu en longueur qu'en largeur : un format donc qui ne serait guère concevable que de la feuille de palmier. Outre que chacun des deux folios présente 4 lignes contenant chacune de 60 à 75 syllabes (*akṣara*), la feuille paraît être mutilée de son bord gauche qui devait aménager, pour chaque ligne, une dizaine d'*akṣara* de plus au recto, une quinzaine au verso : il se peut que la feuille ait été arrachée à un paquet (*pothi*) doté d'un trou de

1. J'adresse mes plus vifs remerciements à M. GÉRARD FUSSMAN qui a non seulement daigné me prodiguer quantité d'information indispensable, mais intervenir avec succès auprès des autorités afghanes pour qu'elles voulussent bien m'autoriser à publier le présent article. Quant aux matériaux archéologiques (dont un petit fragment de manuscrit) trouvés en 1972 dans l'autre bras du même Grand Buddha, cf. le compte-rendu signé de M. FUSSMAN lui-même et paru en 1974 dans la revue *AFGHANISTAN*. Mes remerciements sont à la fois dus à M. HUBERT DURT pour avoir bien voulu mettre au point la présente rédaction française.

2. Les résultats obtenus ne tarderont pas à paraître en détail, dans un gros recueil que M. HIGUCHI prépare sur Bāmiyān (en japonais).

reliure au sixième de sa longueur, à gauche.³ Quant à l'écriture de ce manuscrit, l'affinité est sensible avec, d'une part, la graphie appartenant au Ve s. et que L. Sander désigne par "Gupta-Alphabete der Gruppe B, Alphabet k"⁴ et, d'autre part, avec celle usitée dans les Parts IV-VI du célèbre *Bower Manuscript*,⁵ graphie attribuable au VIe s. d'après A. H. DANI (plutôt qu'au IVE s. comme HORNLE l'affirmait).⁶ De la sorte, dans le présent manuscrit, M. NAKATANI reconnaît une graphie qui, quoiqu'étant issue de l' "Alphabet k" au même titre que celle de la seconde moitié du *Bower Manuscript*, s'est différenciée de cette dernière tout en évoluant dans une autre direction. Bref, au point de vue paléographique, le manuscrit en question peut être supposé dater du VIe s.

Dans le sillage de mon ami qui procédait au déchiffrement, *akṣara* par *akṣara*, de la photocopie, il m'a été aussi agréable que relativement facile, tantôt exaltant tantôt amusant même, de restituer un texte dont la langue est le sanskrit normal à certaines singularités près, et qui, étant donné la mention tant de "voyants" médecins légendaires (*maharṣi*) que de plusieurs *graha* ou "diabes saisisseurs", porte de toute évidence sur la *bhūtavidyā* ou "démonologie" en tant qu'une des "huit branches" (*aṣṭāṅga*) censées avoir constitué la médecine indienne. Contre mon attente, toutefois, un tel texte s'est avéré non identifiable à travers les littératures connues de l'Inde, ceci à l'avis même d'illustres spécialistes de la médecine indienne, tels le regretté professeur J. FILLIOZAT ou M. R. E. EMMERICK, auprès de qui je m'étais renseigné.⁷ Que ledit état de choses serve par avance d'excuse suffisante pour que l'auteur de ces lignes, un pur profane en la matière, se permette de multiplier de capricieuses observations à partir du texte restitué que voici !

Texte

Type romain : leçon estimée sûre — Type italique : leçon sujette à caution — () : lacune ou omission comblée à titre conjectural

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3. Comme on le verra dans notre texte présenté ci-dessous, la feuille se termine par le diagnostic de la 3<sup>e</sup> espèce de *graha* alors que, pour chacune des 9 espèces en tout, il faudrait qu'il y ait non seulement le diagnostic (*rūpa*) mais encore la thérapeutique (*cikitsita*), ceci en réponse à la demande formulée (8bc) bien par avance. Il y a, partant, lieu de croire que, pour constituer un manuscrit complet, la présente feuille a dû être suivie d'au moins deux autres feuilles d'une dimension analogue.

4. Cf. *Palaeographisches zu den Sanskrithandschriften der Berliner Turfansammlung*, Wiesbaden 1968, p. 114 sqq.

5. A. F. R. HOERNLE, *The Bower Manuscript* (= *Archaeological Survey of India*, New Imperial Series, Vol. XXII), Calcutta 1909.

6. Cf. A. H. DANI, *Indian Palaeography*, Oxford 1963, p. 148 sqq.

7. En même temps que je remercie M. EMMERICK d'avoir été jusqu'à consulter M. G. J. MEULENBELD en la matière, je voudrais dédier ce modeste article à la mémoire vénérée du grand maître parisien hélas disparu le 27 octobre 1982,



— <, > : pause à présumer probablement — <ital.> : ajout que nécessiterait la normalisation — .m. : consonne épenthétique — \* : sic MS — ^ : coalescence vocalique accusée (régulièrement) entre mots ou, le cas échéant, entre membres de composé (pour en faciliter l'interprétation).

- (recto 1) X X X X X X X X X X X (upa)jīvite /  
 nilābhi(r) vanarājibhiḥ samantād avagunṭhite // 1 //  
 bahi(h) pumskokilaravai(h) samantād upanādite /  
 svargāya paramadvāre vipranādopanādite // 2 //  
 anūpe 'tapta-sāntāp-ke śara-padmōtpalākule /
- (recto 2) maharṣayo X X X X X X X X X (utta)māḥ // 3 //  
 KāśyapĀtreya-Maudgalyā. m. Agniveśyo <, > Parāśaraḥ /  
 Agastyo <, > Kṣārapāṇiś ca Bhadrāsaunaka. m. eva ca // 4 //  
 sukhopaviṣṭā niyatā<h> kṛtajāpyā<h> kṛtakṣanā<h> /  
 teṣāṃ kathā prādurāsī<t> prajāheto(r) maharṣinām\* // 5 //
- (recto 3) yakṣa-rakṣa X X X X X X (ityādi-dur)vidhaiḥ /  
 bhakṣyante mānuṣā<h> dharmakāmā<s>  
 pāpai(r) tapasvina(h) // 6 //  
 teṣāṃ sukhayā bhagavān Agastyo bhāvitātmanām /  
 praśrto<, > prājñalībhūtvā\* paryapṛcchat Parāśaram // 7 //  
 grahā<h> katividhā<h> teṣāṃ rūpāṇi kāni ca /  
 proktāḥ<, > X X X X X X X X // 8 //  
 cikitsitaṃ ca kiṃ X X
- (recto 4) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X /  
 teṣāṃ nāmaṃ\* ca rūpaṃ ca pravakṣyāmi prthak prthak // 9 //  
 Deva-Nāga-grahāś caiva Yakṣa-Rākṣasa-yo(r) grahāḥ /  
 Piśācā<h> Pūtanāś caiva Kumbhāṇḍa Marutā<s>  
 Gandharvā upari(ṣṭāc ca) tathā // 10 //  
 X X X X X X X X /
- (verso 1) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X // 11 //  
 (te)ṣāṃ rūpāṇi vakṣyāmi yathāvad anupūrvaśaḥ /  
 Devagrahaṃ pravakṣyāmi yathābhūtaṃ asaṃśayam // 12 //  
 śuciḥ śucisamācāro<, > anucchiṣṭo<, > sadā priyaḥ /  
 makṣikā<h> parivarjeti. m. uccaṃ sevati X X X // 13 //



( verso 2 )

X X X X X X X X  
mantrān vyāharate mandam  
mahājvaras cāvisate —  
yasya. m. enāni rūpāni

( sik ) th( aū ) dānam akāhālam /  
vandanām upagr̥hṇati\* // 14 //  
kuśālāntro yadāsti — tam /  
tam vindyā( d )\* Devatā-

graham // 15 //

Nāgagrahasya rūpāni  
śvasate sta( bdha-nayanah )

pravakṣyāmy anupūrvasāh /  
X X X X X X X X // 16 //

( verso 3 )

X X gacchati pāntham ( ca )  
ābhāṣṭaḥ\* paruṣo bhoti. m.  
dīrgham nihsarate jihvā  
yasya. m. enāni rūpāni

pāmsu-pāni( ś ) ca matdati /  
usṇam ca bhavate mukham // 17 //  
phenam ca sravate mukhāt /  
tam vindyāt\* Pannaga-

graham // 18 //

Yakṣagrahasya rūpāni

pravakṣyāmy anupūrvasāh /

( verso 4 )

X X X X X X X X  
sandhi-prapīdā bhavati  
abaddharūpībhavati ( .m.  
hasate rodātē cāpi  
Yakṣa-gra( ham ca ) tam  
vindyā( d )\*

X X X X X X X X // 19 //

pārśvasūla( ś ) ca jāyate /  
a ) baddhāni prabhāṣati // 20 //

gātrāni parimardati /

rūpāni etair vicakṣanah // 21 //

Notation manuscrite : ( 2a ) ° puṁ so ki la ra ve; ( 2c ) sva rgo  
'yam p°; ( 3a ) a nō pē ta pte śā ntā tmā; ( 3b ) sa re p°; ( 4a ) ka  
sya pā t°; ( 4c ) a ga styā k°; ( 5c ) ° prā tu r°; ( 6d ) ° svi nā;  
( 7ab ) ° bha ga vām a ga styā bh°; ( 7c ) pra śr tā p°; ( 7d ) ° pa  
rā śa rah; ( 10a ) ° gra ham c°; ( 10b ) ° gra ham; ( 12b ) ° a na pū  
rvva°; ( 13cd ) ° va rje nti mu c°; ( 14b ) ? th ? da nu mā kā ha  
lah; ( 14c ) ma ntrām v°; ( 15a ) ° jva ram mā v°; ( 15b ) ° la ntra  
ya da s°; ( 17ab ) ° pa ntham paṁ sum pā ni ca m°; ( 17cd ) a bhā  
ṣṭaḥ pa ru ṣo bha va ti mu ṣ°; ( 20a ) sa ndhi pra lā pī bha°; ( 20c )  
a va ba ddha r°; ( 20d ) ba ddhā ni ca p°.

Note occasionnelle : ( 2d ) Jeu de mot tacite : “brāhmane” —  
dviḥ — “oiseau”. ( 3a ) “sur une rive aux eaux fraîches et  
sereines”. ( 5b ) “en attendant l'heure ( de la tâche ) prochaine”.  
( 14b ) “( ne se sert que ) de bouillon de riz non caillé”. scil.  
13d ‘sevali’ ? ( 15b ) “— lors même qu'il ne souffre point des  
entrailles —”. ( 16c ) Cf. stabdha-dr̥ṣṭi- ( uragādhiṣṭhita- ),  
Aṣṭāṅgah. VI. 14. 19. ( 17c ) “injurie ( par le passant ) il se fait



violent", cf. *BHSD*, s. v. *ābhāṣati*. (20a) *prapīḍā-* (= *prapīḷā*, qu'il faut lire pour MS 'pralāpī'), mot inattesté, mais cf. *sandhipīḍā-*, *Suśruta* ('1, 35, 4' d'après *PW*, s. v. *pīḍā*) : "rhumatisme articulaire aigu". (20b) *pārśva-śūla-*, "point de côté", attesté *Suśruta* VI. 42. 117 et passim.

Nous avons donc là un texte versifié de bout en bout, le mètre étant le *śloka* normal.<sup>8</sup> Au début, deux stances et demie décrivent l'endroit où 8 *maharṣi* se sont réunis : c'est une rive fraîche et paisible, entourée de forêts et retentissant de chants de coucous, si bien qu'on dirait la porte suprême menant au monde céleste. Une telle mise en scène où l'on croit percevoir une tournure épico-purāṇique fait, pourtant, totalement défaut aux chapitres de *Purāṇa* afférents à la médecine,<sup>9</sup> de même qu'aux traités proprement médicaux commençant par la *Caraka-Saṃhitā* (désormais, (le) *Car.*). Le *Car.*, il est vrai, évoque très souvent une réunion de divins médecins mais, même là où est désigné le lieu d'assemblée, celui-ci ne se trouve qualifié que d'un adjectif tout au plus : ainsi 'pārśve Himavataḥ śubhe', I. 1. 7; 'ramye Caitrarathodyāne', I. 26. 6. Or, quoique d'un style de loin plus recherché, un prélude analogue se rencontre dès le début du *Bower Manuscript* (désormais, *Bow. MS*) : Pt. I, d'inspiration apparemment çivaïte et qui consiste en opuscule spécialisé relatif à l'herbe médicinale *laśuna* ou "ail".<sup>10</sup> Alors que ses 7 premières strophes (mètre *vasantatilaka*) sont consacrées au sommet himalayen où séjournaient 11 *muni*, bornons-nous à n'en citer qu'une seule, Str. 5 aux termes de laquelle — la pierre mythique *Candrakānta* qui y abonde, puisqu'elle est atteinte par le clair de lune émanant du *yogin* Śiva qui y réside et qui a pour diadème un croissant, se dissout en eau abondante, aussi limpide que du cristal et fraîche, même en plein jour, comme de la neige — :

*yatra trilocana-jatā-mukutāikadeśa-  
nitya-sthitoḍupati-dīdhiti-samprayogāt |*

8. Parmi les 32 vers impairs dont la restitution est assurée, on compte : — 25 en *paṭhyā* ; — 3 en *na-viṣṭā* (2a, 7a, 16c) ; — 4 en *bha-viṣṭā* (5a, 15a ; 10a, c) ; — 1 en *repha-viṣṭā* (5c). Un taux élevé de *bha-viṣṭā* est sensible ici aussi bien que chez Māgha (*Śiśupālavadha*), début VII<sup>e</sup> s. : cf. W. RAU, "Metrical Peculiarities in Bhartrihari's *Vākya-pāṭi*" (in : *ABORI, Diamond Jubilee Vol.*, 1977-78), p. 269. Pour un sommaire grammatical, cf. ci-dessous n. 29.

9. A savoir *Agni*, adhy. 278-302 ; *Garuḍa*, II, adhy. 146-174 ; *Viṣṇudharmottara*, adhy. 232. Cf. aussi *Mahābhārata* (cr. ed.), III, adhy. 219.

10. Si l'on voulait donner à cette oeuvre le titre de "*Laśuna-kalpa*" ou un titre analogue, notre texte aurait droit à un titre comme "*Graha-kalpa*" : sur le terme *kalpa*, cf. HOERNLE, op. cit., p. liv. Entre ces deux, me semble-t-il, la différence de style littéraire n'est fonction que des milieux sociaux différents, sans impliquer un rapport chronologique quel qu'il soit.



*śītaṃ divāpi himavat sphaṭikôpalâbham  
ambv indukāntamaṇayaḥ pracuraṃ sravanti //*

Cette analogie quant à la mise en scène permettrait-elle d'estimer que, de même que la Pt. I, du *Bow. MS*, notre texte appartenait à ce que HOERNLE appelle "the floating medical tradition ?" <sup>11</sup>

De même que dans cet ouvrage (*Bow. MS*, I, 9-10), le maître sage Kāśīrāja, engagé par Susruta au nom des 10 *muni* élèves, va rendre compte de cette plante inconnue qui vient de leur tomber sous les yeux, à savoir l'ail (*laśuna*), de même ici (ci-dessus 5c-8d), le *maharṣi* Parāśara, à la demande de ses 7 pairs dont Agastya est le représentant, se met à dissenter sur les démons (*graha*) dont on déplore qu'ils font périr tant de monde. Jusque là, semble-t-il, le parallélisme demeure parfait entre les deux textes, à l'exception de la différence suivante : — Avec Kāśīrāja (= Dhanvantari) et Susruta au centre des 11 sages, la Pt. I du *Bow. MS* a non seulement la conscience de la tradition médicale allant se cristalliser dans la *Susruta-Samhitā* (désormais, (le) *Suś.*), mais encore la velléité de s'y montrer affiliée, de préférence à la tradition de *Car.* à laquelle doivent être étroitement associés 4 au moins des 9 autres *muni* mentionnés : Ātreya, Hārīta, Parāśara et Bheḷa. Ce qui marque notre texte, par contre, c'est qu'il ignore l'école de *Suś.* : d'entre les 8 voyants énumérés (ci-dessus 4a-5b), tous étrangers au *Suś.* tel qu'il nous est connu, la moitié — Ātreya, Agniveśa, Parāśara, Kṣārapāni — ont affaire à la rédaction légendaire du *Car.* (où interviennent, en outre, Hārīta, Bheḷa et Jātūkarna),<sup>12</sup> tandis que l'autre moitié — Kaśyapa, Maudgalya, Agastya, Bhadrāśaunaka — se retrouvent en quelques passages du *Car.* sous sa forme courante.<sup>13</sup>

Or, qu'on s'en souviennne, la tradition indienne attribue la codification du *Car.* surtout à la lignée académique Ātreya-Agniveśa, celui-ci étant dit de loin le meilleur d'entre les 6 élèves que celui-là eut sous sa direction.<sup>14</sup> Ces deux noms, par ailleurs, figurent certes mais ne jouent aucun rôle dans notre manuscrit, où, au contraire, seule compte en tant que lignée celle de Parāśara-Agastya. Ne s'agit-il pas ici, chez l'auteur hypothétique de notre texte, d'une prétention de se

11. Cf. HOERNLE, loc. cit. Si la *Hārītasamhitā* courante commence par un prélude semblable (éd. et tr. A. RAISON, Pondichéry, 1974, p. 1 sq.), c'était sans doute à l'imitation de ladite même tradition, imitation faite par on ne sait quel auteur tardif de cette prétendue *Samhitā*. A ce dernier propos, cf. G. J. MEULENBELD, *The Mādhava-nidāna*, Leiden 1974, p. 435.

12. Cf. *Car.* I. 1. 30-35.

13. Maudgalya = Pārīkṣi, I. 25. 8 ; Bhadrāśaunaka = Śaunaka, VII. 11. 4-9. Dans la liste de 53 sages, I. 1. 6-14, on voit (n°4) Kaśyapa, (n°12) Agastya, (n°16) Pārīkṣi, (n°43) Śaunaka.

14. Cf. *Car.* I. 1. 31 : *buddher viśeṣas tatrāsīt ... tantrasya kartā prathamam Agniveśo yato 'bhavat.*



situer aux abords de l'école de *Car.* dans son sens large et donc, en quelque sorte, d'un défi à la famille prédominante d'Agnivēsa? S'il en est ainsi, l'auteur avait sans doute raison de prendre pour précepteur Parāśara, condisciple certes d'Agnivēsa,<sup>15</sup> mais son choix d'Agastya en tant que second ne nous est guère compréhensible, d'autant moins que c'est somme toute un personnage obscur sur le plan médical même s'il est à identifier avec Agattiyar de la médecine tamoule.<sup>16</sup> Ceci dit, comme je m'en aperçois soudain, c'est dans les milieux bouddhistes qu'on a pu alléguer à l'aise Agastya comme un médecin légendaire. Témoin là *Mahāvīyutpatti* (éd. SAKAKI : désormais, *Mvy.*), Ch. CLXXVII intitulé '*Maharṣināmāni*' : les *maharṣi* qui s'y trouvent enregistrés, au nombre de 25 (3448-72), sont pour la plupart autant de voyants médecins, y compris pêle-mêle tant Ātreya avec ses 6 disciples que Dhanvantari et Suśruta, voire Agasti mis immédiatement après Kāśyapa et Kāśyapa (3455-57).<sup>17</sup> L'origine bouddhique de notre texte, ainsi à peine soupçonnée, se confirmera quand il sera question de la liste des *graha* "saisisseurs".

A partir de l'*Uttara-tantra* (désormais *UT* : "Appendice"), Livre VI parachevant le *Suś.*, la médecine classique divise les *graha* en deux catégories tout à fait distinctes — *bhūta-* ou *unmāda-graha* d'une part, *bāla-graha* d'autre part — selon qu'ils relèvent soit de la "démonologie", *bhūta-vidyā*, soit de la "pédiatrie" ("obstétrique" largement comprise), *kumāratantra* ou *kaumārabhṛtya*.<sup>18</sup> Les espèces de *graha* mentionnées diffèrent entièrement d'une catégorie à l'autre, ce que nous constatons non seulement chez *Suś.* et Vāgbhaṭa (*Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha* et *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya* : désormais, *AS* et *AH*), mais aussi dans la littérature médicale ultérieure. Chez *Car.*, toutefois, le mot *graha* n'apparaît qu'une seule fois (VI. 9. 21) et concerne clairement *bhūta*, donc la première catégorie seulement. Pour en revenir à notre texte, ce sont également les *unmāda-graha* qui s'avèrent seuls en jeu, avec pour victimes non de petits enfants mais des "hommes aspirant à la Bonne Loi et pratiquant la mortification" : *mānuṣa-dharma-kāma-tapasvin-* (ci-dessus 6cd).<sup>19</sup> Or, parmi les

15. Sur Parāśara, cf. C. G. KASHIKAR (tr.), *Indian Medicine*, Poona 1951, p. 196 ; MEULENBELD, op. cit., p. 415.

16. Sur Agastya, cf. en dernier MEULENBELD, op. cit., p. 422.

17. Cette succession immédiate des deux derniers noms, aussi similaires, se retrouve telle quelle chez Vāgbhaṭa, *AS* I. 1. 78 (à la suite de : Punarvasu = Ātreya, Dhanvantari, Bhadravāja et Nimi), d'où ma conviction de reconnaître un sage médecin également en Agasti (= Agastya), *Mvy.* 3458.

18. Cf. J. FILLIOZAT, *Etude de démonologie indienne : le Kumāratantra de Rāvaṇa*, Paris 1937, p. 24-78 notamment. Les *bāla-graha* sont étrangers au *Car.*, dont la "pédiatrie" (II. 8) est de bout en bout rationnelle.

19. En plus, *bhūvitātman-* "pieux" (7b). Il s'agit indubitablement d'une double entente pour *tapasvin-* : "pauvre, pitoyable".



espèces de *graha* énumérées ici (10a-11a), il n'y a rien à dire de 6 espèces : Deva, Nāga, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Piśāca, Gandharva, qui se retrouvent dans les traités médicaux autorisés,<sup>20</sup> tandis que les 3 espèces suivantes : Pūtana, Kuṃbhāṇḍa, Maruta doivent nous embarrasser diversement.

On peut se demander, à propos du pluriel '*Pūtanāś* (*caiva*)' (10c), s'il s'agit de Pūtana- masculin. Mais ce dernier comme nom de *graha* ne se rencontre nulle part dans les traités médicaux. S'agit-il de Pūtanā- féminin, nom de *bāla-graha* bien connu<sup>21</sup> mais qui serait ici, anormalement, intrus parmi les noms d'*unmāda-graha*? — Quant à Kuṃbhāṇḍa, on serait certes tenté de le rapprocher de Kūṣmaṇḍa(ka) *bhūta-graha* attesté chez Vāgbhaṭa (AS VI. 7, AH VI. 4: n°10 d'entre les 18 espèces relevées). Mais, par contraste avec Kūṣmaṇḍa ou les formes analogues qu'on voit désigner un demi-dieu individuel dans la littérature épico-purāṇique,<sup>22</sup> Kuṃbhāṇḍa (Kuṃbhāṇḍa en pali) constitue dans la littérature bouddhique un nom nettement générique, associé tantôt aux Gandharva, Nāga et Yakṣa (*Lalitavistara*, passim), tantôt aux Yakkha, Rakkhasa, etc. (ainsi, *Milindapañho*, éd. TRENCKNER, p. 267). — Maruta, finalement, nom qui n'est connu nulle part ailleurs qu'en sanskrit bouddhique hybride où l'emploi cité par EDGERTON '*nara-maruta-sahasra*' (*Lalitavistara*) est décisif nonobstant les bases variantes Maru et Marut.<sup>23</sup> — Autant dire que ces termes nous ramènent à nouveau aux milieux bouddhiques.

C'est en effet le cas. Déterminant est le début de la partie finale du *Bow. MS*, Pt. VI consistant en *Mahāmāyūrī* (*Vidyārājā*, scil. *dhāraṇī*), une œuvre traduite en chinois dès le IV<sup>e</sup> s. et qui, en guise d'un *mahāyāna-sūtra*, enseigne des charmes de nature tantrique contre les serpents : — '*gaccha tvam Ānanda ... anayā Mahāmāyūrī ... rakṣāṃ karoḥi ... Deva-grahāto, Nāga-g°, Asura-g°, Maruta-g°, Garuḍa-g°, Gandharva-g°, Kinnara-g°, Mahoraga-g°, Yakṣa-g°, Rākṣasa-g°, Preta-g°, Piśāca-g°, Bhūta-g°, Kuṃbhāṇḍa-g°, Pūtana-g°, Kaṭa-pūtana-g°, Skanda-g°, Unmāda-g°, Chāyā-g°, Apasmāra-g°, Ostāraka-g° ...*'<sup>24</sup> — De cette liste de 21 *graha*, constatons d'abord qu'elle englobe tous ceux (en romains) qui figurent dans notre manuscrit de Bāmiyān — y compris bel et bien Maruta, Kuṃbhāṇḍa, Pūtana masculin — et, ensuite, qu'elle n'a évidemment rien à voir avec cette bipartition des *graha* que, depuis l'*UT* du *Suś.*, la médecine proprement dite va observer très strictement : voir *Bhūta-graha* et *Unmāda-graha* cidessus mentionnés sans aucune valeur technique. Il en va de même de la mention *Skanda-graha* à titre purement et simplement d'un *graha* comme les

20. Ainsi, *Car.* VI. 9. 21 ; *Suś.* I. 1. 8, VI. 60. 1-13 ; AH VI. 4. 13-43.

21. Cf. *Suś.* VI. 27. 1-3 ; AH VI. 3. 1-3 ; ubi alia.

22. Exception faite de '*preta-piśāca-bhūta-k°*', *Bhāgavata-P.* II. 6. 42.

23. Cf. Fr. EDGERTON, *BHSD*, s. vv.

24. Texte cité de HOERNLE, op. cit., Plāte XLIX, Part VI, — Leaf 1, Reverse.



autres, alors qu'il sera *bāla-graha* par excellence pour la médecine classique. Nul doute que c'est à cette liste-là ou à une liste analogue, liste de *graha* propre à une médico-magie bouddhique fort ancienne,<sup>25</sup> qu'a puisé l'auteur de notre texte, un bouddhiste lui-même, ambitieux de se faire connaître par son opuscule démonologique sinon au sein, du moins en marge de la haute tradition médicale de *Car.*<sup>26</sup>

Chez *Car.*, 7 *bhūta* sont d'abord relevés (VI. 9. 16: vers) et, un peu après, on se trouve en présence d'une liste qui en contient 11 (20: prose): par la suite, comme dans la crainte de voir une contradiction entre les deux listes précédentes, mention est faite à nouveau de 8 *graha*, "ces 8 qui sont les plus marquants d'entre les *graha* innombrables" (21: prose). Sur ce dernier chiffre, le *Suś.* est d'accord avec le *Car.* dans la mesure où celui-là signale 8 *graha* afférents à la "démonologie" (VI. 60. 1-13; liste reprise I. 1. 8), tandis qu'en matière de "pédiatrie", c'est naturellement une tout autre série de *graha* qu'il présente, *bāla-graha* commençant par Skanda et comptant jusqu'à 9 (VI. 27. 1-3; liste reprise I. 3. 35-37). Or le *Suś.*, plus précisément, son Livre VI dit *UT*, alors qu'il ne présente jamais un énoncé comme *\*aṣṭa-graha\** au sujet démonologique, se sert de la locution '*nava-graha*' à deux reprises (VI. 27. 1; I. 3. 35) concernant la pédiatrie. Le fait m'incite à imaginer qu'en prêtant le chiffre 9 à la série de *bāla-graha*, le rédacteur de l' "Appendice" du *Suś.* tint présente à l'esprit cette notion astronomique d'ores et déjà établie, à savoir celle de '*nava-graha*' ou "9 planètes."

N'en était-il pas de même pour l'auteur de notre texte? Dans le manuscrit, à la suite de la mention des *graha* — 9, dequis Deva jusqu'à Gandharva — (cidessus 10a-11a), s'est produite hélas une lacune de 26 *akṣara* (11a-d), qui nous empêche, théoriquement, de déterminer le nombre total des *graha* envisagés. De fait, pourtant, il me semble plausible que cette liste de *graha* se termine par la 9<sup>e</sup> espèce Gandharva, '*u pa ri*' qui précède la lacune devant exiger la restitution d'*upariṣṭāt* ("par surcroît", élément convenable pour clore une énumération), tandis que le vers suivant perdu (11b) a dû inclure le chiffre "9", *navan*, en réponse à la question posée en haut (8a) '*kati-vidha*-' "de combien

25. D'une telle liste, on perçoit un reflet lointain mais sûr dans la *Mvy.*, § CLXVII et CCXIII. De même, dans des fragments de manuscrit d'Asie centrale: cf. E. WALDSCHMIDT et alii, *Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden*, Teil III (Wiesbaden 1971) Nr. 842 (V, 1-2 avec Kumbhāṇḍa et Pūtaṇa) ainsi que Nr. 906g (R, 4-5 avec Maruta et V, 1-2 avec Pūtaṇa).

26. Voici un auteur fort talentueux, j'en ai l'impression, tant sa description des insensés de trois types (13a-15b, 16c-18b, 20a-21b) est de loin plus vivace et humoristique que celle donnée par d'autres textes: cf. *Car.* VI. 9. 20; *Suś.* VI. 60. 7, 11, 13; *AH* VI. 14, 13-15, 19-20, 21-23; *Viṣṇudharmottara-P.* 232. 30, 38, 45.



d'espèces », et que, pour l'hémistiche restant (11cd), de même que pour l'hémistiche antérieur aussi lacunaire (9ab), il a dû y avoir une formule apte à introduire la parole de Parāśara.

Pareil raisonnement une fois admis, il sera encore permis d'en dégager pour notre texte, de même d'ailleurs que pour l'*UT* du *Suś.*, un terminus post quem comme suit : on ne pourra le faire remonter au-delà des confins Ve-VI<sup>e</sup> s. Car, dans la *Brhatsamhitā* datant de cette dernière époque, on voit Varāhamihira osciller entre "5 *graha*" et "9 *graha*", voire favoriser plutôt la notion des "5 planètes" qui existait seule depuis le temps védique jusqu'au *Sūryasiddhānta* sans doute de la mi-IV<sup>e</sup> s.<sup>27</sup> — A la recherche d'un terminus ante quem, par contre, on n'aura guère tort d'affirmer que, fût-elle réelle ou feinte, l'ignorance de l'école de *Suś.* dans son ensemble, plus particulièrement, de ces *graha* d'une autre catégorie, *bāla-graha*, dont l'*UT* traite dans son chapitre de *kaumārabhṛtya*, est susceptible de situer la naissance de notre opuscule à une époque où le *Suś.*, sous sa forme munie de l'*UT* du moins, n'aurait pas encore joui d'une autorité comparable à celle du *Car*. Voici donc une oeuvre probablement antérieure au *Yogaśataka* attribué soit à Vararuci soit à Nāgārjuna. Car, étant unique de son genre en tant que charpenté sur la division légendaire d'*aṣṭāṅga* ou "huit branches", ce dernier précis de médecine a dû s'inspirer de cet "Appendice" du *Suś.*,<sup>28</sup> où certaines des 8 branches, telles *bhūtavidyā* et *kaumārabhṛtya*, avaient été intégrées comme autant de ses chapitres. Si le *Yogaśataka* date du VI<sup>e</sup> s. à l'avis de J. FILLIOZAT, que veut rapprocher cette oeuvre et le fameux témoignage d'Yi-tsing en fait de médecine,<sup>29</sup> il est presque exclu de faire descendre notre texte jusqu'à la seconde moitié du même s.

La distance chronologique semble minime entre la rédaction de l'opuscule et l'exécution du manuscrit, celui-ci laissant entrevoir suffisamment de traits moyen-indiens relevant de celui-là.<sup>29</sup> Significative est la consonne épenthétique

27. Renseignements dus largement à M. M. YANO, que je remercie tout en regrettant de n'avoir pu tirer profit ici de son instruction sur la notion intermédiaire de "7 *graha*". Sur *Varāha* se méfiant de la thèse "9 *graha*", cf. aussi *Śabdakalpādruma*, s. v. *graha*, init. Notons en passant 'grahais tataḥ pañcabhir...' chez Kālidāsa (*Ragh.* III, 13a).

28. Cf. J. FILLIOZAT, *Yogaśataka*, Pondichéry, 1979, Introduction, p. iv. notamment.

29. A part des formes irrégulières metri causa, dont *maharṣiṇām* (6b) ou *upa-grhṇati* (14d), et des anomalies vulgaires comme *a-bhūṣ-ṭa-* (17c) ou *prāṇjalibhūṣā* (7c), on aura raison de soupçonner une persistance moy.-ind. dans les faits suivants : radical *√vind-*, tiré du thème *vinda-* (15d, 18d, 21c); *nūman-* thématisé en *nūma-* (9c); *parivarteti* (13c) avec *e* pour *aya* (donc par émendation, *bhoti* avec *o* pour *ava*; 17c); Nom. -o et Nom. pl. -ā (une fois à l'Acc. fém.), presque de règle sans que le *sandhi* intervienne (sauf deyant *ca* et en fin de phrase = hémistiche).



-m.<sup>30</sup> qui nous frappe tant par son maintien fidèle dans le manuscrit que par sa fréquence dans le texte (4a/b, 4d, 13c/d, 15c, 17c/d, 18c et, quoique par émendation, 20c/d), une fréquence qui nous fera penser presque inévitablement au *Mahāvastu*. Or, de cet ouvrage typique du sanskrit hybride, on sait l'affiliation à la secte *Lokottaravādin*,<sup>31</sup> secte de Petit Véhicule qui, à en croire Hiung-tsang, prospérait encore à la mi-VII<sup>e</sup> s. précisément dans le pays de Bāmiyān.<sup>32</sup> Au bout donc de cette série de conjectures multipliées jusqu'ici à la légère et sans répit, voici mon hypothèse ultime, qui ira tant bien que mal de pair avec l'estimation paléographique à laquelle se livre mon ami et collaborateur M. NAKATANI : Dans les milieux *Lokottaravādin* de Bāmiyān, a été rédigé, au seuil du VI<sup>e</sup> s., un opuscule médico-démonologique dont le tiers initial, au plus, nous est maintenant connu grâce à un seul feuillet. Ce feuillet, retrouvé comme par miracle, provenait d'un manuscrit issue des mêmes milieux et datant de la mi-VI<sup>e</sup> s. ou un peu plus tard.

#### ADDENDA : MEA-CULPA

Six mois après avoir achevé cet article, je suis consterné de m'apercevoir, grâce à une correspondance privée de R. E. EMMERICK de Hamburg, que le manuscrit en n'est rien d'autre que celui tôt étudié par M. B. PAULY, "Fragments sanskrits d'Afghanistan", *JA*, année 1957, p. 273 sqq. (notamment I. 1° "Le feuillet A", p. 274-276 avec la *Planche I*, p. 284). Il s'agit donc d'une découverte faite en 1966 par l'équipe française (DAFA) "à une quinzaine de kilomètres à l'Est de Bamiyan", jamais en 1973-74 - ainsi qu'on le prétend - par M. TARZI et son équipe dans un bras du Grand Bouddha à l'Est. Avec infiniment de honte de mon insouciance bibliographique, je n'en voudrais pas moins que le présent article pût constituer, en substance, un essai de développement par rapport à l'admirable étude antérieure de M. PAULY.

30. Cf. EDGERTON, *BHSG*, § 4. 59, où presque la moitié des emplois cités relèvent du *Mahāvastu*.

31. Cf. L. RENOU et J. FILLIOZAT, *L'Inde classique*, § 2002, init.

32. Cf. Taisho, Vol. 51, p. 873b. Cette secte semble avoir été remplacée peu après par les *Mūlasarvāstivādin* sur le terrain, témoin l'*Abhidharma-saṃgītiparyāya* identifié par S. LÉVI (*JA*, 1932, p. 1 sqq.) sur un manuscrit que J. HACKIN découvrit en 1930 à Bāmiyān (dans une caverne, notons-le, près du même Grand Bouddha de 35m.). Sur les relations entre la *Mvy.* (datant de début IX<sup>e</sup> s.) et les *Mūlasarvāstivādin*, cf. *L'Inde classique*, § 1799.







## DEVĀNĀM-PRIYAḤ HAS IT ANY VEDIC ANTECEDENTS?

By

G. B. PALSULE

1. *Devānām-priyaḥ*<sup>1</sup> is an expression which is popular enough to be familiar even to an ordinary educated man – even if he be not a specialist – as an honorific title borne by the celebrated king Aśoka. What he may not perhaps know is that Aśoka was not alone in bearing this title. Daśaratha, his grandson had also taken this title as is known from the Nāgārjuni caves. Similarly it is known from the *Mahāvamsa* that Tissa (Skt. *Ṭiṣya*), who was a contemporary of Aśoka had also borne this title. It would therefore seem that in the Mauryan days the expression *devānām-priya* had established itself as a royal title corresponding to 'His Sacred Majesty' or simply 'His Majesty'.

2. What could have possibly prompted these kings to take this title? There is no unanimity among scholars on this point. It is suggested, for example, that these kings may have called themselves 'dear to the gods' (which is the literal meaning of the term<sup>2</sup>) as indicative of their divine right<sup>3</sup> (in which they apparently believed), or 'to indicate the belief that rulers were under the protection of gods,<sup>4</sup> or because of the ceremony of consecration at which the representatives of Vedic gods Indra, Varuṇa, Mitra, Pūṣan, etc. were invoked by the officiating priest to bestow on the king specific powers in their gift.<sup>5</sup> What the exact reason behind this royal title was, as far as I see, is not possible to be stated precisely.

3. There is one more thing about this title. It was not peculiar to Buddhist kings either. That it was borne by non-Buddhist kings also was already noted.<sup>6</sup>

1. The actual Prakrit form common in the edicts is *devānampiya*, with the variants *devānām-*, *devānam* for the first part and *piye*, *priya* for the second. A cognate form *devatānam-piyo* also occurs (*Āpadāna* I, p. 60).

2. According to the grammarians, however, the word *priya* has a transitive meaning: it means 'one who gratifies' cf. Pāṇini 3. 1. 135. 'Dear', according to them, is evidently a secondary meaning.

3. G. BÜHLER, 'The three new edicts of Aśoka', *Indian Antiquary* 7 (1878).

4. D. R. BHANDARKAR, *Aśoka*, 2nd ed., pp. 7-8.

5. B. M. BARUA, *Inscriptions of Aśoka*, part II, p. 220.

6. G. BÜHLER, op. cit., Pandit BHAGAVANLAL INDRAJI, 'The Inscription of Aśoka', *Indian Antiquary* 18 (1881).



One more interesting point about the use of this title is that it is used, at least on one occasion, as an ordinary common noun in the sense of 'a king'. The Kālsī version of Āśoka's Rock Edict VIII uses the word in plural: *devānāṃ-priyā* to refer to older kings (about whom it says that they took out pleasure excursions and indulged in merry-making). Other versions (like Girnar, Dhauli etc.) here use the word *rājāno* or *lājāno* which clearly indicates that *devānāṃ-priyā* in the Kālsī version is not just a title but is used as a common noun in the sense of 'kings'.

We may as well note here a related expression from Jain Prakrit. It is *devānūrpriyā* (the corresponding Sanskrit form would be *devānūpriya*) which, while almost synonymous with *devānāṃpriya* / *devānāmpriya* is not used there as an exclusive title of kings. Although it is sometimes used with reference to kings (as e. g. in the case of Konika, son of Bimbisāra, in the *Aupapātika Sūtra*) it is far more common in the Jain texts as a polite form of address which literally expresses a pious wish, viz. that the person addressed be dear to gods.

4. What is the origin of this expression? When did the two words *devānām* 'of the gods' and *priya* 'dear' first become integrated into a sort of loose (*aluk*) compound so as to become a formal title and denote a specialised meaning? Has the expression any antecedents in the Veda? Let us take a brief review of the Vedic literature:

(1) RV 9. 85. 2: *asmāntsamaryé pavamāna codaya dākṣo devānām āsi hi priyó mādah*: 'Make us sharp in contest, O Pavamāna, for you are the strength of gods, their favourite intoxicating drink'. This contains a prayer (to grant sharpness in contest) to the Pavamāna Soma who is dear to gods on account of its giving strength and exhilaration to them.

(2) RV 10. 16. 8: *imám agne camasám mā ví jihvarah priyó devānām utá somyánām*: 'Do not upset this vessel, O Agni; it is dear to gods and to Soma-drinkers'. Again a request, this time to Agni, not to upset the Soma vessel, as it is dear to the gods etc.

(3) RV 10. 56. 1: *idám ta ékam pará ū ta ékam tṛtīyena jyótiṣā sám viśasva / saṁvésane tanvās cārur edhi priyó devānām paramé janitre*.

In this "funeral hymn", the union of the deceased with the rays of light is the basic theme. The poet bids the deceased man thus (in the latter half): "Uniting with a body be thou welcome, dear to the Gods in their sublimest birth-place".

(4) AV 2. 34. 2; *upākṛtaṃ śaśamānām yád āsthāt priyám devānām āpy etu pāthah*



The stanza speaks of the sacrificial beast offered to the gods which is dear to them and expresses the wish that the offering should go upon the path (of gods).

- (5) AV 17. 1. 2: *priyō devānām bhūyāsam* : 'May I be dear to gods'. The following three stanzas also contain a similar wish, reading *prajānām*, *paśūnām* and *samānānām* respectively in the place of *devānām*.
- (6) Kāth. Samh. 18. 21 = Mait. Samh. 4. 13. 7: *devānām ājyapānām priyā dhāmāni* 'places dear to gods, the drinkers of *ājya*'.
- (7) Āp. Mantrapāṭha 2. 2. 9: *priyā devānām subhagā mekhaleyam* 'This lovely girdle, dear to gods.'
- (8) Tait. Br. 3. 1. 1. 2: *priyā devānām ūpa yātu yajñām*.

This contains a request to the goddess Rohiṇī, who is dear to gods, to attend the sacrifice.

- (9) (with the singular *dēvasya*) Bodhāyana-grhyaśeṣa-sūtra 1. 22. 15: *yo devasya priyo vidvān devasya padam āpmuyāt* 'the wise one, who, dear to God, will go to the abode of God.'
- (10) Brh. Upaniṣad 1. 4. 10: *tasmād eṣām tan na priyam yad etan manuṣyā vidyuh* 'Therefore they do not like it that men should know this.' Here the pronominal form *eṣām* refers to gods as is clear from the context. The pronoun *etad* refers to the doctrine *aham brahmāsmi*. The Upaniṣad says that gods do not like that men should spiritually awaken to their essential identity with the Brahman (for after self-realization, no man would any longer stay servile to gods).
- (11) I would here also like to mention a peculiar phrase of the Brāhmaṇas, which speaks of yet another favourite item of gods: *parokṣapriyā iva hi devāḥ* (Ait. Br. 3. 33; 7. 30; Tait. Br. 1. 5. 9. 2; Śat. Br. 14. 6. 11. 2 etc.) 'Gods are fond of indirect (way of expression).' This is a favourite expression of the Brāhmaṇas when they set up a theoretical form to serve as basis for the actual Vedic form they want to derive.

5. I do not claim that I have exhausted all the cases where the words *devānām* and *priya-* occur syntactically connected in the Vedic literature, beginning with the Samhitās and ending with the sūtras. But I have noted here as many cases as was possible and these can be said to be fairly representative of the Vedic position. It must have become clear from a study of these cases that the two words convey in the Vedic literature their just simple primary meaning and nothing more. They speak of a variety of items which are said to be dear



to or favourite of gods, such as the Soma, the vessel which contains it, the departed soul, the sacrificial offering of the animal, any person, places, a girdle, the constellation Rohiṇī, indirect way of expression and so on. Also the gods are said to resent men's becoming spiritually awakened. In all this we see that the two words have not developed any special relationship formally, they have not united into a compound, formal or loose. On the other hand, no special meaning also has arisen. In short, the two words have all along stood in the Veda on the level of two independent words without developing into a compound which would have served as a name, as an epithet, or as a designation.

The origin of the title *devānām-priyaḥ*, then, is not in Veda. It is to be looked elsewhere. The compound expression *devānām-priyaḥ*, conveying a particular unified meaning, is found for the first time in Aśoka's inscription in Prakrit, not in Sanskrit.

6. The expression *devānām-priyaḥ* has a long and chequered history in the later Sanskrit literature. It first occurs in the Vārttika<sup>7</sup> of Kātyāyana as an instance of *aluk*-compound having, as is now proved,<sup>8</sup> no bad meaning whatsoever. Patañjali links that word with other honorific expressions such as *tatrabhavan*<sup>9</sup> and also himself uses<sup>10</sup> it as such. The expression continued to be used as a courteous substitute of the 2nd person pronoun *tvam* for centuries in *belle-lettre* like *Harṣacarita*,<sup>11</sup> *Padmaprābhṛtakā*,<sup>12</sup> *Pādatāditakā*<sup>13</sup> and *Chalitārāma*.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, the expression has been found used only in an ironic sense in the scientific literature on different systems of philosophy, commentaries on the sūtras, works on poetics etc. like *Śābarābhāṣya*,<sup>15</sup> *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*,<sup>16</sup>

7. Pāṇini 6. 3. 21 Vār. 3.

8. KIELHORN and others have shown conclusively that the word *mūrke* found in the Vārttika as read in the *Siddhānta-Kaumudī* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita is a later insertion which is first seen in the *Prakriyā-Kaumudī* of Rāmacandra.

9. *Mahābhāṣya* under Pāṇini 5. 3. 14 (KIELHORN'S ed. Vol. II, p. 405, lines 14-22).

10. *Mahābhāṣya* under P. 2. 4. 56, Vol. I, p. 488, line 20, in the celebrated dialogue between a grammarian and a charioteer.

11. Pages 25 and 239, Nirṇayasāgar ed., 1925.

12. *Caturbhāṇī*, p. 8, ed. and trans. MOTICHANDRA and VASUDEVSHARANA AGRAVALA, pub. Hindi Grantha Ratnākār Private Ltd., Bombay, 1959.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

14. V. RAGHAVAN, *Some old lost Rāma Plays*, pp. 52-53, pub. Annamalai University, Annamalainagar, 1961.

15. Under *Mīm. sū.* 1. 1. 15.

16. On the *Brahmasūtra* 1, 2, 8, Nirṇayasagar ed. (bare text), pp. 68-69.



*Vādanyāya*,<sup>17</sup> *Rāmānujabhāṣya*,<sup>18</sup> *Padamāñjarī*<sup>19</sup> etc. Finally the word came to mean 'a fool', in which sense the word first occurs in Mammaṭa's *Kāvya-prakāśa*<sup>20</sup> and Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka*.<sup>21</sup> This change first occurred about 1000 A. D. and this change of meaning is reflected in the grammars and lexicons subsequent to this date.

I have suggested elsewhere<sup>22</sup> that a misunderstanding of the *Mahābhāṣya* passage under Pāṇini 2. 4. 56 mentioned above, primarily by Kaiyaṭa and possibly also by Mammaṭa, was responsible for the new directly derogatory meaning that came to be attached to the expression under discussion. My object in the present paper has been to see Vedic roots, if any, of the expression *devānām-priya*, so I do not go into the details of the subsequent history of this word which I have already traced in detail there.<sup>23</sup>

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17. Of Dharmakīrti, ed. Rahul Sāmkṛtyāyana, Appendix to JBORS, Vols. XXI and XXII, pages 43 and 47.

18. *Śrī-Bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja, ed. R. D. KARMARKAR, Vol. I, p. 33 (University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series), 1959.

19. Of Haradatta, on the *Kaśikā* under Pāṇini 3. 1. 13, ed. Svami Dvarikadas SHASTRI and Pt. Shri-Kalikaprasad SHUKLA, *Prācya-bhāratī-grantha-mālā*, Varanasi 1965, p. 370.

20. BORI ed., pp. 225-226.

21. 4. 172.

22. 'Devānām-priyaḥ', *Indian Linguistics*, Vol. 30 (KATRE Felicitation Volume), part II, pp. 134-161.

23. Recently the late A. R. DESHPANDE 'Anil', 'Aśokācē śilā abhilekha' *Vidharbha Saṁśodhan Maṇḍal Vārṣik* 1980, pp. 66-86, has tried to explain the word *deva* in *devānām-priya* (a title of Aśoka) as meaning a feudatory king and the like. The title according to him is to be translated as 'Beloved of His Lords', M. A. MEHENDALE, 'Aśokācē laghu śilā abhilekh', *Navabhārat*, December 1981, has rightly criticised this view as untenable.



# THE HISTORY OF THE ARYAN SOCIETY

The Aryan Society was founded in 1875 at Bombay. It was the first of its kind in India, and its object was to promote the welfare of the Aryan race, and to spread the principles of the Vedas and the Upanishads. The Society has since then been active in various ways, and has done much to advance the cause of the Aryan race in India.

I have now to give you a brief history of the Aryan Society, and to show you how it has grown from a small group of men in Bombay to a large organization with branches all over India. I shall begin with the foundation of the Society, and then go on to describe its early history, its growth, and its present position. I shall also mention some of the important events in its history, and some of the people who have been connected with it. I hope that this history will be of interest to you, and that it will show you the value of the work which the Aryan Society has done for the Aryan race in India.

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# THE TODAS OF THE NILGIRIS : HYPOTHESIS OF A TWOFOLD ORIGIN — PRE-TAMIL AND SAKA

*By*

ASKO PARPOLA

## 1. Introduction

The Nilgiris or "Blue mountains" indeed shine blue on the horizon when they first meet the eye of a traveller in the hot plains of South India. Rising over 7000 feet above sea level, they offer a wonderfully cool retreat from the excessive summer heat, if one is able to make the climb. This is no problem today, with the roads and even the railway built by the British, who about 170 years ago were attracted to this place of great scenic beauty with its undulating hills. Before the British made "Ooty" their favourite summer retreat, however, it was very difficult to mount the precipitous jungle-covered slopes, which were inhabited by the dread tribes of Kurumba hunters and gatherers. Until 1813, therefore, the Nilgiri tribes lived in almost complete isolation. In addition to the Kurumbas, whom others feared for their sorcery, these comprised three communities living in a symbiotic caste relationship on the plateau. The Badagas, cultivating millet, make up the largest, numbering about 34,000 in 1906 (and about 85,000 in 1961). Above them in the hierarchy have been Todas, about 800 (760), who are buffalo-herders but do not eat meat. Much below both of these groups are the 1200 (860) meat-eating Kotas, who earn their living mainly as artisans and musicians.

The Todas have long attracted the attention of anthropologists on account of their many striking differences from other Indian communities. They were described in great detail by W. H. R. RIVERS (1906), whose book is renowned as an anthropological classic. It has been supplemented, since the late 1930s, by the truly monumental work of M. B. EMENEAU, especially on the difficult language and the unique oral poetry of the Todas (EMENEAU 1938 through 1983). A still ongoing field study of the Todas and Kotas has been conducted for some years by David MANDELBAUM, a leading expert in Indian cultural and social anthropology. In addition to all this and other less qualified anthropological and linguistic work, there are numerous descriptions of the plentiful archaeological monuments of the Nilgiri hills. (Extensive bibliographies on the Nilgiris and their tribes are HOCKINGS 1962 and AGESTHIALINGOM & SAKTHIVEL 1973).



Undoubtedly the most intriguing problem concerning the Todas is that of their origin. This question has remained unanswered to this day in spite of the many different solutions that time and again have been proposed and rejected, such as the hypotheses that the Todas are of Sumerian, Vedic, Scythian, Macedonian or Israelite derivation (cf. EMENEAU 1967a : 61). However, it now appears that conditions for a new holistic review of the problem are at hand, as even the archaeological evidence relating to the Nilgiris has recently received a thorough scrutiny by a well-qualified expert, Lawrence S. LESHNIK (1970; 1974 : 255-267). So let us try and see whether the various pieces of the puzzle can be fitted together into a meaningful whole.

## 2. Archaeological evidence

Almost every hill of the Nilgiri plateau has a large number of easily recognized burial cairns and barrows, mostly in groups but also singly (cf. LESHNIK 1974 : 255; Gururaja RAO 1972 : 104, 106 f.). The most important field study was made in 1871-72 by James W. BREEKS, who prepared a report on the four dozen or so graves which he opened. The objects collected there are now deposited in the Government Museum in Madras and in the British Museum. This material forms the basis of LESHNIK's study, but he has also examined the Nilgiri antiquities brought to Berlin around 1876 by F. JAGOR, and other minor contributions to the subject (cf. LESHNIK 1974 : 255).

Some negligibly few graves characterized by iron objects, black and red ware and uncalcinated fractional burials have been found in the Nilgiris (cf. Gururaja RAO 1972 : 104). They belong to the same extensive and manifold megalithic complex which is spread all over South India, and which has recently been described in full by LESHNIK (1974). The excavations carried out a few years ago in NE Maharashtra (ancient Vidarbha), by S. B. DEO have now placed the beginnings of these South Indian megaliths to about 800 B. C., while their terminal date is in the first centuries of the Christian era (cf. ALLCHIN & ALLCHIN 1982 : 343 ff.). The prominence of the horse in the earlier megalithic graves studied by DEO supports the hypothesis that these graves have been brought to the Deccan via Iran or Central Asia by Aryan nomads, who in the course of their wanderings further south have become Dravidianized in language (cf. PARPOLA 1973).

The overwhelming majority of the Nilgiri funerary monuments, however, form a distinct and largely uniform class of their own, although the cairns and barrows themselves, to the extent of their typical portholes, do resemble the megaliths of the plains (cf. LESHNIK 1974 : 256 and his fig. 52 : 1-4). The Nilgiri graves differ markedly from the South Indian megaliths of the early



iron age both in the burial mode (see p. 323f) and in their unique grave goods. Some of the latter are evidently rather late, and most scholars have dated their origin to somewhere in the first millennium A. D. (cf. *ibid.*). On the basis of comparable though not identical parallels from India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, LESHNIK has now been able to narrow the dating between the 3rd and 5th centuries A. D. (cf. *ibid.* 266). LESHNIK is not concerned about the ethnic association of the Nilgiri antiquities but about their dating; this, he aptly points out, is clearly the prior question, to the solution of which any ethnic identification must correspond (cf. *ibid.* 255). Yet I am inclined to think that the comparisons made by LESHNIK do in fact suggest not only that some of the antiquities and traditions came to the Nilgiris around the Gupta period, but also that they were brought there by Iranian horsemen who had come to stay.

Particularly compelling in this respect are the characteristic figurines surmounted on pottery lids, made of the same material as the pots themselves (LESHNIK 1974 : 258) and "surely locally produced" (*ibid.* 261). Among the many different motifs, which include animals and people, often crudely made and schematic, are birds. Pottery lids topped by birds appear in the Caucasus in the early first millennium B. C., but in India not before the last centuries B. C. (in the Deccan, e. g. at Khapa); the closest parallels can be cited from the Parthian levels at Taxila (LESHNIK 1974 : 259). Most significant, however, are the lids representing horsemen wearing pointed caps and criss-crossed bands from shoulder to waist (fig. 1). Since the sixth century B. C., the pointed cap has been the characteristic par excellence of the Sakas, Iranian nomads hailing from the steppes of Central Asia. Darius the Great in his inscriptions (DNa 25 f., DN XV, DB V, 22, etc.) several times refers to "the Sakas who wear the pointed cap" (*sakā tigraxaudā*), while the sculptures on the Behistun rock include that of a man wearing a pointed cap, with the text, "this is Skunkha, the Saka" (cf. KENT 1952 : 133-140). Herodotus (7, 64), while describing the army of Xerxes, says, "The Sakae... had on their heads tall stiff caps rising to a point". It is generally agreed that the pointed cap was brought to India by the Sakas and Kuṣāṇas (cf. Van Lohuizen-de LEEUW 1974 : 16 and 25 with pl. II-III).

LESHNIK points out that figurines of horse riders are considered typically Iranian, appearing in Iran already in the early first millennium B. C., but not becoming common before the Parthian and Sassanian periods. Large numbers of horseman terracottas with pointed caps have been found at Begram in Eastern Afghanistan, dating from the fourth century A. D. Roman Ghirshman has taken their quantity as an indication of religious importance : found wherever the Iranian nomads passed, they may have represented either a protective or an ancestral deity. In India they are a popular theme during the 4th and 6th



centuries A. D. LESHNIK quotes examples thematically comparable to the Nilgiri horsemen from two North Indian sites, Ahicchatra IIIb (550-650 A.D.) and Kumrahar III (100-300 A.D.). A painting in cave I at Ajanta, thought to portray the ambassadors of the Sassanian King Chosroes II to the court of Pulaskin II (ca. 625 A.D.), shows bearded men wearing pointed caps and foreign dress. Persons wearing a crossed sash with or without an additional chest-band, reminiscent of the Nilgiri riders, are seen in the same cave and elsewhere at Ajanta. (Cf. LESHNIK 1974: 259 f.).

The paintings in cave XVII at Ajanta, dated to about 500 A.D., show drinking bowls comparable in shape to Iranian and Central Asian examples (LESHNIK 1974: 262), and parallels to two Nilgiri weapon types, the double-guarded and the curved dagger. The latter exists in the Nilgiris only in a terracotta model; at Ajanta it is painted as hanging from a rider's waist (ib. 264 f.). The bronze vessels found in the Nilgiri graves have notable parallels in the Parthian levels at Taxila and especially in the Sassanian vessels, which spread widely through commerce and were apparently copied in India, particularly in the Kuṣāṇa empire. The Sassanian influence was strongest in India around the 4th-5th century A. D., which LESHNIK sees as the most likely dating for the Nilgiri bronzes (1974: 261-263).

Like the Nilgiri jewellery, the bronze vessels have been made by very skilled craftsmen, and their forms are quite different from those in ceramic. For these reasons, LESHNIK finds it unlikely that they should have been locally made, and suggests that "either the bronzes were purchased from itinerant smiths or from the bazars in the lowlands" (1974: 261). Yet the very rare occurrence of comparable bronze vessels in South India, which cannot be solely due to the constant reworking of the metal, in my opinion casts doubt on this assumption. I wonder whether such bowls were ever used in South India except by Iranian intruders, and propose that they were brought to the Nilgiris, once and for all, upon their arrival by just those Iranian horsemen whom I assume to have started the grave tradition. The difficult access to the mountains is likely to have isolated them fairly soon from the lowlands. LESHNIK himself sees a hint of an ultimate lowland origin for these people in the scant dress of the terracotta human figurines (1974: 266 f.), which, as observed already by Bruce FOOTE, is incompatible with the rigorous climate of the Nilgiris (ib. 259).

Historically, it does not look at all unlikely that, around the 4th to 6th century A. D., a group of Iranian horsemen should have climbed to the Nilgiris and stayed in that wonderful place. Already in the first century B. C., Saka invaders occupied the lower Indus valley and conquered the city of Ujjain. Though they lost it temporarily to the Āndhra Kingdom of the Sātavāhanas,



Ujjain later formed the capital of the Saka dynasty of the Western Kṣatrapas, whose rule lasted from the first to the late fourth century A. D. The greatest conqueror of the Western Kṣatrapas, Nahapāna, early extended his rule over Gujarat, Kathiawar, northern Maharashtra, Konkan and even parts of southern Maharashtra. During the next centuries, parts of these areas were in turn lost and gained by the Sātavāhanas and the Sakas. (Cf. Nilakanta SASTRI 1966: 94 ff.). Inscriptions with the word (*mahā*)*kṣatrapa* have been found at Nasik and three other sites in Maharashtra (cf. SALOMON 1974: 13). LESHNIK (1974: 261, 263, 266) has quoted several parallels from Nasik to miscellaneous Nilgiri bronze objects (a ring, drinking vessels, and Kohl bottles). The distance to the Nilgiris is not unreasonable for horsemen, and it may be recalled that Pahlava (Parthian) origin has often been postulated for the Pallava dynasty succeeding the Sātavāhanas far in the southeast, in Tamilnadu (cf. Nilakanta SASTRI 1966: 101; THAPAR 1956: 168 f.).

The hypothesis that Iranians or more particularly Sakas (also called Indo-Scythians) should have built the Nilgiri graves is by no means new. But the most popular theory associates them with the ancestors of the Todas (cf. LESHNIK 1974: 255). I do not know whether anyone before has thought of combining these two hypotheses, holding that both identifications could be true simultaneously. This, at any rate, is the thesis developed in the present paper. Several features in the Nilgiri burials do in fact point to the Todas. Most apparent is the frequency of the buffalo among the motifs on the lids of funerary pots, suggesting that buffalo herding played an important role in the economy of the people buried in them. This is a feature distinguishing the Todas from all other Nilgiri tribes: they are "a purely pastoral people, limiting their activities almost entirely to the care of their buffaloes and to the complicated ritual which has grown up in association with these animals" (RIVERS 1906: 6). That the terracotta figures represent domestic buffalo is "evident from the modeled bells and garlands which some examples have suspended from the neck" (LESHNIK 1974: 248 f.). The utensils from the burials seem to confirm the assumption of pastoralism; there is nothing that clearly suggests agriculture, while shears perhaps point to the herding of sheep, also represented on the lids along with many buffaloes (ib. 264).

Another feature connecting the Nilgiri graves with the Todas is the burial mode (cf. Gururaja RAO 1972: 351). In the South Indian megaliths of the early iron age, the bones of the dead were buried after they had been excarnated through exposure of the corpse. The dead of the Nilgiri graves, on the other hand, were burnt. This is proved by the calcination of the bones and by the presence in the urns of charcoal and tin, the latter from bronze ornaments on dead bodies, heated continuously and in contact with air (cf. ib. 110, and passim).



The Toda burial is divided into two ceremonies separated by an interval varying from one month to a year or more, generally called after their Badaga names "green funeral" and "dry funeral" respectively. In the first, the dead body is burnt. In the second, the skull pieces and the lock of hair collected at the first funeral are placed on an ornamented mantle, burnt together with various objects, and buried in a pit dug at the opening of a circle of stones (called by the Toda *ōsōrm*). On both occasions, a number of buffaloes are killed to accompany the dead to the afterworld, after they have first been caught with bare hands by men in an exciting competition, and after a bell has been hung on their necks (some of the terracotta buffaloes of the graves have bells!) and butter has been rubbed on their backs, heads and horns. The things burnt include baskets filled with grain, butter, honey, etc., coins, a bow and three arrows, a knife, the axe with which the buffaloes were killed, and so forth. (cf. RIVERS 1906 : 337-404, esp. 352, 379-382; EMENEAU 1971 : xxxvii-xli; Gururaja RAO 1972 : 348-350.). The stone circle is a characteristic feature of the Nilgiri cairns and barrows, some being so insignificant that BREEKS often found it difficult to distinguish them from the simple Toda osorms (cf. RIVERS 1906 : 712).

### 3. Linguistic evidence

The earliest record for the presence of the Todas in the Nilgiri is an inscription in the Kannada language, dated 1117 A. D. Puṇisa Daṇḍanāyaka, a general of the Hoysala king Viṣṇuvardhana, is said to have invaded the Nilgiris and "frightened the Toda"; no other tribes are mentioned, nor is there any ethnographic information. (Cf. EMENEAU 1967a : 251.) Evidently this expedition opened up the Nilgiris for the Badagas "Northerners". Their language is a dialect of Kannada, partaking of the change  $p \rightarrow h$ - and the merger of alveolar and post-dental  $r$ , dating respectively from the 10th and the late 12th century onwards. (Cf. EMENEAU 1965 : 18 f.).

The Todas, Kotas and Kurumbas have all been created in the Nilgiris according to the oral tradition of the Todas; so this source cannot elucidate the date or direction of their arrival (cf. EMENEAU 1967a : 251; RIVERS 1906 : 695). The only means of penetrating into the prehistory of these tribes is, apart from the archaeological material, the analysis of their languages.

Toda was correctly regarded as a member of the Dravidian family as early as 1832 (cf. EMENEAU 1967a : 1), but it was not properly studied until the work of EMENEAU. He has been able to show that Toda together with Kota forms a Nilgiri subgroup, whose proto-form has branched off from pre-Tamil some time before the Tamil-Malayalam palatalization of  $*k$ - before front vowels.



This change predates the earliest literary texts in Old Tamil, composed in all likelihood in the first century B. C., and the earliest Tamil Brahmi inscriptions dating from the second century B. C. at the latest. An uncertain indication that the change may not be older than the third century B. C. is the mention of *Kerala-putra* ( $\sim$ Old Tamil *Cēra-mān*) in Ashoka's (2nd and 13th) rock edicts. (cf. EMENEAU 1967b: 367; 1967a: 25; and for the dating of the Old Tamil texts, ZVELEBIL 1973: 34 ff.) Such a pre-Christian date for the arrival of proto-Kota-Toda speakers to the Nilgiris suggests that they introduced those few graves found there that belong to the South Indian megalithic complex of the early iron age (cf. above, p. 320f). The introduction of iron had provided these pre-Tamils with an effective means of clearing the jungle and penetrating to the attractive plateau. An iron buffalo once attached to the ritual tridents of iron often found in the megalithic graves of the plains (cf. ALLCHIN & ALLCHIN 1982: 336 f.), together with the importance of the buffalo in the Dravidian folk religion of South India (cf. e. g. HILTEBEITEL 1978), makes it likely that it was they who introduced the buffalo-herding of the Todas to the Nilgiris.

Toda and Kota share some "very deep-lying similarities, e.g. in the overall structure of the verb system", which attest to a genetic relationship between them, while several other features common to them must be due to borrowing through bilingual speakers (cf. EMENEAU 1967b: 370 f.). At the same time, "great diversity in many points" (ib.) and mutual unintelligibility prevails between Toda and Kota. Against the background of their identical derivation from pre-Tamil, contiguity of long standing, and intimate social relationship, the development of such a divergence is rather striking. Certainly "the diversity fostered by the Hindu caste structure" can be invoked as a factor keeping it up once it had evolved (cf. EMENEAU 1967a: 10), but how did it come about?

The Kota language (for which see EMENEAU 1967a: 64 ff.) exhibits no dramatically irregular development in comparison to Tamil and other Dravidian languages, at least as far as its phonology is concerned (cf. BURROW & EMENEAU 1961: xii f.). The same cannot be said of Toda: "Its morphology is different in many respects from that of any other of the (Dravidian) languages. Its comparative phonology shows a great deal of departure from simple one-to-one relationship between its phonemes and those of any other of the languages" (EMENEAU 1967a: 11). Indeed, Toda presents "phones of a nature unexpected even by an investigator with a thorough academic training in phonetics, and ... also difficult problems in analysis of the phonemic kind" (ib. 2). It has no less than eleven fricatives, and in addition four laterals, two of them unvoiced: in short, many more phonemes than the other Dravidian



languages, among them sounds scarcely heard elsewhere in India, besides unusual and long consonant clusters (cf. PINNOW 1973: 191 f.). The only reasonable explanation for this phonetic aberrancy of Toda is that offered by PINNOW: whatever their origin, it is clear that the Todas originally have not spoken a Dravidian language but have at some time adopted it, changing it radically according to the patterns of their original tongue (ibid.). (For such a process, cf. DIEBOLD 1964).

The conspicuous abundance of fricatives in Toda is a feature that clearly distinguishes it from the other Dravidian languages, in fact, from all other languages spoken in India in historical times with one significant exception – the Middle Iranian languages. The great number of sibilants in Toda is a particularly striking feature, for usually sibilants occur in Dravidian languages only as allophones or developments of palatal stops (cf. BURROW & EMENEAU 1961: xii f.); of the known Middle Iranian languages, Toda is in this respect closest to the Khotanese Saka, the language presumably closest to that of the Sakas ruling in Western India and probably spoken by the introducers of the Nilgiri grave tradition.

The following comparative table lists, as far as they can be ascertained at present, the consonant phonemes of common Old Iranian and the principal variants of Middle Iranian on the one side, and of Toda, Kota and pre-Tamil (phonologically close to proto-Dravidian) on the other. Excluded from the phonemes of Old Iranian (from MACKENZIE 1967: 19; cf. also MORGENSTIERNE 1973: 73 ff.; HOFFMANN 1958; WINDFUHR 1971; and CARDONA and EMMERICK 1974: 452) are the nuances of palatalization, labialization, etc., which in all probability were not phonemic. Besides Pahlavi (for whose phonemes see MACKENZIE 1967: 23). Middle Persian includes the language of the inscriptions; the phonemic system of Parthian (see GHILAIN 1939: 40; SKALMOWSKI 1967: 77) is practically identical (the fricatives  $\beta$  and  $\delta$  are allophones of  $b$  and  $d$ ) (Bo UTAS, pers. comm.). Excluding Arabic loans, the "putative Sogdian and Khwarezmian consonants" have been personally communicated by D. N. MACKENZIE, and those of Khotanese Saka, similarly with reservations, by R. E. EMMERICK, who refers to the earlier reconstructions of KONOW 1949 and HERZENBERG 1965; for the phonemes of "Bactrian", see MARICQ 1958: 399 ff. with the critical remarks of HENNING 1960: 49. The Toda and Kota consonants are from EMENEAU 1967a: 18 and 64 f. respectively; for those of pre-Tamil/proto-Dravidian, cf. KRISHNAMURTI 1958: 259; BURROW and EMENEAU 1961: xii f.; EMENEAU 1970: 7; and ZVELEBIL 1970: 76 f. I have unified the phonetic transcription (for Tamil, cf. EMENEAU 1967: 372).



|                           |     |     |   |     |     |
|---------------------------|-----|-----|---|-----|-----|
| Common Old                | p   | t   |   | ç   | k   |
| Iranian                   | b   | d   |   | j   | g   |
|                           | f   | θ/ç |   | θ/ç | x h |
|                           | β   | ð   |   |     | ɣ   |
|                           |     | s   |   | ç   |     |
|                           |     | z   |   | ʒ   |     |
|                           | m   | n   |   |     | ŋ   |
|                           | w   | r l |   | ɣ   |     |
| Western                   | p   | t   |   | ç   | k   |
| Middle                    | b   | d   |   | j   | g   |
| Iranian :                 | f   |     |   |     | x h |
|                           | (β) | (ð) |   |     | ɣ   |
| Middle                    |     | s   |   | ç   |     |
| Persian                   |     | z   |   | ʒ   |     |
| ( Pahlavi &<br>Parthian ) | m   | n   |   |     |     |
|                           | w   | r l |   | ɣ   |     |
| Eastern                   | p   | t   |   | ç   | k   |
| Middle                    | b   | θ   |   | j   | g   |
| Iranian :                 | f   | θ   |   |     | x   |
|                           | β   | ð   |   |     | ɣ   |
| Sogdian                   |     | s   |   | ç   |     |
|                           |     | z   |   | ʒ   |     |
|                           | m   | n   |   |     |     |
|                           | w   | r l |   | ɣ   |     |
| Eastern                   | p   | t   | c | ç   | k   |
| Middle                    | b   | d   | j | j   | g   |
| Iranian :                 | f   | θ   |   |     | x h |
|                           | β   | ð   |   |     | ɣ   |
| ( Late )                  |     | s   |   | ç   |     |
| Khwarezmian               |     | z   |   | ʒ   |     |
|                           | m   | n   |   |     |     |
|                           | w   | r l |   | ɣ   |     |



|           |   |   |    |     |    |   |   |    |     |
|-----------|---|---|----|-----|----|---|---|----|-----|
| Eastern   | p | t | t' | c   | c' | t | č | č' | k   |
| Middle    | b | d |    | j   |    | d | ǰ |    | s   |
| Iranian : | f | θ | θ  |     |    |   |   |    | x h |
|           | β | δ |    |     |    |   |   |    | ɣ   |
| Khotanese |   |   |    | s   | s' |   | ś |    |     |
| Saka      |   |   |    | z   | z' |   | ž |    |     |
|           | m |   |    | n   | n' | n |   |    | ŋ   |
|           | w |   |    | r l | l' | r | ɣ |    |     |

|      |   |   |   |     |     |   |     |
|------|---|---|---|-----|-----|---|-----|
| Toda | p | t | c | t   | t   | č | k   |
|      | b | d | j | d   | d   | ǰ | s   |
|      | f | θ |   |     |     |   | x   |
|      |   |   | s | s   | s   | ś |     |
|      |   |   | z | z   | ž   | ž |     |
|      | m |   |   | n   | n   |   | (ŋ) |
|      | w |   | r | r l | r l | ɣ |     |

|      |   |   |     |     |   |   |
|------|---|---|-----|-----|---|---|
| Kota | p | t | t   | t   | č | k |
|      | b | d | d   | d   | ǰ | s |
|      |   |   |     | (s) |   |   |
|      | m |   | *n  | n   |   | ŋ |
|      | w |   | r l | r l | ɣ |   |

|                                          |   |   |     |   |   |   |
|------------------------------------------|---|---|-----|---|---|---|
| Pre-Tamil<br>( and Proto-<br>Dravidian ) | p | t | t   | t | č | k |
|                                          | b | d | d   | d | ǰ | s |
|                                          | m |   | n   | n | ñ |   |
|                                          | w |   | r l | l | ɣ |   |

Toda vocalism presents great problems, because pre-Tamil vowels have split in different contexts, while extensive borrowing, especially from Badaga, has blurred the results (cf. EMENEAU 1970: 36). Just one striking phenomenon is mentioned here, the split of pre-Toda \**ō* and \**ū*. Abstracting from the complex



evidence, it appears that normally *\*ō* and sometimes *\*ū* became *wa* when the next syllable had a low vowel (*\*a* or *\*ay*), and *wī* (in the case of *\*u*, *ū*) when the next syllable had a high vowel (*\*i*, *\*u*) (cf. *ibid.* 41-43). A somewhat similar phenomenon may be cited from Iranian languages. In Khotanese Saka, *ū* > *wi* is a normal result of palatalisation (e.g. *kūra*- 'false' vs. oblique *kwīre*, or *gūhā*- 'cow' vs. gen.-dat. *gūhū*) and *o* (or *au*) > *wa* when followed by *i* (e.g. *kho* 'when' + enclitic pronoun *-i* > *khvai*) (EMMERICK, pers. comm.). "The 'breaking' of Old Iranian *au* (through *o*?) > *wa* was an irregular feature in the development of Pashto, and the variations *ō* > *wa*, *ū* > *wā* still mark different dialects today" (MACKENZIE, pers. comm.). M. B. EMENEAU (pers. comm.), however, is of the opinion that "the diphthongal developments of <Toda> *\*o* and *\*u* (> *wa wī*) are ...not to be separated from the diphthongal pronunciations of *o* and *u* in many of the Dravidian languages/dialects".

The Proto-Dravidian gender-distinction (in the third person pronouns and pronominal suffixes) is lost only in Brahui and Toda, independently of each other (cf. SUBRAHMANYAM 1971: 414). In Brahui this is clearly due to the influence of the neighbouring Iranian languages, which is highly suggestive for the case of the Toda. It must be left to future research to find out whether some other aberrant innovations of Toda could also be ascribed to an Iranian (Saka) substratum.

D. N. MACKENZIE (pers. comm.) has pointed out the importance of searching the Toda vocabulary: "a couple of Iranian loan-words would surely be worth more as evidence than a dozen phonemes, since the latter can be innovations anywhere ..., the former not." Here I can do no more than regret my inability to go into this matter. When the Toda lexicon will become available in a more accessible form, it will be easier to investigate this. However, Iranian words can be expected to have survived only in a few isolated instances, namely when certain originally Iranian cultural elements have been retained. And even in such rare cases there is the possibility that the Sakas - if such they be - had adopted Indo-Aryan terms for many things during their long-continued presence in north-western India before their arrival to the Nilgiris. A case in point seems to be the Toda word *ōsōrm* denoting "the burning place of the relics at the second funeral" (with a stone circle connecting it with the old Nilgiri graves): M. B. EMENEAU makes the rather convincing suggestion that this word is derived (with the usual Kota-Toda loss of short vowel in non-initial syllable) from Prakrit *ōsāra*- "exit, going away" (from Sanskrit *ava-sāra*- or *apa-sāra*- "id.", cf. TURNER 1966: nos. 466 & 861), "with reference to the departure of the dead person to the world of the dead. My only qualms about this derivation arise from the absence in our Tamil and Kannada lexica of any form which could have been the intermediary; this is probably not a fatal



objection" (EMENEAU, pers. comm. 1983). If the word was introduced by Sakas coming from more northerly areas, this absence gets an explanation.

There is another new etymology that I would myself like to put forward in support of the substratum hypothesis. I suspect that the ethnic name Toda (Kota *ton* < \**todn* 'Toda man', *tody* 'Toda woman'; Toda *toj-mox* 'Toda woman'; Kannada *toda(va)* 'a Toda', Cf. BURROW and EMENEAU 1961 and 1968: no. 2885) is derived from a Dravidian root attested in Kannada, Tulu, Parji, Kuvi and Malto: *todal* etc. 'to stammer, speak inarticulately or indistinctly, lisp' (cf. *ibid.* no. 2884; and TURNER 1966: no. 5965 for Neo-Indo-Aryan borrowings). The unmixed proto-Kotas would have originally used it as a nickname for the first few generations of bilingual Iranians, who spoke their newly adopted Dravidian in a peculiar way. The latter could only master the phonological norms of their native language, forcibly applying them to the second language which they tried to speak in their need to communicate, especially with their wives undoubtedly taken from the earlier proto-Toda-Kota community. This imperfect language spoken by the fathers was adopted by their sons (out-numbering the girls on account of the frequent infanticide of female babies) and soon by the rest of the proto-Todas.

Incorrect pronunciation is known to create social barriers, and in this case a word meaning "stammerer" would have become the ethnic name of the people concerned. A similar name is Hottentot for the Khoisan speakers (Bushmen), whose language has rare smack sounds: it goes back to a Dutch word meaning "stammerer" (cf. WENDT 1961: 33 f.). Conversely, Sanskrit *mleccha* 'person who cannot speak (Vedic Sanskrit) correctly, barbarian', apparently comes from the ethnic name of some Proto-Māgadhī speakers (cf. PARPOLA and PARPOLA 1975: 212 ff.).

### 3. Anthropological evidence

The fact that Todas speak a South Dravidian language and yet racially "differ remarkably ... from the other inhabitants of South India" (RIVERS 1906: 18) is very clear evidence in favour of this hypothesis that Dravidian speakers have mixed with newcomers of Iranian origin. "The average height of men is about 5 ft. 7 in., and that of women 5 ft. 1 in.; both are well-proportioned, and the men robustly built. Their heads are distinctly dolichocephalic ... The nose is usually well-formed and not especially broad... often distinctly rounded in profile. The skin is ... distinctly lighter than that of most of the Dravidian inhabitants of Southern India" (*ibid.*).

Still one markedly aberrant characteristic of the Todas can be brought to bear as evidence for their partly Iranian derivation: their well known fraternal



polyandry (cf. *ibid.* 515 ff.), accompanied by great sexual freedom. "Sexual intercourse is practised by a woman, not only in marriage with her husband or husbands, but also in the *mo-tyt* institution with her lover in the other moiety; in permitted relations with dairy-priests funerals in what is as near promiscuity as anything can be" (EMENEAU 1971 : xxxvi).

The pre-Tamils, from whom the proto-Koto-Todas are descended, have been monogamous. *Karpu* 'chastity, conjugal fidelity' is in the Old Tamil literature the most important virtue of women (cf. SUBRAHMANYAN 1966 : 286 ff.). The great Old Tamil epic *Cilappatikaram* (ca. 200 A.D.) testifies to the importance of the cult of *Pattini* (Sanskrit *patnī* 'wife, spouse'), the goddess of chastity, which is still alive in Kerala and Sri Lanka (cf. ZVELEBIL 1973 : 173). The contrast with the Toda customs could hardly be greater. What could have brought about so radical a change except the arrival of people with quite different customs and ideals?

That the Sakas of Central Asia (Massagetae) indeed were very similar to the Todas in this respect is confirmed by Herodotus (1, 216): "The following are some of their customs. Each man has but one wife, yet all the wives are held in common; for this is a custom of the Massagetae and not the Scythians, as the Greeks wrongly say. When a man desires he hangs his quiver in front of her waggon and has intercourse with her unhindered (transl. George RAWLINSON)." This was in the 5th century B.C., it is true, but also another equally ancient Saka custom still prevailed a thousand years later was introduced even to the Nilgiris, that of wearing a pointed cap (cf. p. 321). And in spite of long-continued pressures from the side of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity, the Todas go on practising their 'sinful' traditions. Moreover, the gap to Herodotus is bridged by two early Buddhist texts, the *Karmaprajñapti* (ca. 2nd cent. B.C.) and the *Mahāvaiśbhāsa* (ca. 2nd cent. A.D.). These refer to the free sexual relationships (even with near relatives) prevailing respectively among "the Maga of the western Brahmans" and among "the tribes of Mleccha called Maga who live on the western frontier" (cf. KASUGAI 1960).

#### 4. Summary and acknowledgements

A solution to the old problem concerning the origin of the Todas seems to be forthcoming from an integrated study of the archaeological, linguistic and anthropological evidence. It appears that around 500-200 B.C. a group of pre-Tamil speakers herding buffaloes settled on the Nilgiri plateau, bringing with them the tradition of megalithic graves. Around 200-600 A.D. a group of horsemen, belonging to the Iranian Sakas who at that time ruled in the Deccan, invaded the hills. They wore pointed caps and brought to the Nilgiris yet other Saka traditions continued to this day by the Todas: polyandry and a new mode of



burial. The Sakas mixed with a part of the earlier settlers, adopting their economy and Dravidian speech. The first generations were bilingual, and introduced a number of changes conditioned by their mother tongue into their second language, especially in its phonology. For this reason they were called by the unmixed proto-Kotas 'stammerers' (toda). Further research is required to test these hypotheses; in particular, the Toda lexicon has to be searched for possible Saka loan words.

My best thanks are due to Professors R. E. EMMERICK and D. N. MACKENZIE and Dr. Bo UTAS for their readiness to help me with Middle Iranian phonology and for constructive criticism. I also thank Professor M. B. EMENEAU for valuable comments. These scholars are not to be held responsible for views expressed in this paper, nor for its possible mistakes. I apologize for the belated publication — many years after consulting them.

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


Fig. 1 : Select objects from the Nilgiri cairns. A-C : terracotta figurines now in the Museum für indische Kunst, Berlin, FRG. (After LESHNIK 1974 : pl. XVI, b-d.) D-E : a funerary urn with a buffalo-lid, and a lid with a pointed-capped rider. (After BREEKS reproduced in RIVERS 1906 : 713, fig. 76, 8-10.)



## THE R̥GVEDIC COMPOUND SVAR-DṚŚ

By

RAM GOPAL

The compound *svar-dṛś* which occurs over a dozen times in the R̥gveda<sup>1</sup> and rarely in the later works<sup>2</sup> has been variously interpreted by ancient and modern Vedic scholars ranging from Yāska to GELDNER. Citing RV. II, 24, 4 to illustrate the use of *Brāhmaṇaspāti*, Yāska (X, 13) explains the compound *svar-dṛśaḥ* of this verse as "*sūrya-dṛśaḥ*" (*raśmayāḥ*). Commenting on this passage of the Nirukta, Durgācārya explains it as sun-rays which look like the sun.<sup>3</sup> Following Durga's explanation, L. SARUP in his English translation of the Nirukta renders Yāska's explanation of this compound (*raśmayāḥ sūrya-dṛśaḥ*) as "rays of the sun which appear like the sun." Similarly some other modern scholars like OLDENBERG and GELDNER also follow Durga's explanation of *svar-dṛśaḥ* as sun-like. However, this explanation of the compound *svar-dṛś* does not fit into the context in several R̥gvedic passages containing this expression, as we shall see below. Moreover, Yāska's above-referred paraphrase of the compound *svar-dṛśaḥ* can also admit of the interpretation: "those who see the sun." Therefore, many Vedic exegetes ancient and modern interpret the

1. RV. I, 44, 9; 155, 5; II, 24, 4; III, 2, 14; V, 26, 2; 63, 2; VII, 32, 22; 37, 2; 58, 2; 83, 2; IX, 13, 9; 65, 11; 76, 4. Following Sāyaṇa ROTH in his *Wörterbuch* enumerates IX, 48, 4 among the R̥gvedic passages where this compound occurs. But in the Padapāṭha *svār* and *dṛśé* of this verse are shown as two separate words. Sāyaṇa in his commentary on this Mantra explains the words *svār* and *dṛśé* as "*sarva-dṛśe devīya*."

2. RV. VII, 32, 22 containing the compound *svar-dṛśam* is cited in several later works such as SV. I, 233; 2, 30; VSM 27, 35; VSK 29, 5, 4; MS. II, 13, 9; KS. 39, 12; AV. XX, 121, 1; TS. II, 4, 14, 2; AitBr. 4, 10; ApSS. XVII, 8, 4; XIX, 22, 16; ManSS. V, 2, 3, 8, 12. Similarly RV. V, 26, 2 with *svar-dṛśam* is adopted in SV. II, 872 and VSK 24, 4, 9 with the latter changing *svar-dṛśam* into *svar-vidam*. The MS. IV, 14, 12 adopts RV. V, 63, 2 containing *svar-dṛśā*. Besides, the MS. I, 3, 11 reads *svar-dṛśam* instead of *svar-vidam* of RV. V, 41, 1; cf. VSM. 7, 12; SBr. IV, 2, 1, 9; KS. 4, 3; TS. I, 4, 9, 1 (*svar-vidam*).

3. Durga on Nirukta X, 13 "स्वर्दृशः" सूर्यस्य रश्मयः । स्वरिव ये दृश्यन्ते ते सूर्य-समान-दर्शनाः । स्वभावेन वा सूर्यभावेन ये मण्डलीभूता दृश्यन्ते ते पिवन्ति ।

Durga who is indebted to Skanda seems to have borrowed this explanation from the latter who in his Bhāṣya on RV. I, 44, 9 suggests one of the explanations of the compound *svar-dṛś* as "sun-like"; cf. my article "*Durga's Indebtedness to Udgītha, Skanda and Uvāta*", pp. 175-178 of the Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference, 30th Session, Santiniketan.



compound *svaṛ-dṛś* as "one who sees the sun." But when this interpretation also does not suit the context in all the Vedic passages containing this compound, the Vedic interpreters suggest several other explanations. It is thus clear that the meaning of the compound *svaṛ-dṛś* is as yet far from certain and needs thorough investigation.

The R̥gvedic passages containing *svaṛ-dṛś* may be divided into two groups :— (1) those passages in which the noun qualified by *svaṛ-dṛś* is clearly mentioned, and (2) the other passages where the noun described by this compound has to be inferred according to the context. Although the Vedic interpreters are neither unanimous nor positively certain in regard to the interpretation of *svaṛ-dṛś* contained in the passages of the first category, the problem of interpretation is much more complicated in respect of the second category of such passages where the noun described by *svaṛ-dṛś* has to be inferred in keeping with the overall import of the verse in question. And this situation leads to all sorts of speculations on the part of interpreters. For instance, the compound *svaṛ-dṛś* occurring in RV. VII, 58, 2 has been subjected to various interpretations, because the pronoun *viśvaḥ* qualified by it can refer to several things<sup>4</sup> and the noun qualified by this compound is not mentioned. Therefore, Veṅkaṭamādhava<sup>5</sup> in his commentary on this verse explains *svaṛ-dṛś* as a "tree", while Sāyaṇa suggests its two alternative explanations<sup>6</sup> :— (1) all creatures who see the sun, or (2) trees that look to the atmosphere. Following Sāyaṇa, WILSON translates the phrase *viśvaḥ svaṛ-dṛś* of this verse as "every gazer on the sun." MAX MÜLLER renders it as "everyone who sees the sun", LUDWIG as "jeder der das licht schaut", GRIFFITH as "each looker on the light", and GELDNER as "jeder der das Sonnenlicht schaut." But GRASSMANN in his Wörterbuch considers "*devaḥ*" to be qualified by *svaṛ-dṛś* in this verse and interprets it as "Himmelslicht schauend" or "sonnengleich."

Even in the case of those occurrences of *svaṛ-dṛś* where it is used as an adjective of gods the Vedic interpreters both ancient and modern are far from certain about its precise meaning. For instance, the compound *svaṛ-dṛśaḥ* which qualifies *devān*<sup>7</sup> in RV. I, 44, 9 is variously interpreted by the Vedic scholars.

4. जनूश्चिद्धो मरुतस्त्वेष्ट्येण भीमासुस्तु विमन्यवोऽयसः ।

प्र ये महोभिरोजसोत सन्ति विश्वो वो यामन्भयते स्वर्दृक् ॥

(RV. VII, 58, 2)

5. Veṅkaṭamādhava on RV. VII, 58, 2— तेषां युष्माकं गमने सर्वोऽपि स्वर्दृक् विमेति । दिवो दर्शनात् वनस्पतिः स्वर्दृक् । वनस्पतयो ह्यर्धं पश्यन्ति उत्तिष्ठन्तः ।

6. Sāyaṇa on RV. VII, 58, 2— तेषां वः युष्माकं गमने विश्वः स्वर्दृक् सूर्यस्य द्रष्टा सर्वो जीवसमूहः । यद्वा । खरन्तरिक्षम् । तत्पश्यतीति वृक्षः स्वर्दृक् । सर्वदोस्तिष्ठन्नित्यर्थः ।

7. उपर्दुष आ वंह सोमपीतये देवा अय स्वर्दृशः । (RV. I, 44, 9 od).



Skandasvāmin, the earliest known Bhāṣyakāra of the RV., suggests as many as four alternative explanations of the compound in this context<sup>8</sup>: "those who appear like the sun or heaven, or those who see the sun or heaven." The same compound is interpreted by Venkaṭamādhava as "those who see all", and by Sāyaṇa as "those who see the sun." Similarly WILSON translates this compound as "contemplating the sun", GRIFFITH as "those who see the light", OLDENBERG as "(the gods of) sun-like aspect", and GELDNER as "those whose eye is the sun." It shows that the Vedic scholars are not sure about the exact meaning of the constituents *sva*r and *dṛś* of this compound.

Similarly a few more examples are cited below to illustrate the state of uncertainty about the meaning of the compound *sva*r-*dṛś* in such passages where it is used as an adjective to qualify gods. Venkaṭamādhava in his Bhāṣya on RV. III, 2, 14 and V, 26, 2, where the compound *sva*r-*dṛś* qualifies Agni, explains it as "viewer of all." And Sāyaṇa who follows Venkaṭamādhava in this respect elucidates in his Bhāṣya on RV. III, 2, 14 the foregoing explanation in the following manner: "the viewer of all, i. e., endowed with the knowledge of all things." Following Sāyaṇa, WILSON translates the compound *sva*r-*dṛś* occurring in RV. III, 2, 14 as "the beholder of all" and that occurring in RV. V, 26, 2 as "the beholder of heaven." GRIFFITH's translation of this very compound is "beholder of the light" in RV. III, 2, 14 and as "thou who lookest on the sun" in RV. V, 26, 2; whereas GELDNER uniformly translates it as "sun-eyed" in both these passages. The compound *sva*r-*dṛś* which qualifies *Viṣṇu* in RV. I, 155, 5 is interpreted as "viewer of all" by both Venkaṭamādhava and Sāyaṇa, and similarly the same compound qualifying *Indra* in RV. VII, 32, 22 is explained as "viewer of all" by both these Bhāṣyakāras, though Sāyaṇa adds the alternative explanation "viewer of heaven" in his Bhāṣya on the latter passage. As regards modern translations, the compound *sva*r-*dṛś* occurring in RV. I, 155, 5 is rendered by WILSON as "heaven-beholding" (deity), by GRIFFITH as "he who looks upon the light", and by GELDNER as "sun-eyed." And the same compound occurring in RV. VII, 32, 22 is translated by WILSON as "beholder of the sun.", by GRIFFITH as "looker on heavenly light", and by GELDNER as "that whose eye is the sun." *Sva*r-*dṛś* as an epithet of *Sōma* is explained by Venkaṭamādhava as "viewer of all" in his Bhāṣya on RV. IX, 13, 9; 95, 11. Sāyaṇa in his commentary on RV. IX, 13, 9 simply toes Venkaṭamādhava's line, but offers as many as three

8. Skandasvāmin on RV. I, 44, 9 cd— स्वर्दृशः स्वः आदित्यः सौवां, तद्दृ वे दृश्यन्ते, ये तस्य दृष्टारो वा, ते स्वर्दृशः, तान् । आदित्यस्य दिवो वा सदृशान्, तदार्शिनो वा ।

Cf. Uvaṭa on VS. 27, 35 — स्वः पश्यतीति स्वर्दृक् तं स्वर्दृशम् । यद्वा स्वरादित्यः तद्दृ यो दृश्यते स स्वर्दृक् तं स्वर्दृशम् ।



alternative explanations of the same compound in his Bhāṣya on RV. IX, 95, 11 : "viewers of all, or viewer of the sun, or worthy of being viewed by all the gods." Following Sāyaṇa, WILSON translates *svar-dṛś* in RV. IX, 13, 9 as "beholding all things", but renders it as "beholder of heaven" in his translation of RV. IX, 95, 11; whereas the same compound occurring in both these passages is translated by GRIFFITH as "looker on the light" and by GELDNER as "sun-eyed." Both Venkaṭamādhava and Sāyaṇa followed by WILSON explain the compound *svar-dṛś* qualifying the gods *Mitrā-Vāruṇā* (RV. V, 63, 2) as "viewers of heaven", but GRIFFITH renders it as "looking on the light" and GELDNER as "seeing the sun." Similarly *svar-dṛś* as an epithet of *Rbhus* (RV. VII, 37, 2) is interpreted by Venkaṭamādhava as "viewers of all", by Sāyaṇa as "viewers of heaven", by WILSON as "beholders of heaven", by GRIFFITH as "beholders of the light of heaven", and by GELDNER as "sun-eyed."

It is evident from a cursory perusal of the foregoing interpretations that neither the ancient Bhāṣyakāras nor the modern Vedic scholars are unanimous in regard to the interpretation of the compound *svar-dṛś* in the case of even those nine passages where there is no doubt or ambiguity about the deities described by this compound. Moreover, Venkaṭamādhava and Sāyaṇa are not consistent in their interpretations of *svar-dṛś* occurring in different passages, and modern scholars also widely differ in regard to the explanation of this compound. Besides, most of the modern scholars suggest more than one meaning of *svar-dṛś*. For instance, ROTH in his Wörterbuch assigns the following meanings to this compound: "every living being seeing the sun" (RV. II, 24, 4; VII, 58, 2; 83, 2; IX, 48, 4; 76, 4), "gods who see the heavenly light" (RV. I, 44, 9; 155, 5; V, 26, 2; 63, 2; VII, 32, 22; 37, 2), and "Soma seeing the heavenly light" (RV. IX, 13, 9; 65, 11). According to GRASSMANN (Wörterbuch), *svar-dṛś* means either "seeing the heavenly light" or "sun-like". GELDNER in his translation of the RV. renders *svar-dṛś* as "sun-eyed" in some passages, as "seeing the sun" in other passages, and as "sun-like" in still other passages. LUDWIG followed by GRIFFITH translates this compound mostly as "looking at the light." MAX MÜLLER in his English translation of the selected Vedic Hymns (SBE, vol. 32) interprets *svar-dṛś* as "one who sees the light", whereas OLDENBERG in volume 46 of the Sacred Books of the East uniformly translates it as "of sun-like aspect."

In view of such a confusion in regard to the extant interpretations of *svar-dṛś* it is very important to determine the exact meaning of this compound in conformity with Vedic usage and context. Now let us critically examine the above-cited interpretations of *svar-dṛś*. First of all, we should take up its meaning "sun-like" suggested by some ancient and modern interpreters. In the



RV. the word *dṛś* is combined with pronouns (cf. Pāṇini III, 2, 60) as a final member of a compound in the sense of "like" in such compounds as *īdṛś*, *kīdṛś*, *tādṛś*, *yādṛś*, etc. But there is no positive proof of its combination with nouns in this sense. Moreover, the meaning "sun-like" assigned to *svaṛ-dṛś* does not fit into the context in those Rgvedic passages where it is used as an epithet of the *Devas*, *Viṣṇu* and *Soma*; because the *Devas* include the sun, and *Viṣṇu* and *Soma* are identified with the sun in several places. As regards its another meaning "sun-eyed" suggested by GELDNER, it may be pointed out that this meaning is possible only if *svaṛ-dṛś* is accepted as a Bahuvrīhi compound and if the use of *dṛś* in the sense of "eye" is attested in the Vedic literature. But *svaṛ-dṛś* cannot be taken as a Bahuvrīhi compound, because it is accented on the final syllable. Moreover, there is no definite use of the word *dṛś* in the sense of "eye" in the Vedic literature. The word *chakṣas* is often used in the RV. in the sense of an "eye" as a final member of such Bahuvrīhi compounds as *svār-cakṣas*, *ghora-cakṣas*, *sūra-cakṣas* and *upāka-cakṣas* in which the first member retains its accent. Therefore, the meaning, "sun-eyed" assigned to *svaṛ-dṛś* by GELDNER is untenable on linguistic grounds. As for the other three meanings of *svaṛ-dṛś*, viz., "beholder of the sun", "beholder of heaven", or "beholder of the heavenly light", suggested by several Vedic exegetes, it may be pointed out that these meanings accord with the general view regarding the ordinary sense of the words *svaṛ* and *dṛś* as members of a Tatpuruṣa compound.

As I have fully discussed this point elsewhere (see my paper "Svar, Sūr and Sūra"), "heaven" is the principal denotation of the word *svār* employed in the RV., although it seems to denote "the sun" in a few passages due to the extension of its meaning. The other meanings "heavenly light" and "bliss" which some scholars assign to *svār* are little more than figurations of its principal meaning "heaven"; for, the Vedas conceive of heaven as a region of eternal light and bliss. A minute study of the Vedic compounds containing *svār* as their first member<sup>9</sup> shows that in all of them the word *svār* denotes "heaven, or heavenly light, or heavenly bliss." On the pattern of such Vedic compounds the *svaṛ-dṛś* denotes "heaven or heavenly light."

With regard to the meaning of the final member of the compound *svaṛ-dṛś*, it may be pointed out that the root  $\sqrt{dṛś}$  underlying the agent noun *dṛś* is here used in its causative sense and not in its primary sense. It is worthy of note in this connection that no causative form of the root  $\sqrt{dṛś}$  is met with in the RV. and the simple form of the root *dṛś* without the use of the causative suffix denotes

9. Cf. *svār-canaś*, *svār-miṭha*, *svaṛ-vīd*, *svaṛ-jit*, *svaṛ-jed*, *svār-para*, *svaṛ-sā*, *svār-sāti*.



its causative sense in several passages.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, in some R̥gvedic passages the infinitive *dṛśé* of the root *dṛś* is employed in the causative sense with the word *svār* as an accusative.<sup>11</sup>

Therefore, the meaning of the compound *svār-dṛś* is "one who shows heaven." This meaning of *svār-dṛś* fits into the context in all the above referred passages where it is used as an epithet of the gods, namely, *Devas*, *R̥bhuḥ*, *Mitrā-Varuṇā*, *Viṣṇu*, *Indra*, *Agni* and *Soma*. This interpretation of *svār-dṛś* as "one who shows heaven" conforms to the general description of the Vedic gods who are praised as bestowers of heaven or heavenly light or heavenly bliss.

As regards the interpretation of *svār-dṛś* occurring in those R̥gvedic passages<sup>12</sup> where the noun qualified by it is not used but is implied, the predominant use of this compound as an epithet of the gods suggests that here, too, it refers to the gods and means "one who shows heaven."

10. Compare, for instance, the use of the infinitive *dṛśé* in its causative sense "to show" in RV. I, 23, 21; 50, 1; 51, 4; 52, 8; 123, 11; VI, 29, 3; VII, 15, 5; VIII, 94, 2; IX, 64, 30; X, 5, 5; 60, 5; 170, 3.

11. RV, I, 50, 5; 112, 5; VII, 81, 4; VIII, 49, 8; IX, 61, 18; X, 136, 6. Although the Padakāra treats *svār* and *dṛśé* of RV. IX, 48, 4 as two separate words, Sāyana and Roth (Wörterbuch) take them as a compound.

12. RV. II, 24, 4; VII, 58, 2; 83, 2; IX, 76, 4. See our *Vaidika-Vyākhyā-Vivēcana*, pp. 167-68, for the interpretation of *svār-dṛśah* occurring in RV. VII, 83, 2.



# THREE FURTHER *KĀRIKĀ*-MANUSCRIPTS OF THE *VĀKYAPĀDIYA*

By

WILHELM RAU

After publishing my edition of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapādiya* (VP) in 1977 (based on 27 manuscripts)<sup>1</sup> I obtained by the good offices of my friend Prof. Dr. Ashok N. AKLUJKAR / Vancouver two more from Kerala, and through my own efforts, a third one from Jodhpur.

They are here described briefly and assigned their proper places in the stemma codicum.<sup>2</sup>

## I

On June 5th, 1977 A. N. AKLUJKAR and C. M. NEELAKANDHAN discovered in the house of Sankaran NAMBOODIRI at Mundanatha Mana, P. O. Mayanoor, Trichur District, eleven folios of a *kārikā*-ms of the VP. They were taken to Adyar, microfilmed there and made available to me.

At present deposited in the Adyar Library and Research Centre, Adyar 20, Madras.

Not yet catalogued.

Palmleaf. 11 originally unnumbered foll., numbered by me : 1. 3-8. 10-13. Brittle. 29.0 × 4.5 cm oblong size. One central hole for tying cord. Between six and ten lines per page; 6 lines : 8re[cto] 13[re]; 7 lines : 1ve[rso] 7ve 8ve 12ve; 8 lines : 1re 3re 4re 4ve 5re 5ve 6re 6ve 7re 13ve; 9 lines : 3ve 12re; 10 lines : 10re 10ve 11re 11ve. The upper and lower edges of foll. 1. 3. 8. 10. 11. 12. 13 are damaged and thus some of the text is lost. Malayālam script. Carefully written. In case of mistaken akṣaras the copyist immediately repeats them in their correct form without, however, deleting the lapsus calami in every case. In sandhi sibilants are assimilated before sibilants, i. e. not transformed into visarga. Before dentals and labials -n- and -m- is written instead of -ṁ-. A consonant following -r- is normally doubled. Transcribed by possibly more than one copyist. *kārikās* not numbered. No abbreviated headings in the margins. Undated.

1. Bhartṛharis *Vākyapādiya*. Die *Mūlakārikās* nach den Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem *pāda*-Index versehen von W. R. Wiesbaden 1977. = *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vol. XLII, 4.

2. See my edition, pp. 24-28.



Contents: fol. 1rel: four of five akṣaras destroyed ...] *ye namaḥ avi-ghnam astu*. 3, 1-12. 13 om. 14-22a *sarvva ... bhūtatvam* [ fol. 2 = 22c - 42c missing. 42c ] *yaugapadyaṃ pralaye* - 97. 98-99 om. 100-106. 107-108 om. 109-110. fol. 5ve2: *śrī iti jātisamadeśaḥ śrī*. 111-128. fol. 6re7: *śrī iti dravyasamuddeśaḥ śrī*.

*yogena cittasya padena vācām  
malam śarīṃsya tu vaidyakena  
yo pākarot tam pravaram muninām  
patañjaliṃ prāñjali ..... śrī*.

129-131. 132 om. 133-176c: *asanmś ca sāste staḥ karttā syā* [ fol. 9 = 176cd - 199a missing. 199a ] *odho nānātve* - 216. fol. 10ve2: *śrī iti tṛtīyas sambandhasamuddeśaḥ śrī*. 217-219. fol. 10ve5: *śrī iti bhūyodravyasamuddeśaḥ śrī*. 220-228. fol. 11re2: *śrī iti guṇasamuddeśaḥ pañcamah śrī*. 229-256. fol. 12rel: *śrī iti diksamuddeśaḥ ṣaṣṭhaḥ śrī*. 257-296. fol. 13ve8 the text ends with 295d *tat prthaktvā* [ .

Position in the stemma.

See p. 24 of my edition.

The ms is closely related to t. True, before 3, 1 the mnemonic verse *jātir dravyaṃ ca°* is missing, but after 3, 110 we have the invocation *yogena cittasya°*. A collation with B is of no use since both mss share the *kārikās* 3, 229-231, 257-262 and 278-279 only, and even these are damaged in B. s cannot be derived from the ms under review for the latter lacks the *kārikās* 3, 13 and 132. On the other hand, s cannot be the source of our ms either in spite of several common features. See e.g. the variant readings 3, 58d *bhedasamanvitāḥ*; 86b *yad ekagrā°*; 143b *ke cit tatsa°*; 150c *saiva nā*; 213a *°syāpy aparaṃ*; 255d *tāsām ātmasu vidyate*; 285c *san dharmmah°*; 288d *kriyānyaiḥ*; 292d *śakti nna* which of course stands for *śaktir nna*.

A list of distinctive readings of the ms is to be found in *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* (REINBEK), Heft 3, 1977, pp. 116-120.

## II

During the second half of July 1981 A. N. AKLUJKAR prepared for me a microfilm of ms 8918 in the Oriental Institute Manuscripts Library / Kerala University, Trivandrum, located at Kariavattam near Kadhakootam.

Not yet catalogued.<sup>3</sup>

3. This ms was for many years available only to the Director, Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library, University of Kerala, Trivandrum; see K. Raghavan PILLAI: *The Vākyapadīya*. Critical Text of Cantos I and II [with English Translation,

(Continued on the next page)



RAU : Three further *Kārikā*-manuscripts of the *Vākyapadīya* 345

Palmleaf. 131 foll. numbered originally recto on the left margin with Malayālam figures, later on, by another person recto and verso on the right margin in addition with Arabic numerals : 1 1a 2 2a 3 3a etc. 24. 1 × 4.5 cm oblong size. Two holes for tying cord. Mostly 8 lines per page; 2 lines : 131ve; 7 lines : 44ve 56ve 57ve 59re 66ve 74ve 109ve 117re 118ve; 9 lines : 2ve 3re 20re 38re 102re; 10 lines : 21re. Pages 24re 25re and 26re have by mistake not been photographed; pages 12re 40ve 42re 43re 56re 56ve 61re 61ve 71ve 72re 72ve 87re 87ve 90re 90ve 94re 94ve 96re 96ve 97re 98re 99re 101re 102re 104re 109re 109ve 113re are out of focus which makes reading often uncertain and sometimes impossible. Malayālam script. *kārikās* not numbered. No abbreviated headings in the margins. Undated. The ms originally belonged to one Vishnu NAMBOORI in Ettikkada Illam, Kaduthurthi, later found its way into the Chirakkal Palace Library and was made over to the above mentioned library as a gift, on 9th September 1941.

Contents : fol. 1re in the left margin : *hariḥ*. fol. 1rel : *śrīgaṇapataye namaḥ avighnam astu śubham*. 1, 1-88. 89 om. 90-107. 108 om. 109-110. 111-119 om. 120-122. 123 om. 124-135. 136-138 om. 139. 140 om. 141-144. 145-147 om. 148-153. 154 om. 155-159. 160-170 om. 171. 172 om. 173-176. 177 om. 178-182. 183 om. fol. 10ve8 : flourish *iti brahmakāṇḍam samāptam* flourish. In the left margin : *brahmakāṇḍam*. 2, 1-172. 173ab om. 173cd-304. 305-307ab om. 307cd-338ab. 338cd om. 339-456. 457 om. 458-490. fol. 43re2 : *iti vākya-kāṇḍam samāptam* flourish. In the left margin : *vākya-kāṇḍam*

*jātir dravyaṇ ca sambandho  
bhūyyodravyam guṇan tathā  
dik sādhanam kriyā kālah  
puruṣo daśama smṛtaḥ  
saṁkhyā copagraho liṅgam  
vṛttiḥ punar iti smṛti* flourish

3, 1-42. 43-44ab om. 44cd-69ab. 69cd om. 70-97. 98-99 om. 100-106. 107-108 om. 109-110. fol. 50re5 : *iti jātisamuddeśaḥ prathamah* two flourishes. In the left margin : *prathamah*.

*yogena cittasya padena vācām  
malam śarīrasya tu vaidyakena  
yo pākaroktam pravaram munīndram  
patañjalim prāñjalir ānato smi*

(Continued from the last page)

Summary of Ideas and Notes], Delhi / Patna / Varanasi 1971, p. iii and xix : manuscript "gha." — The manuscript No. 10924, "ga" mentioned in the same places, seems to be still inaccessible, or lost.



flourish. 3, 111-116. 117a-118a : 39 akṣaras om. 118b-128. fol. 51re 8 : flourish *iti dravyasamuddeśo dvitīyaḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *dvitīyaḥ*. 3, 129-149a. 149b-150b : 32 akṣaras om. 150cd. 151ab om. 151cd-163a. 163b-164b : 31 akṣaras om. 164c-216. fol. 57re2 : flourish *iti sambandhasamuddeśaḥ* *trītiyaḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *trītiyaḥ*. 3, 217-219. fol. 57re 6 : flourish *iti bhūyodravyasamuddeśaś caturtthaḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *caturtthaḥ*. 3, 220-228. fol. 58re1 : flourish *iti guṇasamuddeśaḥ pañcamaḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *pañcamaḥ*. 3, 229-256. fol. 59ve8 : flourish *iti ksumuddeśaḥ* *ṣaṣṭhaḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *ṣaṣṭhaḥ*. 3, 257-272. 273-274a : 40 akṣaras om. 274b-345. fol. 65ve4 : flourish *iti karmmādhikāraḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *karmmādhikāraḥ*. 3, 346-356. fol. 66re8 : flourish *iti karaṇādhikāraḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *karaṇādhikāraḥ*. 3, 357-380. fol. 68re3 : flourish *iti karttadhikāraḥ*. In the left margin : *karttradhikāraḥ*. 3, 381-384. fol. 68re8 : *iti hetvadhikāraḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *hetvadhikāraḥ*. 3, 385-391. fol. 68ve8 : flourish *iti sampradānādhikāraḥ*. In the left margin : *sampradānādhikāra*. 3, 392-403. fol. 69ve5 : flourish *iti apādānādhikāraḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *apādānādhikāraḥ*. 3, 404-411. fol. 70re6 : flourish *iti adhikaraṇādhikāraḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *adhikaraṇādhikāraḥ*. 3, 412-418. fol. 70ve6 : *iti śeṣādhikāraḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *śeṣādhikāraḥ*. 3, 419-423. fol. 71re3 : flourish *iti sādhanasamuddeśaś sapta* flourish. In the left margin : *saptamaḥ*. 3, 424-438. 439 om. 440-460b. 460c-461ab : 28 akṣaras om. 461cd-487. fol. 75re3 : *iti kriyāsamuddeśo ṣṭamaḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *aṣṭamaḥ*. 3, 488-515. 516a-517a : 37 akṣaras om. 517b-601. fol. 82re8 : *iti kālasamuddeśo navamaḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *navamaḥ*. 3, 602-610. fol. 83re2 : flourish *iti puruṣasamuddeśo daśamaḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *daśamaḥ*. 3, 611-642. fol. 85re3 : two flourishes *iti saṃkhyāsamuddeśa* *ekādaśaḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *ekādaśa*. 3, 643-668. 669 is missing in the text but added fol. 87re in the upper margin. fol. 87re1 : *iti upagrahasamuddeśo dvādaśaḥ* flourish. In the left margin : *dvādaśaḥ*. 3, 670-700. fol. 89re1 : flourish *iti liṅgasamuddeśaś trayodaśaḥ*. In the left margin : *trayodaśaḥ*. 3, 701-727. 728 om. 729-791. 792 om. 793-868 two flourishes. 869-890 two flourishes. 891ab. 891c : 8 akṣaras om. 891d-910 flourish. 911-937c. 937d-938c : 32 akṣaras om. 938d-942 flourish. 943-948 flourish. 949-977. 978 om. 979-1016 flourish. 1017-1035. Between 1036 and 1133 the *kārikās* are written in great disorder just as in ms E. Upon 1036a *guṇabhā* follow 1051cd-1132b *kutsa*; 1044a : *kau pāka* -1051ab; 1036a : *vo bhi* -1044a : *pā*; 1132b : *nopādhayaś ca ye* -1056. 1057 om. 1058-1059 flourish. 1060-1084ab. 1084cd om. 1085-1165. 1166 om. 1167-1206. 1207 om. 1208-1321. 1322 om. 1323-1325. fol. 131re8 : *iti śrīmatbhagavatbhartṛharivṛṣabhamahāvaiyyākaraṇapādavīracite vākyaḥ padavīye prakīrṇṇakanāmani padakāṇḍe vṛttisamuddeśaś caturdāśaḥ*



flourish. *śrīgaṇapataye namaḥ śrīsarasvatye namaḥ śrīkrṣṇāya namaḥ* flourish.  
In the left margin : *caturddaśa*.

Position the stemma.

See p. 24 of my edition.

On account of the following lacunae this ms belongs

- to (a) : 3, 1322ab om.  
to u : 1, 111-119 om. 154 om. 160-170 om. 2, 305-307ab om. 338cd om.  
3, 98-99 om. 107-108 om. 439 om. 728 om.  
to t : 1, 89 om. 108 om. 136-138 om. 140 om. 145-147 om. 172 om.  
177 om. 183 om.  
to s : 1, 123 om. 2, 173ab om. ( Mnemonic verse before 3, 1. Invocation  
before 3, 111 ). 3, 792 om. 1057 om. 1207 om. 1322cd om.  
to r : 2, 457 om. 3, 43-44ab om. 69cd om. 117a-118a : 39 akṣaras om.  
163b-164ab : 31 akṣaras om. 273-274a : 40 akṣaras om. 516a-517a :  
37 akṣaras om. 891c om. 937d-938c : 32 akṣaras om. 978 om.  
1166 om.


None of the three mss descending from r is more closely related to either  
of the two others, as can be seen from the lacunae they exhibit individually, —

D : 3, 8d-9b : 19 akṣaras om. 520b-521a : 28 akṣaras om. 558a-d :  
27 akṣaras om. 845d-846a : 16 akṣaras om. 1036a-1051ab om.

E : 1, 65cd-66ab om. 71cd om. 3, 568cd om. 1055d-1056a om. 1090bc om.

our ms : 3, 149b-150b : 32 akṣaras om. 460c-461ab : 28 akṣaras om.  
1084cd om.

Underneath of s the stemma, consequently, now takes this shape :





This shows that there is not much to be won from T 8918 for the final text of the VP, but it permits us at least to determine exactly the text of r. Agreement of any two of the mss D E and T 8918 places it above doubt and the divergent reading is either a slip or (if seemingly better) a conjecture of the copyist.

### III

On 27th January 1975, I discovered a *kārikā*-ms of the VP at Jodhpur, in the Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute and the Director, Dr. Parasottam Lal MANARIYA, was kind enough to send me a microfilm of it, lateron.

Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, Residency Road, Jodhpur.

A Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit Manuscripts in the Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, Jodhpur Collection, Part II (B). Edited by Pad-mashri MUNI JINAVIJAYA, Jodhpur 1965.

P. 164, No. 4238, Acc. No. 5310, Paper, 23 foll., numbered verso in the right and in the left margin as 1-20 and 23-25. 31.5 × 8.7 cm oblong size. Eight lines per page. Ancient Devanāgarī. Lacunae and illegible passages of the exemplar carefully marked. Two copyists; the first copied foll. 1-19, the second - a calligrapher - foll. 20. 23-25. *kārikās* not numbered. No abbreviated headings in the margins. Few marginalia. Undated, but said to be written in the fashion of the 17th century. Acquired by the R. O. R. I. on 27th September 1955, from an unknown source.

Contents : fol. 1vel : *om || śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ ||* 1, 1-71a. 71bc om. 71d-183. fol. 6ve7 : *|| iti bhartr̥harikṛte vākyapadiye āgamasamuccayaḥ prathamam kāṇḍaḥ*. 2, 1-23. 23d : lacuna of two akṣaras marked by the copyist. 24-95. 95a : lacuna of three akṣaras marked by the copyist. 96-127. 127b : lacuna of one akṣara marked by the copyist. 128-207. 207d-208c om. 208d-223a. 223b-224c om. 224d-262c. From here on the *kārikās* are in disorder. There follow 326 (326a is written twice!) -367. 268-269b *apoddhāre* [ ; of the rest there is only c [ *ṇa saṃdhavaḥ*. 270-286. 368-381ab. 286-298ab. In other words, 262d-267 om. 269 mutilated. 286 written twice. -298cd-299ab om. 299cd-325. 381cd-420ab. 420cd om. 421-440. fol. 19ve8 ends with 440b *vastutaḥ || || cha ||*. fol. 20re1 : 439d *te ||* 440-467. In other words 440ab written twice. 468ab in the margin. fol. 20ve8 ends with 473c a[ . fol. 23re1 : 3, 47-68a. 68b-69d 49 akṣaras om., but see instantly. 69d-71. 69-71 written twice. 72ab. 72cd-74ab om. 74cd-101. 102-103d om., but see instantly. fol. 24ve6 : *|| jātisamuddeśaḥ ||* 111-113c. Then follow as line 8 of fol. 24ve : 102bcd. 101cd. 103abc, i. e. the *pādas* skipped above. In the exemplar they



were probably written in the margin; in other words 101cd is written twice. 113c-128. fol. 25re8 : || *dravyasamuddēśaḥ* || 129-146. fol. 25ve8 the text ends with 146d *bhede nyatrāpi saṃkramaḥ*.

Position in the stemma.

See p. 24 of my edition.

The ms belongs to **n** because it exhibits in *kāṇḍa* I the 21 surplus *kārikās*. It belongs to **q** on account of the lacuna 2, 420cd. It belongs to **p**, because after 2, 262c the *kārikās* are in disorder, while 3, 98-99 and 107-108 are available in the text. Finally, the ms belongs to **o** on account of the lacuna 3, 72cd-74ab.

This means that the ms Jodhpur 4238 is one of the codices *deterrimi* and hence practically worthless.

A future editor of the VP-*kārikās* will save time and energy by basing his text mainly on **A**, the ms described above under **I**, **B** and on **s** as it can be reconstructed from **C D E** and **T** 8918; **n** or (or **q**) need to be consulted in doubtful cases, only.

While comparing the three mss described here with the printed text of my edition, I noted down the following additions and corrections to be supplemented there.

Please read 1, 87a in the notes : *cāntarāle* **u**; 2, 37a in the notes : *gate* **r**; 81a in the notes : *saṃbandham* **r H J L M**<sup>12</sup>; 120b in the notes : *akārā* **s**; 127b in the text : *bandhanam*; 127d in the text : *vācyatām*; 447c in the text : *tiṇām tiṇbhyo*, and in the notes : *tiṇāntiṇbhyo* **s**; 3, 39c in the notes : *ntarāle* **u**; 42c in the notes : *pralaye* **u**; 115d in the notes : *nālikā* **u**; 158c in the notes : *tvāviśeṣo* **A**...; we with **s L M**<sup>4</sup> **M**<sup>5</sup> **M**<sup>6</sup> **M**<sup>13</sup>; 374a in the text : *pūrvām avasthām ajahat*; 518b in the notes : *pracayāpaca* [ **A** *pracayāpacayātmataḥ* **C D** *pracayāpacayātmakaḥ* **E T** 8918; 554b in the notes : *ntarāla* **u**; 557b in the notes : *nāli* **A** *nāḍi* **s**; 861a in the notes : *kālyām kālād* **s**; 861b in the notes : *kāle kālyās ta* **C** *kāle kālyānta* **r**; 965 in the text : *anekadharmavacanaiḥ śabdaiḥ saṃghābhīdhāyibhiḥ*.

In the course of 25 years I have thus collected, described, and classified 30 *kārikā*-mss of the VP. If anyone reading this paper could make known others, hitherto undetected – especially from South India or from Kashmir –, my humble efforts would be amply rewarded.



112

The first part of the book is devoted to a general introduction to the subject of the history of the Indian people. It is a very interesting and well-written book, and it is a very good introduction to the subject of the history of the Indian people.

History of the Indian people.

History of the Indian people.

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# DĀYABHĀGAVYAVASTHĀSAMKṢEPAḤ

By

LUDO ROCHER

The short text on inheritance which is edited here for the first time, is known so far from two manuscripts. One manuscript is deposited at Calcutta Sanskrit College ( Catalogue II pp. 151-152, no. 162 = handwritten catalogue Smṛti 196 ) [ C ]

*Dāyasamkṣepa*. Substance, country-made yellow paper, 18×4 inches. Folia, 3 [ actually 4 ]. Lines, 9-10 in a page. Character, Bengali. Date, ?. Appearance, old, worn out, torn, and writing destroyed in most parts. Prose. Correct. Complete.

An abstract of the Hindu law of inheritance by Gaṇeśa Bhaṭṭa.

The second manuscript is preserved in the India Office Library. It is at the end of ms. 386a ( Catalogue p. 452, no. 1494 ) [ L ].

Fol. 29; 16×5 inches. Bengali handwriting, in places difficult to read owing to sticky ink. 8 lines.

The colophons, in both manuscripts, clearly indicate the title as *Dāyabhāgavyavasthāsamkṣepaḥ*. This seems to be supported by the chapter headings in the text itself : except for the paragraph entitled *strīdhanam*, and two paragraphs *atha vyavasthā*, the other nine have *atha vyavasthāsamkṣepaḥ*.

The author, Gaṇeśa Bhaṭṭa according to the Sanskrit College catalogue, is uncertain. His name is not mentioned in the text, but it has been added in C, by a different hand, to the colophon : *iti [ Gaṇeśabhaṭṭakṛta ] dāyabhāgavyavasthāsamkṣepaḥ sampūrṇaḥ*.

The situation in L is not clearer, but, to say the least, more intriguing. In the bottom margin of the last folio, a devanāgarī hand, which I presume to belong to a Westerner, has added :

*gaṇeśabhaṭṭakṛtadāyasamkṣepaḥ patra 4 ślo 142.*

It is the same hand that added on the empty page preceding the four folios of the text :

*gaṇeśabhaṭṭakṛtadāyavivekaḥ udvāharivekaḥ patra 25 ślo 850.*

These earlier 25 folios of ms. 386a contain three texts : *Prāyaścittavivekaḥ*, *Dāyabhāgarivekaḥ*, and *Udvāharivekaḥ*, which the Catalogue describes as " the



last three chapters of *Raghunātha's Smārta-Vyavasthārṇava*." The colophons of these three sections read as follows :

(1) fol. 16a : *iti Rāghava* [ deleted, and replaced second hand : *Gaṇeśa* ] *bhattachakṛte* [ corr. -a- ] *prāyaścittavivekaḥ samāptah*.

(2) fol. 22b : *iti Rāghava* [ deleted, and replaced same second hand : *Gaṇeśa* ] *bhattachakṛte* [ corr. -a- ] *dāyavivekaḥ samāptah*.

(3) fol. 25a : *iti ...* [ original illegible, corr. second hand : *Gaṇeśa* ] *bhattachakṛte udvāhavivekaḥ samāptah*.

The *Dāyavivekaḥ*, which is here attributed to Gaṇeśabhattacha, is a different text than the *Dāyabhāgavyavasthāsamkṣepaḥ*. It is one of the eight sections of the *Smārta-vyavasthārṇavaḥ*, also called *Dāyabhāgavyavasthā*. Its author is Raghunātha Sārvabhauma, the son of Mathureśa Tarkapañcānana, who wrote his book at the instance of Rāya Rāghava, in Śaka 1583 (A. D. 1661). Several manuscripts of this text are known ; I intend to publish its section on inheritance elsewhere.

It is clear that the individual who, in IOL 386a, three times changed Rāghava into Gaṇeśa, was ill informed. We must therefore count with the possibility that he may have been equally ill informed when he attributed the anonymous *Dāyabhāgavyavasthāsamkṣepaḥ* to the same Gaṇeśabhattacha.

ॐ रामाय नमः

॥ अथ मृतधनाधिकारिणां व्यवस्थासंक्षेपः ॥

यः श्राद्धकर्ता स एव न सर्वत्र धनाधिकारी प्रायिकत्वात् । यथा मातापितरौ दायधिकारिणौ श्राद्धाधिकारिणस्तु भ्रात्रादयः ।

तत्रादौ औरसपुत्राः धनाधिकारिणः । ततः पौत्राः । तथा औरसपुत्रेण सह मृतपितृक-पौत्रमृतपितृ<sup>२</sup>पितामहयोरेकदैवाधिकारः । <sup>३</sup>तथाविधपौत्रप्रपौत्रयोरेकदैवाधिकारः । एतयोरभावे क्षेत्रज्ञातानामधिकारः । औरसे जाते पुनस्तेन सह तृतीयांशाधिकारिणः ।

एषां पुत्रादीनामभावे पत्न्या अधिकारः ।

पत्न्या अभावे अदत्ता कन्या । तदभावे दत्ता । उभयोः कन्ययोः सपुत्रासम्भावितपुत्रयोस्तुल्याधिकारः । अनयोरेकतराभावे अन्या अधिकारिणी । एतयोरभावे वन्ध्याविधवयोस्तुल्याधिकारः ।

1. ॐ रामाय नमः : O श्रीगणेशाय.

2. °पितामह° : possibly °पितामहकप्रपौत्र°, cf. DKS 1. 1. 3.

3. तथाविधपौत्र° : mss. तथाविधपुत्र.



दुहितुरभावे दौहित्राः ।

दौहित्राभावे माता पिता च ।

तयोरभावे भ्रातरः । तत्रादौ सहोदराः । ततो वैमात्रेयाः । संसर्गिअसंसर्गिसहोदरेषु संसर्गि-  
सहोदरस्यैवाधिकारः । एवं वैमात्रेयेषु संसर्गिवैमात्रेयः । यदा तु संसर्गी वैमात्रेयोऽसंसर्गी सहोदरस्तदा  
उभयोस्तुत्याधिकारः । यदा तु सोदरासोदरौ संसर्गिनौ तदा सोदरः ।

भ्रात्रभावे भ्रातृपुत्राः । भ्रातृपुत्रेष्वदौ सहोदरमुताः । अत्रापि पूर्ववत् संसर्ग्यसंसर्गि-  
व्यवस्था ।

ततः सोदरपौत्राः । ततो वैमात्रेयपौत्राः । ततो भागिनेयः । ततः पितामहपितामह्यौ । ततः  
पितृव्यः । ततस्तत्सुतः । ततः पितामहदौहित्रः । ततः पितामहभ्राता । ततस्तत्सुतः । ततस्तत्पौत्रः । ततः  
प्रपितामहदौहित्रः । ततो मातामहमातुलौ ।

ततो निकटक्रमेण आदौ सपिण्डाः । ततः समानोदकाः । ततो गोत्रजाः क्रमशोऽधि-  
कारिणः ।

ततः शिष्यः । ततः सहाध्यायी । ततः श्रोत्रियः । ततो ब्राह्मणधनवर्जं राजाधिकारी ।  
ब्राह्मणधनस्य सर्वाभावे ब्राह्मणोऽधिकारी । वानप्रस्थयतिव्रह्मचारिणां क्रमेणाचार्यतच्छिष्यधर्मभ्रात्रैक-  
तीर्थिनः ॥

### ॥ अथ स्त्रीधनम् ॥

शिल्पेन प्रीत्या वा प्राप्तं धनं शुद्धस्त्रीधनम् । तत्र भर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यं नान्येषां ।

प्रीतिशिल्पातिरिक्तं यदुभयकुलालब्धं यावद्धनं तदपि स्त्रीधनम् । तच्च सौदायिकं धनमुच्यते ।  
विवाहकाले यल्लब्धं तद्धनं औद्राहिकं धनमुच्यते । तत्र स्त्रीणां दानविक्रयाद्यधिकारः नान्येषां ।  
दुर्भिक्षादौ स्त्रीधनेऽपि भर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यम् ।

यद्वर्त्रा दत्तं स भर्तृदायः । भर्तृदायं धनं भर्तरि जीवति अमुक्तहस्ता विनियुञ्ज्यात् । भर्तरि  
मृते तु यथेष्टं विनियुञ्ज्यात् । विक्रीणीयाद्वा स्थावरादृते । दुर्भिक्षादौ वर्तनाशक्तौ विक्रयणा-  
दावधिकारः ।

एवं पारकालिकऔर्ध्वदेहिककार्यार्थं कन्यापुत्रसंस्कारार्थं राजनिग्रहे वा उत्तमर्णादिनिग्रहे वा  
विक्रयणादि बोध्यम् ॥

4. स्वातन्त्र्यं conj. : L सान्यं C nil, Cf. DTa p. 134 and DKS 2.2.7 : तत्र भर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यं.  
Possibly स्वाम्यं, cf. DBhā. 4.1.20, commenting on स्वाम्यं at Kātyāyana 904 : तत्र भर्तुः स्वाम्यं  
स्वातन्त्र्यं.

5. वतना° : mss. वर्तमाना, cf. DBhā 4.1.24 and DKS 2.2.33.  
...45



॥ अथ स्त्रीधनाधिकारिव्यवस्थासंक्षेपः ॥

कुमारीधने सोदरभ्रातृमातृपितृणां क्रमेणाधिकारः । भर्तृदत्तधनातिरिक्तवाग्दत्तधनेऽप्येव क्रमः । वरदत्तधनं तु व्ययातिरिक्तं वरस्थैव ।

ऊढायौतुकधने कुमारी वाग्दत्ता सपुत्रा सम्भावितपुत्रा च बन्ध्या विधवा च क्रमशोऽधिकारिणी । ततः पुत्रदौहित्रपौत्रप्रपौत्राः अधिकारिणः ।

यौतुकातिरिक्तपितृदत्तधने तु कुमारीपुत्रकुमार्योरेकदैवाधिकारः । तयोरभावे पूर्ववत् सपुत्रा सम्भावितपुत्रादिक्रमः ॥

॥ अथ विभागानधिकारिव्यवस्थासंक्षेपः ॥

ह्रीवपतितपुत्रजात्यन्धवधिरउन्मत्तजडमूकपङ्गुइन्द्रियरहितपितृद्वेष्टयचिकित्सकरोग्युपपातकिनः एते औरसपुत्राद्या अपि निरंशकाः । एभ्यः पतितवर्ज्येभ्यो अन्नवस्त्रं दद्यात् ।

अन्धादीनां पुत्रा यदि स्वयमदुष्टास्तदा तत्पित्रनुसारेण भागार्हा भवन्ति ॥

॥ अथ विभाज्याविभाज्यव्यवस्थासंक्षेपः ॥

साधारणद्रव्यस्य व्ययव्यतिरेकेन यत् शौर्यधनं तत्र विभाज्यं । साधारणद्रव्यव्ययेन अर्जिते तु अर्जकस्य भागद्वयम् । शेषाः समभागिनः । यथा यदा पञ्च सहोदरास्तदा षडंशाः कर्तव्याः । अर्जकस्य द्वयंशभागित्वं चतुर्णां चतुरंशाः । द्वौ चेतुर्योऽंशाः । अर्जकस्य द्वयंशो अन्यस्य एकांशः । एवं क्रमेण बोध्यम् । साधारणद्रव्यव्ययेन अर्जितभूमौ तु अर्जकस्य तुरीयांशः ।

एवं विवाहकाले यल्लब्धं तद्वार्याधनं मित्राल्लब्धधनं मैत्रं पितृपितामहादिप्रसादाल्लब्धधनं न विभाज्यम् ।

केवलं विद्याया अर्जितं धनं विद्याधनम् । तत् समविद्याधिकविद्याभ्यां विभजनीयम् अविद्यान्यूनविद्याभ्यां न विभजनीयम् । विद्यामधिगच्छतो भ्रातुः परिजनभरणं यः करोति स मूर्खोऽपि विद्याधनाद्भागं लभते । स्वकुलाच्छिक्षितविद्योपार्जितधनं भ्रातृभिः सह विभजनीयम् । सर्वत्र विद्यापदं यावद्विद्यापरम् । अत एव द्यूतप्राप्तमपि विद्याधनं बोध्यम् ।

पितृपितामहादिमृतधनं बलादन्येन हृतं साधारणद्रव्यव्ययव्यतिरेकेण अंशयन्तराणामनुज्ञया यो यदुद्धरति तद्धनं उद्धर्तुरेव ।

वाहनअलङ्कारकृताशोदकशय्यासनभोजनाद्युपयुक्तभाजन अङ्ग<sup>7</sup>[. . . . .] उपयुक्तवस्त्रादीनि अविभज्यानि । एवं दासीव्यतिरिक्ताः स्त्रियोऽविभाज्याः । एकैकदासदास्यादिसमयनियमेन कर्म कारितव्यम् । गोप्रचाररथ्यानां प्रचाराणां न विभागः । एवं यद्यस्य प्रयोजनाहं तत्र विभजनीयम् । तेन

6. द्वयंशो : mss. द्वयंशौ.

7. [.....] : mss. नाञ्जलम् (?). Cf. DBhā, 6. 2. 27 and DKS 4. 2. 14, on वस्त्रं at Manu

9. 219 : वस्त्रमङ्गयोजितं पंक्तिपरिच्छदार्थं च.



पुस्तकं मूलैः सह न विभजनीयम् । शिल्पोपयुक्तं द्रव्यं अशिल्पिभिर्न विभजनीयम् । यस्मिन् वास्तुनि  
ध्येन गृहोद्यानं कृतं अपरेणापि स्थानान्तरे तथा कृतं चेत्तदा येन कृतं तत्तस्यैव । एवमन्यान्यपि ॥

॥ अथाविभक्तानां कर्तव्यव्यवस्थासंक्षेपः ॥

अविभक्तभ्रातृणां सर्वेषां देवपितृद्विजार्चनादियावद्धर्म एक एव । विभागे सति स एव  
धर्मः गृहे गृहे पृथक् पृथक् । एवमविभक्तस्यावरदाने वन्धकविक्रयेषु परस्परानुमतिं विना कस्यचिन्ना-  
धिकारः । किन्तु आपत्काले कुटुम्बार्थं धर्मार्थं च तेष्वप्यधिकारः । <sup>10</sup>एवं कुटुम्बार्थं दासादिभिर्यद्वणा-  
दिकं क्रियते तत् स्वामिना तदभावे तत्पुत्रादिना परिशोद्धव्यम् ।

पृथग्भूतेषु स्थावरेषु सर्वेषां पृथक्पृथग्दानविक्रयादौ यथेष्टं स्वातन्त्र्यम् ॥

॥ अथ पितृकृतविभागव्यवस्थासंक्षेपः ॥

पिता यदि जीवति तदा स्वोपार्जितधने तदिच्छयैव विभागकालः । नो चेत् न तदिच्छा-  
कालः ।

तत्र स्वधनविभागे पुत्रादीनां न्यूनाधिकदाने पितुः प्रसुत्वं । एतच्च पितृभक्तत्वबहुपोष्यत्व-<sup>11</sup>  
कार्याक्षमत्वादिना बोद्धव्यम् । तदभावे न्यूनाधिकविभागे नाधिकारः । व्याधिना कोपादिना सुभगापुत्र-  
त्वादिना अधिकदाने कृतेऽपि भागस्यासिद्धिः । एवं पितृद्रव्योपघातेन स्वार्जितधने न न्यूनाधिक-  
भागः । <sup>12</sup>यत्र पुत्रा एव मिलित्वा विभागमर्थयन्ते तत्र न विषमभागः । इच्छया गुणवज्ज्येष्ठपुत्रत्वे  
विशोद्धारदानं न विषमांशः । पुत्रेभ्यः समानांशदाने अपुत्रपत्न्यै अप्राप्तस्त्रीधनार्थं पुत्रतुल्यविभागो<sup>13</sup>  
दातव्यः । प्राप्तस्त्रीधनार्थे अर्धांश इति दायभागः । स्त्रीधने दत्ते अर्धांशोऽपि न इति मिश्राः ।

विभागात्परं यस्य गर्भाधानं स विभक्तजः । पूर्वजविभक्तभ्रातृधने नाधिकारः । किन्तु स्व-  
पितृधने ऋणे तत्साधने चाधिकारी । किन्तु पितृसंसृष्टपुत्रान्तरेण सह तस्य विभागः ।

विभागात्पूर्वं गर्भस्यो विभागात्परं जातस्तु विभक्तपितृभ्रातृधनं चैकीकृत्य पुनर्विभागकरणेऽ-  
धिकारः । तेन विदेशस्थस्य अप्राप्तव्यवहारस्य धनं मध्यस्थे रक्षणीयम् । किन्तु पितृसंसृष्टपुत्रान्तरेण सह  
तस्य विभागः ।

पितरि मृते तु भ्रातृभिः सहार्धभागाधिकारी । भ्रातृणामभावे दौहित्रं विना सर्वधनाधिकारी ।  
सति दौहित्रे तेन सह सर्वधनाधिकारी ॥

॥ अथ पितृकृतपुत्रार्जितधनविभागव्यवस्था ॥

पितृद्रव्यव्ययं विना अर्जितपुत्रधने पितुरंशद्वयं अर्जकस्यापि तदेव इतरेषां पुत्राणामनंशित्वम् ।  
पितृद्रव्यव्यययेनार्जितपुत्रधने पितुरर्धं अर्जकस्यांशद्वयं इतरेषां पुत्राणामेकैकांश इति दायभागः ॥

8. येन : mss. यमेन, cf. DBhā 6. 2. 30. Possibly येन यत्, cf. DKS 4. 2. 29.

9. तथा : mss. यथा, cf. DKS 4. 2. 30.

10. एवं : L एवंभूतःसन् एवं C एवंभूतःसन् एवं (?)

11. "कार्याक्षम" : mss. कार्यक्षम, cf. DKS 6. 11.

12. यत्र : mss. एवं. Possibly एवं यत्र.

13. "विभागो" : possibly "भागो.



॥ अथ जीवत्पितृकपितामहधनविभागव्यवस्थासंक्षेपः ॥

पैतामहधने पितुरेव स्वत्वं <sup>14</sup>संवन्धिसत्त्वानिवृत्तेः ।

जीवन्त्या मातुरिच्छा इत्येकः कालः । पितुरिच्छातः पितामहधनविभागे मातृरजोनिवृत्तिरपेक्षिता । पैतामहधनविभागानन्तरं दैवाज्जातस्य भ्रातृभिः सह विभागः ।

भूमिनिबन्धद्विपदरूपपितामहधने पितुर्न्यूनाधिकविभागस्वाच्छन्द्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं पितापुत्रयोरैवं पितृव्यभ्रातृपुत्रयोश्च तुल्यस्वामित्वम् । किन्तु पितुरेवात्र द्वयंशित्वम् । मणिमुक्तादौ तु पितुरेव स्वाच्छन्द्यम् । एवं प्रपितामहधने पितामहस्येति बोध्यम् ।

स्थावरस्य समस्तस्य दानविक्रयादिनिषेधो हि यद्वचनेन कथितं तदन्यस्य सान्निध्यभ्रात्रादेर्दौर्जन्यादिनिवृत्त्यर्थम् । <sup>15</sup>ग्रहीतुर्दुःखोत्पादनेन दातुर्नरकोत्पादनं जायते । तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं दानविक्रयादिनिषेधः । दानादिकं तु सिध्यत्येव ।

पितामहधनविभागे गुणवज्ज्येष्ठपुत्रस्य पितुरिच्छया विंशोद्धारदानं <sup>16</sup>अदानं वा बोध्यम् । पैतामहधनमन्यैर्हृतं पितृद्रव्यव्ययेन विना पित्रा उद्धृतं तद्धनं अकामतो न विभजनीयम् । उपवाताजिते तु न कश्चिद्विशेषः । एवं पूर्वपक्षं तु यो भूमिमित्यत्र चतुर्थांशाभिधानम् । तत्तु उद्धृतविषयं एतत्तु स्थावरादिविषयम् । मणिमुक्तादौ उद्धृतेऽनुद्धृते च समम् ।

सर्वभूम्यादिकं पुत्राद्यनुमतिं विना दानविक्रयादिकं न कार्यम् । धर्मकामार्थं कुटुम्बभरणार्थं वा पुत्राद्यनुमतिं विनापि यत्किञ्चित् विक्रयणादिकं कार्यम् ।

पितृमरणानन्तरं <sup>17</sup>पौत्रैर्विभागेऽप्राप्तस्त्रीधनार्थं मात्रे पितामह्यै च समांशो दातव्यः प्राप्तस्त्रीधनार्थं चेदधर्मांशः । विमात्रे पितामहीसपत्न्यै चेत् ग्रासाच्छादनं दद्यादिति दायभागः ॥

॥ अथार्जकस्य द्वयंशादिव्यवस्थासंक्षेपः ॥

सर्वत्र पित्रादिद्रव्यव्ययेनार्जितधने भूमिभिन्नेऽर्जकस्य द्वयंशः भूमौ तु चतुर्थांशः । पित्रादिद्रव्यव्ययं विना अर्जितधनमर्जकस्यैव तद्धनं अनिच्छया न विभजनीयम् ॥

॥ अथ ज्येष्ठोद्धारव्यवस्थासंक्षेपः ॥

जन्मविद्यागुणज्येष्ठस्य द्वयंशः अन्ये समानांशभागिनः । सोदरमात्रविभागे गुणवज्ज्येष्ठस्य भागद्वयम् । सोदरासोदरविभागे गुणवज्ज्येष्ठस्य विंशोद्धारः । किञ्चिद्गुणवज्ज्येष्ठस्य यत्किञ्चिद्दत्त्वा विभागसमगुणवते तु यत्किञ्चिद्दत्त्वा वा विभाग इति दायभागः ।

ज्येष्ठोऽत्र पुत्रामनरकव्यावर्तकोऽभिप्रेतः न तु जीवदपेक्षः ।

14. \*सत्त्वानिवृत्तेः conj. : mss. स्वत्त्वानिवृत्तेः.

15. दुःखो° conj. : C दुष्खो(?) L id. or दुष्टयो(?).

16. अदानं con. : mss. आदानं.

17. पौत्रैः : possibly पुत्रैः.



18 यत्र ज्येष्ठस्य द्वयंशविंशोद्धारो तत्र मध्यकनीयसोश्च तदर्धतत्पादो बोध्यः ।

उद्धारो दशसु गवादिषु न कार्यः ।

कलौ भ्रातृणां तादृशभक्त्यतिशयाभावादुद्धारार्हतादृशज्येष्ठाभावाच्च प्रायः सम्भाग एव लोके दृश्यते इति दायभागः । एवं च एष उद्धारो वर्णत्रयाणां बोध्यः । शूद्रस्य तु सर्वदा ज्येष्ठत्वाभावात्तेनोद्धारो न देयः ॥

॥ अथ मृतपितृकभ्रातृविभागव्यवस्था ॥

सहवासश्च सर्वेषामेवेच्छया भवति नान्यथा । विभागस्तु 19 एकस्यापीच्छया भवति ।

अत एव विदेशस्थानामप्राप्तव्यवहाराणां वा धनं मध्यस्याग्रतो गुटिकापातादिना निर्णाय आयव्ययौ प्रदर्श्य मध्यस्थे स्थापनीयम् ।

कृषिवाणिज्यादिना परिजनपोषकं भ्रातरं कनिष्ठमपि विभागकाले अन्ये 20 भ्रातरः अधिकद्रव्येण संवर्धयन्ति ।

विभागपराङ्मुखभ्राता येन विभागकाले पितृपितामहद्रव्यं उपेक्ष्यते तत्पुत्रादेः कालान्तरीय-दुरन्ततानिरासाय किञ्चिदुपजीवनं दत्त्वा स तु भागशून्यः करणीयः ।

21 एकमातृकविभिन्नपितृकस्तु 22 यद्यस्य पैतृकं धनं स तद्गृहीत न 23 इतरत् ।

संसर्गभ्रातृणां विभागे पुनर्ज्येष्ठस्य न अधिकांशः । पितापुत्रयोः संसर्गे संसर्गिणः पितृर्भागः संसर्गिपुत्रान्तरसत्त्वेऽपि संसर्गोत्तरजातपुत्रस्यैव । तदसत्त्वे संसृष्टिनामेव । संसृष्टिपुत्राणामभावे तत्पुत्राणामेव तद्धनम् । यदा पुत्रोऽसंसर्गी तदा तयोस्तुल्यांश इति दायभागः ।

कदाचित् भ्रात्रादिना अपहृतधनं विभागकाले न ज्ञातम् । विभागोत्तरकाले प्राप्तं चेत्तदा अपहर्त्रा सह तदेव धनं संविभजनीयम् । तदभावे तत्पुत्रादिना सह । पितृमरणानन्तरं पितामहपुत्रैः सह मृतपितृकपौत्रप्रपौत्रैः सह 24 पित्रंशो ग्राह्यः ।

यदि पितामहाद्भागो न लब्धः 25 विभागमनिच्छन्त्यै अप्राप्तस्त्रीधनार्थं मात्रे पुत्रतुल्यांशो दातव्यः । प्राप्तस्त्रीधनार्थं तु अर्धांशो दातव्यः । अपुत्रार्थं विमात्रे तु भोजनाच्छादनमात्रमिति दायभागः । मिश्रमते तु मात्रेऽपुत्राविमात्रे च पुत्रतुल्यांशो दातव्यः । मात्रे वैमात्रे वा प्रतिश्रुतं स्त्रीधन-

18. यत्र : mss. अत्र.

19. एकस्यापीच्छया conj. : mss. एकत्र(?) इच्छया, cf. DBhā. 3. 16.

20. भ्रातरः : mss. भ्रातरं.

21. एकमातृकं : mss. एवंमातृक, cf. DKS 10. 1.

22. यद्यस्य : mss. यद्य, cf. Manu 9. 191 at DKS 10. 3.

23. इतरत् : possibly इतरः, cf. DKS 10. 3.

24. पित्रंशो conj. : mss. पित्रांशो.

25. विभागमनिच्छन्त्यै conj. : mss. विभागनिच्छन्त्यै.



मदत्वा मृते पितरि पुत्रैस्तद्दातव्यं भर्तुरनुज्ञया धृतालङ्कारो भर्त्रा त्वदत्तोऽपि भार्याया एव इति मिश्राः । मृतपितृकानां अविभक्तभ्रातृणां मध्ये एकस्य मरणेऽपुत्रातत्पत्न्यै <sup>26</sup>तद्भ्रातृभागो न दातव्यः । स्त्रीधनं ग्रासाच्छादनं च देवरैर्दातव्यम् ।

पितृद्रव्यसाधारणद्रव्यव्ययेन विना यदर्जितधनं तदर्जकस्यैव । अनिच्छया तत्र विभजनीयम् । पित्रादिद्रव्यव्ययेन अर्जितभूमिभिन्नधने अर्जकस्य द्वयंशः भूमौ तु तुरीयांशः । अन्ये त्वेकैकांशिनः ।

सर्वत्र पुत्रैः पितृकणं अवश्यं शोधनीयम् ।

पूर्वसंस्कृतैर्भ्रातृभिः असंस्कृतभ्रातृभगिनीनां पितृद्रव्येण तदभावे स्वीयद्रव्येण वा संस्काराः कर्तव्याः ।

देवगृहपुष्करिण्यादिकरणार्थं स्थापितं धनं देवब्राह्मणादिप्रतिश्रुतं वा मृते पितरि तद्धन-स्वामिना तदर्थं देयम् ॥

<sup>27</sup>इति दायभागव्यवस्थासंक्षेपः संपूर्णः ॥

#### ABBREVIATIONS USED IN CRITICAL NOTES

C Calcutta Sanskrit College manuscript

conj. editor's conjecture

DBhā Jīmūtavāhana's Dāyabhāga (ed. Jīvananda VIDYĀSĀGARA, Calcutta 1893).

DKS Śrīkrṣṇa Tarkālaṃkāra's Dāyakramasamgraha (ed. P. M. WYNCH, Calcutta 1818).

DTa Raghunandana's Dāyatattva (ed. Jīvananda VIDYĀSĀGARA, Calcutta 1895)

L India Office Library manuscript

mss. manuscripts C and L

(?) reading uncertain

26. तद्भ्रातृः possibly तद्भर्तृः.

27. The addition in C, second hand : गणेशभट्टकृत, has been discussed in the introduction. After the colophon, both mss. add : अत्र किंचिद्व्यंशसत्वे सुधीभिरनुग्रहादिना तद्व्यंशं परि-शोद्धनीयमेव ॥ श्रीरामाय नमो नमः ॥ श्रीसीतायै नमो नमः ॥ श्रीकृष्णाय नमः ॥ + C श्रीराधाकृष्णाभ्यां नमः ॥



## ŚLEṢA : THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AN ARGUMENT\*

By

J. A. F. ROODBERGEN

Recently some books and at least one article have been published in which the topic of *śleṣa* is discussed. I mention S. K. DE,<sup>1</sup> V. RAGHAVAN,<sup>2</sup> Miss S. S. JANAKI,<sup>3</sup> M. M. AGRAWAL, and Miss M. C. PORCHER.<sup>4</sup> The present paper mainly deals with the argument on *śleṣa* by Mammāṭa in connection with the example *svayaṃ ca pallavātāmra*, etc.<sup>5</sup>

Udbhaṭa, a Kashmiri *ālaṃkārika* dated around 800,<sup>6</sup> provides us with a starting point. In his *Kāvyaālaṃkārasārasaṃgraha*, at the end of the fourth *varga* which deals with qualities of style like *preyasvat*, *rasavat*, he states a definition of *śliṣṭa*, that is, *śleṣa*. The definition says *ekaprayatnocāryāṇām tacchāyām caiva bibhratām | svaritādiguṇair bhinnair bandhaḥ śliṣṭam iho-cyate || ālaṃkārantaragatām pratibhām janayat padaiḥ | dvividhair artha-śabdoktiviśiṣṭam tat pratiyatām* 'a configuration (of *śabdās*) which can be uttered with one and the same articulatory effort, and (of *śabdās*) which bear a likeness to that on account of different properties in the form of *svarita*, etc. is called *śliṣṭa* here. Generating the appearance belonging to another *ālaṃkāra* through twofold words, that (*śliṣṭa*) is to be understood as different on account of the statement of meaning and word-form.'<sup>7</sup> In some respects the definition is not too clear, but, I think, we can rather confidently make the following points :

1. Udbhaṭa makes a distinction between *artha-* and *śabdaśleṣa*, that is, between a play upon meanings expressed by one and the same word-form, homonyms, and a play upon phonic sequences which, when divided into different words, convey different meanings.
2. Udbhaṭa is the first to introduce the term *pratibhā* to describe the effect of the use of *śleṣa*. I have rendered *pratibhā* simply by

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1. DE, Vol. II, pp. 232-34.

2. RAGHAVAN, pp. 380-82.

3. JANAKI, Introduction, pp. 116-24.

4. PORCHER, pp. 341-99, of which pp. 370-96 deal with the relation between *śleṣa* and *dhvani*.

5. KP, p. 519.

6. GEROW, p. 233.

7. KASS, p. 54.



'appearance' in order not to presume upon the poet's intentions.<sup>8</sup> I shall have occasion to return to this term in connection with Mammaṭa.

3. Udbhaṭa's proposition regarding *śleṣa* may be summed up in Mammaṭa's words as *alaṃkāṛāntarapratibhotpattihetuḥ śleṣaḥ* 'śleṣa is the cause of the origination of the (mere) appearance of another *alaṃkāra*'.<sup>9</sup>

The commentator, Pratiḥarendurāja, dated in the first half of the tenth cent.,<sup>10</sup> in his commentary on Udbhaṭa's definition states the following :

1. It is Udbhaṭa's established opinion that words differ on account of a difference in meaning.<sup>11</sup>
2. *Śleṣa* attains to the status of *alaṃkāra* only through generating the (mere) appearance of an *alaṃkāra* like *upamā*.<sup>12</sup>
3. Since *śleṣa* is *anavakāśa* 'without scope' in its own domain, it sets aside other *alaṃkāras* which are *sāvakāśa* 'having scope elsewhere (also)'.<sup>13</sup> According to the commentator, this is what Udbhaṭa means by saying *alaṃkāṛāntaragaṭām pratibhām janayāt padaiḥ | divi-vidhaiḥ*. Indurāja adds that he reof the other *alaṃkāras* we find a mere appearance, not their full expression by means of words (*padabandha*).<sup>14</sup>

8. JHALAKIKAR, in his commentary on KP, p. 517, lines 1-2 of the commentary, explains *pratibhā* in Mammaṭa's *vṛtti* as *pratibhāmātram*, that is, *ābhānamātram* 'the mere appearance'. On p. 418, line 13 of the commentary, JHALAKIKAR uses *ābhāsatvena* *pratīti* 'understanding as an appearance'. JANAKI, Introduction, p. 119, renders *pratibhāmātram*, used by Ruṣyaka, by 'appear in an incipient form'. AGRAWAL, p. 102, dealing with Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha, uses the word 'tinge'. The word *pratibhā* does not figure in the list of principal technical terms in PORCHER'S book. Dr. K. KRISHNAMOORTHY, Karnatak University, Dhārwar, has suggested the translation 'marginal awareness' to me. In any case, 'appearance' or 'mere appearance' should not be taken in opposition to 'reality'.

9. Compare KP, *vṛtti*, p. 517, line 1.

10. GEROW, p. 261.

11. KASS, p. 55, *arthabhedena tāvac chabdā bhidyanta iti bhaṭṭadibhaṭṭasya siddhāntaḥ*.

12. KASS, p. 55, *etacca śliṣṭam . . upamādyalaṃkārapratibhotpādanadvārenā-lamkāratām pratiṣadyate*.

13. KASS, p. 55, *ato 'nenūnavakāśatvāt svaviśaye 'lamkāṛāntarāny apodyante, teṣāṃ viśayāntare sāvakāśatvāt*.

14. KASS, p. 54, *alaṃkāṛāntarāṇām atra pratibhāmātram na tu padabandha ity arthaḥ*.



We may feel inclined to think that it is precisely because of their being set aside that the other *alamkāras* are mere *pratibhās*, pale appearances. However, this is not the commentator's view. He has a different explanation.

After his explanation of the definition Indurāja quotes an example. It consists of three *ślokas*, taken from a hymn on Lakṣmī. The first *śloka* and the second line of the third *śloka* will be borrowed by Mammaṭa later on.<sup>15</sup>

The first *śloka* reads *svayam ca pallavātāmra bhāsvatkaravirājitā / prabhātasamdhya evāsvāpaphalalubdhehitapradā*.<sup>16</sup> Here Lakṣmī is compared to early dawn. When interpreted to refer to Lakṣmī, the stanza says : 'and she, brilliant with lustrous hands reddish like young shoots, of her own fulfils the wishes of those desiring a fruit which is difficult to obtain'. When interpreted to refer to early dawn, the stanza says : 'and it (namely, dawn), brilliant with sunrays reddish like young shoots, fulfils the wishes of those not desirous of the fruit of sleep'. In the first interpretation, by 'the fruit difficult to obtain' reference is to *mokṣa*. In the second interpretation, by 'the fruit of sleep' reference is to the cessation of fatigue, and by 'those not desirous of the fruit of sleep' persons are meant who perform their *saṁdhyopāsana*. This is anyway how Indurāja explains it.<sup>17</sup>

The *śleṣa* here is conveyed by the word *bhāsvatkarā* which applies in two meanings, and by the phonic sequence *asvāpa*. This sequence, when broken up in two different ways, resp. *a + su + āpa* and *a + svāpa*, where the negative particle *a* is to be connected with *lubdha*, results in two different words conveying a different meaning. Indurāja notes that in *bhāsvatkarā* we have an instance of *arthasleṣa*,<sup>18</sup> whereas in *asvāpa* we have to do with *śabdaśleṣa*.<sup>19</sup>

15. KP, p. 519 and p. 524, resp.

16. KASS, p. 55.

17. KASS, p. 56, *prabhātasamdhyaṁ pakṣe tu svāpasya .. yat phalam śramanivṛtti-lakṣṇam tatra yo na lubdhaḥ saṁdhyopāsanaṁ pravṛttatvāt* 'but in the case of early dawn (we must interpret *asvāpaphalalubdha* as) *svāpasya yat phalam*, which takes the form of *śramanivṛtti* "cessation of fatigue", *tatra yo na lubdhaḥ*, because he has performed his act of worship at dawn.'

18. KASS, p. 56, *atas tantreṇocāraṇasambhavād ayam arthasleṣaḥ* 'therefore, because it is possible to pronounce it uniformly (without a different break-up of the phonic sequence), this is *arthasleṣa*.' For the meaning of *tantra* see ibid. p. 35, line 6, *sādhāraṇam bhavet tantram* 'let *tantra* be what is common', which may be a reference to the *Śābarabhāṣya* (see V. S. APTE, *A Sanskrit - English Dictionary*, Part II, Poona 1958, s. v. *tantra*).

19. KASS, p. 56, *atas tantreṇocārayitum aśakyatā. Ekasmims tv atra śabde samuccarite śabdāntarasya tatsādṛśyāt pratipattiḥ* 'therefore it is not possible to pronounce it (namely *asvāpa*) uniformly. But when here one word (*asvāpa* as *a + sv + āpa*) is pronounced, we understand the other word (*asvāpa* as *a + svāpa*), because it is similar to that (first word).'



Finally, the commentator says that in this stanza the *śleṣa*, both *artha-* and *śabdaśleṣa*, generate the appearance of *upamā*.<sup>20</sup> Why the mere appearance of *upamā*? Indurāja explains that the *upamā* is short of a *sādhārāṇadharmā* founded on meaning.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, apparently, it is assumed that the *upamā* has been stated in weak, underdeveloped, marginal form, lacking its full growth. Then the commentator concludes his discussion on the example *svayaṃ ca*, etc. by saying that therefore, that is, for the reason just mentioned, what we find here is not *upamā*, but *śleṣa* generating a mere appearance of *upamā*.<sup>22</sup>

It will be seen that all of the matters touched upon by Udbhaṭa and his commentator return in Mammaṭa's discussion of the example quoted. But before going to Mammaṭa let us have a quick look at Ānandavardhana. In the second *Uddyota* of his work he says that, according to Udbhaṭa, the designation *śleṣa* also holds good in the case of the *pratibhā* of another *alaṃkāra*.<sup>23</sup> Then how to set off *dhvani* from *śleṣa*?<sup>24</sup> As Ānandavardhana sees it, *śleṣa* and the *pratibhā* of another *alaṃkāra* belong to the domain of *vācya* 'what is directly stated', and, of course, *dhvani* does not.<sup>25</sup>

Mammaṭa mentions the example *svayaṃ ca*, etc. in the ninth *Ullāsa* of his work, which deals with *śabdālaṃkāras*. It is also in this *Ullāsa* that we find the main discussion on *śleṣa*.<sup>26</sup> After having invoked the principles *artha-bhedena śabdabhedah*, which, as we saw, is Udbhaṭa's *siddhānta*, and *kāvya-mārga svaro na ganyate* 'on the pathway of *kāvya* accent is not taken into account'<sup>27</sup> Mammaṭa, in his *vṛtti*, states that the simultaneous pronunciation of

20. KASS, p. 56, *etayoś ca dvayor aḥy arthaśleṣaśabdaśleṣayor upamāpratibhot-pattihetutvam*.

21. KASS, p. 56, *śabdavyatirekeṇa tu sādharāṇo dharmo 'rthādhikarāṇo 'tra na vidyate'* but, apart from words, a common feature which is based on meaning is not found here.' By saying *śabdavyatirekeṇa* Indurāja acknowledges the existence of the view which says that a mere wordform may also be considered a *sādhārāṇadharmā*.

22. KASS, p. 56, *tena nopamūyā api tu śleṣa upamāpratibhotpattihetuḥ*.

23. KRISHNAMOORTY, p. 72, *nanv alaṃkāraṇtaraḥpratibhūyām api śleṣavyapadeśo bhavatīti darśitam Bhaṭṭodbhaṭeṇa*.

24. KRISHNAMOORTY, p. 72, *tat punar api śabdaśaktimūlo dhvanir niravakāśa* 'therefore, however, *dhvani*, which is based on the (meaning-conveying) power of the word, would be left without scope.' Compare on this point PORCHER, pp. 373-378.

25. KRISHNAMOORTY, p. 74, *yatra tu śabdaśaktiḥ sāmāthyāḥkṣiptam vācyaḥ* 'but where through the power of the word another *alaṃkāra* which is suggested on account of the word-context (*sāmāthyā*), which is shorn of (any) expressed meaning (and) which is suggested only, becomes manifest, that is the domain of *dhvani*'.

26. KP, pp. 509-29. In *Ullāsa* X, KP, sūtra 96, p. 609, Mammaṭa states the definition of *arthaśleṣa*.

27. KP, p. 510.



words which differ in their expressed meaning is called *śleṣa*.<sup>28</sup> Eight varieties are duly distinguished and provided with examples. A ninth variety is introduced separately. It is defined as that variety in which the earlier mentioned differences do not occur.<sup>29</sup> An example is quoted. It contains two compounds neither of which needs being broken up into different constituents in order to convey different meanings.<sup>30</sup> As stated by JHALAKIKAR in his commentary on this passage, it is an example of what Mammaṭa later on in his *vṛtti* calls *abhaṅgaśleṣa*.<sup>31</sup>

Then a discussion starts in the *vṛtti*. There are those who hold that *śleṣa*, both *artha-* and *śabdaśleṣa*, is *alamkāṛāntarapratibhotpattiḥetu* 'the cause of the origination of the (mere) appearance of another *alamkāra*.' Therefore *śleṣa* should be counted among *arthālamkāras*. But, in that case, how can it be a *śabdālamkāra*?<sup>32</sup> In answer to this objection Mammaṭa states the criterion by which he distinguishes between *śabdālamkāras* and *arthālamkāras* in general. The criterion, as is known, is *anvayavyatireka* 'positive and negative concomitance'.<sup>33</sup>

It is here that Mammaṭa introduces the example *svayaṃ ca*, etc. borrowed from Indurāja.<sup>34</sup> According to Mammaṭa, the first line exemplifies *abhaṅgaśleṣa*, the second *sabhaṅgaśleṣa*. Reference is, as we may remember, to the constituents *bhāsvatkarā* and *asvāpa* respectively. Both *abhaṅga-* and *sabhaṅgaśleṣa* come under *śabdaśleṣa*, as Mammaṭa sees it, as against Indurāja for whom what Mammaṭa calls *abhaṅgaśleṣa* is *arthaśleṣa*. The moot point is, obviously, to show the difference between *abhaṅgaśleṣa* – a borderline case in which word-form and phonic sequence coincide – and *arthaśleṣa*.<sup>35</sup> I think this can be done fairly easily, but I shall not go into that question now. What interests me is the pro-

28. KP, p. 510–11, *vācyabhedena bhinnā api śabdā yat yugapaduccāranena śliṣyanti bhinnam svarūpam apahnuvate sa śleṣaḥ* 'when words which are different on account of their expressed meaning unite due to their simultaneous pronunciation, (that is,) give up their different nature, that is *śleṣa*.'

29. KP, sūtra 120, p. 515, *bhedābhāvāt prakṛtyāder bhedo 'pi navamo bhavet* 'let there be a ninth variety also, in which the difference of stem, etc. does not occur.'

30. KP, p. 516.

31. KP, p. 516, line 3 of the commentary.

32. KP, p. 517, *alamkāṛāntarapratibhotpattiḥetuḥ śabdaśleṣo 'rthaśleṣaś ceti .. arthālamkāramadhye paṇigato 'nyair iti katham ayaṃ śabdālamkāraḥ*.

33. KP, p. 518, *īha doṣaguṇālamkāṛānām śabdārthagatatvena yo vibhāgaḥ saḥ anvayavyatirekābhyām eva vyavatiṣṭhate* 'in this (work) the classification of flaws, virtues and *alamkāras*, according to whether they belong to word-form or meaning, is established on account of positive and negative concomitance only.' PORCHER, p. 349, following FOUCHER, to whom she refers, gives a wrong interpretation of the *vyatireka* part. For the historical context of the criterion stated see RAGHAVAN, pp. 380–82.

34. KP, p. 519.

35. Compare AGRAWAL, pp. 94–95; PORCHER, pp. 348–50.



position phrased by Mammaṭa in connection with the example and the way he sets out to prove it by condensing whole arguments into a single line and leaving his readers to fill in the details, in the manner of great pandits. The proposition reads *na cāyam upamā pratibotpatihetuḥ śleṣaḥ api tu śleṣapratibhotpattir upamā* 'and this is not *śleṣa* generating the (mere) appearance/marginal awareness of *upamā*, but rather *upamā* generating the (mere) appearance / marginal awareness of *śleṣa*.'<sup>36</sup> In other words, Mammaṭa undertakes to defeat Udbhaṭa most directly.

The argument starts with a discussion of problems concerning the notions *upāma* and *śleṣa* which form part of the proposition. These problems are best phrased in the form of objections.

First objection. Is *svayaṃ ca*, etc. an instance of genuine *pūrṇopamā*?<sup>37</sup> We remember that Udbhaṭa, as interpreted by Indurāja, had some reservations in connection with the *sādhāraṇadharmā*. The difficulty is that in the example *svayaṃ ca*, etc. the *sādhāraṇadharmā* does not consist in a 'shared meaning', because the meanings conveyed through *śleṣa* are different, but in a shared word-form or phonic sequence. Therefore people may think that, since the *sādhāraṇadharmā* looks rather suspect, there can be no question of genuine *pūrṇopamā*, and that, therefore, we must accept *śleṣa* as the only full-bodied *alaṃkāra* here. Mammaṭa denies this. He quotes two examples. The first is *kamalam iva mukhaṃ manoḥṇam kacatilarām* 'her face enchanting like a lotus blossoms more (than a lotus)', which is a clear case of *pūrṇopamā*. The point of the second example is that it contains a *sādhāraṇadharmā* which is purely verbal. It consists in the word *sakalakalam*, which is to be read as *sa + kalakalam* 'full of noise' in connection with the *upameya*, a town, and as *sakala + kalam* 'having complete digits' in connection with the *upamāna*, the moon. This is declared to be *upamā*, that is, *pūrṇopamā*, on the authority of Rudraṭa.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, the purely verbal *sādhāraṇadharma*s in the example *svayaṃ ca*, etc. cannot detract either from its status of being an instance of *pūrṇopamā*.

Second objection. There are some who hold that the domain of *upamā* is properly constituted by instances like *kamalam iva mukhaṃ* 'her face is like a lotus', in which no *sādhāraṇadharmā* figures at all.<sup>39</sup> This is really a basic issue the full purport of which becomes clear later on. Mammaṭa rejects this

36. KP, p. 520.

37. From the following argument it is clear that the objection is to be phrased like this, rather than as : is it an instance of a genuine *sādhāraṇadharmā*, or as : is it an instance of genuine *upamā*, as Mammaṭa's phrasing might suggest.

38. KP, p. 521. The stanza quoted from Rudraṭa is KAR, 4. 32.

39. KP, p. 522.



view. His reason is that otherwise, that is, if this view is accepted, no scope would be left for *pūrṇopamā*, which requires the statement of a *sādhāraṇa-dharma*.<sup>40</sup> This is not desired. Therefore, in *svayaṃ ca*, etc., where we did accept the statement of a *sādhāraṇadharma* as shown above, we have a genuine case of *upamā*.

Third objection. Here Mammaṭa does not state the objection, but only its refutation with the help of an example.<sup>41</sup> The objection may be reconstructed as follows. *Śleṣa* is always bound up with another *alaṃkāra*, like *upamā*. Therefore *śleṣa* can be said to lack independent scope. But then, how can *śleṣa* be said to occur at all? To solve this difficulty, we will have recourse to a maxim known from grammar. The maxim says *yena nāprāpte yo vidhīr ārabhyate sa tasya bādhaḥ bhavati* 'in case a rule Y cannot become applicable without rule X becoming necessarily applicable too, then rule Y must be considered to set aside rule X'.<sup>42</sup> In our case, this means that *śleṣa*, precisely because it would be superseded in its own domain by another *alaṃkāra*, sets aside the other *alaṃkāra* which does have scope elsewhere also. Therefore the example *svayaṃ ca*, etc. is really a case of *śleṣa*, not of *upamā*. Mammaṭa rejects this by quoting an example of *śleṣa* pure and simple, without admixture of any other *alaṃkāra*.<sup>43</sup> Accordingly, since *śleṣa* has been shown to possess independent scope, it cannot set aside the *upamā* in *svayaṃ ca*, etc. Therefore this example cannot be said to be an instance of *śleṣa*.

Then what? Mammaṭa says that a combination of *śleṣa* and another *alaṃkāra* results in *saṃkara* only.<sup>44</sup> Here a crucial point is reached in Mammaṭa's argument. He set out to prove that in *svayaṃ ca*, etc. the *upamā* generates the mere appearance of *śleṣa*. That is to say, *svayaṃ ca*, etc. is really an instance of *upamā*. But what he did prove so far is that in this example *upamā* and *śleṣa* blend in the manner of water and milk, which is rather a different matter.

How to continue the argument and turn it into the desired direction? This Mammaṭa does by means of a very short and enigmatic statement. The state-

40. KP, p. 522, *na ca kamalaṃ iva mukhaṃ ityūdiḥ sādharmaṇadharma-pratyogā-śūnya upamāviśaya itī vaktuṃ yuktam pūrṇopamāyā nirviśayāpattēh* 'nor is it proper to say that instances like *kamalaṃ iva mukhaṃ* "her face is like a lotus", which are without the use of a *sādhāraṇadharma*, form the domain of *upamā*, because (then) we would have to face the consequence that no scope is left for *pūrṇopamā*."

41. KP, pp. 522-23.

42. A statement by Nāgeśa, at the beginning of his commentary on *paribhāṣā* 57, See PN, Part I, p. 134. Compare AGRAWAL, p. 98, and PORCHER, p. 363.

43. KP, p. 522.

44. KP, p. 523.



ment says *upapattiparyālocane tu upamāyā evāyaṃ yukto viśayaḥ* 'on a careful consideration of the argument, however, this is the proper domain of *upamā* only.' A reason is added: *anyathā viśayāpahāra eva pūrṇopamāyāḥ syāt* 'otherwise *pūrṇopamā* would be definitely left without scope.'<sup>45</sup>

Which argument is Mammāṭa referring to? Obviously, it cannot be the argument just stated, because this leads to *saṃkara*. So it must be a different argument. JHALAKIKAR, in his commentary on this passage, provides two different arguments, as alternatives.<sup>46</sup> But I do not see how these reasonings are helpful to prove Mammāṭa's thesis, namely, that in *svayaṃ ca*, etc. we have to do with *upamā* generating the marginal awareness of *śleṣa*. However, some remarks made by M. M. AGRAWAL in his article provide, I think, the solution.<sup>46</sup> I shall expand AGRAWAL's observations a bit. In the first place, the example *svayaṃ ca*, etc. is a clear case of *upamā*, because the text says *iva*. In the second place, it is agreed that here the *sādhāraṇadharmā* is conveyed through *śleṣa*. That is to say, really speaking, the *sādhāraṇadharmā* is one thing for the *upameya*, and something else for the *upamāna*. The consequence is that in such cases we can hardly speak of a *sādhāraṇadharmā*. Still, we will do so by assuming that here the *sādhāraṇadharmā* is purely verbal consisting in a word-form or in a phonic sequence. So much for *svayaṃ ca*, etc. But we may view the matter in a wider context also. Just take any *upamā* where the *sādhāraṇadharmā* is not conveyed through *śleṣa*, like in *kamalam iva mukhaṃ manoḥṇā* 'her face is enchanting like a lotus.' Here the word *manoḥṇā* conveys one meaning which is to be connected with both the *upameya* and the *upamāna*. But if we insist on really speaking, that is, if we have to take into account the things meant, it seems obvious that the *manoḥṇatva* of the face is different from that of the lotus as pointed out by AGRAWAL. So here also, in an ordinary *upamā* not mixed up with *śleṣa*, it seems obvious that we cannot speak of a *sādhāraṇadharmā*, at least not in the strict sense of the word. But the consequence of this is that no scope is left for *pūrṇopamā* at all. This is both the full purport of the view referred to earlier and the point of Mammāṭa's *upapatti*.

Still, to speak of *pūrṇopamā* is desired. Therefore, whatever the difference *in re*, we will go on using the term *sādhāraṇadharmā*, whether the common property is conveyed through *śleṣa* or not. But Mammāṭa's argument is not complete yet. He still has to show that in the example *svayaṃ ca*, etc. the

45. KP, p. 524, lines 3-16 of the commentary.

46. AGRAWAL, p. 101, "If you do not accept *Upamā* in the example "*sakala-kalam...*", due to *Sabda-Śleṣa*, then in the example "*Kamalamiva...*", you should accept *Artha-śleṣa* in stead of *Pūrṇopamā*, because even if the word *manoḥṇā* does not have two meanings, yet there is a difference between the *manoḥṇatva*, beauty of lotus and that of face."



*upamā*, which is *pūrṇopamā*, generates the mere appearance of *śleṣa*. In support of his proposition he quotes five examples.<sup>47</sup> Here the first example is taken from Indurāja's commentary on Udbhaṭa's definition of *śliṣṭa*.<sup>48</sup> The fourth example is also found in the *Dhvanyāloka*.<sup>49</sup>

I shall only take up the first example, because, I think, it suffices to show the drift of Mammaṭa's reasoning. It is taken from the same hymn on Lakṣmī mentioned earlier. It says *abindusundarī nityam galallāvaṇyabindukā* 'she being *abindusundarī* ever spills drops of loveliness.' *Abindusundarī* is an instance of *śabdaśleṣa* and may be interpreted in two meanings depending on the division of the phonic sequence, namely, as 'beautiful without drops' (*abindu + sundarī*) and 'beautiful like (the reflection of) the moon in the water' (*ap + indu + sundarī*). Mammaṭa's *vṛtti* here says *na hy atrārthadvayaprātipadikaḥ śabdaśleṣaḥ dvitīyārthasya pratibhātamātrasya prarohābhāvāt* 'because here there is no *śabdaśleṣa* through which two meanings are conveyed, since the second meaning which merely appears (in an incipient stage in our consciousness) lacks (full) development.'<sup>50</sup> We note that here Mammaṭa uses the term *pratibhāta* in contrast with *praroha*. That gives us the meaning '(merely) appearing in an early stage of development (in our consciousness)' for *pratibhāta* and a corresponding meaning for *pratibhā* also. Apparently, the idea is inspired by the growth of plants. But what does Mammaṭa mean by saying that there is no *śabdaśleṣa*, or no real, full-bodied *śabdaśleṣa* here? First of all, we have to keep in mind that the poet through his choice of expression (*abindu* ... *bindukā*) intends to convey the *alaṃkāra* of *virodhābhāsa* 'the appearance of contradiction (where, in reality, there is no contradiction)'. The rest of the explanation is provided by JHALAKAIKAR in his commentary on this passage.<sup>51</sup> The second meaning, to which Mammaṭa refers in his *vṛtti*, is 'beautiful like (the reflection of) the moon in the water.' This meaning, which is conveyed through *śleṣa*, unfortunately destroys the *virodhābhāsa*, and the poet's clear intention. Therefore the second meaning is to be rejected. But that, again, implies that the two meanings conveyed through *śleṣa* are not on an equal footing, and the question arises whether we are still justified in speaking of *śleṣa* here. As JHALAKAIKAR puts it, *yatra hy arthadvayasya samakakṣatvam sa śleṣasya viśayaḥ* 'for where the two meanings are on an equal footing, that is the domain of *śleṣa*.'<sup>52</sup> Therefore, since the *śleṣa* is, so to speak, stunted in its

47. KP, pp. 524-526.

48. KASS, p. 55.

49. KRISHNAMOORTHY, p. 22, lines 8-9 (*vṛtti* on *kārikā* 1. 13).

50. KP, p. 524.

51. KP, p. 524, lines 21-24 of the commentary.

52. KP, p. 554, lines 25-26 of the commentary.



growth, *pratibhāta*, the only thing we can say with reference to the example *abindusundarī*. etc. is that, certainly, it gives us an idea of *śleṣa*, but the full *alaṃkāra* here is *virodhābhāsa*. Or, to put it in different words, *śleṣapratibhotpattihetur virodhābhāsaḥ* ' *virodhābhāsa* is the cause of the origination of a marginal awareness of *śleṣa*.'

Back to the example *svayaṃ ca*, etc. again. We know that Mammata's reason for his proposition *śleṣapratibhotpattihetur upamā* must be sought in the *śleṣa* being undeveloped, leading a marginal existence in our consciousness. This, in its turn, has to do with the relation between the two meanings conveyed through *śleṣa*. So the question ultimately amounts to this: which of the meanings conveyed by *śleṣa* in the example can be shown to be existing in an incipient stage only? That is, undeveloped from the point of view of its incompatibility with another, desired meaning, or from the point of view of its construction with the *upameya* or *upamāna*. Either we show this, or we accept *saṃkara*. This seems to have been Mammata's dilemma.

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# ZUR BEDEUTUNG VON VED. *śámsa-* UND AW. *sāngha-*, *saṃgha-*

Von

B. SCHLERATH

In dem Artikel "Some Aspects of the Agni-mythology in the Veda" (Journal of the Oriental Institute XI, 4, 1962, pp. 347-370), der Zeugnis ablegt von seiner meisterhaften Beherrschung der vedischen Philologie und seiner profunden Kenntnis der rituellen Gegebenheiten, hat R. N. DANDEKAR, dessen Ehrentag wir in diesem Band feiern, sich ausführlich mit dem Wort *nārāśámsa-* auseinandergesetzt. Er lehnt die Auffassung HILLEBRANDTs (Ved. Myth. II, 98 ff.) ab, daß dieser Ausdruck "censor of men" und dann weiterhin "adjudicator of the dead" bedeute. Er plädiert dafür, daß *śámsa-* als nomen actionis aufzufassen sei, und daß das Vorderglied *nārā-* (für *nārām*) als genetivus subjectivus interpretiert werden müsse. Die Bedeutung wird mit "the magically potent formula produced by men or priests" festgestellt. Damit ist ein Kern der vedischen rituellen Bedeutung getroffen. Die von R. SCHMITT, Dichtung und Dichtersprache, 1967, 98 aufgeworfene Frage, ob wir nicht auch ursprünglich mit gen. obj. zu rechnen haben, muß freilich offenbleiben. Mit DANDEKAR stimmt OLDENBERG ZDMG 54, 52 überein, wozu man die Bemerkung GELDERS zu seiner Übersetzung von 1, 185, 9 vergleiche.

Es fragt sich, ob wir möglicherweise durch einen Rückgriff auf indo-iranische Zeit die Bedeutungsgeschichte aufhellen können und damit vielleicht auf für *śámsa-* einen neuen Aspekt gewinnen.

Die Ausgangsbasis unserer Überlegungen sollen die indo-iranischen Junkturen sein.

a. indo-iranisch \**nārām* \**śámsa* : ved. *nārām śámsa-* (RV 1, 173, 9. 10; 2, 34, 6; 6, 24, 2), *nṛṇām śámsa-* (RV 3, 16, 4), *śámsá nāryāh* (RV 1, 185, 9), ved. *nārāśámsa-*, aw. *nairiō. saṃgha-*, iranNPr. (elam) Na-ri-ša-an-ka (MAYRHOFFER, OnP 8.1243).

Möglicherweise wurde dieser Ausdruck schon in indo-iranischer Zeit auf das Feuer bezogen (R. SCHMITT, 1967, p. 99).

Die Zugehörigkeit von griech. NPr. *Κα'66ωδ205* usw. (wodurch indogermanisches Alter der Formel gesichert wäre) ist zweifelhaft (vgl. die Diskussion bei R. SCHMITT, 1967, p. 100).



F. SPECHT hat Zschr. f. vergl. Sprachf. 64, 1937, 1 auf die semantische Nachbarschaft von *śrávas-* und *śámsa-* hingewiesen und somit *narām śámsa-* in die Nähe von griech. κλέος ἀνδρῶν gerückt. Diese Überlegung hilft natürlich nicht für eine genauere Bestimmung der Bedeutung von *śámsa-*, zeigt aber immerhin, daß *śámsa-* ursprünglich in den Bereich des frühen Kriegerturns gehört.

Man hat in diesem Zusammenhang darauf hingewiesen, daß *śrávas-* immer positive Geltung hat, während *śámsa-* vox media ist (MANESSY, Subst. en -as-dans le RkS. 1961, 221). Darauf weist auch, daß im RV nur ein (verstärkendes) *suśrávas-* existiert (zu verstärkendem *su-* vgl. B. SCHLERATH, K. R. Cama Oriental Institute Golden Jubilee Vol., 1969, pp. 113 sqq.) *duḥśráva-* heißt "unangenehm zu hören" und gehört also nicht in diesen Kontext. Von *śámsa-* wird aber sowohl ein *suśámsa-* "durch gutes *śámsa-* charakterisiert" als auch ein *duḥśámsa-* (aw. *duš. saṃha-*) gebildet. RV 2, 23, 10 sind diese beiden Wörter einander gegenübergestellt. Freilich nicht als "Übelredende" und "Belobte" (GELDNER), sondern allenfalls als "Übelredende" und "Gutredende". — RV 2, 23, 10 *vayám ... suśámsā matibhiḥ tariṣmahi* bezieht sich zweifellos auf die Gedichte, die aus den Gedanken entspringen: "wir wollen überwinden als solche, die auf Grund (ihrer) Gedanken ein gutes *śámsa-* haben".

Wir können also schon hier festhalten, daß *śámsa-* sich tatsächlich auf eine mündliche Äußerung bezieht. Dieses ist in der Forschung unbestritten und die Bedeutung des zugrundeliegenden Verbuns *śams-* läßt auch nichts anderes erwarten. Unbeschadet einer späteren Präzisierung kann nicht bezweifelt werden, daß *śams-* die Bedeutungskomponente "feierlich aussprechen" hat.

In dieselbe Richtung deuten auch die parallelen Ausdrücke Y. 51, 13 : *x̣̌ āis śīiaoθanāiṣ hizvāscā* und Y. 51, 14 *x̣̌ āiṣ śīiaoθanāiṣcā sēnghāiṣcā*, wo den Taten die Worte gegenüber gestellt werden. Einmal werden die Worte mit "Zunge", das andere Mal mit *sēngha-* bezeichnet. So stellt sich *sēngha-* in die alte Reihe "Gedanken-Wort-Werk" als Vertreter für \**vācas* oder \**uktā*. Das wird noch unterstrichen durch die eng verwandte Stelle aus der gleichen Gatha Y. 51, 3 *śīiaoθanāiṣ ... uṣṍāiṣ vaṃhuṣ managhā* (vgl. zu Gedanken-Wort-Werk B. SCHLERATH, *Antiquitates Indogermanicae*, 1974, p. 201 sqq.). Hierher gehören auch Y. 31, 11 *śīiaoθanā sēnghāscā* und Y. 48, 12 *śīiaoθanāiṣ ... θbahiiā ... sēnghahiiā*.

Wir wollen versuchen, ob wir den bis jetzt gewonnenen Bedeutungsansatz "feierlicher Ausspruch (Lob oder Schmähung)" noch weiter präzisieren können.



b. Indo-iran. \**vardh-śānsans* (die *śansa-* wachsen lassen " und \**vardh-śānsā* " durch *śansa* wachsen (lassen)."

R. SCHMITT, 1967, p. 99 hat im Anschluß an Humbach auf die Parallele Y 46, 3 *vərəzdāiš sēnghāiš* "mit angewachsenen *sēngha-*" : RV 5, 41, 9 *vārdhān nah śāmsam* "er lasse unser *śāmsa-* wachsen" aufmerksam gemacht. Ich habe (Awesta-Wörterbuch II, 157) RV 3, 3, 8 *prá śāmsanti ... vṛdhé* "sie preisen ... damit wachse" hinzugefügt. Nachzutragen ist noch RV 10, 73, 2 *śāmsena vāvṛdhus tá indram* "sie ließen den Indra durch *śāmsa* wachsen."

In diesen Beispielen zeigt sich die auch sonst häufig belegte Vorstellung, daß durch den Preis (bzw. durch das Opfer) der gepriesene Gott wachsen, d. h. stark werden soll, aber daß man sich auch wünscht, daß der Preis selbst wachsen soll :

*vṛdh- vācam* RV 9, 97, 36

*vṛdh- vácobhiḥ* RV 10, 61, 26

entsprechend Y. 10, 5 *varədaiauyha mana vāca*

*vṛdh- girah* RV 5, 39, 5 (u. ö.) Hier steht

daneben *vāca ukhām ... śāmsyam*.

*vṛdh- gīrbhiḥ* RV 3, 53, 1 (u. ö.)

Die Junktur \**vardh- : śānsa-* und die damit verbundenen Kontexte widersprechen einer Bedeutung "feierlich geäußerte Feststellung" nicht. Sie reihen sich ein sowohl in die Kriegerideologie als auch in das Opferwesen : Götter und Helden werden von Sängern und Priestern gepriesen. Die Kraft und die Geltung der so gepriesenen wächst in dem Maße, wie auch die Worte selbst wachsen und an Kraft gewinnen.

c. \**śānsās sacante* "die *śāmsa-* leisten Gefolgschaftsdienst". Y 45, 2 *nōit nā manā nōit sēnghā nōit xratauū naēda varanā nōit uxā naēdā šīiaoθanā nōit daenā nōit urvanō hacānte* "nicht unsere (des Übelredenden und die eigenen) Gedanken, nicht die *sēngha*, nicht die Geisteskräfte, nicht die Wahlentscheidungen, nicht die Worte, nicht die Taten, nicht die Gesinnungen, nicht die Seelen leisten (gemeinsamen) Gefolgschaftsdienst"; Y 48, 12 *yōi ... hacāntē šīiaoθnāiš ašā θwahiiā mazdā sēnghahiā* "diejenigen, die Gefolgschaftsdienst leisten mit Taten, die aus der Wahrheit deines *sēngha-*, o *Mazdā*, (sind)". Es scheint nicht ratsam, in der Übersetzung von *sēngha-* auf "Verkündigung, Befehl, Gebot" auszuweichen, sondern von der bereits gewonnenen Bedeutung "Lobpreis" auszugehen. Will man die zweifellos auch vorhandene Bedeutungs-möglichkeit "Schmähung" einschließen und die enge Beziehung von \**śānsa-*



und \**ṛtā* "Wahrheit" mit einbeziehen, so kommt man notwendigerweise auf eine zugrundeliegende Bedeutung "Meinung, Urteil (in Form eines wohlformulierten Spruchs)." Im RV entspricht 1, 185, 9 *ubhā śāmsā nāryā mām ariṣṭām, ubhe mām ūti āvasā sacetām* "beide *śāmsā* (Lobpreisungen, die auf einem wahren Urteil beruhen) der Herren sollen mich unterstützen, bei Unterstützungen ( $\sim$  *śāmsā*) sollen mir mit Unterstützung Gefolgschaftsdienst leisten".

Der \**śānsa*- unterstützt und hilft, so wie ein Gefolgsmann seinen Herrn im Kampf unterstützt, er leistet zusammen mit dem Gedanken, den Taten und den anderen Geisteskräften Gefolgschaftsdienst. Sie alle bilden gemeinsam eine Kriegsschar, die \**sakhāyas*, die ihrem Herrn folgen – wie in Indien die Schar der Maruts ihren Herrn, Indra, unterstützen.

d. Von der *Hilfe* durch den \**śānsa*- ist es nur ein Schritt zu dem *Schutz*; \**śānsā pā* "durch *śānsa*- schützen" oder \**śānsas pātu* "*śānsa*- soll schützen" : Y. 44, 16 *kā vərəθrəm jā θwā pōi sēnghā yōi hēnti* "wer bricht den Widerstand damit er durch dein *sēngha* die schützt, die existieren (die auf dieser Welt leben)?" und RV 10, 64, 10 *śāmsah...pātu naḥ* "der *śāmsa*- soll uns schützen."

Diese Belege stützen auch die eingangs zitierte Meinung DANDEKARS, daß dem *śāmsa*- als Opferformel eine magische Kraft innewohnt.

#### Zusammenfassung

Es gilt, die Vielzahl der in den Wörterbüchern angegebenen Bedeutungen auf einen Mittelpunkt auszurichten.

Die indo-iranischen Formeln :

- a. *narām śānsa-*
- b. *vardh- śānsans*
- c. *śānsās sacante*
- d. *śānsas pātu*

haben sich dabei nützlich erwiesen, weil sie uns in Kontexte geführt haben, die für dieses Wort typisch sind.

Wir müssen folgende Angaben, die alle an den entsprechenden Belegstellen "passen" auf den kleinsten Nenner bringen, einen plausiblen Fokus finden :

BARTHOLOMAE, *Wörterbuch* s. v. *sēngha* :

1. pronuntiatio, Verkündigung, Lehre
2. Befehl, Gebot



3. Richter, Richterspruch
4. Reden, Sprechen über jemanden
5. Rede Wort

entsprechend : HINNELS, Numen 16, 1969, p. 169 : "decree", "doctrine", "judgement", "speech", "word", "judical decree".

und GRASSMANN :

1. Lob, Preis, Gebet
2. Segen, Huld
5. Tadel, Fluch, Verwünschung

Die Lösung ist – wie schon eben vorgeschlagen – "Meinung, Urteil über jemanden (in Form eines wohlformulierten Spruchs)". Die von BARTHOLOMAE angesetzte Bedeutung "Befehl, Gebot", die auch von HINNELS nicht aufgenommen wurde, ist zu streichen.

Mit diesem Ansatz verringern sich die semasiologischen Bedenken, die J. WACKERNAGEL, *Kleine Schriften* p. 322, gegen eine etymologische Verbindung von altind. *śams-* und lat. *censēre* vorgebracht hat, und die von J. UNTERMANN, IF 63, p. 251 sq. mit weiteren Argumenten verstärkt wurden. J. WACKERNAGEL und J. UNTERMANN stellen fest, daß dem lat. *censēre* "schätzen, urteilen, ein Votum abgeben", die Bedeutungskomponente "laut verkünden" fehlt, die für *śams-* wesentlich ist. Aber bei der übrigen genauen Übereinstimmung, die erst auf dem Umweg über das nomen actionis *śamsa-* deutlich wird, ist es doch möglich, daß dem lat. *censēre* die Komponente "laut verkünden" verloren gegangen ist.

So bleiben gegen diese etymologische Verbindung nur die formalen Bedenken O. SZEMERÉNYIS, Akten der II. Fachtagung für indogermanische und allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft, INNSBRUCK 1962, p. 182 sq. : "if the verbal stem were *\*kens-*, the supine would be *\*censtum*, and the derivatives *\*cens-tu-s*, *\*cens-tōr*..., however the forms are *censum*, *census*, *censor*, we must conclude that they cannot be from a stem *\*kens-*".

SZEMERÉNYI erwähnt die (angeblichen) semasiologischen Bedenken nicht. Ob seine Erklärung (*censēre* < *\*kensseyō* vom p. p. *\*kenssos* < *\*knttos*) unumstößlich ist, steht in keinem Zusammenhang mit der in dieser Betrachtung versuchten Bedeutungspräzisierung von indo-iran. *\*śamsa-*.



CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF INDIA

1. Introduction
2. The British Period
3. The Indian Period

The history of the Indian Constitution is a story of the struggle for freedom and self-government.

### THE BRITISH PERIOD

1. The Charter of 1833
2. The Charter of 1853
3. The Charter of 1862

The Charter of 1833 was the first step towards the establishment of a representative body in India. It was followed by the Charter of 1853 and the Charter of 1862, which gave the Indians a greater say in the administration of the country.

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## AKŪPĀRA

By

HANNS-PETER SCHMIDT

The word *ākūpāra* is attested in the meaning "ocean" from the Yajurveda-Samhitās (VS 24. 35; TS 5. 5. 13. 1) onwards and in the meaning "turtle" from the Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa onwards. It can hardly be doubted that the latter meaning is derived from the former: *ākūpāra* "ocean" became a name of the sea-turtle.

If one took the interpretation of the author of JB 3. 203 seriously, one would have to assume that the meaning "turtle" is already present in RV 5. 39. 3. He tells the story that the Ṛṣis wanted to see some marvel (*yakṣa*) and decided to see Akūpāra Kāśyapa "the Turtle Akūpāra" in the ocean. However, Akūpāra did not show himself to them. Atri, one of the Ṛṣis, then saw the *ṛṣa* RV 5. 39. 1-3 and turned with it to Indra. Upon hearing the words *vidyāma tāsya te vayām ākūpārasya dāvāne* (3 cd) Indra realized that they wanted to see Akūpāra and tossed him up with his foot. Accordingly the author interpreted the words as "may we get to know this your turtle so that you give it."

The author of JB 3. 272 introduces a Ṛṣi Akūpāra Kāśyapa whose name is punningly interpreted: *kaśyapo vai samudram atipārayitum arhati* "the turtle indeed is capable of making one pass over the ocean". Accordingly he understood *-pāra* in the meaning of "letting cross" (cf. RV 5. 31. 8); unfortunately it remains unclear how he interpreted the first part of the compound, *akū-*.

There is circumstantial evidence for another etymology in the Brāhmaṇas. PB 9. 12. 13 mentions a girl, Āngirasī Akūpārā, who is freed by Indra from her *godhā* (monitor lizard)-like skin. This is clearly an imitation of the Apālā-story of JB 1. 220-221 which itself is based on the Apālā-hymn RV 8. 91. If we realize that *apālā* is a dialectal form of *apārā* "without yonder shore, boundless" (cf. RAM GOPAL 1964: 71) and does not mean "without protector" as commonly assumed, it becomes obvious that Akūpārā was understood as a synonym of Apālā by the author of PB.

The word *pāla* "protector" is not Vedic; it occurs only from the epics and smṛtis onwards, and the verb *pālayati* "protect" (AV+) is a special development of *pārayati* as WACKERNAGEL (1926/1953: 426 ff.) has shown.



Though *pārāyati* has the sense "rescue, save, protect" in the RV, the noun *pārā* never is "protector", so that we can exclude the possibility that *apālā* was ever understood as "without protector" in Vedic times.

The meaning "without yonder shore, boundless" is an appropriate designation for the ocean, and *apārā* occurs as an epithet of the sea basin (*ūrvā*) in RV 3.1.14. More frequently, however, it is used of Indra or his strength and greatness (4.17.8; 5.87.6; 10.44.1). The name of the girl *Apālā* was probably derived from this epithet of Indra since she was a special protégée of his.

We can then assume that the author of PB understood the word in the same way as BÖHTLINGK and ROTH did in the Petrograd dictionary: analyzing it as *a-kū-pāra* "whose yonder shore is nowhere = limitless, boundless".

It is not possible to tell with certainty whether the author of RV 5.39.2 intended the word *ākūpāra* to be understood in the literal etymological sense - "may we get to know you as the one who is boundless in giving" - or in a metaphoric sense - "may we get to know you as the ocean (of liberality) in giving" or "may we get to know this your ocean (of gifts) so that you give it". The former alternative is that of BÖHTLINGK and ROTH, the latter that of BERGAIGNE, GELDNER and NEISSER (1924: 5).

In the second Rgvedic passage, 10.109.1, the meaning "ocean" has been assumed by many scholars, mainly because *ākūpārah* occurs next to *salilāh*. This is however far from certain since the terms are standing in an enumeration of personified entities, and we have no means to tell whether one qualifies the other - "the boundless ocean" or "the surging ocean" - or they are separate entities. The latter was assumed by Sāyana who here took *ākūpāra* as a designation of *Āditya*, obviously because this was one of the meanings assigned to the word by Yāska in Nirukta 4.18.

Yāska discusses the word in connection with RV 5.39.2, but unfortunately his gloss *ākūparāṇa* relating to this passage remains obscure. He gives three further uses of the word: (1) *Āditya*, "sun", in which case he interprets it as *dūrapāra* "whose yonder shore is far", apparently thinking of *akū* "nowhere - far away" since the sun is taking a long course from rising to setting. (2) *Samudra*, "ocean", because the ocean is *mahāpāra* "of large yonder shore". (3) *Kāśyapa*, "turtle", because the turtle *na kūpam r̥chati* "does not fall into the well". The last etymology is of course fanciful, but the others reflect an understanding of what we can assume to be the basic meaning of the word.

BURROW (1955: 191 ff.) has argued that the sense "unbounded" is not warranted in the oldest occurrence, RV 5.39.2, since here rather a word



meaning "liberal, generous" is expected. He proposes to derive *ākūpāra* from the root *pr* "give" (which he separates from *pr* "fill") and *akū* "not little" from a base *ku* "little" (posited on the basis of Iranian material by BAILEY 1954: 144f.), thus "not giving little". Accordingly he has to assume that the other meanings are based on a wrong etymology of an obsolete word. I think this is far-fetched especially since BURROW's argument that the earlier renderings of 5.39.2 are forced is not well taken: the imagery of the stanza rather gains in pregnancy if we do not introduce another term for "giving".

PISANI (1957: 767f.) seeks in *akū* the Indian cognate of Latin *aqua*; the meaning of the compound would then be "whose yonder shore consists in water". In my opinion there is little to recommend this suggestion. Neither is it very probable that an ancient word has survived in this isolated compound nor does the meaning obtained constitute an improvement.

As to the true etymological meaning of *ākūpāra* there remain two possibilities: either "whose yonder shore is not anywhere" or "whose yonder shore is not small". A choice between them is not possible on the basis of the plausibility of the meaning because both are more or less equal in this respect. In the Rgveda words with prefixed *kū-* or *kū-* are rare, and most of them are of uncertain meaning.

*kucarā* occurs in the pāda *mṛgō nā bhīmāḥ kucaró giriṣṭhāḥ* once as an epithet of Viṣṇu (1.154.2) and once of Indra (10.180.2). In the later language the word means "behaving badly, wicked" in consonance with the then general pejorative sense of the prefix *ku-*. When commenting on the pāda Yāska (Nirukta 1.20) says: *kucara ilī caritakarma kutsitam atha ced devatābhi-dhānam kvōḍyam na caratīti* "kucara means 'one who moves, behaves in a bad, despicable manner'; but if it is an epithet of a god it means 'where does he not move?'" The latter meaning has been adopted by modern interpreters, obviously because it is more likely that the poet would, when comparing gods like Viṣṇu and Indra to a fearful wild animal, rather speak of its roaming freely than of its potentially wily evil behaviour. The choice would have been different if the pāda were used of Rudra, an ambivalent and dangerous god. Since we do not know the original context in which the pāda was first used, we cannot assert that *kucarā* must mean "moving everywhere" here.

*Kūyava* occurs in the RV as an epithet of the drought demon Śuṣṇa and as the name of a separate demon. It is generally taken to mean "of bad harvest, crops". BURROW (1955: 190) quotes it as a good example for the transition of the meaning "small" to the pejorative "bad". The meaning "bad harvest" has also been assumed for the neuter substantive *kūyava* (variant *kūyava*) in MS 2.11.4; KS 18.9; KapS 28.9; TS 4.7.4.2;



VS 18. 10. This meaning, however, does not suit the context at all. This was realized by MONIER-WILLIAMS who takes it as "name of particular grains". It is indeed improbable that a negative term such as "bad harvest" would be mentioned among a long series of throughout positive powers which are to be made work and prosper through the sacrifice (*yajñéna kalpantām*). MONIER-WILLIAMS had probably the pair *śarā* "reed" - *kūśara* (RV 1.191.3) as an analogy in mind, where the opposition "reed" - "small reed" is plausible. For *kūyava* in the Yajurveda context the meaning "small barley" is however not likely since the enumeration of plant names is starting only later and the whole series is given in pairs, *kūyava* being paired with *ākṣiti* "imperishableness". If we do not have here a homonym of unascertainable meaning, I should suggest to interpret "small crops" in the sense of modest belittlement.

*Kūcakra* in 10.102.11 may refer to a small inadequate water-wheel. *Kunamnamā* is probably the name of a female demon in 10.136.7; as the etymological meaning one can think of "bending all the time a little" which would fit a demon of snakelike character. *Kuśāvā* in 4.18.8 is either an epithet of Indra's mother or the name of a river; the suggestion to connect it with *sū* "give birth" cannot be corroborated since the noun *sava* in the meaning "birth" is not attested in the Vedic language; "having or giving little impulse" would be a possible epithet for a slow river.

These words with prefixed *ku-* can mostly be plausibly etymologized if the meaning "little" is assigned to the prefix. The connection with the interrogative "where" would make sense only in *kucarā* and *ākūpāra*. This makes the etymological meaning "whose yonder shore is not small" for *ākūpāra* slightly more probable, but by **no** means certain.

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## THE ROLE OF MIND (CITTA) IN THE YOGASŪTRAS

By

R. K. SHARMA

This paper represents a modest attempt to present a brief account of the rôle played by the mind (citta) in the Yoga system of Patañjali. The study is based on the material collected from the extant text of the Yogasūtra comprising four (samādhi = meditation; sādhanā = practices; vibhūti = Supernatural powers and Kaivalya = liberation) sections = pādas and one hundred and ninety-four sūtras (aphorisms). The commentaries of Vyāsa, Vācaspati-miśra, Bhoja, Bhāvāgaṇēśa, Nāgajibhaṭṭa, Rāmānanda yati, Anantadeva, and Sadāśivendrasarasvatī as well as the material referred to in M. R. YARDI's edition of the Yoga of Patañjali have also been consulted.<sup>1</sup>

Yoga, by its very definition, represents the control of the five types of psychic movements (cittavṛttinirodhaḥ) including valid knowledge (pramāṇa); illusion (viparyaya), presumptuous fallacious notions based on verbal expressions (vikalpa), sleep (nidrā) and memory (smṛti).<sup>2</sup>

According to Vyāsa, the mind is comparable to a river with its two streams flowing in two opposite directions – the one towards salvation, the other towards vices (cittanadī nāmo' bhayatovāhinī, vahati kalyāṇāya, vahati pāpāya ca).<sup>3</sup> If it flows towards worldly objects, it causes bondage. The same mind flowing towards the controlled state causes salvation.

This brings us to the five states of mental behaviour, as explained by the commentators, viz. fickle (kṣipta), mūḍha (dull), vikṣipta (too fickle with occasional stability), ekāgra (concentrated) and niruddha (controlled). The first two states of mind do not qualify for Yoga at all (kṣiptamūḍhayor yoga-gandho' pi nā 'sti /). Too fickle a state of mind (vikṣipta), however, constitutes the first stage of a yogic practitioner (Prathamakalpika) in as much as this state of mind has a tendency to become stable occasionally. Ekāgra (con-

1. I am grateful to Prof. Alex WAYMAN, Columbia University, Prof. (Mrs.) ROCHER of University of Philadelphia and Prof. M. B. EMENEAU and Prof. R. P. GOLDMAN of University of California for their kind suggestions. This paper is substantially the same as it was read on several occasions during my tenure as Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University. Thanks to Board of Foreign Scholarships, Washington and USEFI.

2. Yogasūtra 1. 2; 5. 11.

3. Yogasūtra 1. 12.



concentrated) state constitutes the two intermediary stages of a Yogic practitioner (Madhubhūmika and Prajñājyoti) whose conscious efforts to bring about a concentrated state of mind (sāmprajñātasamādhi) bear a cloud of merits (dharma-megha) and have the way for a well-identifiable distinction between Prakṛti (Primordial matter) and Puruṣa – the conscious Self. Niruddha (absolutely controlled) state of mind represents the final stage of its transformation in the direction of Yogic accomplishment where a Yogic practitioner of the topmost category (atikrāntabhāvanīya) transforms his citta of the ekāgratā state into a niruddha state which again transforms itself into a state not known, where there is no feeling whatsoever (asāmprajñāta). As it has been pointed out by Bhoja, the impressions of the controlled state of mind not only wipe out those of the previous concentrated state but also the very controlled state itself just like lead which being burnt along with gold not only helps burn away the undesirable contamination from gold but it also burns itself (yathā suvarṇasamvalitaṁ dharmā-mānaṁ sīsakam ātmānaṁ suvarṇamalaṁ ca nirdahati evam ekāgratājanitaṁ saṁskārān nirodhajāḥ svātmānaṁ ca nirdahanti /).<sup>4</sup>

Thus the mind (citta), in the Yogasūtras, plays the role of transformations and thereby brings about a state of control (nirodha) respectively so as to facilitate salvation (kaivalya) for Puruṣa (the conscious self).

Commenting upon the very first sūtra, both Vyāsa and Vācaspati-miśra make it abundantly clear that neither the five types of knowledge or pseudo knowledge (vṛttis) nor their control can be ascribed to Puruṣa (Empirical Self). So the term yoga itself meaning samādhi or contemplation (derived from the root yuj 'to contemplate' is technically speaking, not the property of the self but of the mind itself. Yoga represented in the transformations – psychic transformations of various type, (viz. madhumatī, madhupratīkā, viśokā and saṁskāraśeṣā depending upon the successive levels of yogic attainment) cannot be a property of conscious power (citīśakti or Puruṣa) who is immutable, immobile, illuminating, pure and infinite (citīśaktir aparīṇāminy apratisaṁkramā darśitaviśayā 'suddhā cā' nantā ca).<sup>5</sup>

Needless to mention that with just one or two exceptions, Pātāñjala Yoga accepts, *in toto*, the Sāṁkhya doctrine of Causation. Vyāsa's citīśakti i. e. Puruṣa is pure consciousness and is above all the three qualities (guṇas) and has no role to play in creation except that his very presence disturbs the equilibrium of the constituent three guṇas (sattva = stability, rajas = mobility and tamas = obscurity) of Prakṛti (the Primordial Matter) which marks the starting point of creation or evolution. All the evolutes inherit the three qualities as their consti-

4. Yogasūtra 1. 1-2, 18.

5. Yogasūtra 1. 2.



tuent elements. The first evolute from Prakṛti is Mahat (Intellect) from which evolves Ahaṁkāra (ego) which gives rise to the mind (manas) and the ten sense and motor organs from out of its predominantly sāttvika aspect and to five subtle elements (tanmātras) from out of its tāmasa aspect. These five tanmātras in turn give rise to the five gross elements. As Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṁkhya-kārikā puts it, Puruṣa - consciousness pure and simple, can see but being devoid of any of the guṇas cannot move and so he is comparable to a lame man with a clear eyesight. Prakṛti, the unconscious (jaḍa) Primordial Matter with all Her evolutes on the other hand, by virtue of the three constituent qualities can move but cannot see and is so comparable to a blind person with Her faculty of movement intact. So a blind person, i. e. the Primordial Matter seating a lame person endowed with good eyesight that is Puruṣa the consciousness on Her shoulders moves and makes Him move. This allegory represents the Sāṁkhya doctrine of causation. This is how, according to Sāṁkhya, creation comes into being (pañgvandhavad ubhayaḥ api saṁyogas tatkr̥taḥ sargaḥ). Thus all the ten sense and motor organs with the mind as their head, ahaṁkāra (ego) and intellect (mahat) constitute the thirteen instruments of knowledge (karaṇas) (including the three internal intellectual instruments (antaḥkaraṇas) and the ten sense and motor organs as external instruments (bāhya karaṇas) and if they all instead of evolving as further transformations in the forms of inner or outer objects of senses start involving in the reverse order and ultimately identify themselves with Prakṛti - the Primordial Matter, the ignorance which was responsible for the conjunction of or / and confusion between Puruṣa and Prakṛti would cease to exist and like a crystal separated from a red flower, Puruṣa will shine as consciousness pure and simple and Prakṛti will stop functioning as a prime mover of the process of evolution. To quote Īśvarakṛṣṇa again, nothing is as tender and bashful as Prakṛti. The Primordial matter who once having realised that she has been seen by Puruṣa as a distinct unveiled entity never appears before Him again (Prakṛteḥ sukumārataram na kiṁcid asti' ti me matir bhavati / Yā dr̥ṣṭā 'smi 'ti punar na dar̥śanamupaiti puruṣasya).

So in this background Puruṣa is an eternal viewer of things (draṣṭṛ) whose very presence is responsible for presenting the various objects to Prakṛti or Her evolutes. Among the twenty-three evolutes of Prakṛti, the mind par excellence i. e. Mahat with Ahaṁkāra and Manas occupies the most prominent position in as much as reflecting as it does the illuminating rays of the Viewer (Puruṣa) it presents itself as a viewer and also on the other hand by virtue of its identification with the objects it presents itself in the form of the diverse, subtle and gross objects. This is how Patañjali describes the multipurpose character of the mind in his Sūtra draṣṭṛdr̥śyoparaktam cittam sarvārtham. Vyāsa's exposition of this idea makes it still more clear (tad etac cittam eva draṣṭṛdr̥śyoparaktam. viśaya-



viṣayinirbhāsaṃ cetanācetasavarūpāpannaṃ viṣayātmakam apy aviṣayātmakam ivā'cetanam cetanam iva sphaṭikamaṇikalpaṃ sarvārtham ity ucyate — Y. S. IV. 23 ). So the intellect alone has the capacity to identify itself with any of the objects, instruments or the subject in accordance with the Yogic prescription so as to present Prakṛti as a distinct entity to Puruṣa the consciousness pure and simple and to let Him free from His confusion with the various mental conditions (vṛttisārūpya ).

Thus the role par excellence of the mind is to establish Puruṣa, the viewer, in His own form, by diverting its manifesting, evolutory or modificatory powers (darśanaśakti) from its own objects, subjecting itself to a position of an object and finally identifying itself with the Primordial Matter in a balanced state (alīṅgaparyavasānam ).

As there are as many Puruṣas as the individual items of creation (Puruṣa-bahutva), the question arises whether there is a corresponding separate Prakṛti (Primordial matter) together with her evolutes for each individual. Vyāsa quotes the view of an ancient Sāṃkhya authority Vārsaganya and agrees with him that in the absence of any ..... differentiating factor, it has to be held that the final cause (Prakṛti) is one and the same for all the material things in the Universe.<sup>6</sup>

The following are some of the major yogic prescriptions for the maintenance of mental discipline leading to the attainment of the asamprajñāta samādhi :

- (a) Practice and detachment (abhyāsavairāgya)
- (b) Wishful Devotion to God (Īśvarapraṇidhāna)
- (c) Controlled harmonious mental disposition towards concerned worldly events, viz.
  - (i) Cordial delight (maitrī) towards a happy event in the surrounding and not malice;
  - (ii) Compassion (karuṇā) and not mischievous delight towards an unhappy surrounding;
  - (iii) Spiritual happy (muditā) disposition and not fault-finding tendency in virtuous surrounding;
  - (iv) Spiritual detachment (upekṣā), towards vicious surrounding and not detective enjoyment.
- (d) Concentration on the tip of the nose or tongue, palate, middle part of the tongue, the root of the tongue leads to the preliminary yogic experience of the enjoyment of divine perfume, divine taste, divine

6. YARDI, p. 296.



form, divine touch and divine sound respectively and generates a genuine faith in the yogic prescriptions and also self-confidence (viśayavatī pravṛtti).

- (e) Concentration on the inner divine light.
- (f) Concentration on the mind of the enlightened sages free from attachment and worldly desires (vītarāgaviṣayaṃ vā cittam).
- (g) Concentration on the dream experience or the experience of a sound sleep (svapṇanidrājñānālambanaṃ vā).
- (h) Concentration on any object of choice (yathābhīmatadhyānād vā).
- (i) Practice of the eight components of Yoga (Yogāṅgas), viz.
  - ( i ) yama (ahiṃsā = non-violence, satya = truth, asteya = non-stealing, brahmacharya = celibacy, aparigraha = non-accumulation)
  - ( ii ) niyama (śauca = cleanliness, santoṣa = contentment, tapaś = austerity, svādhyāya = study, Īśvarapraṇidhāna = devotion to God).
  - ( iii ) āsana (yogic posture) (Please note specific instructions regarding relaxation and communion with the infinite, while performing āsanās (Pratyakṣaśaithilyānantasamāpattibhyāṃ)).
  - ( iv ) prāṇāyāma (holding of breath).
  - ( v ) pratyāhāra (withdrawal of sense-organs and redirection in reverse order)
  - ( vi ) dhāraṇā (concentrating of the mind on a fixed point)
  - ( vii ) dhyāna (meditation)
  - ( viii ) samādhi (continued state of meditation).

All the above prescriptions aim at introverting the mind generally and directing it to the various stages of yogic attainment, specially.

Does the mind expand or contract, depending on the size of an individual? According to Vyāsa, the mind being omnipresent, it cannot expand or contract; its modifications can of course expand or contract. The limit of expansion of the mental states (and not the mind) would be ākāśa (Paramamahat) and limit of contraction thereof, the atoms or even the subtlest non-material item like "one moment".

The mind, by virtue of its powers specially manifested through continued concentration on a fixed point (saṁyama = dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi taken



together), can gain supernatural Powers like even creation of *Nirmāṇacittas* i. e. similar multiple minds and bodies elsewhere. A mere practice of mental, oral and physical non-violence is conducive to the eradication of all sense of enmity in the proximity of the practitioner. One can attain powers to fly in the sky just by concentrating on the relationship between the body and the space and so identifying himself with the lightness of a tiny piece of cotton.

But these supernatural powers are considered to be the impediments in the attainment of the main objective, i. e. liberation. The gradual inverted transformation of the mental state is considered to be an ideal to be aspired for. For example, when a yogin establishes himself in the *nirvicāra* type of *samprajñāta samādhi* (an intermediary stage of yogic attainment), he attains spiritual Bliss (*adhyātmāprasāda*) and is endowed with a superintellect known as *Ṛtambharā Prajñā* which enables him to know and describe things as they are in their right perspective. But the mind has to go several steps further so as to attain the absolutely controlled state (*niruddha*) in the form of *asamprajñāta samādhi* from which there is no return.

Vyāsa specially warns against the fivefold mental blasphemy (*avidyā*) including (i) recognition of non-self as self (*tāmas = avidyā*) (ii) contentment with supernatural powers (*moha = asmitā*) (iii) aspiration for the enjoyment of enhancing worldly pleasures through yogic powers (*mahāmoha*), (iv) feeling of embarrassment with the unfavourable situations leading to the non-attainment of yogic supernatural powers (*dveṣa = tāmisra*) and (v) feeling of apprehension about the termination of his self-earned supernatural powers after a specified period (*abhiniveśa = andhatāmisra*). All this is included in the fiftyfold creation of intellect (*pratyayasarga*) in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (46 ff).

It is generally believed that yoga is confined to the prescribed physical postures as well as some special devices for health and development of psychic faculties. From what we have seen in the course of the foregoing discussions, Patañjali also does not ignore the *āsanas* or *siddhis*. But what we call *Hathayoga*, does not form part, at least the integral part of the *Yogasūtras*. The taming of the mind in all its aspects and that too with a well defined purpose is the only area which concerns Patañjali most. In his prescriptions, like an effective teacher, he starts with the simplest and the most common ones and goes up to the most difficult ones. He is not opposed to the attainment of special Psychic Powers. But he is afraid of the usual substitution of the means as a goal. That is why he says that the supernatural powers are *siddhis* at the post-*Samādhi* stage but if intervening in the course of the *Samādhi* they are unwelcome stumbling blocks to the intellectual sojourn to Primordial Matter for the sake of the liberation of the self. To Patañjali, even devotion to God constitutes an intellectual means to



attain ( or to work for ) the liberation of the self and to overcome the intervening obstacles ( *pratyakcetanādhigamo 'py antarāyābhāvaś ca* — 129 ).

Thus the role of the mind ( *citta* ) is to go on transforming itself in the reverse order until a stage comes when *Puruṣa* sees Primordial *Prakṛti* in the balanced state of the three qualities as a separate entity and becomes as if indifferent towards Her after having seen Her once and the *Prakṛti* on the other hand gives up evolutory process after having realised that She has already been seen by *Puruṣa* ( *drṣṭā maye 'ty upekṣaka ekaḥ, drṣṭā'ham ity uparamaty anyā* ) — *Sāṃkhyakā* 66. This is what is meant by ... *svarūpapratīṣṭhā vā cittiśakteḥ* — Y. S. 4. 34.



CHAPTER: THE STATE OF THE NATION (1881) IN THE REPUBLIC

It is a well known fact that the history of the nation is a history of its progress. The progress of a nation is measured by the extent to which it has advanced in the various branches of knowledge, science, art, and industry.

Thus the state of the nation (1881) is a state of progress. It is a state of progress in the various branches of knowledge, science, art, and industry. It is a state of progress in the various branches of knowledge, science, art, and industry. It is a state of progress in the various branches of knowledge, science, art, and industry. It is a state of progress in the various branches of knowledge, science, art, and industry.

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## KING KUMĀRAVARMAN OF DAŚAPURA

By

D. C. SIRCAR

On the 11th of October, 1978, Shri Girija Shankar RUNWAL of Mandsaur (ancient Daśapura, formerly called Mandasor) discovered the inscription under study in the ruins unearthed as a result of digging for the construction of the foundation of a house in the area called Gudri Mohalla near the southern gate (Gudri gate) of the medieval fort in Mandsaur. Shri RUNWAL brought the inscribed stone to his house, and it is preserved there along with his other collections.

The inscription was studied by Dr. V. S. WAKANKAR of the Vikram University, Ujjain. He read a paper on it under the title 'Aulikara Rājvaṃśake Itihās par Nayā Prakāś' at the Golden Jubilee Celebrations of the Indore Museum held in February (7th to 9th), 1981, and it was published in the *Malwa through the Ages*, 1981. Later he also read a paper on the epigraph at the Bhopal Session of the Epigraphical Society of India (1982). In WAKANKAR's opinion, the inscription mentions the Aulikara kings Kṛṣṇavarman, Bhāskara-varman and Kumāravarmān; but this is due to his wrong reading and interpretation of the inscription.

Early in 1982, Shri Kailash Chandra PANDEY of Mandsaur favoured us with a photograph of the inscription. The record is inscribed on a slab of black slate stone 4. 6" in thickness, 21. 5" in length and 16. 5" in breadth. However, a big part of the stone is slantingly broken away from its left-hand side causing the loss of a large number of *akṣaras* from the beginning of all the lines of writing. The number of lost letters is greater in the lower lines than in the upper. Thus, out of the twenty-one lines, the number of lost letters in line 2 is twenty-four and in line 20 it is thirty-eight. The inscription is very neatly and carefully engraved; but the individual letters are not uniformly shaped and spaced, and they are often slightly smaller in shape and closer to one another particularly in the concluding part of the lines. The loss of letters in the lines can be determined by the missing syllables in the stanzas.

Thus about one-third of the original writing of the present inscription, which is of the *praśasti* type and is written in verse, is lost. The loss in the first few lines is a little less than one-third of the original while that in the last few lines is slightly above one-third. Still, however, the purport of most of the



stanzas is on the whole intelligible. There are 32 stanzas in the twenty-one lines of the *praśasti*. The last passage of the epigraph is in prose. The characters are similar to those of the Mandsaur epigraphs of the Aulikara king Yaśodharman, one of which is dated in 532 A. D.

The inscription begins with a salutation to the god Puruṣottama (Viṣṇu) in verse 1. The fragment of verse 2 seems to speak of a person named [Ya]-jñadeva whose son Vīrasoma is mentioned in the next stanza (verse 3) which is fully preserved. A heroic person named Bhāskaravarman is next introduced in the following fragmentary verse (No. 4) while verses 5-6, only the first of which is completely preserved, speak of the success of the hero in the military exploits against his enemies. Probably Bhāskaravarman was the son of Vīrasoma though the relationship between the two is not traceable from the extant parts of the verses. The next fragmentary stanza (verse 7) introduces the leader of the Aulikarins not only as a foremost king but also as the subduer of his six senses, and apparently Bhāskaravarman is stated to have done something to him (probably he propitiated the Aulikarin king as a vassal). The following two verses (Nos. 8-9) are fragmentary; but while the first apparently speaks of the vanquisher of enemies (i. e. Bhāskara) as happy in receiving a suitable *dayitā* or wife, the second likewise refers to the *abhimatā pramadā* (dear lady) of the ruler very probably as giving birth to a son while it also mentions Kumāravarman. It seems permissible to conjecture from the language that the subordinate ruler Bhāskaravarman married a daughter of his overlord, the Aulikarin (i. e. Aulikara) king, and that they were the parents of Kumāravarman. This Bhāskaravarman seems to be the homonymous ruler mentioned in Dāmodara-gupta's *Kuṭṭanīmata* (verse 561). We are told in this work that, when Bhāskaravarman died, his *vilāsinī* (wife or mistress) committed Sutte though she was dissuaded by the king (Bhāskara or his successor) to do that.

The present inscription is a eulogy of Kumāravarman. In verse 10, the major part of which is preserved, he is stated to have received his coronation as *Yuvarāja* (heir-apparent) and become a ruler of men in his childhood. The next fragmentary verse (No. 11) says how, during the reign of a ruler (apparently Kumāravarman), the people enjoyed complete peace so that the True Faith (often used in the description of Buddhism) flourished.

Verse 12 reads -

*Tan* = *Kṛṣṇa-sūnur* = *ativīrya-madena matto*

— — U — U U U — U U — U — — /

— — U [ *Vṛ\** ] *ṣṇim* = *api c* = *āśu cakāra rājā*

*mṛtyoḥ priy-ātithim* = *Upendra-samo narendram* ||



The first half of the verse, which is partially preserved, seems to say that Kṛṣṇa's son, haughty owing to his prowess, [attacked] him (i. e. Kumārarvarman) who killed the [Vṛ]ṣṇi king. Since our inscription apparently relates to the history of Mandsaur after Yaśodharman (second quarter of the sixth century A. D.), i. e. roughly to the latter half of the same century, it is tempting to identify Kṛṣṇa, the father of Kumārarvarman's opponent, with the Kalacuri king Kṛṣṇa whose son Śaṅkaragaṇa issued his Abhona plates<sup>1</sup> from Ujjayinī in 595 A. D. If then Kṛṣṇa's son is identified with Kalacuri Śaṅkaragaṇa, it would appear that these Early Kālacuris claimed to have belonged to the Vṛṣṇi race just as the Later Kālacuris called themselves descendants of Kārtavīrya Arjuna of the Haihaya clan of Māhiṣmatī (modern Maheshwar in West Nimar). Indeed, Vṛṣṇi was a descendant of Haihaya in the Purāṇas.<sup>2</sup> In case this is accepted, king Kumārarvarman of Mandsaur ruled about the close of the sixth century A. D.

Verse 13 (fragmentary) says that the victor (Kumārarvarman) appropriated the elephants of the vanquished (probably the Vṛṣṇi king), the following stanza (fully preserved) describing the victor as the performer of sacrifices and propitiator of the priests by gifts. Kumārarvarman's marriage with a beautiful girl seems to be described in verse 15 (fragmentary) and the young king's happy life in the next fragmentary stanza (No. 16). Verse 17 (slightly damaged) seems to speak of the same ruler's victory in a battle with some enemy. The following fragmentary stanza (verse 18) says how he (Kumārarvarman) fought for and obtained Daśāhvaya, i. e. the city of Daśapura or Mandsaur. Verse 19 (fragmentary) refers to some battles and verse 20 to the increase of sin in the kingdom owing to the deterioration of the True Faith and to a king (Kumārarvarman) comparable to the Kālkali king. This may be the description of the Daśapura region under the occupation of enemies whose religion was different from the True Faith. Verse 21 (fragmentary) says how the goddess of fortune belonging to other king was appropriated by Kumārarvarman by causing her *go-trāntara* in her marriage with himself. The reference here may be to the occupation of Daśapura from some enemies of the Aulikarins (Aulikaras) who were the overlords of the family of Kumārarvarman. The enemies who occupied Daśapura were probably the Kalacuris or the Hūṇas and the time may be some years after Aulikara Yaśodharman's claim to have defeated the Hūṇa king Mihirakula in the second quarter of the sixth century. The reference to the victor's youthfulness seems to suggest that the description of Kumārarvarman still continues, and the lengthiness of the description is apparently due to the fact that

1. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. IX, pp. 297 ff.

2. VETTMAN MANI, *Purāṇic Encyclopaedia*, pp. 883, 914. He writes *Hehaya* in place of *Haihaya*.



he was the hero of the *praśasti*, who obliged one of his subordinates in the matter of creating a rent-free holding.

Verse 22, which is fragmentary, refers to the celebration of the sacrificial rite called Paunḍarika probably by Kmāravarman and the next stanza (verse 23), also fragmentary, speaks of him as an equal to Indra in power and also of his *ādhipatya* or lordship. Verses 24-25, both of which are damaged, contain vague praise of the ruler, while verses 26-27 (both damaged) introduce a person named Bhogārṇava, who appears to have raised a temple and been responsible for getting the eulogy composed and engraved. Verses 29-30 are both damaged; the first introduces the rainy season probably in connection with the time or date of the record or the construction of the temple while the second says that the king (Kumāravarman) himself placed some one greatly devoted to himself (i.e. Bhogārṇava) who was at first the officer to look after the manufacture of articles and did his job satisfactorily, in charge of dealing with the removal of the bad name attached possibly to Daśapura as a city infested by thieves and robbers. Thus Bhogārṇava seems to have now been appointed by Kumāravarman a special *Cauroddharaṇika* of the capital city. This Bhogārṇava is apparently described in verses 30-31 (both damaged) as having been favoured by the king by the creation of the grant of a village or a group of villages for Harideva who was very probably the priest of Bhogārṇava's temple.

The concluding verse (No. 32 - fragmentary) says how the *pūrvā* (i.e. the eulogy quoted above) was composed by Lakṣmaṇagupta, son of Bhartṛ (*Bhatti*) - Ananta out of his love for the king (Kumāravarman). The poet was possibly also called Bhartṛ-Cellaparakāśa. The record ends with the benedictory passage - "Let it be well!"



## IMPOTENT GODS

*By*

R. MORTON SMITH

I am very happy to be asked to pay tribute to Prof. R. N. DANDEKAR on his 75th birthday, and hope the following, though small, will be acceptable. The aim of this paper is not to inform, but to ask questions and seek suggestions for answers as to why we have such very different attitudes to gods in Vedic India from those in the Western world, particularly its ancestral culture of the ancient Near East.

We may begin with quoting H W F SAGGS, *The Greatness that was Babylon*, p. 320 : "The Babylonian or Assyrian saw his religious duty in terms not of a moral law, but the arbitrary and usually unpredictable will of a pantheon of gods." Parallel with this omnipotence of the gods - which is not to say of any one god - we have a science of omens and auspices to penetrate the mysteries of the future. KEITH's *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda* 2 pages plus 1 footnote out of 637 pages suffice to deal with omens. The subject could not be so dismissed in Mesopotamia, where man is weak, the gods are powerful, and man can best prepare by foreknowledge for what he cannot prevent. Magic can of course compel the gods/powers, but besides that it may prove counterproductive, it is not in the official cult of Mesopotamia, in which man may pray, beseech, expostulate, but cannot compel change. It is safe to say that there was no religious revolution in Babylonia; and while there were steps towards monotheism, or at least henotheism, such as Marduk (or Assur in Assyria) taking over other jurisdictions, Mesopotamia lagged decidedly behind Israel, and the gods do not get ethicized. Nor is there a religious revolution to complete the incipient process; rather the demons, ubiquitous in popular religions, may surface more and more, and it would appear that Mesopotamian religion was in decline from the Neo-Babylonian period, from 600 B. C.

In Greece we have a humanization and ethicization of the gods, so that men may still have to pray, and they cannot compel (apart from magic in low-grade popular religion), but they can trust. Zeus is philosophically usable: there is a religious revolution into philosophy. But in India when the religious revolution comes, there is no god to take advantage of it in the higher thought, where gods have lost significance and power and personality. Why should this contrast be?



The political situation is not sufficient reason. Certainly there is no clear hegemony in India, though the Kuru Pāṇcālas might have their turn of predominance; but the tribes/kingdoms do not have their special god individually; Indra is for all warriors. And in Greece, while Athena might be special protectress of Athens, Zeus is still the highest god. The position is much the same in Mesopotamia; before Sargon of Accad Inanna is specially at home in more than one city, and we have her glorification from Uruk (by his daughter?), but this does not mean a hegemony of Uruk. And while Marduk is promoted by the First Dynasty of Babylon, and may henceforth have the highest prestige, other gods are by no means debilitated – we have a glorification of Ishtar on the old lines. True the city state is no longer the rule, though Asshur might be compared to Rome in its expanding power.

I would suggest that one important reason for the continuing reality of the gods is the statue, which goes back at least to Early Dynastic. There the god is, visible at least to (key members of) the thinking class, and to all in the progress from city to city, or in the procession of the religious festival – the visibility of the image on such occasions meant much to the lower orders in mediaeval India. This visibility of the cult statue seems to be a very strong factor, for in Egypt, where the man who had the right knowledge could as in India compel the god, the respect for the gods does not decrease. In the Vedic and early Formative period Indian worship was essentially aniconic – while there may be an ad hoc idol that could be rented out by its owning priest / brahman, there is no temple, and the god does not have land; he does not have a city as in Babylonia. I suspect that in India as in Rome, the personality gods are an imposition on the earlier religion, and suggest that the Aryans acquire them when passing through/above the sphere of Mesopotamian cultural influence that would extend from Anau to Afghanistan, and they are imposed in coexistence with the hypostases, social (e. g. Amśa, the acquired portion) or factual, e. g. the local field spirit, or the action spirit, as of dice.

What happens in India and why? In the religious crisis of the 6th-5th centuries the alternative to gods is asceticism and self-containment, self-sufficiency. This is succeeded by the theistic reversal (for revolution is far too strong a word) which comes up from the unthinking classes, who need a place for emotion, and it is accompanied also by the public rise of what would have been called superstitious elements, or we might say, the lower magic, as in tantra, that had been held down by the higher magic of the brahman, tamed and domesticated by them in the Atharva Veda: – HEESTERMAN's old cycle of sacrifice had broken down with the tribal society, and the consequent settlement and urbanization with the growth of kingdoms.



In India the ritual undergoes great development, (which it appears not to do in Babylonia), and this ultimately leads to the power of karma, the (ritual) act, which by its brahma power cannot be ineffective, and leads to the classical theory of the fruits of action, when on the atomic theory mental phenomena are conceived as material. The sacrifice holds the key to Vedic thought, and it has to be constantly repeated for the gods' sake as they are in constant struggle with the forces of destruction, the anti-gods. The difficulties the gods might have had with Tiamat in Babylonia, or such as Zeus had with the Titans in Greece, are over, and the divine authority is unchallenged now. But until the theistic rise of the classical deities of the Hindu triad, the struggle was continuous in India: it was / is man's action of sacrifice that turned the scale in the gods' favour, and this situation must have lessened the prestige of the gods; man was the key. The question must then arise, what is the secret, the centre of the power of the omnipotent sacrifice? The answer is the Word, i. e. the magically creative brahma word/power. Naming is creating. This brahma power, acquired through knowledge of the sacred word and ritual, becomes monopolized - reasonably, for the ordinary tribesman or servant/retainer is an ordinary person with nothing of the divine about him; it is dangerous to himself, not to mention the community for the unqualified to tamper with the sacred - the gods are as touchy as men - therefore abnormal people, i. e. king or brahman (originally interchangeable as in the Celtic Druidic culture) are best left to deal with the abnormal supernatural world.

As in Indian art or literature we get the extreme of ornament, so we also get the extreme of sacrifice; 10-year, even 100-year rites are invented, and 2-3-year are quite common. If sacrifice is powerful, the more sacrifice the more power; and a rite can be made to meet any situation - as is relevant in BA U 3/2 on the first mention of karma. The end is that the god had not the choice of accepting the prayer or not, agreeing or not; he is compelled. The magic word creates its truth, and therefore when one says "Agni has come, leaving the fires of our rivals", he has immediately done so on the (correct) pronouncing of the formula. Why then should one worry about an unfree god, when the brahman can do things much more securely? He knows the result of his brahma, whereas if there is any independent character of the god at all, there cannot be the same certainty, or the god may even be intercepted by the enemy. And on the devaluation of material things, gods have nothing whatsoever to offer, hence they must be brought back from the circles of the unthinking classes, who do want material things they can help to procure.

With the loss of power, personality becomes unimportant, and this unimportance spreads in art, literature and social organization. The highest ātman/brahman of later Hinduism is impersonal. Of the classical trio, Brahmā,



Śiva and Viṣṇu, the first is imposed by the brahman class: the other two owe their origin to the search for the emotional of the unthinking classes, and while Viṣṇu escapes malignant forms, the childish fears of the subconscious have great scope in Śiva and his consort. With the unimportance of the individual the universe itself loses significance and individuality, it is merely at any given time at a point of a recurring cycle: the unimportance of man spreads throughout his conception.



## SIGNIFICANCE OF ŚĀṆKARA'S ADHYĀSA-BHĀṢYA

By

E. R. SREEKRISHNA SARMA

Śaṅkara, the greatest exponent of Advaita, has written *bhāṣyas* or commentaries on all important works of *Prasthānatraya*, the *Brahmasūtras*, the ten principal *Upaniṣads*, and the *Bhagavadgītā*. But only on the *Brahmasūtras* he begins his *bhāṣya* with a discussion on *adhyāsa*. In other instances he gives an introduction to the study of the work basing on the statement of the texts concerned. Only in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* he resorts to a discussion on *adhyāsa*.<sup>1</sup> In fact the *Brahmasūtras* begin with the statement *athāto brahmajijñāsā*. One may therefore expect that the *bhāṣya* begins with the significance of the three words of the *sūtra*, *atha*, *ataḥ* and *brahmajijñāsā*. Or it may be beginning with the consideration of the meaning of the word *brahman* for the establishment and exposition of which the whole treatise has started. Instead, Śaṅkara elaborately makes a discussion on *adhyāsu* and connects it with the theme on hand. What is the significance of it? No other *Ācārya* who wrote commentaries on the *Brahmasūtras* has adopted such a method. So the question is pertinent and requires a reasonable answer. This is the purpose of this paper. Connected with this main question two more supplementaries can also be put, which we will see later in the course of our deliberation.

The main contention and conviction of Śaṅkara is that Brahman alone is true, diversity and cognition of objects separately therefore are false. This is the main theme of the Vedāntas, the *Upaniṣads*. The *Brahmasūtras* are only a string which ties together this theme of the *Upaniṣads*. When this is the main theme to be established, it is necessary to prove that diversity and plurality of the world are not real. What is constant and forms a background of diversity and plurality is alone real. This background is what is termed as Brahman. Realization of Brahman means the cessation of diversity and plurality. Because Brahman is constant and real, no extra effort is needed to realise it, except the

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1. *Adhyāsa* literally means to put something in the place of any other which stands for an erroneous knowledge. Śaṅkara himself has, after defining it according to the prevalent schools of *anythūkhyāti*, *vīparīta-khyāti* or *vivekāgraha*, concluded that it is the knowledge of something as another thing (*atāsmiṁś tadbuddhiḥ*). The word is an ancient one found in the Brāhmaṇa literature, where it means to recite certain *ṛks* in the place of original *ṛks* in a *śāstra*. The word is also used by Patañjali in his *Yoga-sūtras* to mean a mistaken knowledge.



annihilation of diversity and plurality. Brahman is the only existant and not bound by time and space. Diversity and plurality are not such. They are changing and having an end.

Now the question is how this is to be proved. Only through our experience and by reasoning out. As *ātman* and Brahman are not different Śāṅkara asks to have introspection and analyse our daily experience. Are we not having three states of consciousness daily? The waking state, the dream state and the dreamless deep sleep. In the waking state we identify ourselves with the gross body or our other faculties like thoughts and sensations. In the dream we do the same but in a different plane of consciousness. In the deep sleep we feel nothing but happiness. So it is certain that the deep sleep is our constant nature. The same *ātman* continues in the three states but with different experiences. So, the *ātman* which is constant must be recognised as real. If it alone is real the other phenomena become unreal. Now if we are really the *ātman* why should we not realize it, it can be asked. The answer is, because we have many distractions we do not realize the truth. These distractions are to be annihilated. That is what is the purpose of understanding the Vedānta. This is the theme of the *Brahmasūtras*. So, on understanding of *adhyāsa* the case of distraction is to be analysed and understood. That is the significance of prefacing the *Brahmasūtras* with a discussion of *adhyāsa*.

Another question may be raised in this context. There are many statements in the Upaniṣads meaning that Brahman alone is existence; there is no plurality. Why should not Śāṅkara have taken these passages which are valid for him and show that plurality and diversity are only false. Why should he begin with the *bhāṣya* saying *yuṣmadasmātpratyayaḥ gocarayoh viṣayaviṣayinoh* etc. The answer is obvious. Śāṅkara wants to show that he is discussing *adhyāsa* only as an experience of everybody. So it is a *mānana*, analysing the experiences. In Vedānta *śravaṇa*, *mānana* and *nididhyāsana* are said to be the means to realize Brahman. *Mānana* is as or more important than the other two in the sense that man can understand things only when they are reasoned out. So Śāṅkara bases this discussion on experience and not on any statement of the *Vedas* or other texts.

Another question which may raise its head is like this. Even though it is based on experience, why should he begin the passage with *yuṣmadasmātpratyaya*? Why should not it be *asmadyuṣmatpratyaya* or something like that. The answer is more psychological and philosophical. Any discussion takes place only with two – You the object and I the subject. So, if it is shown that the subject and the object are mutually mistaken and this notion is the error which is to be removed in order to realize the truth, there also the object is evident.



for all. Only those who have more intelligence will consider that there can be no object if there is no subject. The subject-object relation forms the basis of human life. So Śaṅkara thought it fittingly correct to begin the discussion as put by him.

*Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* is the pivotal point in understanding the *Brahmasūtras* which are only a garland of the flowers of *Vedāntic* statements neatly arranged.



on the other hand, the Aryans who have more recently arrived in India, have been found to be of a different race, and to have a different language. The Aryans who have been found in India, are of a different race, and to have a different language. The Aryans who have been found in India, are of a different race, and to have a different language.

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## RITUAL, MANTRAS AND THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

By

FRITS STAAL

(1981) Historical origin and current function are very different things. In a recent review on the relations between culture and biology and on the origin of the human mind, Stephen Jay GOULD (1983) has discussed several cases which illustrate this important truth. In the course of evolution, our ancestors first began to walk upright, and subsequently developed a large brain. The humanoid creatures that lived in Africa some three or four million years ago did already walk upright, but their brain remained at an ape's characteristic size. It took a long time before the brain began to develop to its present dimensions. Whatever the complex reasons for these developments, the outcome enabled men to perform all manner of operations bearing no direct relation to their original impetus or motivation. Walking upright, for example, enabled them to develop gestures (e. g., *mudrā*) and to make fire, but may also be related to the origin of speech, since hands were now free to do certain things that previously had to be done by mouth (e. g., carrying food). Similarly, the brain came to be used to perform many tasks that are unlikely to be related to the original reasons for its biological growth. Moreover, such a state of affairs is not confined to the realm of biology: "I may put a computer in my factory only to issue paychecks and keep accounts," writes GOULD, "but the device can (as a consequence of its structure) also calculate  $\pi$  to 10,000 places" — indeed, perform a variety of mathematical calculations.

The difference between historical origin and current function, or diachronic and synchronic perspectives, is instructive in the case of semantics. Though popular belief (and some philosophers) hold the opposite, linguists know that the meaning of a word is not necessarily related to its origin or etymology. The Indian theorists of language were aware of this: *rūḍhir yogam apaharati*. Western grammarians expressed it by means of the Latin saying: *verba valent usu*, "the validity (viz., meaning and function) of words depends on their use." Western philosophers have begun to understand some of the implications of this insight since WITTGENSTEIN's well-known statement: "for a large class of cases — though not for all — in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (*Philosophical Investigations* I: 43).



If the original reasons for the origin and development of an activity are no longer present or operative, then why do humans as well as other animals continue to perform some such activities? One would assume that either there are new reasons that justify the performance, or the activity continues through mere force of habit (another kind of reason). As we shall see, there are indeed activities, in man and also elsewhere in the animal kingdom, that are engaged in without reason, goal, motivation, stimulus, or without there being any pragmatic justification. The variety of terms used in this context suggests that conceptual clarification is called for. Contemporary philosophers (e. g., DAVIDSON 1980) have tried to bring some order in our concepts of activity, action, event, reason and cause. Certain events – e. g., raising my arm – can be identified and explained as actions when they are viewed as caused by reasons or motivations (e. g., my desire to pluck a flower); but these same events, when described in physical, biological or physiological terms, may be explained by appealing to natural regularities or laws. We use terms such as “reason” in many senses, and have at our disposal a large vocabulary of related terms. We say that a general reason for eating is that our body needs food in order to survive; and survival is invoked to explain many of the activities of men and other animals. Moreover, we invoke this reason not only with reference to the individual, but also with reference to the species. However, a reason for eating may also be gluttony. Or, on specific occasions I may feel hungry, or be interested in specific delicacies, or it may be time for breakfast, or there may be food in front of me. I may have a good reason for eating, or I may not even be aware of the fact that I am or have been eating. The reasons, moreover, need not be explicit. Why did I want to raise my arm to pluck a flower? Because I liked its color or smell? Did I want to put it in my or someone else’s hair? Or was it planned for a garland or offering? And what if a psychologist came along and told me that I am obsessed by flowers because I am obsessed by deflowering – or because they remind me of my mother? The latter kinds of reasons, if they are reasons, would be less explicit than any of the others.

I must leave it to linguists, philosophers and psychologists to unravel this tangle of causes, reasons, purposes and intentions that are invoked to explain why we engage in certain activities. And of course, if they would have succeeded in completing that task for English, many other languages remain to be studied that have yielded similarly interesting, but not necessarily identical, concepts and distinctions. In Sanskrit, for example, we have *karāṇa*, *kāraṇa*, *kārya*, *hetu*, *nidāna*, *bīja*, *nimitta*, *mūla*, *yoni*, *abhiprāya*, *prayojana*, *phala*, *artha*, *saṃkalpa*, *tātparyā*, *uddeśa*, *icchā*, *kāma*, and so many other terms and concepts. The task to distinguish between these is not impossible but certainly large, and different from what I am presently interested in investigating.



What I propose to do in the present context, keeping these conceptual complexities in mind, is to ask for the reasons why people engage in ritual, recite mantras, and use language. To merely ask and discuss these questions will help us to understand these three activities a little better, and will also show how and to what extent they are related to each other. Let me initiate our discussion by mentioning three answers that are frequently given to these questions but that I regard as erroneous. Scholars as well as laymen often say that : (1) ritual is performed because it is symbolic, viz., it refers to something else, e. g., beliefs, mythology or social structure; (2) mantras are recited because they are believed to increase the efficacy of the rites they accompany; and (3) language is used for the sake of communication. I believe that a closer inspection of the facts will show that neither of these reasons can be regarded as satisfactory and that they are, at best, only partially true. I shall now focuss on these three questions one by one, and make use of the distinction made at the outset of this essay, viz., the distinction between diachronic and synchronic, or between historical origin and current function.

### 1. Ritual

We cannot discuss ritual without discussing specific rituals; and it stands to reason, when honoring the doyen of the Vedic studies in India, to pay special attention to Vedic ritual. But here it is immediately obvious that a symbolic interpretation in terms of mythology, such as is sometimes provided in the Brāhmaṇa literature, is not satisfactory. It will suffice to quote another great Vedic scholar on this point :

The most important mythical episodes, those which reflect cosmogonic events, have no ritual equivalencies; and in general they are not used in any way in the classical ceremonies. We must be content with very general theories if we are to avoid arbitrary explanations such as those put forward in the old *Brāhmaṇas*, where we find fabricated accounts of the origin of various details in the liturgical ceremonial. In these stories there is much that deserves attention, but the *nidāna* or *bandhu*, the hidden connection that they try to establish, cannot be accepted; it is too visibly the product of the priestly mind (RENOU 1953, 16).

What then are the reasons for performing the Vedic ceremonies? According to the *Mīmāṃsā*, the reason for performing a specific ritual is the desire (*kāma*) for a particular effect or fruit (*prayojana*, *phala*). The stock example is : *agniṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*. But apart from the question whether such fruits are renounced through the recurrent *tyāga* recitations by the *yajamāna*, there is another contradiction that becomes increasingly apparent. The rites are



subdivided into two classes, *nitya*, "obligatory", and *kāmya*, "optional." The Agnistoma is *nitya*. But how can it be obligatory to desire heaven? Moreover, we find that the expression of the desire itself is ritualized: the declaration of intent (*saṃkalpa*) is a rite that occurs at the beginning of the ceremony. This implies, among other things, that it is not necessary to believe that a particular effect will ensue; the pronunciation of the formulas is sufficient. Rites are performed independently of beliefs. Moreover, they may be interpreted in a variety of different ways. According to the late Erkkara Rāman NAMBUDIRI, the expression *sarvakāma* in the *saṃkalpa* for the Agnicayana (*sarvakāmo'gnim ceṣye*) means: "desirous of the common good." But the *yajamāna* may not know this and need not therefore have such a desire prior to the performance of his ritual. Moreover, similar rites may be performed by or on behalf of persons who have different conceptions of the presumed result, for example, *svarga*. The two main schools of the Mīmāṃsā disagree on this, yet both enjoin identical rites. Even Vedāntins and Buddhists, who hold various opinions on the value of performing ritual and on the fruits of such performances, perform rituals and rites. In a later theistic context, even Vedic ceremonies have been interpreted as acts of worship of a deity called Yajñeśvara. Harold ARNOLD has collected many instances of what he has called the "Hinduization" of Vedic ritual. The Subrahmanya rites, for example, acquired special importance among Tamil brahmins because of the increasing importance of the deity Subrahmanya, who rose to prominence in southeast India long after the Vedic period. The extraordinary fact that calls for an explanation is that, though rites remain the same, their interpretations tend to change. Rites remain invariant even across religious boundaries. Identical oblations into fire, accompanied by invocations of Agni, occur not only in Vedic, Hindu and Tantric rites, but also in Buddhist ceremonies in southeast Asia, in Tibet, and at the extreme eastern limit of Indian cultural diffusion, in present-day Japan (see AGNI = STAAL 1983, I-II).

Let us now address the question of function before turning to the problem of origins. There are at least some rites in which the function of what is being performed seems obvious. In the Vedic marriage rite of *pāṇigrahaṇa*, the groom takes the hand of the bride, thus leading her away from her father's house (*udvāha*, *vivāha*); and it seems obvious that what is referred to here is the transition or passage from the status of a daughter to that of a wife. Several *grhya* rites may be interpreted in such terms. But notions such as "rites de passage" or "liminality", that have been introduced by Western anthropologists, cannot account for the large majority of *śrauta* rites. True, there are a number of rites in the *śrauta* realm that are amenable to a simple explanation in terms that also apply to *grhya* rites. For example, similar to the marriage rites in some respects is the *tānūnaptra* ceremony during which the priests enter into an



alliance with the *yajamāna* at the outset of the performance (one difference is that this alliance is dissolved at the end of the ritual proceedings during the *sakhyavisarjana* rite). The *śrauta* ritual, however, is characterized by much more complex ritual constructions, and their function is not straight-forward or clear. How are we to explain the construction of the main altar of the Agnicayana from 1005 kiln-fired bricks, 200 each in four layers, and 205 in the fifth? Why is the surface of each layer  $7\frac{1}{2}$  times a square of the *yajamāna*'s length? Why are there ten different shapes of bricks, with ten bricks half as thick as the others? Why are they consecrated by particular mantras and in a specific order? Why do some have figures drawn on them, whereas others are lifted from their proper place, carried around the altar and put back? All of this, and much more, is in accordance with numerous precise rules, for which in some cases rationalizations, but in no case convincing explanations, have been offered. This verdict applies both to the efforts in the ancient Brāhmaṇa literature and to those of contemporary scholars.

Let us now address the problem of origins, starting with a specific example. HEESTERMAN has provided an ingenuous and undoubtedly correct explanation for the peculiar manner in which the sacrificial animal is tied to the *yūpa*: "the cord is fastened to the right foot, goes round the left side of the neck and is then wound round the right horn and finally fastened to the stake" (HEESTERMAN 1962, 18). HEESTERMAN has observed that, in this way, room is left for the slaughterer's knife. But the victim is not slaughtered with a knife in the classical ceremony as we know it; and it is not killed when it is tied to the *yūpa* at all. It is killed later, elsewhere, and by a different method. The apparent reason for the manner in which the cord is fastened lies therefore in its origin: originally, the victim's head was cut off while it was tied to the stake.

We could easily imagine that a practising ritualist would accept this as a correct explanation for the manner in which he performs this rite. But this does not explain the function of the rite. For why should one continue to tie the animal in a particular manner when there is no longer any reason for doing it in that way? We do not, for example, light a cigarette by *agnimanthana* when matches are at hand. What is puzzling about rites is not that their origins can sometimes be explained, but that they continue to be performed even though the original explanation is no longer valid or operative.

The same holds for more general explanations for the origin of ritual: they do not explain why rites continue to be performed. Let us take again an example from HEESTERMAN – in fact, a generalization from cases similar to that of the slaughterer's knife. In HEESTERMAN'S view, violence, death and destruction set the scene from which ritual must be explained. Ritual is an attempt to eliminate



and overcome strife and violent death. There is discontinuity between "two sets of ritual, the systematized or mechanistic as against the popular or organicist ritual" (see Professor HEESTERMAN'S "The Ritualist's Problem", this volume, pages 167-179). "Against this tale of catastrophe stands the vision of the ritualists"; "...the construction we know as the classical system or 'science' of ritual". In this construction, the principles of ritual structure are "consciously applied." The vision of the ritualists "is concisely expressed in the mythic story of the contest between Prajāpati, the Lord of life, and Mr̥tyu, Death. The 'weapons' of Prajāpati were the standard elements of the classical ritual - chant, recitation, and (orderly) act. Those of Death, on the other hand, were typically non-*śrauta* elements - song, dance and wanton act ... The breakthrough came with Prajāpati's 'seeing' or discovering of *sampad* and *saṃkhyāna*, numerical equivalence and 'counting together' (of liturgical and cosmic elements)." Again and again we observe how in a variety of rites, the agonistic elements of real battle are "identified away" and replaced by abstract liturgical elements. According to Professor HEESTERMAN, "given the specific history of the *śrauta* ritual it seems questionable whether we can generalize from this to ritual in general." In this sense, then, Vedic ritual is unique.

Professor HEESTERMAN's vision of the ritualists' problem deserves our serious consideration because it contains a very large element of truth. There is no doubt that many *śrauta* rites and rituals originated in a context of battle, destruction and death. HEESTERMAN (and earlier, RAU) had shown, for example, that cattle raids are at the background of several Vedic processions. And yet, it seems that this vision should be restricted in several important respects. First of all, it is not obvious that it can explain the origin of *all* *śrauta* rituals. Those that are primarily connected with fire, for example, are clearly related to man's discovery of fire, and not directly to violence (see AGNI I, 77-86). Moreover - and this constitutes a second restriction - man's discovery of fire is reflected in other than only Vedic rituals, so that Vedic ritual is not, in this respect, unique. But that it is not unique even in the sense in which it reflects violence and death follows from the fact that similar connections have been stressed by other scholars with reference to other cultures and their rituals (see, e. g., BURKERT 1972, 1979; GIRARD 1972).

All of this is significant; yet, the crux of the matter lies elsewhere. According to HEESTERMAN, the classical *śrauta* ritual as we know it is the outcome of deliberate, conscious, even scholarly construction; an abstract, priestly edifice, a "Glasperlenspiel." This is not entirely untrue; but it is not entirely true either, and therefore misleading. The "Science of Ritual" as we know it from the *śrauta sūtras* is certainly the product of scholarly analysis; it is in fact the first, and quite possibly the most interesting and characteristic manifestation



of the Indian scientific genius, as I have argued elsewhere (STAAL 1982). However, the *object* of this science is *ritual structure*; and ritual structure is not a conscious creation by ritualists. In this sense, too, the myth about Prajāpati and Death hit the right nail on the head: it reports, not that Prajāpati *invented* these structures, but that he discovered them by *seeing* them. These ritual structures, then, were already there.

Myths prove little but there is solid evidence that proves the same point. Before presenting it, let me comment on the significance of such a demonstration. At the outset we have emphasized the difference between historical origin and current function. Now, though these two are different in general, it does not follow that they cannot overlap or be closely connected in specific cases. They are closely related, in fact, when current function is a conscious reflection on historical origins. For example, in a dramatic play on the origin of Kumāra, the function of the play is related to the story of that origin. But if all awareness of origins has long disappeared, it is unlikely that origins will throw light on current functions. When no such awareness has ever existed, unlikeliness turns into impossibility.

Let us now consider the solid evidence. That ritual need not be a conscious construction and is yet a replacement for aggression, not confined to the *śrauta* ritual or other human rituals, is demonstrated by the fact that such ritual is quite common among animals. I am referring to what biologists and ethologists, following Konrad LORENZ, have called a *tournament* – a technical term for a ritualized battle. Here are some examples described in biologists' terms:

During the breeding season the male marine iguanas become territorial. They defend a small area of lava rock against other males, whilst females are allowed to stay. If a male rival approaches the territory, its owner displays. He opens his mouth, nods with the head and walks stiffleggedly up and down in front of the rival, showing his lateral aspect. The dorsal crest is erected and the gular regions extended. If the rival answers by the same display, fighting is initiated. The opponents rush at each other. But in spite of the biting intentions shown during the display they never bite each other, but instead lower their head and butt. The hornlike scales on the roof of the head interlock and the animals try to push the other away. This can continue for a while, with pauses in between, during which the opponents display frontally. The struggle ends when one of the rivals is pushed from the rock or when he gives up by assuming a submissive posture (lying flat on his belly). The winner then stops fighting and waits in threat display for the rival to leave. The fight is a highly



ritualized tournament in the course of which the stronger wins, without hurting the loser.

\* \* \*

Ritualized fighting is fairly widespread in animals that are capable of inflicting serious damage to the conspecific. Poisonous snakes never bite each other, but the rivals wrestle according to fixed rules. Cichlid fishes have developed various forms of mouthfighting and thus avoid mutual damage. In a number of species, e. g. in wolves, fighting starts as a damaging fight, but ends by a submissive posture of the loser, which inhibits further aggression (EIBL-EIBESFELDT 1966, 475-476; referring to LORENZ 1963).

Animal ritualization is not confined to the context of violence, and this fact throws further doubt on the thesis that ritual and violence are characteristically related. Numerous animal rituals are related to establishing a bond, and resemble features of such human rites as *pāṇigrahaṇa* and *tānūnaptra*. Two penguins, for example, may engage in a bout of intense head-shaking, displaying in their movements varying regularities that reflect fixed rules. They then dive into the water, emerge with some water-weed in their bills, swim towards each other, and rear up breast to breast. They then indulge in a new head-shaking display, which continues after they have dropped the weed and returned to a normal position (HUXLEY 1914; 1966, 255, Figure 2). Note that water-weed is used to build nests, which consist in general of branches, twigs or grasses. This points again in the direction of Vedic ritual. BURKERT (1979, 44) was the first to demonstrate that the branches the ancient Greeks carried ceremonially when pleading for peace or pardon, reflect appeasement rituals among animals, especially birds, who pass each other nesting materials before establishing a bond or pairing. BURKERT refers in this connection to EIBL-EIBESFELDT 1971, where many examples are discussed. These observations and comments are applicable to the *barhis* and many uses made of *kuśa* or *darbha* grass in Vedic ritual, such as for example the *prastara*. It is not without reason that Rgveda 6.15.16 calls Agni's seat "nestlike" (*kulāyin*).

Facts of this type are numerous and they show that ritual is not confined to men but also occurs among other animals; that ritual is therefore not a highly conscious, artificially contrived or purely priestly activity – though the science of ritual is; and finally, that ritual is not only related to violence or death, but also to other things, e. g., pairing, nesting, or establishing a bond or alliance.

To what extent are these considerations, that pertain to the origin of ritual, also relevant to its current function or functions? The answer is: only to a



very limited extent. The enduring character of ritual is, as we shall see, that it is governed by rules of specific kinds. The biologists who first studied animal rites looked at them from a largely pragmatic point of view, embedded in a Darwinian view of evolution. The ceremonial head-shaking of the penguins was regarded as a feature of bond-establishment itself. But this does not explain the particular nature of the rules that govern this activity. Moreover, we run here into the same problems that many anthropologists and scholars of religion encountered, when they tried to explain rites as features of social structure or counterparts of myths or beliefs : they never explain why anybody should perform a rite that refers to something else, instead of doing that other thing to which it allegedly refers. What we have to explain is why rituals continue to be performed when the original reasons for their performance are no longer present or operative. That is the chief and most puzzling problem of the student of ritual.

## 2. Mantras

I shall spend less time on mantras than on ritual because many of the same considerations apply. Mantras, after all, are not just verse from the Vedas ; they are bits and pieces from the Vedas used ritually. This ritual use of mantras is very different from something else that is apparently similar, viz., the ordinary use of a natural language such as Sanskrit or English. Even if mantras derive from straightforward and intelligible sentences, their ritual uses are often unintelligible and "crooked" (*vakra*). A verse is taken, but before it is half over, the reciter inserts a long *o* and breathes ; he then continues, but does not stop at the end of the line, linking it instead with the following and inserting other vowels and nazalisations. In addition, he recites the first and the last verse of each sequence each three times. Such is the practice of mantra recitation we find in the *sāmidhenī* stanzas and in the *śāstra* recitation of the Soma rituals. When we come to more complex rites, the distortions of and deviations from ordinary language use become more pronounced. In the *rātriparyāya* rounds of the Atirātra, for example, the first quarter of the three initial and final verses is repeated in the first round ; the second quarter in the second round, and the third in the third. Such structural transformations result in expressions that have nothing to do with linguistic communication or the expression of thought. They are ritual. Another example occurs in the *ṣoḍaśī-śāstra*, where use is made of a metrical arithmetic called *viḥaraṇam*, "intertwining" or "transposition." In accordance with this technique, parts of verses are intertwined with parts of other verses in such a way that the resulting sequences are in the *anuṣṭubh* meter. However, the resulting expressions are no longer sentences or phrases, and certainly do not make any sense.



The mantras I have so far considered are "derived" (if that is the correct way to look at the relationship) from ordinary sentences or phrases in Vedic Sanskrit. But there are also many mantras that cannot be related, easily or at all, to ordinary language. According to Āśvalāyana, the Hotṛ murmurs before the beginning of his first *śastra* :

*su mat pad vag de.*

Such syllables may be related to Sanskrit words – but is that the proper way of interpreting them? If it were, then why don't we find the words themselves in their regular forms? Similar questions arise with regard to such forms as: *o śrāvaya*, *śrauṣat*, *vaṣat* and *svāhā*. These are "ritual exclamations" rather than mantras, and derivation, etymology and meaning can be provided at least for the first three. But their actual ritual function is quite different: the first three mark one kind of oblation (the *iṣṭi* or *yajati*), and *svāhā* marks another (the *āhuti* or *juhoti*). Such markings are different from the regular uses of words as names in language. They are ritual. The subsequent history of *svāhā* is there to underline this: *Svāhā* became a goddess, the divine consort of Agni.

The use of divine names in ritual invocations is another development that deviates from the ordinary use of names in language. We find it in the Vedic *Śatarudrīya*, in Hinduism in such lists as the *Viṣṇusahasranāma* and other similar enumerations, and outside India in Islam, Christianity, and other religions. So-called Purāṇic mantras like *namaḥ śivāya*, *oṃ namaḥ śivāya*, *oṃ namo nārāyaṇāya*, *oṃ namo bhagavate vāsudevāya*, *śrīrāmajayarāmajayajayarāma*, ... are not distinguished from each other by the different deities invoked or by their meanings, but by the fact that these mantras are, respectively, five-syllabic (*pañcākṣara*), six-syllabic (*ṣaḍakṣara*), eight-syllabic, twelve-syllabic, thirteen-syllabic, etc. (KANE V, 1958, 1962 notes 219 and 1775). The same holds for the well known Tibetan mantra *oṃ maṇi padme hūṃ* which is six-syllabic. Such forms are not treated like utterances of language, but as if their main characteristic were the number of their syllables. They are also repeated in accordance with fixed rules that are entirely different from repetition in a natural language and dissimilar from any of the rules of grammar.

Syllable counting occurs in poetry, but there it is of a different character. Poetic language is in many ways related to ordinary language, whereas it is not obvious that mantras are derived from, or even related to language. Vedic mantras display the phonological properties of Sanskrit (and some of the pragmatic: see STAAL 1984a), but the manner of syllable counting found in mantras is different from any known use of language, including the poetic: it disregards meaning and disrupts morphemic and syntactic units. We found this in the *ṣoḍaśī-śastra*, but it also applies to such forms as the *āhāru* (*śomśāvo*



... *śoṣomsāvo*) and the *pratigara* (*othāmo daiva, āthāmo daiva, othāmo daiva made, modāmo daivotho*, and other "bizarres contortions liturgiques," as CALAND and HENRY 1906, I, 232 note 8 called them).

In the chants of the Sāmaveda the choreography of mantras becomes richer and more varied. The chants themselves are preceded by *om* or *o hm*. The patterns are so complex that the priests keep track of them by constructing *viṣṭuti* figures with the help of sticks (for illustrations, see AGNI I, Figures 48-51). In the *gāyatra* melodies the *udgītha* is :

*o vā o vā o vā hm bhā o vā.*

The most characteristic contribution of the Sāmaveda to the domain of mantras is the *stobha*. These generally monosyllabic mantras are similar to the *bīja* mantras of Tantrism (cf. the *Stobhānusaṃhāra* published by Satyavrata Sāmasramin in the *Bibliotheca Indica*, II, 1874, 519-542), but they are strung together in more complex and varied ways through a type of "syntax" that is different from Sanskrit syntax or the syntax of any natural language (see STAAL 1983a). The ritual meaning or function of such mantras does not lie in their language or even in their poetic or metrical structure, but in the sounds with their themes and variations, repetitions, inversions, interpolations, and the particular distribution of their elements. All these transformations are executed in accordance with fixed rules. However, these rules are musical rather than linguistic, and these mantras resemble music more than language (see STAAL 1984).

In many uses of Vedic mantras silence plays an important role. Some mantras are *anirukta*, others are *upāṃśu* and again others are recited *tuṣṇīm* or *manasā*. Prajāpati has a preference for silent mantras and silence (perhaps because he was not an Aryan deity, and most mantras are Aryan imports; but this is a diachronic consideration, and the true significance of these silent mantras lies elsewhere). Though Ṛgveda 10.95.1 declares that mantras should be pronounced, their ritual use presents a different picture. Mantras are often transformed, made unrecognizable, hidden, truncated, decapitated, quartered and reduced until literally nothing is left (cf. RENOU 1949, RENOU & SILBURN 1954, HOWARD 1983). It is often said that such strange (though rule-governed) transformations show that mantras point to a region which is "beyond language." This is correct, but it should be recognized that this ineffability is not merely metaphysical, but is a symptom and vestige of an actual fact: mantras point to a stage of development which preceded language in the course of evolution. Language derived from mantras.

I have so far mainly concentrated on meaningless or apparently meaningless mantras, and disregarded the large number of mantras that are not only



meaningful, but that possess a meaning that refers or is otherwise related to the ritual acts they accompany. GONDA has discussed many such mantras in a series of recent studies (GONDA 1979, 1980, 1981, 1983). In his 1982 review of GONDA 1980, WITZEL has argued that we should distinguish several phases in the semantic development of mantras : the so-called "mantra-period" of the Atharvaveda and Yajurveda comes after the Ṛgveda, and is in due course followed by the prose of the Yajurvedasamhitā, the earlier and later Brāhmaṇas (including the Āraṇyakas and earliest Upaśiṣads) and finally the Sūtras. These different stages of mantras can often be distinguished on linguistic grounds, and it is obvious that all are composed in Vedic or Sanskrit. In the face of such overwhelming evidence, how can I have made the far-fetched suggestion that mantras are not derived from language, but language is derived from mantras? To understand this adequately, we must recall the distinction made at the outset of this paper between historical origin or development and current or ritual function. GONDA, WITZEL and other contemporary Sanskrit scholars who have written about mantras adopt a diachronistic point of view which is different from the synchronistic point of view adopted in the present context. Both are valid perspectives but they should not be confounded. From the synchronistic point of view it is apparent that the Sanskrit that occurs in mantras is often used in an unintelligible fashion and not in the manner in which any natural language is normally used. Even those mantras that say something or have meaning are not used like linguistic utterances when they are ritually used. From the point of view of their ritual use, there is no difference in treatment between mantras we would regard as meaningful and mantras we would regard as meaningless. In the context of a natural language, however, such a state of affairs is inexplicable – nay, unthinkable; the distinction between meaningful and meaningless is fundamental to human language in all its normal uses. Though specific mantras may derive from sentences of a specific language, their use indicates a different background which has nothing to do with language. The synchronic study of this usage has therefore diachronic implications : it points to a more distant origin, preceding the succession of stages or periods in the development of any particular language.

Let me give a final example of a use of mantras that is entirely different from any normal use of language. It is well known that the original metres of many mantras, that were accorded great importance during the period of Ṛgveda, are lost in the ritual application (*prayoga*). In the transmission of mantras (*adhyāya*), the names of the metres are sometimes preserved (along with their *devatā* and *ṛṣi*), but in the actual recitation the characteristics of the metres have disappeared and are replaced by special renderings, often musical, of the Vedic accents (*udātta*, *anudātta* and *svarita*). This treatment is characteristic of Veda recitation and is given not only to poetry, but also to prose (provided the



brāhmanas were originally accented), and not only to meaningful but also to meaningless mantras. The entire development has nothing to do with the normal preservation, continuation, development or change of language, but is rather a musicalization of language.

Let me summarize. Many mantras are constructed from language, but in their ritual use, which is their proper use, they do not conform to any of the normal uses of language. Though many specific mantras are derived from language, the species of mantra need not therefore be derived from the species of language. On the contrary, in order to explain these various anomalies, we must assume the opposite, viz., that language derived from mantras in the course of evolution. In that case, the origin of language marks an entirely new use of mantras, unrelated to their original function – just as the many functions of walking upright or of a large brain mark new uses that are unrelated to their respective origins.

### 3. Language

There are important similarities and dissimilarities between language on the one hand and ritual and mantras on the other. All three activities are engaged in in accordance with precise rules, though the performers need not be aware of the form of these rules. In language, speakers are often unaware of the rules of grammar which they interiorized as children when they were first exposed to language. A first language, that is, one's mother tongue, is learned by such exposure, not by explicit teaching of correct forms or of rules. The teaching of ritual is more explicit, as is the teaching of mantras or of a second language, but the importance of the rules that govern their use is equally important in all these activities. In India, this importance was clearly exhibited by the development of the sciences that studied these rules: the earliest rules (or *sūtras*) were the ritual rules of Baudhāyana, and the genre was brought to perfection by Pāṇini in his grammar. But while the rules (Latin: *regula*) were formulated by scholars, the underlying regularities expressed by the rules express deeper lying structures characteristic of the domains of language and ritual, but not consciously created or artificially contrived – a topic I have already discussed (above, pages 408f.).

Rules are of many kinds: in the Sanskrit terminology, for example, we have *sūtra*, *saṃjñā-sūtra* and *paribhāṣā-sūtra*, and in contemporary linguistics we have phrase-structure rules, transformational rules, etc. In mathematics and logic, rules may be used to express definitions, axioms or derivations. In all these fields, some rules are recursive (viz., they may be applied to their own output) while others are not. If we wish to study the relationships between ritual,



mantras and language in a precise fashion we have to study the different kinds of rules found in these three domains and determine to what extent they are related to each other. In linguistics, due attention has been paid to rules and remarkable progress has accordingly been made. But ritual and mantras have mainly been studied in a narrow empiricist fashion, or by dilettantes. In the domain of ritual, almost nothing has been done though the data are or can be made accessible and available through the study of the *śrauta sūtras*. In the domains of ritual and mantras, India provides all we might wish for, and probably more than any other civilization or cultural area has provided. However, progress in these studies that goes beyond mere inventories or speculation can only be made when the material will be subjected to precise analysis in terms of rules.

An important difference between language on the one hand and ritual and mantras on the other is that language has definite functions and applications, whereas the uses of mantras and ritual are a matter of continuing discussion and are often controversial. The uncertainties pertaining to the latter domains become obvious once we compare the results of the work of Sanskritists, anthropologists, scholars of religion and biologists. All have something to contribute, but no unified or even intelligible picture results when the results of these investigations are placed next to each other. There is much less uncertainty in the realm of linguistics, though here, too, scholars often fail to recognize that language is not only used for communication (e. g., the exchange of ideas), but that it also expresses thought and enables man to think in more precise terms that would not be possible without it.

The basic feature of language that enables it to perform its various functions is the following: language relates, in a systematic manner, sounds and meanings to each other. The study of language therefore falls into three parts, dealing respectively with: a domain of sounds (corresponding, approximately, to phonetics and phonology), a domain of meanings (approximately, semantics) and an intermediary domain that relates the two others to each other (approximately, syntax). Now, if one studies language from a biological point of view and seeks to determine to what extent it is adapted to its alleged functions, a striking fact emerges: human language is singularly inefficient and ill-adapted to its tasks. There are at least two features of language that are obstacles rather than conducive to its proper functioning. If language were an effective means of communication or an adequate vehicle for the expression of thought, one would expect the relationship between sounds and meanings to be simple and straightforward, and also the same for all human beings. Ideally, this relationship could be quite straightforward: nothing prevents the existence of a 1-1-correspondence between sounds and meanings, for there are indefinitely many members in either class.



What we find in fact is very different : ( 1 ) the relationship between sounds and meanings, viz., the domain of syntax, is highly complex, cumbersome in use and roundabout, and apparently independent of either ; and ( 2 ) there are thousands of different languages, mostly unrelated to each other, and these are so different from each other that it is impossible to learn more than a few unrelated languages properly. Communication is not served or assisted, but almost blocked by these curious and unexplained facts. The complexity of language syntax has been formulated in linguistic and rule-oriented terms as follows : " Nobody in his right mind would attempt to build an artificial language based on phrase structure plus transformations " ( J. A. FODOR quoted in STAAL 1979, 19-20 ). The mere fact that men have created logic and artificial languages, which are attempts to improve upon the existing modes of communication and the expression of thought, demonstrates the unsatisfactory nature of natural languages. If language were more logical, there would be no need for logic.

If we meet in the course of biological evolution with an organ that is ill-adapted to its current function, we conclude that its origin has nothing to do with this present function. Syntax, therefore, must have originated elsewhere, outside the realm of natural language. If it can be shown that all or some of its rules are closely related to the rules of mantras or ritual, this would suggest that those are the domains where its origin should be sought. Of course, we must furthermore show that such rules do not also occur elsewhere, or are simply universal. The work of CHOMSKY and his followers has paved the way : for it has certainly shown that the rules of syntax are not only not universal, but are very special and uncommon.

To effectively carry out a comparative investigation into the rules and rule structures found in ritual, mantras and language would be a major undertaking. I shall only discuss an example of one type of rule that occurs in both syntax and ritual. There are other similarities between rules in both domains, and there are also different kinds of rules ( for other examples, see STAAL 1980 ).

Let us start with language - in fact, with English syntax ( there are similar structures and rules in many other languages ). In English we use the following two sentences to say more or less the same thing :

Though John was not hungry, he ate a lot. ( 1 )

Though he was not hungry, John ate a lot. ( 2 )

In both sentences " John " and " he " refer to the same person ( they are " coreferential " ) and users of the language interpret ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) accordingly. Linguists have analysed such forms in various ways, but in most cases the pronoun " he "



is conceived of as derived from, or standing for "John," so that we in fact postulate an underlying hypothetical expression of the form :

\*Though John was not hungry, John ate a lot.

(3)

(The asterisk "\*" expresses the fact that (3) is not a well-formed sentence, i.e., is not correct English.) There must be restrictions on the derivability of sentences of the forms (1) and (2) from structures of the form (3). For example, from :

\*John entered the room and John sat down,

(3')

we should be able to derive :

John entered the room and he sat down,

(1')

but not :

\*He entered the room and John sat down.

(2')

There is a third case, in which :

Abandoning John's good intentions, John went to the party (3'') should yield :


Abandoning his good intentions, John went to the party (2'') but not :

\*Abandoning John's good intentions, he went to the party. (1''). The asterisked sentences (2') and (1'') may be regarded as correct English sentences under the right circumstances, but in that case "John" and "he/his" are interpreted as referring to different persons, and the latter should therefore not be derived from the former.

In all such cases, grammar has to provide the rules which permit the derivation of the correct sentences in the correct manner, but block a derivation of the incorrect ones. This is characteristic of contemporary linguistics as it is of Pāṇini and the śrauta sūtras, though in the latter case it is ritual acts and not sentences that are derived. None of the works in these disciplines were therefore teaching manuals; they all presuppose that the correct results are already known, but have to be explained (they are "scientific" in this, and in other senses: see STAAL 1982).

I shall not try to formulate precisely the linguistic rules that permit the correct derivations of the right results in all these cases. However, one may be able to form an idea of the relevant underlying structures by constructing "trees" that explicate it. In the third case, the case that is relevant in the present context, the underlying structure is of the following form :






In order to derive the correct sentence (2'), rules should operate on the circled, specific occurrences of "John" in such trees, replacing some of them by a pronoun. Such rules of pronominalization are called transformational rules. They belong to this specific class of rules because the scope of their application or operation is determined by complex configurations of the type characterized by trees of the form (4).

Very similar complex structures occur in Vedic ritual. The following is an example, suitably simplified in order to bring out its salient features more clearly. In the Agnicayana, several rites that are concerned with the *ukhā* pot do not follow each other in immediate succession, but are spread out over different sections of the ceremonies, occurring on different days of its performance. The three most important ceremonies that involve the *ukhā* pot are: (1) *ukhāsam-bhāraṇam* (ritual preparation of the *ukhā* pots); (2) incorporation of the *ukhā* in the *dīkṣā*, following the *agni-dīkṣaṇīyeṣṭi* which corresponds to the *dīkṣaṇīyeṣṭi* of the Agniṣṭoma; and (3) deposition of the *ukhā* under the center of the area where the altar will be constructed. There is coreferentiality to the *ukhā* pot in these rites as there is coreferentiality to "John" in the case of pronominalization, and the structural configurations in which these occur are identical in the two cases. In order to explicate how the different episodes concerned with the *ukhā* pot are related we have to apply transformational rules that operate on an underlying tree structure of the following form:





Various alternative descriptions of this structure are possible, and to argue in detail for the correctness of one would take up more space than is available here. The same holds for linguistic structures such as (4). But whatever their precise form, the similarity between (4) and (5) is striking. Even though the "ritual relations" that can be defined in (5) do not stand in 1-1-correspondence to the grammatical relations that can be defined in (4) (e. g., "Subject-of," "Predicate-of," etc.), this similarity is not vague and general, but detailed, complex and precise. It goes far beyond such characteristics of ritual structure as were discussed by HUBERT and MAUSS in their famous study of 1897-1898, which showed no more than that rites have a beginning, a middle and an end (in the apt phrase used by J. VAN BAAL: see STAAL 1980, 122-123). What such detailed similarities suggest is that language and ritual are genetically related. Since ritual occurs very early in the course of biological evolution, and language very late, this suggestion implies that language structure was influenced by ritual structure. Since mantra structure follows ritual structure in many known cases, it is tempting to assume that it is through the intermediary of mantra structure that this influence was realized.

At this point two observations are in order. The first, already referred to, is that such structures as are exemplified by (4) or (5), are not products of priestly ingenuity or artificial intelligence: they are products of a natural development or evolution just like the structures and configurations of molecules, crystals, or nervous systems. The second observation is related to the first, and is equally intriguing. How can (4) and (5) be related if the first structure



characterizes a speech act performed in about one minute, whereas the second pictures a ritual performance that takes several days to execute? How can the two be possibly related when there is such a difference in duration in terms of real time?

I believe that this difference is instructive because it shows that we are only beginning to explore a domain of rule-governed structures and activities that will require a great deal of study before it can be adequately interpreted. There may exist, for example, intermediate forms of structures (e. g., in the domain of mantras) about which we know, at present, nothing. This is not surprising at all if we approach these relationships from a biological perspective. There are very large animals as well as very small ones, and yet they may be similar or identical in structure in specific respects. The whale is a mammal but the ratio of its size to the size of the smallest mammals is similar to (or at least of the same order of magnitude as) the ratio of the duration of an Agnicayana performance to that of the utterance of a single complex sentence (say, 1,000:1). Moreover, there are many different *kinds* of structure. Morphologically, whales are so different from other mammals that palaeontologists could not determine from fossils or anatomical evidence from which group of other animals they had developed. This was determined only recently by using methods adapted to different structures that had been studied in biochemistry. Vincent SARICH, a pioneer in these studies, comments on this discovery in the following terms: "Morphologically, where do you place a whale? It doesn't look like anything but other whales. Biochemically, it's easy. They come off the cow-sheep-antelope stock" (*Discover*, July 1983, 39-40). It would be unwise to speculate that ritual, mantras and language will one day be related by biochemical methods. But it is possible even now to study these three activities in terms of the rules and rule structures that govern their use. There are bound to be unexpected conclusions pertaining to their genetic relationships as well as others.

Whales are interesting in the present context also for another reason. Whales sing songs consisting of lengthy cycles that are repeated during their long journeys from polar to equatorial regions. Each cycle lasts several hours. Whatever the difference in their duration, these songs display structures that are in some cases similar to the structures displayed in the songs of birds, the chirpings of grasshoppers and the mantras of men.

### Conclusions

Darwin's revolutionary ideas and discoveries are sometimes popularized in terms of the oversimplified notion of "survival of the fittest". In accordance with this doctrine, all evolution is explained by natural selection on the basis of



successful adaptation to the struggle for existence and survival, both of the individual and of the species. But Darwin himself did not adopt such a narrow, utilitarian and pragmatic perspective, and contemporary biologists have espoused a less dogmatic and much more flexible attitude. Konard LORENZ has defended the assumption that "there are mechanisms in existence which reinforce economical perfection in motor skills independently of the attainment of the ultimate biological goal in whose pursuit the learned movement is developed" (LORENZ 1967, 75). Among the examples he mentions are the swimming of a shark, the gallop of an antelope, and the gymnastics of a gibbon. The human animal does not lack similar skills; moreover, "we know that when we skate, ski, or dance, we perform these activities for their own sake, for the enjoyment they give us" (*ibid.*). LORENZ adds: "The most convincing argument in favor of my speculative assumption lies in the fact that acquired motor skills of this type, more than any other types of movements, are forever being performed for their own sake in the obvious absence of any other motivating or reinforcing factors. Indeed, the very concept of play is based on this fact to a large extent."

At the end of his essay (this volume, page 178), Professor HEESTERMAN has referred to the Dutch historian J. HUIZINGA, who in his book *Homo Ludens* defended the view that play is an important element, perhaps the most important element in the origination and development of human culture. This book was first published in 1938, and was therefore written during those carefree days between the two world wars when violence, despair and such movements as existentialism had not yet become preponderant. HUIZINGA himself espoused more somber sentiments in a subsequent study entitled: *In the Shadows of To-Morrow*. And yet, his earlier views have now re-emerged in a different garb, incorporating substantial new evidence, biological as well as ritual, and providing a necessary corrective to the narrow utilitarianism and pragmatism that pervades much postwar work in a variety of fields, especially in the United States. Within the latter perspective, whether it is formulated in biological, anthropological, sociological or religious terms, it is not possible to understand ritual, mantras, or the origin of language. The study of ritual and mantras as rule-governed activities is significant and promising in the first place because it represents a new perspective in the biological sciences and the sciences of man. But this study is also of paramount interest because of the unexpected development that was kindled by ritual and mantras, and that contributed a decisive feature to human evolution: when meaning and purpose were attached to and incorporated into these almost primordial structures, ritual and mantras gave birth to language.

Whatever its shortcomings and imperfections, language remains the most characteristic property of the human animal. It also preserves the curious property of ritual, mantras, and all playful activity, that it can arise without



external stimulation: for as CHOMSKY and others have never tired of explaining, language is not a mechanistic or determined response to a stimulus. The occurrence of this feature corroborates the idea that ritual and mantras are the immediate predecessors of language in the course of evolution, and not, for example, animal systems of communication.

It is not mere playful activity that has caused this essay to appear in a Felicitation Volume that rightfully devotes more space to Sanskrit studies than to matters pertaining to biology. Professor DANDEKAR is not only the nestor of Vedic studies in India, but he has throughout his distinguished career supported a variety of endeavors and enterprises in which Vedic studies play an important part. If it is true that ritual and mantras have to be studied in relation to the origin of language and within a biological perspective, such studies will have to focus primarily on the ritual and mantras of the Veda. The reason is obvious. Nowhere in human history has ritual played a more important part, was cultivated with more flourish or studied in greater formal depth than during the Vedic period. The ideas discussed in the present contribution are closer in spirit and owe more to the analysis undertaken in the Vedic period than to contemporary theories. The same applies with even greater force in the case of mantras: for though it is true that mantras and mantra-like elements occur in Taoism, Islam, and in Western religion in such isolated forms as *amen*, *aleluja* and *abacadabra*, their use and study has been nowhere more abundant and varied than in India. May Professor DANDEKAR therefore accept this *mantramālā* as a tribute to his *mantradarśana*.

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## THE MOUSE IN THE ANCESTRY

By

ROMILA THAPAR

Historians of India have tended to give little credence to the histories of dynasties and regions as described in the *vaṃśāvalis* dismissing the texts as being of slight consequence. There is however a pattern to the *vaṃśāvali* literature which needs to be investigated and which suggests that the texts although in part drawing on mythologised accounts of the past, do however provide certain social and political insights which should be of value to the historian. That these patterns recur with frequency in the literature of various parts of the sub-continent is of course partly due to its being a literary genre in the second millennium A. D. and therefore observing its own rules of structure and form; but in part it also draws on the *itihāsa-purāṇa* tradition which obviously continued to be meaningful and which provided a common fund of origin myths and genealogical links. An illustration of this is the role of the *mūṣaka* (mouse or rat) as a symbol in the origin myths of dynasties as recorded in a number of *vaṃśāvalis* from geographically unrelated areas.

Most *vaṃśāvalis* can be fairly clearly demarcated into earlier and later sections. The former draw heavily on traditional material often deriving from Purāṇic sources and the latter reflect historical events suggestive of a more authentic record of what actually happened. The *vaṃśāvali* of the Himalayan valley of Chamba is a case in point. The gradual but noticeable change of symbols provides indicators in the changing process of those who ruled.

The Chamba *vaṃśāvali* claims to be a history of the kingdom of Chamba and has been gathered and collated by modern scholars.<sup>1</sup> The earlier part (vs 1-34) shows a familiarity with Purāṇic sources particularly the *Bhāgavata* and the *Skanda Purāṇas* and describes the origins of the earliest ruling family. The later and major portion of the text is a more reliable account of events connected with the Chamba state. The original compilation dates to about the seventeenth century and was probably put together by a *brāhmaṇa* editor emphasising as it does the grants and donations made to *brāhmaṇas* and the religious under-pinnings of the actions of kings.

The dynasty is said to be of the Sūryavaṃśa lineage and the Chamba *vaṃśāvali* makes the link through a founding ancestor Kuśa, the son of Rāma,

1. J. Ph. VOGEL, *Antiquities of Chamba State*, Calcutta, 1911. ASI, Vol. XXXVI,



but continues the descent to include the Śākya and Prasenaka (? Prasenajit). The immediate ruling ancestry of the Chamba royal family is traced to Mūṣanavarman, the story of his early life being reminiscent of some other dynastic origin myths. His father, we are told, died as a result of an attack by the Kiras against his kingdom. The queen, rescued by the ministers and the *guru*, gave birth posthumously to a son who was kept in a cave. Later he was taken to a neighbouring kingdom where he was brought up in a style befitting a prince and given a patrimony at the time of his marriage to his benefactor's daughter. Eventually Mūṣanavarman was able to defeat the Kiras and win back his kingdom.

Epigraphic evidence corroborates some of the terms used in the origin myth as related in the *vaṃśāvali*. There are references to *āditya-vaṃśa* and *moṣūna gotra*.<sup>2</sup> Given the context in which they occur these references also suggest that the claim to monarchical status involved controlling the *sāmantas* or feudatories. The Gum inscription and the later Proli-Ra-Gala inscription make this apparent in the reference to the title of ...*mahārājādhirāja paramēśvara*...<sup>3</sup> The continuing presence of feudatories into the second millennium A. D. is also indicated by the "fountain stones", a form of memorial stones characteristic of Chamba. A further inscription links one of the names with Kishkindha which VOGEL interprets as a location in Chamba<sup>4</sup> state but which may indicate connections further away. Linguistically the earlier inscriptions display a poor knowledge of Sanskrit and a groping from Prakrit to Sanskrit. The quality of the language and style changes noticeably in the Saraham *praśasti*<sup>5</sup> composed in the established tradition of Sanskrit lyrical poetry. This also links the royal family to Kishkindha, the link being through a marriage with Somaprabhā, obviously a lady of great political consequence since the *praśasti* is lavish in her praise. Subsequent to this, the inscriptions are frequently records of donations of cultivated land or terraced fields made to *brāhmaṇas* and temples in the main. The format of these inscriptions follows that of the land grants from the kingdoms in the plains of this period. Clearly the Chamba state in the second millennium A. D. was taking on the form familiar from the established monarchies of northern India.

The earlier inscriptions are issued chiefly from Brahmapura (Brahmor) the first capital of the state. This was a seemingly inaccessible area but in fact well-endowed with terraced fields and lying on the route over the Kukti Pass to Lahul and Zaskar. In the next phase the issuing of royal inscriptions is from

2. Laksana Image inscription at Brahmor, *Ibid*, p. 144; Gum inscription, p. 146.

3. *Ibid*, pp. 146-48.

4. Svaim image inscription, *Ibid*, p. 150.

5. Saraham *praśasti*, *Ibid*, p. 152.



Champakā (Chamba) which was the new capital.<sup>6</sup> However, the connections with Brahmapura were not entirely terminated and there was an element of validation in mentioning the earlier capital in some of the inscriptions. Echoes of the *praśasti* style are also evident in phrases such as, "Sahilla was a rain cloud extinguishing the Kira forces." It is curious that in the *vaṃśāvalī* it is only after the moving of the capital to Chamba that the origin myth is narrated. Does this reflect a marriage alliance with the *kṣatriyas* of the plains or the migration of the latter to the hill valleys? If it was the latter there is no clear reason to account for such a migration as the reason which is generally given by modern historians, the invasion by the Turks, would not account for such a migration since the reference to the Turuṣkas is of a later period. Dynastic origin, even in the later phase, is associated with the *āditya-vaṃśa* and the *Mūṣana-gotra*. Legitimation includes the standard formula, ...*deva-dviḥ-guru-pūjā paripālam cāturvarṇya vyavasthā*..., which was in keeping with the best traditions of *rāja-dharma*.

In analysing the myth of origin it is clear that a link was sought with one of the two major lineages, the *Sūryavaṃśa* or solar lineage and this was characteristic of claims put forward by many *kṣatriyas* of the post-Gupta period who often sought either *Sūryavaṃśa* or *Candravaṃśa* ancestry. The former provided associations with the descendants of the Ikṣvākus and the epic hero Rāma, the later *avatāra* of Viṣṇu. All these were impeccable antecedents. However the use of the term *Moṣūna* as a *gotra* name raises another set of questions. In the popular tradition of Chamba this word and its variants *mūṣuna/mūṣuna* is associated with *mūṣ/mūṣi* and therefore with a mouse. In fact the king *Mūṣana* is said to have been guarded by mice whilst taking refuge in the cave.<sup>7</sup>

The story of the founder of the family being born posthumously in a cave on the defeat of his father and the child growing up among people of lesser status and using them to reconquer his father's kingdom in order to reassert his rights, is common to other historical traditions as well. According to Tod,<sup>8</sup> the Guhilas of Mewar are said to have derived the etymology of their name from *Goha/Guha* the prince being born posthumously in a cave - *guha*. In this case the prince exploited the friendship of the Bhil tribes to regain his kingdom. It could perhaps be argued that this myth encapsulates a process by which tribal resources were used by adventurers in borderlands to carve out kingdoms for themselves where the term *guha*, meaning a cave or to live in a cave, may have been a generic term for tribal peoples (for example, *Guha* the *Niṣāda* in the *Rāmāyaṇa*).

6. Kulait Copper-Plate inscription, *Ibid*, p. 182.

7. vs. 49-61, *Ibid*, p. 91 ff.

8. J. Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*. Oxford 1920, Vol. I. p. 173 ff.



Elsewhere it has been argued that the term *Guhila* means a forest and is to be identified with the area between the *Guhila-bala* and the river *Mahī*.<sup>9</sup> The birth of a prince in a cave need not therefore be taken literally but may be an oblique reference to tribal connections. The story of the recapturing of the kingdom was to legitimize the formation of a kingdom and may not have referred to the inheriting of a patrimony in literal terms. But the claim to the territory would be strengthened if it could be described as a patrimony. Further sanction is obtained by the child being reared or cared for by the family of a *brāhmaṇa* or a *guru*. In some cases it is hinted that the original caste of the family was *brāhmaṇa*. Thus, in the *Guhila* ancestry, the *Atpur* inscription refers to *Guhadatta* as *viprakulānandaḥ*.<sup>10</sup>

The theme however is not restricted to northern India. A parallel origin myth comes from Kerala in the eleventh century text of the *Mūṣakavaṃśakāvya* composed by the court poet *Aṭula*.<sup>11</sup> According to this text, *Paraśurāma*, having slaughtered all the *kṣatriyas* then discovered that he required one for completing a sacrifice. A prince is produced and it is stated that he is the posthumous son of a *kṣatriya* killed by *Paraśurāma*, that he is of *Haihaya* ancestry and that his then pregnant mother was rescued by a *purohita* at the time of the killing of the *kṣatriyas* and was taken to south India for safe-keeping. The child was given birth to in a cave, *guha*. The name *Mūṣaka* was given to the family because of the appearance of an elephant-sized mouse in the cave just before his birth. The lowly status of the mouse is explained by its being in fact the great *Parvatarāja*, the lord of the mountains, inadvertently converted into a mouse by the power of a *ṛṣi*. The child was reared by the *purohita*. On the successful completion of the sacrifice by *Paraśurāma* he bestowed on the child the region of *Elimallai* in northern Malabar as his kingdom and he was consecrated king by *Paraśurāma* himself who libated him with jars of water, hence his full name, *Rāma-ghaṭa-mūṣaka*. (It is curious that the play on the word 'mouse' is maintained in this story since *eli* is the Dravidian term for mouse and *mallai* for mountain). The link with the *Haihayas* locates the ancestry in the *Vindhyan* region or along the *Narbada* and therefore the migration southwards has to be explained. A later section of the text clearly refers to *Mahīṣmatī* as the capital of the *Haihayas*<sup>12</sup> who are usually listed as a segment of the *Candravamśa* lineage in the *Purāṇic*

9. J. N. ASOPA, *Origin of the Rajaputs*, Delhi 1976, p. 102 ff.

10. *Epigraphia Indica*, XXXIX, p. 191.

11. Gopinatha RAO "Extracts from the *Mūṣakavaṃśam*..." *Travancore Archaeological Series* 1916, II, 1. No. 10, pp. 87-113; M. G. S. NARAYANAN, "History from the *Mūṣakavaṃśakāvya* of *Aṭula*," *PAIOC* Jadhavpur, 1969.

12. *Ibid*, section VI.



sources.<sup>13</sup> In claiming links with the lunar lineage, the *Mūṣakavaṃśakāvya* differs a little from the Chamba *vaṃśāvali*.

It would seem then that the stereotype of posthumous birth in a cave and an association with a mouse in the founding ancestry were part of a common heritage among some origin myths of families claiming *kṣatriya* status during the second millennium A. D. The term *Mūṣaka* occurs in early sources as the name of an important tribal people<sup>14</sup> and is sometimes also identified with the Musikenoi/Musicanus who opposed Alexander of Macedon when he was campaigning in northern India. STRABO<sup>15</sup> quotes Onescritus in locating the Musicanus in the southernmost part of India. In a later passage however he locates them near Patalene, generally identified with the delta of the Indus and states that they dwelt along the river lands of the Indus. This raises the obvious question of whether a section of the Musicanus migrated from the Indus delta, perhaps along the west coast and settled in the Elimallai area. This would further suggest that the provenance of the origin myth might have been western India and that the people had as their symbol or totem, the mouse. If the identification of *Mūṣaka* with Musicanus is feasible then they must have been a people of some consequence (as is suggested by the accounts of Alexander's campaigns) and later genealogists would seek links with the name. Or it could be suggested that the bards, who were the keepers of the tradition before it went into the hands of the court poets and the *brāhmaṇas*, had certain stock stereotypes for origin myths and used these indiscriminately, hence the occurrence of parallel stories from areas as far afield as Chamba and Kerala. In the case of Chamba it may be possible to argue that the Guhila tradition had travelled up to the hills with the migration of some Rajput families seeking their fortune in the valleys of the Himalayan foothills and further up. From the inscriptions at Chamba it is clear that the use of terms such as *āditya-vaṃśa* and the *Mūṣaka gotra* are fairly early and if they travelled up from the plains they would date to the post-Gupta period.

It is however worth keeping in mind that the root *\*mūṣ* can also be used for *mūṣaka*, meaning, a thief and a plunderer. Was the term *mūṣaka* a synonym for clans and families which forcibly seized power or welded lineage based societies into monarchical states in spite of being themselves of uncertain origin? The double meaning of *mūṣaka* would then be the only clue to their less salubrious origins. Such a meaning would strengthen the idea of their being born or raised in a forest cave.

13. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, IV. 1. ; F. E. PARGITER, *The Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, London 1922, p. 266.

14. *Mahābhārata*, VI. 10. 62.

15. STRABO, *Geography*, XV. 1. 21 and 33.



Both the Guhila and Chamba sources make a passing reference to Kishkindha but it remains uncertain whether the reference is to the same place (although unidentified) or to two distinct places both of which can be separately identified one being near Udaipur in Rajasthan and the other in the Curah area of Chamba.<sup>16</sup> In the Chamba inscription it is associated with a marriage where the lady, Somaprabhā, is described as of the house of Kishkindha. That the inscription is substantially a eulogy of the lady in unexpectedly fine Sanskrit may hint at her having come from the plains and having introduced through her presence and her entourage the use of a more literary Sanskrit in Chamba than was usual earlier.<sup>17</sup> Possibly the place-name Kishkindha may also have travelled to Chamba in some such fashion.

Another link between the Guhila tradition as recorded by TOD and the Chamba *vaṃśāvali* is the role of the *siddha* and of the Tantric cult. In the Guhila story, Bappa, who actually establishes the kingdom is initiated by a Śaiva ascetic, receives his armour from the goddess Bhavānī and at the most crucial point of his career, when making a bid for the control of Chittor, he meets the *yogi* Gorakhanātha, who gives him a double-edged sword.<sup>18</sup> (The anachronism of Gorakhanātha dating to a period after the founding of the Guhila kingdom is ignored). In the rise of the state of Chamba, the Jogi Carpaṭa Nātha plays an important role as the royal advisor. The inclusion of *yogis* as key persons in the story may have derived from the tendency among the record-keepers of the tradition, the genealogists and chroniclers, often being worshippers of the *kula-devas* and the *śakti* and Tantric cults.<sup>19</sup> Their deities and *gurus* would therefore be involved in the successful establishing of power by the clients of the record keepers. Or alternatively, if the new ruling families had local origins then they may have associated local cult figures with the processes of legitimizing their power. In the case of Chamba the association of the Jogi sect would have been an added support for legitimacy since Tantricism was popular in the foothills of the Himalayas with Mandi and Kangra being major cult centres as also parts of the adjoining plains at Jalandhar, not to mention areas further away such as western Tibet.

There appear to have been two levels of sanction derived from religious systems. With the transfer of the capital from the more remote Brahmapura to the more accessible site of Chamba the sanction seems to have come from the Tantric *siddhas* suggesting that they were the more popular. Sahilavarman who

16. VOGEL, *op. cit.* pp. 180-85.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

18. TOD, *op. cit.* pp. 180-85.

19. cf. N. P. ZEIGLER, "Marwari Historical Chronicles..." *IESHR*, 1979, XIII No. 2, pp. 319-52.



worked towards establishing a powerful state and founded the city of Champakā, is clearly linked with Tantric *siddhas* who grant him the boon of ten sons. His preceptor was the Jogi Carpaṭa and the founding of the city is associated with the goddess Champāvatī. Sahilavarman introduces the worship of *liṅgas*, orders the building of a number of temples and also a sanctuary for Carpaṭa to which he himself eventually retires after installing his son as king. The location of Chamba on a plateau overlooking the confluence of the Ravi and the Saho rivers points to the need for a large and more open location easily accessible to the foothills. The site also provided entry points into the main valleys of the region controlled by the feudatory chiefs or *rāṇās*. The establishing of the new capital probably dated to the end of the first millennium A.D. since the successors of Sahilavarman are referred to in the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* of Kalhaṇa and would date to the eleventh century A.D. The religious sanction is extended to include Vaiṣṇavism as Sahilavarman is also said to have built the important Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa temple at Chamba with its special image made of white marble brought from the Vindhyas. A further Vaiṣṇava association is that of a subsequent king Pratāpasimhavarman who as a devotee of Viṣṇu wished to build yet another temple but was initially unable to finance it. However the discovery of a copper mine in Chamba helped to overcome his obstacle.

It would seem that the sanction of the *siddhas* may have been politically insufficient and consequently the further sanction of Vaiṣṇavism was necessary. This perhaps becomes more significant as the powers of the state are further established and the assimilative ability of Vaiṣṇavism becomes an effective agency of social manipulation by the ruling elite. Whatever the personal religious persuasions of a ruler may have been the fact of his giving public expression to them through large-scale financing and monumental structures inevitably draws these persuasions into the social concerns of the state. The influence of Vaiṣṇavism would also have underlined the indenting on the *itihāsa-purāṇa* tradition for links with the conventional roots of *kṣatriya* culture. The claim to Sūryavaṃśa connections by the ruling family would have tied in with the worship of Rāma both as an ancestor of the royal family as well as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu. Vaiṣṇavism was also in part a reflection of other influences from further away, from the cultural norms and life style of the established kingdoms of the plains. It is significant that the white marble for the image of Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa has to come from the Vindhyas. The financial cost of temple building could only be met after the discovery of a copper mine which would point to the heavy financial outlay required in imitating the trappings of the larger states as also using this for purposes of legitimation. It could be argued that the introduction of the Vaiṣṇava sanction was an interpolation into the *vaṃśāvalī* by *brāhmaṇa* editors. That this was not merely a matter of recording a tradition in a *vaṃśāvalī* but

...55



reflected the growth of brahmanical culture in the region is evident from the epigraphical data registering the granting of land to *brāhmaṇas* which becomes a noticeable feature from this point onwards. That much of the land granted was cultivated land also points to the gradual acculturation of the area with nuclei of *brāhmaṇa* settlements. As was common in many of these kingdoms the *brāhmaṇas* were often invited from sacred centres and in one of the copper-plate grants of Vidagda it is stated that the *brāhmaṇa* Nandu came from Kurukṣetra.<sup>20</sup>

Power relations within the state and with neighbouring states are also reflected in the sources. Thus there are references to close links between Chamba and Kashmir which were initially hostile but later became more amicable with a marriage alliance in the eleventh century,<sup>21</sup> a clear indication that Chamba now had high status and an acceptable culture since the 'high culture' of Kashmir dates back to an earlier period. The acculturation of Chamba is also expressed in the changing forms of the "fountain stones," the memorial stones erected mainly by the families of the *rājās*, in memory of and for the merit of, deceased kinsmen. The earlier stones carry traces of local craftsmanship in the style of carving and the use of space. The later stones depict recognizable deities carved in an elaborate style. There is a noticeable refinement and elegance of all that is included on the stone. The epigraphical data further indicates the administration of the state assuming a form similar to that of other areas of northern India. A large range of feudatories are referred to as well as a hierarchy of administrative officials<sup>22</sup> suggesting that the formalities and embellishments of state functioning were now familiar to the state of Chamba. However the significance of the mouse in the ancestry still remains something of an enigma!

20. VOGEL, *op. cit.* p. 255 ff.

21. Kalhana, *Rājatarangīnī*, VII. 218; 58

22. VOGEL, *op. cit.* p. 120 ff.



## DURONA. N.

By

PAUL THIEME

1. The loc. sing. *duroṇé*, occurring in the RV about 30 times, is given in the Nighaṇṭus (3. 4) among the 'gṛhanāmāni'. The RV has the acc. sing. *duroṇám* three times, and, once, the nominative *idám duroṇám* (5. 76. 4). In the other Samhitās the form *duroṇé* alone is met with. The use of the word is limited to verses, the youngest mantra where it has a place being TS 3. 3. 11. 3, MS 4. 12. 6 ~ AV 7. 17. 3.

*duroṇá-*, not treated as a compound in the RV-Padapāṭha, is divided by TS-Pp. (2. 2. 12. 8, 3. 3. 11. 3): *duroṇá iti duḥ-oné*.

Yāska on RV 5. 4. 5 (Nir. 4. 5): *duroṇa iti gṛhanāma duravā bhavanti dustarpāḥ* " 'duroṇe' is a name of the house (gṛhās). It (the house) is difficult to be helped, [that is:] difficult to be satisfied."<sup>1</sup> He is referred to by Sāyaṇa on RV 5. 4. 5 and quoted on 3. 25. 5. There is a slight difference. While Yāska operates with the meaning *trpti-*, assigned (among many others) to root *av* in the Pāṇinīya-Dhātupāṭha, Sāyaṇa takes *av*, presumed to be contained in the *-ona-* (of *duḥ-oná-*) as standing in the sense of *rakṣaṇa-*, given as the first meaning of *av* in the Dh. P.

Neither 'difficult to be satisfied [by food and drink]' nor 'difficult to be protected' would be a designation of a house that recommends itself easily. Nor is *duroṇa-* ever met with in a context that would refer to the burden of house keeping.

2. Most European linguists have tried to give an altogether different explanation. In deviation from the TS-Pp., from Sāyaṇa and from SB 6. 7. 3. 11 (see below §3), they find the stem *dur-* 'door' in the *dur-* of *duroṇá*, taking either *-ona-* (for *-ona-*) as a taddhita-suffix (thus WACKERNAGEL-DEBRUNNER, Altindische Grammatik II 2 § 354) or proposing to see in *-ona-* a reflex of *onī-* 'arm' (thus RENOÜ, Journal Asiatique 231 (1939), 497).

1. Durga remarks: *uktam ca gṛham upakramya kuṭumbatantrūni hi durbharāni* "When approaching a house (that is; "when getting married"?) it is said: The requirements of a household are, alas, difficult to bear."



Such like attempts<sup>2</sup> at a linguistic analysis are in no way, I am afraid, more plausible than Yāska's. A suffix *-ona-* cannot be supported by any parallel formation either in Sanskrit or in any other Indo-European language. It is just as arbitrary an invention as Sāyaṇa's 'uṇādi' -suffix *na-*, with the help of which he derives *ona-* from the root *av-*. Nor can a *dur-ona-*, which, if formed with *onī-* as a second member, would mean 'whose arms are doors', seriously be looked upon as a likely designation of a 'house' or a 'home'.<sup>3</sup>

3. All explanations of *duroṇā-* offered till now have one, single, merit: they show that the formation of *duroṇā-* cannot be analysed, if we keep within the framework of Sanskrit only.

We start, then, from a stem *\*onā-*, not traceable in Sanskrit otherwise, but explainable as a historically possible equivalent of Greek *eunē* (IE *\*eunā*) 'bedstead'. *duroṇā-* would be 'of bad (*dus*) bedstead (*\*onā*)', that is: '[a house/home] offering a bad bedstead'.

With this we get, surprisingly, in the vicinity of the first paraphrase of *duroṇā-*, which is given us by ŚB 6. 7. 3. 11, commenting on RV 4. 40. 5b, (VS 10. 24b, 12. 14b) *ātithir duroṇasād*:

*duroṇasād viśamasād ity etād "duroṇasād, that is 'taking his seat in an inconvenient/uncomfortable [place/house]'. "*

4. At first blush, both, the paraphrase of the ŚB and my etymological analysis, would seem to be in contradiction to certain statements of the RV, where it is stressed that a *duroṇā-* is a place of comfort and even of enjoyment:<sup>4</sup>

2. For other, if possible even more impossible, suggestions see M. MAYRHOFER, Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen, vol. 1, under *duroṇam* and vol. 3 p. 735.

3. Expressions like *dvārabāhū* (Lāt. 2. 3. 9) "the two arms (sides) of the door" (~ "the two doorposts"), *dakṣiṇasya dvārabāhoḥ* (Lāt. 1. 3. 1) "of the right arm of the door", *dakṣiṇam dvārbāhum* (ĀpSS 11. 8. 5; 14. 29. 1; 15. 19. 10; 21. 17. 18, 19; 21. 18. 12; 21. 19. 5), *dakṣiṇe dvārbāhau* (HirSS, quoted by CALAND, Übersetzung, as parallel to ĀpSS 21. 18. 12), referred to by RENOUE in support of his analysis of *duroṇā-*, obviously cannot help us in swallowing the absurdity of the alleged denomination of a house as "whose arms are doors." Neither grammatically (*dvār(a)bāhu-* being a tatpuruṣa, *duroṇā-* a bahuvrīhi) nor semantically ("doorpost" against "house") can they be called "equivalent" (RENOUE).

N. B.: Several msscripts of ĀpSS write *dakṣiṇam dvārbāhum*, *dvārbāhu* being treated as a feminine, obviously under the influence of its quasi-synonym *dvārasthūnā*. But this is hardly genuine and ought not to be received in the text (as was done by GARBE). Several (good) msscripts write *dakṣiṇam* (see GARBE on 21. 18. 12, 21. 19. 5) and the commentary using the expression *dakṣiṇe dvārbāhau* on 11. 8. 5 certainly must have read *dakṣiṇam*...

4. Contrast *duroṇā-* ' [a lair] of bad lap (that is: 'Offering bad accommodation')' (1. 174. 4, 5. 29. 10, 5. 32. 8) — obviously meaning a grave.



7. 42. 4 — *revāto duroṇé s(i) yonāśir ātithih...* "a guest, lying on [a lair] of good lap<sup>5</sup> (that is: 'a lair offering a good rest') in the *duroṇá-* of a rich man."

8. (76) 87. 2, 10. 40. 13 *mandasānā ... duroṇā ā* "enjoying themselves in the *duroṇá-*".

1. 108. 7 *yād ... svādathaḥ své duroṇé* "when you are savouring [food and drink] in your own *duroṇa-*".

5. Yet, this apparent difficulty can readily be removed. We have to make the easy, even obvious, assumption that the house as 'a place of bad bedstead', 'a place of discomfort' was designated as such originally by the host, when offering hospitality, in a modest, self-deprecatory way — asking the stranger to put up with the inconveniences he may encounter, politely deploring the 'poor accommodation' he, the host, has at his disposal, feigning that even the best he has to proffer is by far not good enough for his honoured guest.

The guest, on his part, would not take this overpolite modesty at its face value. What is called a 'place of bad bedstead', 'place of discomfort' by the host, will be a welcome place of recreation and rest, a shelter or even a refuge, for him. It will be his home, though a temporary one, a place of sojourn only :

Manu 3. 102 *ekarātram tu nivasan*  
*atithir brāhmaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ*  
*anityam hi sthito yasmāt*  
*tasmād atithir<sup>6</sup> ucyate*

According to the context, the connotations of 'hospitality' offering recreation and rest, of 'shelter' and 'refuge', of 'limited sojourn' will alternately step to the foreground. In the following, it will be shown that we shall understand the precise meaning of a number of passages, where *duroṇá-* is used in the RV, better, if we watch out carefully for the varying overtones that of necessity accompany a word that may mean so different things to different persons and on different occasions.

6. Agni, though a 'heavenly one' (*devá-*)<sup>7</sup>, is present on earth as well (1. 128. 3 ... *sádo dádhāna úpareṣu sānuṣu agniḥ páreṣu sānuṣu* "Agni, taking his seat on the upper heights, on the lower heights"), in particular in the

5. *s(i)yoná-* < *\*suyoná-*, like *mithyā* < RV *mithuyā*; *anuṣṭhyā* < RV, AV *anuṣṭhuyā* etc. J. WACKERNAGEL, *Zeitschrift f. vgl. Sprachforschung* (ZvS = früher: KZ) 61, 203 f. = Kl. Schr. 364 f.

6. Kullūka: *anityāvasthānān na vidyate dvitīyā tithir asyety atithir ucyate*.

7. *devá-*, derived from *div-* m. f. 'heaven', is originally an adjective, as the instr. plur. *devébhis* shows (in contrast to the type *āśvais*).



dwellings of man. Hence he may be looked at as 'lord of the house' (*dāmūnas-*, *grhāpati-*), 'lord of the settlements' (*viśpāti-*), or else as guest (*ātithi-*), often as both in the same verse: *dāmūnāḥ ... ātithiḥ* 5. 1. 8, *viśāṃ pátim ... dāmpatim ... ātithim mānuṣānām* 1, 127. 8, *ātithim ... viśvāsāṃ viśāṃ pátim* 6. 15. 1, *ātithim ... grhāpatim* 6. 16. 42 etc. etc.

5. 4. 5ab *agnir dāmūnā ātithir duroṇé* "Agni - lord of the house, guest in the *duroṇá-* (his hospitable temporary home)", 8. 60. 19 *agne ... āproṣivān grhāpatir mahāṃ asi divās pāyur duroṇayúḥ* "Agni, you are, when not gone for a journey, lord of the house, you are the great protector of heaven, [when gone for a journey] you are [a traveller] looking for a *duroṇá-* (hospitable temporary home)."

See also: *vīráśya reváto duroṇé ... ātithiḥ* 7. 42. 4, *hótā veditāḥ ātithir duroṇé* 4. 40. 5b, *mādhye hótā duroṇé ... agniḥ* 6. 12. 1, *nī duroṇé amṛto mártiyanām* 3. 1. 18.

7. While *ātithi-* in the singular is, in the RV, always (more than 40 times) applied to Agni, *ātithi-* in the plural (once in the RV) applies to the gods in general (5. 30. 3a). The gods in general, however, are - in contrast to Agni - guests on a particular occasion, the sacrificial act, only and their place on earth, the house where they receive hospitality, is the sacrificial ground. Rightly, then, does Sāyaṇa paraphrase *duroṇá-* in the contexts where *duroṇá-* is spoken of with reference to other gods also, with *yajñagrha-* 'house of worship', that is: 'sacrificial ground'.

3. 25. 4ab *agne indraś ca dāśúśo duroṇé  
sutāvato yajñām ihópayātam*

"Agni and Indra, come here to the worship in the [hospitable] home of him who shows liberality, who has pressed soma!"

1. 117. 2c *yéna [rathena] gáechatho sukrto duroṇám*

"by the [chariot] by which you (the two Nāsatyas) come to the [hospitable] house of him who acts well [towards you]."

See 1. 183. 1c, 3. 58. 9ab, 4. 13. 1c, 5. 76. 4, 7. 16. 8ab, 7. 92. 3ab.

8. In those cases where it is said that the heavenly come [as guests] to a *duroṇá-*, it is often qualified by a genitive: as *mānuṣas* 'belonging to man' (7. 70. 2, 8. 76 (87). 2, 10. 40. 13, 104. 4), as *mártiyanām* (3. 1. 18), as *vīráśya reváto* (7. 42. 4), as *sutāvatas* (3. 25. 4), *dāśúśas* (3. 25. 4), *sukṛtas*.

8. *vedi-*, in the RV, is the *barhis* strewn round the *āhavanīya* fire; *ātithir duroṇé* may refer to the *gārhapatya*. As *āhavanīya*, Agni is *hotṛ* (see 1. 1. 1. *agnim ... pūróhitam hótāram* 'Agni, placed in the east (as *āhavanīya*), the *hotṛ*').



(1. 117. 2, 183. 1-4. 13. 1), *stotúr* 'of one who will bestow praise' (3. 18. 5): the genitive always designates the real owner of the *duroṇá*.

When *duroṇá* is qualified by *svá*-, this must be understood in different ways, according to the context.

9. Sometimes we have to understand the expression *svá-duroṇá* as 'the place belonging to him as his usual place of sojourn'.

7. 12. 1ab *áganma mahá námasā yáviṣṭham*  
*yó didāya samiddhāh své duroṇé*

"We have come with great reverence to the youngest [Agni] (that is: 'the *āhavanīya* fire'<sup>9</sup>), who shines, kindled in his own *duroṇá* (that is: 'in his usual place of sojourn')."

See 5. 1. 8ab *mārjālyò mrjyate své dāmūnāh*  
*kavipraśastó átithir duroṇé*

"He (Agni) is rubbed (massaged, that is 'lovingly cared for') as lord of the house in his own [home], as a guest (at the same time<sup>10</sup>) [is he] praised by the poet in his [own] home of sojourn."

6. 41. 1cd *gāvo ná varjin svām óka ácchā-*  
*índrā gahi prathamó yajñīyānām*

"Come as the first of those deserving worship towards your own [hospitable] place [of sojourn], you with the cudgel, like cows go towards their own habitual place (habitation) [in the evening]."

10. Sometimes, however, *svá-duroṇá* is the 'place belonging to him who offers hospitality'.

4. 4. 7 *séd agne astu subhágah sudāmur*  
*yás tvā nityam haviṣā yá ukthāh*  
*pīpriṣati svá áyusi duroṇé*  
*vīśvéd asmai sudínā sāsad iṣṭih*

"Let him be happy... who wants to please you (Agni) continuously by [sacrificial] pouring, by words [of praise] in his *duroṇá* (his own hospitable home) for [to win] life<sup>11</sup> — let all [days] be of good day [light] (that is: 'sunny, serene') for him! This will be our wish."

9. The third of the three brothers as which the three sacrificial fires are spoken of in 1. 164. 1.

10. See above § 6.

11. I take *áyusi* to be a loc. of aim like e. g.: *agnim... toké tánaye... imāhe* (8. (60) 71. 13) "we come to Agni for [to win] progeny": B. DELBRÜCK, *Altindische Syntax* (1888), 119.



See 3. 51. 9 ...*pibatu vṛtrakhādāḥ sutām sómam dāśúsah své sad-  
hasthe* "let Indra drink the pressed soma in the own place of the liberal  
[host]."

Here belongs :

1. 108. 7 *yád indrāgnī svádathah své duroṇé  
yád brahmāṇi rājani vā yajatrā  
ātah pári vṛṣaṇāv ā hí yātām  
áthā sómasya pibatam sutásya*

"When you, Indra and Agni, are savouring [food and drink] in your own  
[hospitable] home [as hosts together with your guests], or when at a *brahmán*  
( 'poet' ) or at a king [as guests] — come from there here, you bulls, and drink  
of the pressed soma."

Sometimes, when *duroṇá-* is qualified neither by a genitive nor by *svá-*,  
we are free to interpret it as spoken from the standpoint either of the host or of  
the guest :

4. 24. 8cd *ácikradad vṛṣaṇam pátny áccḥā  
duroṇá ā nīsitam somasúdbhiḥ*

"The wife called the bull (Indra) towards [his house], when he had been made  
sharp (that is 'made keen [to drink more soma]') by those pressing soma in the  
*duroṇá*-<sup>12</sup> (that is either 'in their hospitable home' or 'in his temporary home  
[where he was staying as a guest]') ."

11. The *duroṇá-* is not only spoken of in relation to the hospitality offered  
to Agni, the heavenly guest in the house of men, or to the gods (inclusive of  
Agni) on the sacrificial ground. It is not, by origin a "religious" or "poetical  
term", but is taken, as our etymological analysis would suggest, from everyday  
language as used in everyday situations.

10. 37. 10cd *yáthā sám ádhvañ chám ásad duroṇé  
tát sūrya dráviṇam dhehi citrám*

"That there will be [for us] weal [when travelling] on the road, weal [when  
resting] in a [hospitable] home, — that splendid endowment give us, Sūrya!"

Sūrya of whom it is said : *yo na tandrayate caran* (AitBr. 7. 15. 5)  
seems an apt protector of a traveller.

12. Rightly construed by Sāyaṇa (*durone yajñagrhe somasudbhiḥ ... tikṣṇīkṛtam*).  
*ácchā* cannot be construed with *duroṇá ā* (thus GELDNER), since *ácchā* 'towards' is  
construed with the accusative only, in the RV. Contrast RV 9. 91. 1d *ájanti váhniṃ  
sádanāny áccha* ; SV 1. 54. 3d *mṛjánti váhniṃ sádanēṣu áccha*. See GRASSMANN,  
Wörterbuch, on *ácchā*.



As the poet speaks of the *ṛtasya dhāman-*, *yōni-*, *sādana-*, *sādman-* etc., he speaks of its *duroṇā-* : *ṛtasya duroṇé* 1. 60. 5.

As he speaks of the *sadhástha-* of the water, he speaks of its *duroṇā-* : 3. 25. 5a *agne apām sám idhyase duroṇé* (see 1. 149. 4c *hótā yájiṣṭho apām sadhásthe*, 1, 195. 2).<sup>13</sup>

Agni is born from different places, from the water, the stone, the wood, the plants, [in the house] of men<sup>14</sup> :

2. 1. 1 ...*tvām adbhyás tvām áśmanas pári*  
*tvām vānebhyaś tvām óṣadhībhyas*  
*tvām nṛṇām nṛpate jāyase śúcīḥ*

He is *adrijá-* : 4. 40. 5. The stone may be looked upon also as his *duroṇā-* "his temporary home" :

1. 70. 4c *ádrau cid asmā antár duroṇé*

"even inside the stone is it for him as in a [hospitable] home".

12. We are quite within the domain of human relations in some other cases :

1. 117. 7cd *ghóṣāyai cit pitṛśáde duroṇé*  
*pátim júrjantyā áśvināv adattam*

"Even to Ghóṣā, sitting at her father's/parents', aging in [her] *duroṇā-*, you gave a husband, you Áśvin."

After reaching the marriageable age, Ghóṣā is as it were a guest in her father's house. "I have given you a home long enough" says the Spanish mother to her daughter, who keeps on refusing to accept any suitor, in Somerset MAUGHAM's short story "The romantic young lady".<sup>15</sup>

In contrast to a daughter, a son has a right to the house where he is born.

8. 19. 27a *pitúr ná putráḥ súbhṛto duroṇā ā*

"[Agni is] well kept in his place of sojourn ([*mānuṣo*] *duroṇé*) like a son in his father's [house : *dāme*]."

13. I shall not here try to answer the question what precisely was in the poet's mind when speaking of "the place of sojourn of the truth" or of "the place" or "the place of sojourn of the water."

14. An elliptic genitive (like *nṛṇām* in 2. 1. 1d) often — also in Vedic prose — requires to be supplied by the idea "house, place" : DELBRÜCK, *Altindische Syntax* (1888) 9ff. See below § 12, translation of 1. 117. 7cd and 8. 19. 27a.

15. The complete short stories, vol. I (London 1975).

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1. 69. 4 *putró ná jātó raṇvó duroṇé*

“agreeable (that is something like ‘welcome’) [as a guest] in his place of sojourn like a son born [in his father’s house].”

The connotations of “temporariness” and, even more strongly, of “shelter, refuge” are dominant in :

4. 28. 3 *áhann índro ádahad agníḥ*

...*dásyūn...*

*durgé duroṇé kratvá ná yātām*

*purú sahásrā śārvā ní barhīt*

“he (Indra) stretched down with his weapon many thousands [of them] in their inaccessible *duroṇá-* (that is : ‘their place of refuge in the mountains’), as if they were riding (that is : ‘advancing in their chariots’) with a strong will [to fight].”<sup>16</sup>

The sense seems to be : Indra slew them in their inaccessible mountain refuge with the same ease as if they had engaged in open battle.

13. There is one passage in the RV where we should take *duroṇé*, in deviation from the RV-Pp. and all commentaries and translators, not as a loc. sing. but as an acc. dual :

3. 14. 3 *drávatām ta uśásā vājáyanti*

*agne vátasya pathābhir áccha*

*yāt śim añjānti pūrvyām havirbhir*

*ā vandhúreva<sup>17</sup> tasthatur duroṇé*

“Let Dawn and Night run (that is : ‘although they may run’<sup>18</sup>) towards your [place], Agni, racing one another on the paths of the wind — [yet,] when they

16. See 7. 48. 1cd *ā vo ’rvācaḥ krátavo ná yātām*

*vibhvo rátham náryam vartayantu*

“Let your strong will [to come] turn you in the direction towards [us], as the strong will [to fight] of the riding ones (that is : chariot fighters’) turns the manly (that is ‘fighting’) chariot in the direction towards [the enemy].”

Somewhat differently on *kratvá ná yātām* : OLDENBERG, *Noten* on 4. 28. 3 and 7. 48. 1. Unacceptable GELDNER’s translation, who wants to take *durgá-* as ‘gemieden’ (shunned) (!) and to equate *duroṇá-* here with *duryoṇá-*, which however, in contrast to *duroṇá-*, is accompanied by bad associations only (see above § 3. note 4). If I am not quite mistaken, a ‘grave’ could never be called a *duroṇá-* “a hospitable place of sojourn.”

17. *vandhúrā* : acc. dual of *vandhúr-* m. ‘chariot stand’ (1. 34. 9).

18. *drávatām* is to be taken as a “concessive” imperative. See e. g. 3. 33. 13ab *íd va ūrmīḥ śamyā hantv ōpo yókrāni mūñcata* “Although your wave may drive up

(Continued on the next page)



(the sacrificing mortals) anoint him (Agni) as the first one with [sacrificial] pourings [of ghee] (that is : 'right at the beginning of the sacrifice'), they (Dawn and Night) have stepped into their [respective] two houses [of sojourn] like [two charioteers] on their [respective] two chariot stands [and thus cannot both be present at the sacrifice]."

*duroṇé* cannot be loc. sing. here, as this would mean that both, Dawn and Night, have come to the sacrificial ground together. When morning is breaking – and this is the exact time the sacrificial rites are starting – "darkness has gone away – light is coming – it (darkness) has left the path free for the sun to go."<sup>19</sup>

The picture presented by our verse (3. 14. 3) may be lacking in the strict logics dictated by natural science, yet, as a poetic imagery it is perfect and wonderful.

14. It is comparatively seldom that we can analyse a Sanskrit compound only by identifying one of its members by means of a cognate word in another IE language. The inverse happens more often.

The Greek compounds with the "strengthening particle" *eri-*, *ari-* as a first member, become explainable if we identify *eri-* with *arí-* m. — 'enemy' in classical Sanskrit, but 'stranger' (who can be looked upon as a "friend" when he is received as a guest) in the RV.<sup>20</sup>

Thus we can understand Homeric *erikūdēs* 'of great fame' as 'he whose fame is [even] at the stranger's [place]' (see *aryāḥ śrāvāmsi* 10. 116. 6a "fame at the stranger's",<sup>21</sup> *ariṣṭutāḥ* 8. 1. 22, *arigūrtāḥ* 1. 186. 3 "praised by the stranger [and not by his own people only]").

A problem is offered by the Homeric byword of god Hermes : *eriounēs*. I tried at the time<sup>22</sup> to translate "helping the stranger". However, the fact of there being a root *on* 'to be useful to' in Greek, but no noun like \**ónos* n. derived from it, and, besides, the length in the first syllable of *-ounēs*, create

(Continued from the last page)

[already] the pins of the yoke, yet, waters, give free the harness", 10. 108. 6bcd *aniṣavyās tanvāḥ santu pūpīḥ adhr̥ṣto va itavā astu pānthū bṛhāspātīr va ubhayā nā mṛṣāt* "although your ... bodies may not be reached by arrows..., yet Bṛhaspati .. will not show mercy to you."

19. RV 1. 113, 16bc *āpa prāgāt tāma ā jyōtir eti āraik pānthū yātave sāryūya*

20. See THIEME, *Der Fremdling im Rigveda* (1938).

21. See THIEME, *Fremdling*, 72.

22. *Fremdling*, 165.



difficulties. Should the word not contain *eunē* 'bedstead' and originally mean 'whose bedstead is at the stranger's?' "

Semantically, this would fit very well. Hermes, with Homer, is the messenger of the gods, as Agni is (in his own way, of course). *Hérēmēs eribunēs* might then well receive light from RV 10. 110. 1 *samidhó... mānuṣo duroṇé... tvām* (Agni) *dūtāh*.

Nor can there be any grammatical objection.<sup>23</sup> Old Greek feminine stems in *ā* (hom. *ē*) as second members of bahuvrīhis are either turned into o-stems: *pūlē* 'door': *heptā-pulos* 'of seven doors', or else turned into *ā/ē*-masculines: *eurupulēs*.

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23. See E. Risch, *Homerische Wortbildung*<sup>2</sup> (1974), pp. 226 ff., E. Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik I* (1939, 513, 355 (Zusatz 2), for a fuller account of the details referred to in my following short discussion.



## THE LEGEND OF THE DESTRUCTION OF TRIPURA AND ITS VEDIC ORIGIN

By

GAYA CHARAN TRIPATHI

One of the most common adjectives of Lord Śiva is *tripurāri* — 'the enemy of the three cities' which he has earned by burning down the three metallic cities of the demons which consisted of gold, silver and iron respectively. These cities used to revolve round the earth with different speeds, according to the legend, much on the lines of modern satellites and could be assailed collectively only once in a year when all the three met at a point. The Asuras oppressed the gods. They came out of their walled cities (*purāḥ*), attacked the gods and by the time the gods got themselves ready to combat them, they retreated to their moving cities and made off with them. Rendered helpless, the gods approached Rudra-Śiva with the request to burn down the three cities with his fierce arrows. Rudra agreed to it and exactly at the moment when all the three cities were in a straight line, he shot his fierce arrow setting ablaze all the cities at a time.

The legend has an uncommon character and an unusual content. It is not one of the hackneyed type of the 'Devāsura' legends available in hundreds in the Brāhmaṇic and Purāṇic literature.<sup>1</sup> Strange are also the weapons and other implements which are used in this cosmic warfare. The earth itself serves the purpose of a war chariot, the Sun and the Moon are the two wheels, the seasons (*ṛtus*) are the six horses. No less a person than Lord Brahmā holds the reins of these horses as the charioteer. Whereas the Himalayas extending from the East to the West come handy as a bow, Lord Viṣṇu offers himself as a deadly arrow for the whole operation. Nice has Puṣpadanta remarked in his *Mahimnastava* on this unusual preparation of war :

रथः क्षोणी यन्ता शतधृतिरगेन्द्रो धनुरथो  
रथाङ्गे चन्द्राकौ रथचरणपाणिः शर इति ।

1. A philosophical interpretation of the story is attempted by Km. Bhakti Sudha MUKHOPADHYAYA in her article "The Tripura Episode in Sanskrit Literature" published in the *Journal of Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol. VIII (1951), 371-395. According to her, the destruction of Tripura is 'a mythological representation of the spiritual phenomenon of the destruction of *Avidyā*' whereas the three cities (*Citadels*) represent three bodies — *sthūla*, *sūkṣma* and *kūṛāṇa* (since 'puram' can mean 'body') or the three stages *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *suṣupti*. 'The pure self is beyond these stages and self-realisation is possible when these are transcended' (p. 377). She adds: 'Most humbly it can be presumed that such an interpretation will clarify the mystic and legendary character of the story' (*ibid*).



दिधक्षोस्ते कोऽयं त्रिपुरतृणमाडम्बरविधिः

विधेयैः क्रीडन्त्यो न खलु परतन्त्राः प्रभुधियः ॥ (Śl. 18)

“...Why all this bombast and show-off, O Lord, just to burn down a blade of grass in form of Tripura? The one who is omnipotent, surely, need not play with such means to attain his objectives!”

Detailed description of the preparation and conduction of this cosmic war are found in the *Karṇa-parva* of *Mbh.* (Adhy. 33), *Matsya-P.* (Adhy. 128-139), *Padma-P.*, (Ādikhaṇḍa, Adhy. 15), *Linga-P.* (I. 70-72), *Śiva-P.* (Rudrasaṃhitā, V. 1-12), *Skanda-P.* (Avantikhaṇḍa, Revākhaṇḍa, Adhy. 26-28) and *Saura-P.* (Adhy. 34-35) etc. The Purāṇas, however, treat this chariot mostly as a representative of Time. Its various parts are said to be consisting of the different measurements of time. The *Linga-Purāṇa*, e. g., narrates that the right and the left wheels of the chariot consisted of the Sun and the Moon respectively. The right wheel had twelve spokes (symbolising the months) and the left one sixteen (symbolising the phases of the moon). The two wheels had six felloes symbolising the six seasons :

रथाङ्गं दक्षिणं सूर्यस्तद्वामं स्तोम एव च ।  
दक्षिणं द्वादशारं हि षोडशारं तथोत्तरम् ॥  
अरेषु तेषु विप्रेन्द्र आदित्या द्वादशैव तु ।  
शशिनः षोडशारास्तु कला वामस्य सुव्रत ॥  
ऋतवो नेमयः षट् च तयोर्वै विप्रपुङ्गव

(*Śiva-Purāṇa* [Rudra-S.], V. 1)

The allegory proceeds further. The two wheel-joints are declared to be the two solstices (*ayane*). Its seat consists of the *muhūrtas*, the yoke-pins of the *kalās*, the nozzle of the yoke of the *kāṣṭhās*, the axle of the *kṣaṇas* and the *anukarṣa* and *iṣā* respectively of the *nimeṣas* and the *anulavas*. The reins of this unusual chariot are held by the gods whereas god Brahmā functions as the charioteer with the whip of *Prāṇava* in his hand. Himālaya serves as the bow and Vāsuki as the bow-string. The arrow is made up of Viṣṇu with Agni serving the purpose of the tip of the arrow. The chariot is a studded with heavenly stars and is pulled by the four Vedas in the form of horses.<sup>2</sup>

The above description represents Time or *kāla* as the ultimate Annihilator of everything, as an element which is identical with Death. Only the Imperishable one who has conquered the death (*mṛtyuṇījaya*) or the one who lies beyond the effects of *kāla* (i.e. Śiva as *Mahākāla*) can utilize *kāla* as an instrument to destroy the inimical forces hampering the normal course of the Universe.

2. *Śiva-Purāṇa*, Rudra-Saṃhitā, 5th Khaṇḍa, Adhy. 1, Śl. 6 to 27.



However, if one were to trace back the legend to its Vedic sources, it would become evident that the picturesque description of the chariot, horses, charioteer and the weapons used in the above warfare are but later embellishments of apparently simple ritualistic references found in the *Samhitās* of *Yajurveda* and some *Brāhmaṇas*. The nucleus of the story as it is found in the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* 6. 2. 3, *Maitrāyaṇī-saṃhitā* 3. 8. 1, *Kaṭha-saṃhitā* 24. 10, *Kāpi-ṣṭhala-saṃhitā* 38. 3, *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* 4. 6-8 and *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* III. 3. 5. 3-20 etc. is as follows :

‘Devas and Asuras vied with each other to get suzerainty over these worlds. The Asuras converted these three worlds into fortresses. Out of the earth they made a fortress of iron, out of the mid-region a fortress of silver and out of sky a fortress of gold. The gods counselled among themselves and decided to counter the move of the demons with the sacrificial rite of *upasad*. With the first *upasad* they drove them away from this world, with the second from the mid-region and with the third from the region of the sky’ :

देवासुरा वा एषु लोकेषु समयतन्त । ते वा असुरा इमान् एव  
लोकान् पुरोऽकुर्वन्त यथा ओजीयांसो बलीयांस एवम् । ते वा  
अयस्सीम् एव इमाम् अकुर्वन्त रजतामन्तरिक्षं हरिणीं  
दिवम् ... । ते देवा अब्रुवन् उपसद उपायाम । उपसदा वै  
महापुरं जयन्तीति । तथेति । ते यामेव प्रथमा उपसदम्  
उपायंस्तथा एव एनान् अस्माल्लोकाद् अनुदन्त, यां द्वितीयां  
तथा अन्तरिक्षाद्, यां तृतीयां तथा दिवः । ( *Ait. Br.* 4. 6 )

A little later the *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa* describes the weaponic nature of the *upasads*. An *upasad* works like an arrow, it says, of which the point (*anika*) is made up of Agni, the arrow-head of Soma, the shaft of Viṣṇu and the feathers of Varuṇa. It was shot with the bow of clarified butter —

इषुं वा एतां देवा समस्कुर्वन्त यदुपसदः । तस्य अग्निनीक-  
मासीत्, सोमः शल्यो, विष्णुस्तेजनं, वरुणः पर्णानि । ताम्  
आज्यधन्वानो व्यसृजन् । ( *Ait. Br.* 4. 8 )

It would perhaps be necessary here to know a little about the rite of *upasad*. The sub-rite of *upasad* is an *iṣṭi* forming part of the rite of *Pravargya* which is an important rite of the Soma sacrifice.

The Vedic sacrifices are broadly classified into five groups, viz. *Agnihotra* (daily fire-sacrifice), *Daśapūrṇamāsa* (the new and full-moon sacrifice), *Cāturmāsya* (four-monthly sacrifice), *Paśuyāga* (animal sacrifice) and *Somayāga* or *Agniṣṭoma* (Soma sacrifice). Of these the last or the *Somayāga* lasts usually for five days. The first day is dedicated to the preparation of the sacrifice and for the consecration of the *Yajamāna*. On this day an earthen pot called *mahāvīra* is prepared by kneading together common



earth, the earth brought from an anthill and the earth upturned by a boar. To the mixture are added some goat-milk, *pūtikā*<sup>3</sup> and seeds of *gavedhuka* grass. The pot thus prepared has the shape of a mortar (*ulūkhala*). Soma is bought on the second day of the Yāga and the extraction of juice starts after an *iṣṭi* (*ātithyeṣṭi*) to Viṣṇu. Thereafter the act of *Pravargya* takes place which must not be watched by the wife of the Yajamāna.

For performance of the act of *Pravargya*, two sand-platforms having a measurement of one cubit square each are first made towards the north of *Gārhapatya* and *Āhavanīya* fires. Fire is made on these platforms with the help of *muñja* grass and stands are placed on it. On the stands are then placed the *maḥāvīra* pots and melted ghee is then poured into them to the recitation of the mantras (mainly the *praṇava*). When the ghee becomes excessively hot, the pot is taken down from the fire with the help of tongs and some goat's milk is poured into it. This milk gets lightly fired in the heated ghee. Thereupon some cow's milk is added to the mixture. The whole thing is known as *gharma*. Offerings are made with this to *Āsvins*, *Vāyu*, *Indra* and *Savitṛ* etc.

The *Pravargya* is such an important act of *Somayāga* that it is considered to be the 'head' of the Soma sacrifice,<sup>4</sup> cf. :

*tau (āsvinau) etad yajñasya śiraḥ pratyadhattam yat pravargyaḥ (Taittirīya Br. 5. 1. 7)*

and

*yat pravargyam pravṛñjanti tad yajñasya eva tac chiraḥ pratidadhāti (Pañcaviṃśa Br. 7. 5. 6)*

The *upasad iṣṭi* is then performed towards the North of the *Yajñasālā*. It consists of pouring into the *Āhavanīya* fire oblations of clarified butter with *juhū* for the deities *Agni*, *Soma* and *Viṣṇu* respectively. While offering these oblations two *ṛks* of *Rgveda* are recited for each of the deities, i. e. *RV* VI. 16. 34, 39 for *Agni*; *RV* I. 91. 5, 12 for *Soma* and *RV* I. 22. 17, 18 for *Viṣṇu*.

3. Under this term one understands a sort of creeper which serves as a substitute for Soma. In a learned article recently published in the *Journal of American Oriental Society*, Vol. 102, 4 (1983), however, R. G. WASSON has endeavoured to prove that this term denotes a variety of mushroom which starts stinking soon after it is plucked due to its toxic juice (cf. pp. 591 ff.). This theory is a part of the conviction of WASSON that Soma is originally a Mushroom (Fly-agaric). See his work *Soma — The divine Mushroom of Immortality*, Chicago, 1968.

4. The concept of *Pravargya* as the head of sacrifice (which is identical with *Viṣṇu*) plays an important role in the development of the legend of *Dadhyañc* and the myth of *Viṣṇu* assuming the form of *Hayagrīva*. For details see my article "Hayagrīva as Demon and God in Indian Mythology" in *Ritam* (Lucknow), Vol. XI-XV (Baburam Saxena Fel. Vol.), 1983, pp. 497-98.



(cf. *Ait. Br.* 4. 8). The *iṣṭi* is concluded with oblations of ghee called *upasad-homa* performed with *sruva* (instead of *juhū*).

The rite of *upasad* is performed twice a day, in the forenoon and afternoon respectively, for continuously three days. It starts on the second day of the *Somayāga* and continues through the third and the fourth days. This *iṣṭi* is thus performed altogether six times in a *Somayāga*. For further details of the *iṣṭi* one may consult *ĀśvaśŚ.* V. 8; *ŚāṅkhśŚ.* V. 11; *KātyśŚ.* VIII. 33f; *BaudhśŚ.* VI. 20ff. and *ĀpśŚ.* XI. 2. 12-3. 12 etc.

In the whole complex of mantras and verses uttered at the time of the performance the rite of *Upasad*, we are especially concerned with the *prāyaścitta* mantra addressed to Agni towards the end of the *iṣṭi* with a view to make good for any possible shortcoming in the rite. This mantra has a direct bearing upon the development of our legend. In the forenoon of the first day of the *Upasads*, the sacrificer offers oblation to that form of Agni which lies (or is established) in the iron with the words :

या ते अग्ने अयःशया तनूर्वर्षिष्ठा गह्वरेष्ठा, उग्रं वचो अपावधीत्,  
त्वेपं वचो अपावधीत्, स्वाहा । ( *Vāj. Sam.* V. 8 )

“ That form of time, O Agni, which rests in the iron, that which is the seniormost of all and which resides in the cleft, by that one has driven away harsh words, with that one has driven away the forceful words. Hail thee ! ”

This mantra is found with slight variations in the *Taittirīya-Saṃhitā* I. 2. 11 (*ayāśayā* for *ayaḥśayā* and *apāvadhīm* for *apāvadhīt*), *Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitā* I. 2. 7 (*ayāśayā* for *ayaḥśayā*, *gahaneṣṭhā* for *gahvareṣṭhā* and *apāvadhīḥ* for *apāvadhīt*) and *Kāthaka-Saṃhitā* II. 8 (*ayāśayā*, *gahaneṣṭhā*, *apāvadhīt*) as well. A concordance of these and other related mantras is given in the Sanskrit section of the *Śrautakośa*.<sup>5</sup> With the verb forms occurring in 2nd person (*apāvadhīḥ*) or 1st person (*apāvadhīm*) the sense of the sentence is of course changed to : ‘ O Agni, you have driven away...’ or ‘ I have driven away...’ etc.

On the second day the same mantra is addressed to Agni with the only variation *rajaḥ śayā* ( *VS* ) or *rajāśayā* ( *TS, MS, KS* ) for *ayaḥśayā*. For the third day this expression is changed into *hariśayā* in the *Vāj. Sam.* for which we have a variant reading *harāśayā* in the texts of Black *Yajurveda* and *hariśayā* in *VS - Kāṇva*.

Whereas the Agni thus has an *ayaḥśayā* ( or *ayāśayā* ) *tanūḥ* on the first day, it is said to have a *rajaḥśayā* ( *rajāśayā* ) *tanūḥ* on the second day

5. Cf. *Śrautakośa*, Vol. II, Pt. I ( Poona 1970 ), pp. 130-146.  
...57



and a *hari-śayā* (*harā-śayā*) *tanūh* on the final day of the *upasads*. Of these the meaning of *ayas* is more or less certain. It means either iron or bronze.<sup>6</sup> Agni is twice mentioned as *ayo-daṁṣṭra*, i. e. having teeth of *ayas* in the *Rgveda* (I. 88. 5, X. 87. 2). Black is also the colour of the earth (= *annam*) in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI. 4 as against white and red of the water and the fire respectively. The word *rajas* denotes 'brightness' or 'whiteness'. In the *Rgveda* the mid-region, i. e. the region between the earth and the sky is known as such because it is filled up with the brightness of the sun-rays. Sāyaṇa in his commentary on *Ait. Br.* 4. 8 takes it to mean silver i. e. a synonym of later *rajata* (n.). As far as the word *hari* is concerned, it is not attested in the sense of gold. However, the original meaning of this word is 'greenish-yellow' or 'pale-yellow' colour and as such it stands for and denotes a number of objects having this colour such as Viṣṇu, Indra, lion, monkey, peacock, serpent (yellowish), horse, jackal as well as the rays of sun. The word *harina* (gazelle) also seems to be connected with it. It is the colour of the gold which is so deeply connected with gods and the highest region. The solar god Savitr is, for example, called *hiranyākṣa* (*RV* I. 35. 8), *hiranyabāhu* (VI. 71. 1), *hiranyahasta* (I. 35. 10), *hiranyapāṇi* (I. 35. 9) and *hiranyajihva* (VI. 71. 3).<sup>7</sup> It is, therefore, likely that the expression *hariśayā* (*tanū*) means 'that form of Agni which is of golden hue' and is associated with heaven. The three *tanūs* of Agni, therefore, are the forms which are associated with the *earth*, the *mid-region* and the *heaven* respectively and also with the metals *iron*, *silver* and *gold*.

This is the passage which unmistakably supplies the clue for the development of the concept of the three walled cities or citadels of the demons. The demons convert these worlds into three fortresses. But since the earth is associated with the iron-form of Agni, the fortress of demons on earth is said to be consisting of iron; since the mid-region is associated with the silver form of Agni, the fortress of demons in this region is said to be made of silver and, finally because of the association of heaven with the golden form of Agni, the third fortress of demons is said to be made of gold.

The constitution of the arrow of Rudra-Śiva with which the three fortifications of the demons are destroyed becomes quite clear when the details of the nature of this *Upasad-iṣṭi* are properly comprehended. The *iṣṭi* of *Upasad*, it is said, drives away the evil demonic forces. In this *iṣṭi* oblations are offered to the gods Agni, Soma and Viṣṇu respectively. With the help of these three gods, the sacrificer repels the demons. These three gods, therefore, function more or less

6. MACDONELL and KEITH, *Vedic Index*, sub-voce *Rajas* (Vol. I, p. 31).

7. A. A. MACDONELL, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 32, 93.



like an arrow which destroys the habitats of demons and drives them away. It is, therefore, allegorically described later (*Ait. Br.* 4. 8) that with the help of an arrow consisting of Agni as its point, Soma as its head and Viṣṇu as its shaft the gods destroyed the fortresses and drove away the demons from these three worlds :

इष्टुं वा एतां देवाः समस्कुर्वत यदुपसदः । तस्या अग्निरनीक-  
मासीत् सोमः शल्यः विष्णुस्तेजनं वरुणः पर्णानि । तमाज्य-  
धन्वानो व्यसृजन् । तया पुरो भिन्दन्त आयन् । (*Ait. Br.* 4. 8)

In the Purāṇas the gods Agni and Soma are dropped altogether as constituents of the arrow and it is only Viṣṇu who serves this purpose (cf. *rathacaraṇa-pāṇih śara iti*). That the arrow is, however, still full of ignite force is proved by the fact that instead of hitting someone directly, it causes fire in the three fortresses of the demons which burns them down.

Let us now turn to the significance of the term *upasad*. In the passage from *Ait. Br.* (4. 6) quoted above, it has been remarked that 'through *upasad* one can conquer [even] a big fortress' (*upasadā vai mahāpuram jayanti iti*). This general remark helps in determining the meaning of the term. The word *upa + sad* means to sit around, to besiege. *Upasad* as a noun (fem.), therefore, clearly means a 'siege'. Just as one conquers big forts and fortresses by besieging and beleaguering them, so also gods could conquer the demons through the ritualistic act of *upasad*. Against the invisible enemies of gods who lie hidden in the non-physical dwellings of 'year' (*samvatsara*) and 'months' etc. only this sort of ritualistic *upasad* could be effective. The above meaning of the term *upasad* is supplied by *Śatapatha-Br.* III. 3. 5. 4; cf. :

त एताभिः उपसद्भिः उपासीदन्<sup>8</sup> । तद् यदुपासीदन् तस्मादु-  
पसदो नाम । ते पुरः प्राभिन्दन्, इमान् लोकान् प्राजयन् ।  
तस्मादाहुः उपसदा पुरं जयन्तीति । यदहोपासते तेनामां  
मानुषीं पुरं जयन्ति । (*Ś. Br.* III. 3. 5. 4)

The *Śatapatha* further states that whosoever sacrifices with the *upasads*, creates, as it were, a thunderbolt for himself against his enemies. The point of this thunderbolt is Agni, the arrow-head Soma and the shaft (*kulmala*) Viṣṇu :

यदेता देवता यजति वज्रमेवैतत् संस्करोति । अग्निमनीकं सोमं  
शल्यं विष्णुं कुलमलम् । (*Ś. Br.* III. 3. 5. 4)

In the references quoted above, Rudra has not yet come into picture. It is the gods who try to drive away their enemies through the *upasads*. Such references on the merit of different sacrificial rites are found in abundance in the

8. असुरनिर्गमनप्रतिबन्धात् त्रीणि पुराण्यावृत्त्य न्यवसन्नित्यर्थः । — Sāyaṇa



Brāhmaṇas and they do not necessarily form part of a legend. But this reference assumes the character of a legend in the *Taittirīya-* and the *Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitās* with the introduction of Rudra. The gods, through the *upasads*, are able to prepare a deadly arrow consisting of Agni, Soma and Viṣṇu against their enemies. Now arises the problem : who is to shoot that arrow ? Rudra is the natural and unanimous choice. When the gods approach Rudra for performing this act, he agrees to do it provided the gods make him the lord of animals. The gods agree to it and Rudra shoots the arrow dispelling the demons from these worlds :

तेषामसुराणां तिस्रः पुर आसन् अयस्मय्यवमास्थ रजतास्थ  
हरिणी । ता देवा जेतुं नाशकुवन् । ता उपसदैवाजिगीषन् ।  
तस्मादाहुयश्च वेद यश्च नोपसदा वै महापुरं जयन्तीति । ते इष्टुं  
समस्कुर्वन्त अग्निमनीकं सोमं शव्यं विष्णुं तेजनम् । तेऽब्रुवन्  
क इमाम् असिष्यतीति रुद्र इत्यब्रुवन् । रुद्रो वै क्रूरः ।  
सोऽस्यतु इति । सोऽब्रवीद् वरं वृणा अहमेव पशूनामधिपतिः  
असानीति । तस्माद्रुद्रः पशूनामधिपतिः । तां रुद्रोऽवासृजत् ।  
स तिस्रः पुरो भित्त्वैभ्यो लोकेभ्योऽसुरान् प्राणुदत् ।

( *Taittirīya Sam.* VI. 2. 3 )

The *Taittirīya-Saṃhitā* simply speaks of the driving away of demons by Rudra through his arrow. But the *Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitā* goes a step further and brings in the element of fire in the legend. When Rudra pierced the three fortresses of demons, ' he pierced them through the glow of Agni ' —

तां वै रुद्रो व्यसृजत् । एष हि देवानां क्रूरतमः । तथा इमाः  
पुरः अभिनत् । अग्निना वै स तास्तेजसा अभिनत् । तस्मादग्निः  
प्रथम इज्यते । ( *Mait. Sam.* III. 8. 1 )

Piercing the fortresses with the *tejas* of Agni would mean in the simple language : to set them ablaze. Thus, in all probability, the imagination of the three metallic fortresses of the demons is an older element in the story based on the Rgvedic concept of the three habitats of Agni; the concept of the three *upasads* forming an arrow against the demons is a ritualistic development at a later stage and the introduction of Rudra as a 'marksman perhaps a still later phenomenon.

Amongst the later vivid and graphic narrations of the legend of the destruction of Tripura, the oldest version is found in the *Anuśāsanaparva* of *Mahābhārata*.<sup>9</sup> The three fortresses of the demons are mentioned. Indra is

9. I do not agree with Km. Bhakti Sudha (*op. cit.* 372, 379) that the version occurring in the *Karna-parva* of *Mbh.* (XXXIII, 3-112) is the oldest of all versions. It is too elaborate to be the oldest. She does not seem to be aware of the version of the story in the *Anuśāsana Parvan*.



unable to pierce them with all the weapons at his disposal. The gods approach Mahārudra and grant him the boon that he shall be the overlord of the animals. They request him to destroy the three fortresses together with the demons. Rudra places Viṣṇu as an arrow on his bow with Agni as the arrow-head. Yama serves the function of the feathers. Brahmā becomes the charioteer and Rudra shoots his blazing three-pronged arrow at the opportune moment burning down the fortresses :

असुराणां पुराण्यासन् त्रीणि वीर्यवतां दिवि ।  
 आयसं राजतं चैव सौवर्णमपरं तथा ( v. 1. °मपि चापरम् ) ॥  
 नाशकत् तानि मघवा भेजुं सर्वायुधैरपि ।  
 अथ सर्वेऽमरा रुद्रं ( v. 1. महारुद्रं ) जग्मुः शरणमर्दिताः ॥  
 तत ऊचुर्महात्मानो देवा सर्वे समागताः ।  
 रुद्रं रौद्रा भविष्यन्ति पशवः सर्वकर्मसु ॥  
 जहि दैत्यान् सह पुरैर्लोकैश्चायस्व मानद ।  
 स तथोक्तस्तथेत्युक्त्वा कृत्वा विष्णुं शरोत्तमम् ॥  
 शल्यमग्निं तथा कृत्वा पुंस्त्वं वैवस्वतं यमम् ।  
 ब्रह्माणं सारथिं कृत्वा विनियुज्य च सर्वशः ॥  
 त्रिपर्वणा त्रिशल्येन तेन ( v. 1. काले ) तानि बिभेद सः ।  
 शरेणादित्यवर्णेन कालाग्निसमतेजसा ॥

( *Mahābhārata* [ Cr. Ed. ], Anu. 145. 24-29 )

The version here seems to be based mainly on the reference to the story occurring in the *Taittirīya-* and *Maitrāyaṇī-Saṃhitās*. The boon granted by gods to Rudra ( *rudra raudrā bhaviṣyanti paśavaḥ sarvakarmasu* ) connects it directly with the *TS* and it is usually not found to be mentioned in later versions.

The expression ' *kāle tāni bibheda saḥ* ' ( he pierced them at the appropriate moment ) occurring as a variant and a better reading elsewhere for Śl. 29b above is of special significance. The later Purāṇas deal more clearly with this point. The 'appropriate time' is the moment when all the three fortresses revolving round the earth come in a straight line. Only then they can be pierced with one single arrow. This moment, according to many Purāṇas, occurs but *once in a year*; according to *Bhāgavata-P.*, once in a *thousand* years ( which is obviously a later development ).

The idea of the three fortresses meeting together at a certain point once a year only is neither arbitrary nor speculative. It has an arithmetical logic behind it. To understand it one must go back to the passage of *Āitareya-Brāhmaṇa* ( 4. 8 ) where this legend is found in its most elementary form. The story there does not end with the driving away of the demons from these words. It goes further. Driven away from these worlds the demons take recourse to the



six seasons. Again the gods use the same *upasads* as instrument to drive away the demons from the seasons. Since the *upasads* are six in number, with the *upasads* the gods are successful in driving away demons from the six seasons :

ते वा एभ्यो लोकेभ्यो नुत्ता असुरा ऋतूनश्रयन्त । ते देवा  
अब्रुवन् उपसद एवोपयामेति । तथेति । त इमास्तिस्रः सती-  
रुपसदो द्विद्विरेकैकाम् उपायन् । ते वा ऋतुभ्यो नुत्ता असुरा  
मासानाश्रयन्त । ते देवा अब्रुवन् उपसद एवोपयामेति ।  
तथेति । त इमाः षट् सतीरुपसदो द्विद्विरेकैकाम् उपायन् ।  
ता द्वादश समपद्यन्त । द्वादश वै मासाः । तान् वै मासे-  
भ्योऽनुदन्त । ते वै मासेभ्यो नुत्ता असुरा अर्धमासानश्रयन्त ।  
ते देवा अब्रुवन् उपसद एवोपयामेति । तथेति । त इमा  
द्वादश सतीरुपसदो द्विद्विरेकैकाम् उपायन् । ताश्चतुर्विंशतिः  
समपद्यन्त । चतुर्विंशतिर्वा अर्धमासाः । तान् वा अर्धमासेभ्यो-  
ऽनुदन्त । ते वा अर्धमासेभ्यो नुत्ता असुरा अहोरात्रे  
अश्रयन्त । ते देवा अब्रुवन् । उपसद एवोपयामेति । तथेति ।  
ते यामेव पूर्वाह्णे उपसदमुपायंस्तथैव एतान् अहोऽनुदन्त ।  
यामपराह्णे तथा रात्रेः । ( *Ait. Br.* 4. 8 )

And so it goes on. Driven away from the seasons the demons take shelter in the months. With the six *upasads* gods drive them away from the twelve months of the year. The demons then take refuge in the twenty-four fortnights, the three hundred and sixty days and so on. *Upasads*, however, prove to be infallible weapons of gods everywhere.

Now in whatever part of the year the demons may hide themselves, it is obvious that the number 360 is going to remain the Least Common Multiple (L. C. M.) for all the units of time. Even if the three fortresses of the demons revolve round the earth with different time units, they are bound to come together exactly at the end of one year.

The legend of destruction of Tripura has found a fertile soil in the Purāṇas and it has blossomed forth almost to the magnitude of an impressive Khandakāvya in the *Matsya-Purāṇa* (Adhy. 128 to 139) where the poet finds time to describe the amorous sports of the ladies in the harems of the demons, their delicate feelings towards their husbands and children and their pathetic mournings at the moment when they visualize the imminent destruction of their cities.

According to *Matsya-P.* the three fortresses of the demons were constructed by Maya, the able architect of the Dānavas who was also a great devotee of Lord Śiva. After shooting his arrow, Śiva is suddenly reminded of the plight of his *bhakta* living in one of these cities. He immediately sends Nandī to rescue Maya from the great conflagration ( *Matsya-P.* 139-49 ).



The Purāṇas like *Līṅga* and *Śiva* describe the battle part of the legend in great detail in order to glorify the bravery, steadfastness and physical strength of their hero. *Padma-P.* also narrates the legend in the 15th Adhy. of the Ādikhaṇḍa in a coherent and beautiful manner. In the version of *Bhāgavata-P.* Viṣṇu has an important rôle to play. Here he appears as a cow and drinks away the ambrosia of the step-well (*vāpī*) in which the Dānava Maya throws the dead bodies of the demons in order to bring them back to life.

An investigation into the origin and gradual development of the legend of the destruction of Tripura throws ample light on the process of the development of the ancient religious legends of India from simple ritualistic speculations of Vedic period.



THE HISTORY OF THE ARYA SAMAJ

The Arya Samaj is a religious and social reform movement which was founded in India in the year 1875. It was founded by a Hindu, Mr. Keshav Das, who was a native of the district of Meerut. He was a man of great energy and ability, and he was determined to do something for his country. He was a man of great energy and ability, and he was determined to do something for his country. He was a man of great energy and ability, and he was determined to do something for his country.

An investigation into the origin and growth of the Arya Samaj is a subject of great interest. The Arya Samaj is a religious and social reform movement which was founded in India in the year 1875. It was founded by a Hindu, Mr. Keshav Das, who was a native of the district of Meerut. He was a man of great energy and ability, and he was determined to do something for his country.

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FURTHER REFERENCES TO THE VAIŚEŚIKASŪTRA  
IN THE PĀTAÑJALAYOGAŚĀSTRAVIVARAṆA  
(Studies in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivarāṇa III)\*

By

ALBRECHT WEZLER

1. Elsewhere<sup>1</sup> attention was drawn to a quotation from the Vaiśeṣikasūtra (= VS) found in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivarāṇa (= PYŚV), which was not recognized as such by the editors of the latter text: while examining this quotation, it was also shown that the author of the PYŚV – whose identity has to be regarded as not yet established<sup>2</sup> – was acquainted not only with the VS itself, but evidently also with an old commentary on it which seems not to be extant any longer, but is echoed, as it were, in Candrānanda's Vṛtti,<sup>3</sup> at least to a certain degree.

In what follows, two more instances are presented and discussed where the author of the PYŚV, though not quoting in the strict sense of the word from the VS, nevertheless clearly refers to it; and these references, too, have apparently not been noticed by the editors of the PYŚV. My present aim is a double one: Firstly and generally I wish to keep alive the discussion about the PYŚV,<sup>4</sup> as this highly interesting text has not yet found the attention it no doubt deserves by itself, i. e. quite apart from the provocative intricacies of the authorship problem

\* As for "Studies in the Pātañjalayogaśāstravivarāṇa I", entitled "Philological Observations on the so-called Pātañjalayogasūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇa", cf. IJ 25 (1983), pp. 17–40: "Studies. ... II", entitled "On the Quadruple Division of the Yogaśāstra, the Caturvyūhatva of the Cikitsāśāstra and the 'Four Noble Truths' of the Buddha", will be published in "Indologica Taurinensia", most probably in 1984. – The edition referred to is, of course: Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya-Vivarāṇa of Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda (MGCS No. 94), Madras 1952.

1. Viz. in my article "Remarks on the Definition of 'yoga' in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra", published in: Indological and Buddhist Studies. Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. DE JONG on his Sixtieth Birthday, ed. by L. A. HERCUS et al., Canberra 1982, pp. 643–686.

2. Cf. "Studies in the PYŚV I" as well as the Appendix "Notes on the 'Yoga-sūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇa'" in W. HALBFASS' monograph: Studies in Kumārila and Śaṅkara, Reinbek 1983.

3. Cf. my article mentioned in fn. 1. – The edition referred to is, of course, Muni Śrī JAMBUVIJAYAJI's Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda (GOS No. 136), Baroda 1961.

4. This was, by the way, also the first aim of W. HALBFASS in adding the Appendix, mentioned above in fn. 2, to his "Studies in Kumārila and Śaṅkara,"



it also poses. In addition what I wish is not merely to supplement the list of quotations from and references to other works found in the PYŚV which was compiled by T. VETTER,<sup>5</sup> though apparently on the basis of the editors' observations only; for regarding the undisputed, though limited<sup>6</sup> importance of such a list, provided it is really exhaustive, for tackling the problem of dating this text, in terms of a relative chronology at least, hardly anything is gained by pointing out that a particular work, in the present case the VS, is quoted or referred to more than once. It is rather my intention to throw some light on the attitude shown by the author of the PYŚV towards the VS in particular and the Vaiśeṣika school of thought in general, an attitude which is not, as might have been expected on account of the criticism directed by him against the Vaiśeṣika definition of *yoga*, determined by biased opposition alone. In discussing the manner in which the author of the PYŚV makes use of two more elements of the VS, I also hope to offer a contribution, though a quite modest one, to our knowledge of the reception of the VS and to that of the history of Indian philosophy.

2. Almost right at the outset of the Yogahhāṣya (= YBh) on Yogasūtra (= YS) 1.1 the following statement is met with *yogaḥ samādhiḥ / sa ca sārvaḥśaumaś cittasya dharmah / kṣiptam, mūḍham, vikṣiptam, ekāgram, niruddham iti cittabhūmayah*/. As I have dealt with this passage and essential parts of the PYŚV on it already elsewhere,<sup>7</sup> albeit not yet with the necessary comprehensiveness, I need not go here into the details again nor pursue this topic any further, but can confine myself to a portion of the PYŚV passed over in my earlier article.

2.1. The manner in which the author of the YBh expresses himself poses a problem: On the one hand he (provisionally) defines *yoga* as "the state of being attentively directed" and states this latter to form a property (*dharmā*) of the mind-stuff present in all its different states (*bhūmi*); in enumerating these states thereafter, on the other hand, he uses expressions, viz. *kṣiptam* etc., which cannot but be taken as attributes of the term *cittam* to be supplemented;<sup>8</sup> that is to say, he does not give the actual names of the five states themselves, but instead those of the mind-stuff in so far as it is in one or the other state.

It speaks clearly for the Vivaraṇakāra's philological competence, the acuteness of his observation, that he fully recognizes this problem and deals

5. Cf. his book: Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung Śaṅkaras (Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, ed. by G. OBERHAMMER, Vol. VI), Wien 1971, p. 22.

6. This proviso results from general methodological considerations as well as from what W. HALBFASS says in his Appendix (cf. fn. 2) on the authorship problem.

7. Viz. in the "Studies in the PYŚV I" (cf. fn. \*).

8. This is made clear by the author of the YBh himself in that he introduces the immediately following sentence by: *tatra vikṣipte cetasi...*



explicitly with it. For, after having explained the attributes *kṣiptam* etc., as regards their grammatical formation (*karmakartari niṣṭhā!*) as well as their meaning, he continues his interpretation by himself raising the objection (p. 5 1. 17) : *nanu ca bhūmiṣu dharmeṣu vivakṣiteṣu kimartham kṣiptam ityādinā dharmy ucyate*/. "Since" it is intended to state (i. e. define) the [different] states as properties [of the mind-stuff],<sup>10</sup> to which purpose is the possessor of the property taught [thereafter] by [employing the attributes] *kṣiptam* etc., [and not these properties themselves]?"

Yet, as in other cases, too, when a sentence is introduced by *nanu ca*, used almost stereotypically in the PYŚV,<sup>11</sup> the objection raised is not accepted as justified. In the present case it is rejected thus (p. 5 1. 18-20) : *naīṣa doṣaḥ, dharminā dharma evopadiśyate | dharmāṇām dharmivīṣayatvāt | yathā gotve kiṃ līṅgam iti | prṣṭe, viśāṇī kakudmān prāntavāladhir iti dharminā dharma evopadiśyate | tasmāt kṣepādayaś cīlasya bhūmayo dharmā ity arthaḥ ||*

"This is not a fault; by what possesses the property (i. e. by the expression denoting the *dharmin*) the property itself (*eva*) is pointed out because of the fact that the sphere of properties is [by necessity] what possesses them / is characterized by them. As e. g., when it is asked, 'What is the characteristic sign as regards the being an animal of the bovine species?', [by giving the answer] '[An animal] characterized by peculiar horns, by a hump and as one having a tail at the [hinder] part [of its body]', it is the property which is pointed out by [the expressions denoting] their possessor. Therefore, what is meant [by the YBh statement under discussion] is that the states of the mind-stuff forming its properties are 'the having thrown itself indeliberately', etc."

2. 2. Anybody conversant with the VS will recall here sūtra 2. 1. 8<sup>12</sup> which runs thus : *viśāṇī kakudmān prāntevāladhiḥ sāsnāvān iti gotve dṛṣṭam*

9. I give throughout my own translation, since the work done by T. LEGGETT (Śaṅkara on the Yoga-sūtra-s [Vol. I : Samādhi]. The Vivaraṇa sub-commentary to Vyāsa-bhāṣya on the Yoga-sūtra-s of Patañjali : Samādhi-pāda, London 1981) can only be styled a pseudo-translation : I have never come across a comparably careless translation of any Sanskrit text : it abounds in incredible misconstructions of the original to such an extent that those interested in the text itself can only be strongly warned from consulting this would-be-translation, unless they are fond of shaking their heads in utter disbelief.

10. This is true in so far as according to the author of the YBh as well as to the Vivaraṇakāra *samādhi* is a permanent *dharma* of the mind-stuff, whereas the different *bhūmis* are temporary properties of it.

11. Cf. "Studies in the PYŚV I", p. 36. - In passing it may be pointed out that *ca* in juxtaposition with *nanu* has only in quite vague a manner its normal conjunctive adversative function so that it seems even advisable to transcribe it as one word : *nanuca*.

12. In numbering sūtras of the VS I follow MUNI JAMBUVĪJAYAJI's edition (cf. fn. 3).



*liṅgam* /. Of course, the formulation of the relevant passage in the PYŚV differs to such a degree that it cannot by any means be regarded as a quotation in the strict sense of the word: The attribute *sāsnāvān* is absent, *dr̥ṣṭam*<sup>13</sup> is likewise left out, etc.; on the other hand, it is, I think, equally patent that what we have to do with is not simply another reading i. e. a variant to VS 2. 1. 8. The manner in which the author of the PYŚV takes recourse to this sūtra has rather to be called a complex mixture of a partial quotation and a reference which at the same time contains elements of an explanation of VS 2. 1. 8, which latter, as it stands, is not easily intelligible; the explanatory aspect is, however, confined to what really matters to the author of the PYŚV in the context of his commentary on the YBh; hence the attribute of the key-word *liṅgam* in the VS, viz. *dr̥ṣṭam*, which is of particular importance in the context of this *āhnika* of the 2. *adhyāya* of the VS,<sup>14</sup> is simply left out, and the sūtra is reformulated in such a way as to derive two sentences, viz. a question and its answer; and by this a specific peculiarity of the sūtra is brought out into distinct relief, namely, that in it *dharmin*-expressions are used instead of expressions denoting properties (*dharma*s) though this is what one actually expects.

It is noteworthy that Candrānanda on his part likewise does not even look this peculiarity of the wording of VS 2. 1. 8; for he concludes his commentary on it by stating:<sup>15</sup> *viśāṇyādibhiḥ śabdais tadvatpratipādakair apy arthavyāpārād dharmā eva vyapadiśyante* /. “What is indicated by the words ‘characterized by peculiar horns’, etc., are, although [these words literally] convey [the meaning] of ‘that which is characterized by it’, nothing but the [corresponding] properties, because they are employed [here precisely] for [this] purpose / [to denote this] meaning.”

In spite of the fact that Candrānanda’s introductory remark *dr̥ṣṭāntārtham sūtram* refers to the contextual importance of VS 2. 1. 8 in so far as it illustrates a basic element of the VS’s epistemology, i. e. although he is fully aware that this sūtra was introduced as an example of something quite different, he does not fail to point out also a linguistic peculiarity though this forms but a side-issue for him.

Therefore, one wonders whether what the author of the PYŚV had in mind was this sūtra alone or whether he, in this case too, was acquainted with an older commentary on the VS in which this linguistic peculiarity had already been explained in a similar manner and which was drawn upon by Candrānanda also in

13. On this term cf. my article “A Note on the Concept *adr̥ṣṭa* as used in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*”, to be published in the Felicitation Volume for Professor A. N. JANI.

14. Cf. the article mentioned in fn. 13.

15. The quotation is from the edition (cf. fn. 3), p. 12 1. 10–11.



his turn. The similarities between the latter's Vṛtti and the passage of the PYŚV, quoted above, are in any case remarkable, and, to be sure, to such an extent that one may even reckon with the possibility that the Vivaraṇākāra knew also, albeit probably from another source, the explanation of the word *gotve* as given by Candrānanda, viz.: '*gotve*' *iti gotvāvacchinnā vyaktiḥ* /. For in the context of the YBh passage under discussion as well as of the PYŚV on it, it is likewise not a *jāti* that is spoken of, but a *vyakti*, i.e. the mind-stuff as an individual, so that one would in fact expect the question *kim liṅgam* similarly to refer to an individual of the bovine species, and not to the species itself – if the example adduced by the author of the PYŚV is really intended to fully correspond to the *upameya* / *dārṣṭāntika*.

2.3. At first sight it might seem a deviation when in addition to what has been said in paragraph 2.2 attention is now drawn to another and, to be sure, diverging interpretation of VS 2.1.8. However, it will become clear that in view of the close similarity between the interpretation common to both, Candrānanda and the author of the PYŚV, and in view of the above assumption based on this close similarity, it is, no doubt, useful to take into account other interpretations also.

What I mean is that the anonymous author of the Vyākhyā<sup>16</sup> gives a significantly different interpretation of the expressions *viśāṇī* etc., in that he takes them to stand for the corresponding abstract nouns:<sup>17</sup> *sarve caite bhāvapradhānā nirdeśāḥ* / *tenāyam gaur viśāṇaviśeṣavattvāt kakudmattvād ityādi* //. That is to say, according to him it is not the properties that are intended, but the fact of something being characterized by them. This interpretation was, however, evidently suggested to the author of the Vyākhyā by the epistemological context of VS 2.1.8, viz. that of inference, and a particular, more exact manner of formulating an *anumāna*, which had become usual in his times, the standard example of such a *prayoga* being *parvato vahnimān dhūmavattvāt* (and not any longer: *dhūmāt*). In its substance, his interpretation is hence most probably later than that offered both by Candrānanda and the author of the PYŚV; both these interpretations, though different, have, on the other hand, equally the advantage of grouping rather well in a widely known picture, i.e. that the authors of (certain) Sūtra works and other ancient writers sometimes tend to express themselves in a way which definitely lacks precision.

These shortcomings were evidently not observed for the first time by Western philologists, but already much earlier by Indian 'commentators' who

16. Cf. Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda with an Anonymous Commentary, ed. by Anantalal THAKUR, Darbhanga 1957.

17. The quotation is from p. 201. 9–10.



not only tried their very best to solve individual cases of such inaccuracies, but also seem to have gathered the impression that the Sūtrakāras took quite some liberties in expressing themselves and in ordering their material. At least, one cannot but recall in this connection the dictum of the author of the Kāśikāvṛtti on Pāṇ. 1. 2. 35: *vicitrā hi sūtrasya kṛtiḥ Pāṇineḥ*, or the remark found in the Yuktidīpikā on Sāṃkhyakārikā 3: <sup>18</sup> *vicitrāḥ sūtrakārāṇām abhiprāyagatayaḥ*, or similar statements, although they do not exactly refer to this lack of precision.

The modern philologist, on the other hand, will, of course, start with no more than noticing the unevenness of the construction of VS 2.1.8 as it stands formulated, and in terms of its syntactical analysis he will then arrive at the conclusion that it forms an anacoluthon in that an answer – to refer now to the Vivaraṇakāra's rewording for the sake of clarity – is given not to the question 'What are the characteristic properties of an animal of the bovine species?', but as it were to the question, 'What does an animal of the bovine species look like as regards its characteristic properties?'. In addition the modern philologist will most probably recall a relevant passage from the Paspasāhnikā of the Mahābhāṣya, viz. I. 1. 6-7: <sup>19</sup> *atha gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdaḥ | kiṃ yat tat sāsna-lāṅgūlakakudakhuraviṣāṇy artharūpaṃ sa śabdaḥ | nety āha | dravyaṃ nāma tat ||*, and contemplate the likelihood that the peculiar construction of VS 2.1.8 is due to the fact that there existed from of old a question and answer pattern, viz. 'What is an animal of the bovine species?', 'It is an animal characterized by a dewlap, etc.'; and that this pattern was more or less stereotypically used whenever the problem of the "characteristic sign(s)" of something was discussed.

Candrānanda and the Vivaraṇakāra, not to mention the author of the Vyākhyā, however, clearly go a step further: Obviously unable or, at least, unwilling to accept the anacoluthon, both of them do away with it by contending that the expressions *viṣāṇi* etc., though literally denoting the *dharmin*, are in the context of VS 2.1.8, nevertheless, used to convey the meaning of the corresponding *dharma*s.

2.4. There cannot, hence, be the least doubt that it is precisely this interpretation which made the Vivaraṇakāra adduce VS 2.1.8 as an example which by its syntactical and semantic parallelism at the same time illustrates and justifies the peculiar construction of the YB observed by him. His motive is, therefore, perfectly clear: Evidently he thought it necessary or, in any case, advisable to safeguard against any criticism with which one might come up against his interpretation of this passage of the YBh by explicitly stating that

18. In the edition by R. C. PANDEY, Delhi 1967, p. 28 1. 15-16.

19. The reference is to F. KIELHORN's edition, Poona 1962<sup>3</sup>.



this is not by any means a unique case, but that this peculiar manner of expressing oneself is, on the contrary, attested elsewhere also.

Yet, there remains one question still to be answered, viz. why the author of the PYŚV did opt precisely in favour of VS 2.1.8. Were there no parallels to be found in everyday speech? And, if he thought it preferable to adduce an example from a Śāstra, why did he select of all others this sūtra of the basic text of the Vaiśeṣikas? Of course, one might raise the following counter-objection: Since it is evidently not the doctrinary content of VS 2.1.8 which the Vivaraṇakāra is interested in, but only its linguistic form, i.e. since philosophical theoremata of the Vaiśeṣika are of no importance at all to him here, why should he have hesitated to refer his readers to just this parallel? But as there is apparently no circumstantial evidence whatsoever to warrant the assumption that VS 2.1.8 functioned as a well-known *mūrdhābhiṣiktam udāharaṇam* for *dharmin*-terms being used to denote the corresponding *dharma*s, this objection, if it is justified, would only mean that the problem boils down to asking why it was precisely VS 2.1.8 that came first to the author's mind when about to account for the peculiar mode of expression of the YBh. One possible answer that suggests itself is that he thought first of the VS since he intended to deal shortly afterwards (viz. p. 6 l. 8 ff) with the definition of Yoga as given there. Yet, I think, this solution is not absolutely convincing: it is by far more likely that this sūtra came (first) to his mind simply because he was generally quite familiar with the VS as such and most probably also with a commentary or commentaries thereon; at least, this familiarity is a fact which can be demonstrated also with the help of other passages of the PYŚV, among them the second example referred to at the beginning of the present paper and to be discussed in what now follows.

3. This second instance is from the long *utsūtra* portion of the PYŚV to which as such attention has already been drawn by P. HACKER<sup>20</sup> and which, starting from YS 1.25 and the Bhāṣya on it, is wholly devoted to the topic of the *īśvaravāda*, i.e. to adducing an extensive list of proofs for the existence of Īśvara, to refuting the inferences brought forward by an opponent against this view, and to maintaining the position of theistic Yoga. It is in this latter part that the discussion centres around the (Yoga) concept of Īśvara being (even) simultaneously *saśarīra* and *aśarīra*. For the opponent both these ideas seem to imply many and serious difficulties, particularly as regards the central Yoga tenet

20. Cf. his article "Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin. Einige Beobachtungen" in: *Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner*. ... Wien 1968 (= WZKSO 12-13. 1968-59), p. 124 = *Kleine Schriften*, hrsg. von L. SCHMITHAUSEN, Wiesbaden 1978, p. 218.



of Īśvara's omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) taught in YS 1.25: If Īśvara is *saśarīra*, so he makes the upholder of the Yoga position consider, his cognitive capacity should be limited like that of us and the like of us, and if he is, on the other hand, *aśarīra*, he shouldn't be able to have any cognition at all.

The defendant is convinced that he has proved Īśvara's omniscience even if God is taken to lack a body and organs of sense (... *ity akāyānindriyatva-pakṣe 'pīśvarasarvajñatvasiddhiḥ*: p. 69 1. 6); and the counter-argument of the opponent that the capacity of the mind-stuff to perceive anything visible necessarily depends on organs of sense like the eye, etc., is refuted by repeating what had already been stated earlier by the defendant, viz. that Īśvara possesses *aīśvarya* and is free of *dharma* and *adharma*.

3.1. The discussion is continued as follows: *api ca cakṣurgrāhyasyāpi cakṣuṣāgrahaṇam loke drśyate | cakṣurgrāhyam sat santamaḥ<sup>21</sup> sannimīlita-locanair api svasthāntaḥkaraṇair upalabhyate | tad evāndhatamasam viśphāritanayanair apy anyagatacittair naiva grhyate | yathā grhyamāṇa evākāśe prakāśaḥ ||*.

"And, besides, it is an empirical fact that [an object which], though it could [by its nature] be perceived by the eye, is [nevertheless] not perceived by the eye; [e.g.] complete darkness which forms [an object] that [by its nature] can be perceived by the eye, is [in fact] perceived [by people] whose internal organs are healthy, even though they have their eyes fully closed; but this same intensive darkness is actually not perceived [by people] whose mind is fixed on something else even though they have their eyes wide open, contrary to the light in sky which is in fact [in any case] apprehended [even if one's mind is fixed on something else]."

*athāpi prakāśābhāvamātram eva tamo na vastv iti brūyāt - tac ca na - abhāvasya vastutirodhānasāmarthyābhāvāt ||*.

"If [the opponent] would say that darkness is, nevertheless, nothing but the [absence of light [and] not a [really existing] thing, this, too, would not [be acceptable], because the absence [of something, viz. light] could not conceal really existing [things, [whereas darkness is patently able to do so]."

*atha grahaṇnimittasya prakāśasyābhāvād eva ghaṭādyagrahaṇam, na vastu-tirodhāyakaṃ tama iti bruvīta - na - cakṣuṣaḥ prakāśakatvāt prakāśasāhāya-kāpekṣānupapattiḥ | asati bhinnajātīye vastuni vastūnām tirodhātrīṇi tatrayā ca yāvatī ca mātṛā prakāśakatvāc cakṣuṣā prakāśyeta | na hi pradīpaḥ pradīpāntaradvaityakāpekṣaḥ prakāśayati ||*.

21. Read thus with the Trivandrum MS (cf. "Studies. ... I"),



"If [the opponent] would, on the other hand, maintain that [really existing things] like a jar etc. are [sometimes] not perceived simply because of the absence of light, a necessary precondition / cause of perception, and that [it is hence not necessary at all to assume that] darkness conceals [really existing] things, [then this objection] would not be correct; since the eye [itself] illuminates [its object], it is not correct [to assume] that [in order to be able to perceive an object] it depends on an accompanying factor in the form of [another, i. e. extraneous] light assisting it [in its function]. If there were no [other] thing of a different kind to conceal things (i. e. the potential objects of the perception by the eye), the eye because of its being something which [itself] illuminates would [by necessity] throw its light on whatever and how vast soever [object(s)] there are in the particular [place covered by darkness]. For a lamp does not in lighting up [things] depend on a second factor, i. e. another lamp."

*kiṃcānyat - cakṣuṣaḥ prakāśāntarasahāyatvāpekṣatāyām ca niśāyām api tārādhīpati<sup>22</sup> - prakāśadvitīyena cakṣuṣā divasa iva rūpādigrahaṇaprasaṅgas tirodhānasyāsati nimitte ||.*

"And further, [there is] something else [to be pointed out in this connection]: And if the eye would [indeed] depend [for its functioning] on the assistance of another [source of] light, [then] something visible etc. would necessarily be perceived by the eye even at night just as at day-time (i. e. equally clearly and distinctly) as it is [then] seconded by the light of the moon, since there would be no cause for the [partial] concealment [of its object]."

*kiṃcānyat - abhāvaś cet tamaḥ, candrabhāsu niśāyām bhavantiṣu<sup>23</sup> tamasā mandena na pravartitavyam | sarvātmanaiva hi tena vinaśanīyam | bhāsām bhāvāt | bhāsām tu vastutvān mandatvapātavādiviśeṣo ghaṭate na bhā-bhāvasya<sup>24</sup> nirviśeṣatvāt ||.*

"And further [there is still] something else [to be considered here]: If darkness were [nothing but] the absence [of light], [then] darkness could not obtain faintly when the rays of the moon shine at night; for it (i. e. darkness if it were merely absence of light) ought to vanish completely because of the presence of the [moon-] rays. But since the rays [as in fact any light] belongs to the category of [really existing] things, the distinctions between faintness and intensity etc.

22. Note that the Lahore MS. (cf. "Studies... I") reads *tārādhīpati<sup>o</sup>*, which might be the original reading.

23. The editors of the PYSV propose the emendation *bhāntiṣu*; but *bhavantiṣu* is attested in all the MSS. consulted by me so far and need not be emended if *bhā* is taken to mean "to arise, to function."

24. Read thus with the Lahore MS.



[ of darkness ] are possible, not [ however ] if [ darkness ] is [ nothing but ] the absence of light, for [ such an absence ] does not possess any distinctions. "

*kimca sahāyābhāvāc cakṣuṣa upalabdhisāmarthyābhāvād agraḥaṇam ity etad api vyabhicarati | yathā saty api vidyullatāprakāśe tivratare vidyullatā-vilāsena cakitatdṛṣṭir<sup>25</sup> nopalabhate | na hi vidyutah sahāyatre<sup>26</sup> dṛṣṭa<sup>27</sup> cakitatvenāgraḥaṇam virodhābhāvād yuktam ||.*

" Nor does it correspond [ to empirical fact ] to contend that the eye [ in certain cases ] does not perceive [ its object ] because without assistance it lacks the capacity of apprehension. For instance, [ a person ] whose vision is frightened ( i. e. who is dazzled ) by the appearance of a flash of lightning does not perceive [ anything at all at that moment ] although there is the highly intensive light of the flash of lightning. For, as there is an assisting factor [ in this case ], viz. the lightning, the non-apprehension cannot [ as it should ] be correctly accounted for by the fact that the vision is frightened ( i. e. the person dazzled ), because [ the light of the flash of lightning ] is not opposed [ to the rays of the eye ]. "

*kimca - cikitsāsāstre chāyā madhuraśītalety ucyate | na hy avastuno madhuraśītalatvam | tathā cākṣipathyāpathyatvam<sup>28</sup> | nābhāvasya pathyāpathyatvam brūyuh ||.*

" And, again, in the science of medicine<sup>29</sup> shadow is said to be pleasant and cool. [ Yet ] it is patent that what is not a [ really existing ] thing [ cannot ] be pleasant and cool ; and, similarly [ the science of medicine speaks ] of the fact that [ shadow ] is [ sometimes ] healthy for the eye and [ sometimes ] unhealthy. [ The authors ] would [ of course ] not teach [ shadow ] as being healthy and/or unhealthy, were it [ merely ] an absence [ of light, and not a really existing thing ]. "

25. Read thus with the Trivandrum MS. and cf. *dṛṣṭacakitatvena* in the immediately following sentence.

26. This is a conjecture ; all MSS. read *sahāyake*.

27. Should one perhaps read instead *dṛṣṭi* ?

28. The Trivandrum MS. reads *cākṣipathyāpathyatvam* ; my conjecture is strikingly confirmed by *pathyāpathyatvam* in the immediately following sentence.

29. My colleague Prof. Dr. Ronald E. EMMERICK has kindly checked these references and I am most grateful for the information given by him, viz. ( as regards the first one ) cf. Rājanighaṇṭu, varga 21. 38 ( p. 418 ) : *ātapaḥ kaṭuko rūkṣasā ch āyā mādhuraśītalā | tridoṣasamanī jyotsnā sarvavyādhikarāṇi tamah |* and Kaiyādevanighaṇṭu, ed. P. V. SHARMA and G. P. SHARMA, Varanasi-Delhi 1979, p. 549 : *ātapaḥ pittarakṭūgnisvedamūrechātṛṣṭāvahah ||* ( 418 ) *dāhavaivarnajanano rūkṣaḥ kaṭurasā ca saḥ | ātapoktaguṇān hanti ch āyā mādhuraśītalā ||* ( 419 ). As for the second reference of the PYSV, however, a literally identical passage could not be found in any of the medical texts ; nevertheless, there is at least the following statement in Bhoja Rāja's Cārucaryā ( ed. by B. RAMA RAS, Hyderabad 1974, p. 101 ) : *chatran tu vātūtaḥ pa-varṣadāhanivāraṇam netra hitam ca*, which should be noted here.



*pradīpāc chāyopalabdheś ca | abhāvaś cet tamaḥ, pradīpaprabhāmaṇḍale  
pradīpāc chāyā katham bhavet | vastutve 'pi virodhād ayuktam iti cet - na  
- viśasarpayor iva sambhavāt | yathā prāṇaviyogakaram api viṣaṃ panna-  
gaprāṇaviyogāya na paryāpnoti tathā pradīpatacchāyayor api ||.*

“ [ Shadow as a particular form of darkness is in fact a really existing thing ] also because shadow is perceived due to [ the presence of ] the light of a lamp : If darkness were [ nothing but ] absence [ of light ], how could there be within the circle on which the light of a lamp falls a shadow due to [ the presence of ] the light of the lamp ? If [ the objection is raised ] that [ this fact ] cannot be correctly accounted for even if shadow is a [ really existing ] thing because [ shadow ] is the opposite [ of light and vice versa ], [ then this ] couldn't [ be accepted ], because [ both of them, i. e. the shadow and the light of a lamp ] co-occur [ in a given space ] just as a snake and its poison : As poison, though causing death [ of other living beings if bitten by a venomous snake ] is not able to kill the snake [ itself ], so it is the case also with the light of a lamp and its shadow.”

*tasmād vastu tamaḥ, prakarṣāpakarṣavattvāt prabhāvat | virodhidravayāpane-  
yatvāc ca ghaṭavat | upalabdhṛvyavadhānakaratvāc ca bhittivad iti ||*

“ Therefore, [ to sum up ], darkness is a [ really existing ] thing [ 1 ] because it is characterized by faintness and intensity like light, [ 2 ] because it can be removed by [ another ] substance which is opposed [ to it ] ( i. e. by light ) like a jar, and [ 3 ] because it causes a separation of the perceiving subject [ from an object ] like a wall.”

3.2. This rather detailed discussion about the nature of darkness, remarkable in itself and also in the context of the history of Indian philosophy, has been given here in full primarily with the aim of examining the relation in which it stands to the VS.

Now, the relevant sūtra, viz. 5.2.21, poses some text-critical problems. In the Sūtra text as constituted by MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI it runs thus :

*dravyaguṇakarmavaidharmyād bhāvābhāvas tamaḥ ||*

One of the MSS. used by MUNI reads ... *bhāvābhāvas tamaḥ*, as does Siddhasena in his commentary on Tattvārtha-sūtra 5.24<sup>30</sup> ( only that in the former part of the sūtra he reads *karmanīṣpattivaidharmyād* ), whereas in the anonymous Vyākhyā the variant *dravyaguṇakarmanīṣpattivaidharmyād abhāvas tamaḥ* is attested to, as also in Śāṅkaramiśra's Upaskāra. According to the secondary transmission

30. Viz. in Hiralal Rasikdas KAPADIA's edition of the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra with Umāsvāti's auto-commentary and Siddhasena Gaṇi's Tīkā, ( Sheth Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakodhar Fund Series ) Vol. I, Bombay 1926, p. 363,



(listed by MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI<sup>31</sup>) as found in the Nyāyakandaḷī,<sup>32</sup> the Kiraṇāvalī,<sup>33</sup> the Nyāyavārttika<sup>34</sup> and the Nyāyaratnākara,<sup>35</sup> however, the sūtra runs thus: *dravyaguṇakurmaniṣpattivaidharmyād bhābhāvas tamaḥ*.

But it is further to be noted that already MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI states in a footnote<sup>36</sup>: *atra vṛtṭyanusāreṇa Nyāyakandalyanusāreṇa Mi. anusāreṇa ca 'bhā'bhāvas tamaḥ' iti pāṭho 'numato bhāti' ;* and he adds in another footnote<sup>37</sup> by way of correcting himself: *pr° 43 paṇi° 28 ity atra "vṛtṭyanusāreṇa" ity ataḥ param "bhābhāvamātram tamaḥ iti pāṭho 'numato bhāti'" iti pūraṇīyam*. He is perfectly right in pointing out that both the commentators, Candrānanda as well as the anonymous author of the Vyākhyā, cannot have known any other reading but *bhābhāva°*; for, the former concludes his explanation of VS 5.2.21 with the words; *tasmāt prakāśasyābhāvamātram tamaḥ*, while the latter in the body of his (obviously partially corrupt) commentary on this sūtra uses a similar wording, viz. *tasmā[d] bhāśas tejaso 'bhāvas tamaḥ*, and, besides, gives the *pratiñā* of the subsequent inference as *bhābhāvas tamaḥ*. Thus there is, in fact, sufficient evidence to assume that both of them refer to a reading *bhābhāva°*. Much less convincing, however, is the MUNI's conclusion that Candrānanda actually read *bhābhāvamā tra m*; for *mātram* is clearly an explicative and has for this very reason in any case to be regarded as secondary when we compare the reading transmitted in the Nyāyakandaḷī etc. and indirectly attested by the author of the Vyākhyā with that of the MS. O of those used by MUNI JAMBUVIJAYAJI. There is, hence, a much higher degree of probability that *mātram* slipped into the sūtra only out of Candrānanda's paraphrase who added it to *bhābhāva*, for the sake of clarity.

As regards the second half of VS 5.2.21, the choice is, therefore, between three readings only, viz.

- a) *abhāvas tamaḥ*,
- b) *bhāvābhāvas tamaḥ*, and finally
- c) *bhābhāvas tamaḥ*.

31. Cf. his edition of the VS (fn. 3), p. 230.

32. Cf. *Prāśastapādabhāṣya* (Padārthadharmaśaṅgraha) with Commentary Nyāyakandaḷī of Śrīdharabhāṭṭa (Gaṅgānātha-Jhā-Granthamālā, Vol. I), Varanasi 1963, p. 26.

33. Cf. *Prāśastapādabhāṣya* with the Commentary Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya, ed. by J. S. JETLY (GOS. No. 154), Baroda 1971, p. 13.

34. Viz. on Nyāyasūtra 3. 1. 1.

35. Viz. in Rāmaśāstri TAILANGA's edition of the Ślokavārttika with Pārtha-sārathi Miśra's Commentary (ChSS 11, 1898-99), p. 740, l. 13.

36. Viz. on p. 43 of his edition.

37. Viz. on p. 230 of his edition.



Of these, variant *a* could mean either "darkness is a non-positive entity", i. e. "is not a positive entity" or else "darkness is (an) absence." As to the first alternative, one cannot but think of Udayana who in his *Kiraṇāvalī*<sup>38</sup> rejects Śrīdhara's view<sup>39</sup> according to which darkeess is a particular colour (*rūpaviśeṣa*) and is, therefore, a *bhāva*; the reading has, then, to be discarded. The second alternative interpretation is by no means preferable since in its case the entity the absence of which is darkness would not be stated. One might, of course, voice the opinion that there is also no need to state it explicitly; for, what else if not the absence of light could be the definiens in the present case?<sup>40</sup> Variant *c* would, then, have to be regarded as secondary since it would contain an explicative addition. But in view of the obvious posteriority of the only real testimony for variant *a*, viz. the *Upaskāra*, and its notorious unreliability, the balance is clearly weighted on the other witnesses' side, i. e. the side of those commentaries and secondary sources who attest variant *c*. And that this is the reading which has also to be accepted as the original one, follows from the fact that variant *b* is most naturally and convincingly explained as due to dittography (just as variant *a* might be simply a kind of haplography).

As for the first half of VS 5.2.21, the situation is different: It is only Candrānanda who testifies to the reading *dravyaguṇakarmavaidharmyād*, whereas in all the other sources the reading is *°karma niṣpattiḥ vaidharmyād*. As the expression *niṣpatti* can hardly be used here in a sense different from the one it has in other sūtras (cf. VS 2.2.36; 3.2.15; 8.3 and 4. 10.4), viz. "arising, origin", the latter reading implies a considerable narrowing down of the argument; for, the reason given for the conclusion that darkness is but the absence of light is confined to the difference obtaining in the manner in which *dravyas*, *guṇas* and *karmas*, on the one hand, and darkness, on the other, arise. Within the framework of Vaiśeṣika categoriology this argument is not only plausible, but also sufficient to prove what it is adduced for. In terms of logic of proof there is indeed no need to point out other differences also to be observed between darkness and substances, qualities and movements. Yet, in the course of the discussion about the nature of darkness, which was evidently continued by later philosophers, it might have seemed useful, if not even necessary, to at least some of the Vaiśeṣikas to argue out their traditional position with all the elements of *vaidharmya* between the three first *padārthas* and darkness, which latter could but belong to one of these very three categories and not, of course, to any of others. There is,

38. In the edition mentioned in fn. 33, p. 11 ff.

39. Expounded in the edition mentioned in fn. 32 on p. 21 ff.

40. It should, however, be noted that even in the PYSV a wording like *abhāvas* (cet) *tamaḥ* is used only later, i. e. after it has been stated at the very beginning of the discussion about the nature of darkness that *prakāśābhāvamātram eva tamaḥ*.



hence, a greater likelihood that 'niṣpatti' was secondarily eliminated than that it was a later addition.

3.3. Be that as it may, this part of VS 5.2.21 is in any case not referred to in the PYŚV, at least not directly; rather, it is the second part, i.e. the statement of the actual view of the VS as regards the nature of darkness, which the Vivaraṇakāra vigorously attacks. But again he does not really quote this part of VS 5.2.21; instead what he gives is a paraphrase, viz. *prakāśābhāva-mātram eva tamo na vastu* (p. 69 l. 13), thus reformulating, as it were, the relevant Vaiśeṣika tenet more explicitly and indicating at the same time his own view, viz. that darkness is, on the contrary, a really existing thing ( *vastu* ), obviously regarded by him as a substance. This paraphrase, except for the final *na vastu*, is of particular interest in that it, too, in its turn exhibits a striking similarity with a remark of Candrānanda's, viz. the concluding one on VS 5.2.21, already quoted above, viz. (*tasmāt*) *prakāśasyābhāvamātram tamaḥ*. Therefore, there is hardly room for doubting that the opponent in the passage of the PYŚV under discussion is a Vaiśeṣika, and this is true in spite of the fact that the arguments implied in VS 5.2.21 for the view that darkness is but the absence of light, are not discussed by the Vivaraṇakāra.<sup>41</sup>

Apart from the fact that the whole topic, i.e. the nature of darkness, forms in the context of this *utsūtra* section of the PYŚV but a side-issue, although *tamas* as such occupies a central and prominent position in Sāṃkhya-Yoga metaphysics, it is rather difficult to judge to what extent the arguments of the opponent reflect genuine Vaiśeṣika thought. They might well be fictitious in the sense that they were devised by the author of the PYŚV himself, thinking along the lines of the Vaiśeṣika.

As for his own counter-arguments, one cannot but notice that they are by and large substantially different from those which Vaiśeṣika and, to a lesser degree, also Nyāya authors<sup>42</sup> feel prompted to refute; there is, however, one important exception: The 'shadow argument', though according to E. FRAUWALLNER an ancient one,<sup>43</sup> continues to engross the attention of later Vaiśeṣika thinkers.

41. A possible reason being that such a discussion would have necessarily led to a rather long digression, i.e. critical examination and finally, of course, rejection of, at least, the first three categories of Vaiśeṣika.

42. The relevant passages for both of them can be easily and, so I hope, exhaustively, located with the help of the Index in: Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa, ed. by K. H. POTTER, Delhi 1977.

43. Cf. the quotation below.



Space does not permit to elaborate on this point, as this would entail examining the entire history of the discussion about the nature of darkness – and shadow – in Indian philosophy, nor to inspect the defendant's arguments more closely as regards their importance for the Yoga theory of perception. Therefore, I have to confine myself to a few concluding remarks which are in part even of the nature of mere impressions.

3.4. Compared with the first instance (§ 2), the reference to the VS is in the second case, though almost equally unambiguous, of quite a different kind; for, regarding VS 5.2.21 the author of the PYŚV is evidently and exclusively interested in its doctrinary content. It is, therefore, perfectly understandable that his attitude in this case is that of a severe critic, as the positions of the Vaiśeṣika and that of Sāṃkhya-Yoga are in fact mutually incompatible, nay plainly contrary to each other. The Vivaraṇakāra's arguments, though wholly unconvincing to the modern mind, are nevertheless evidence of a remarkable intelligence, if viewed against the background of the (physical) 'Weltbild' of his time (whatever it may be) in general and of Sāṃkhya-Yoga in particular. And when we view them against their proper background, i.e. the old nature-philosophy (as tentatively reconstructed and outlined by FRAUWALLNER<sup>44</sup>) as well as the later development of the discussion about the nature of darkness, we also perceive that the discussion found in the PYŚV forms a most welcome and not unimportant additional piece of information in that it clearly enlarges our knowledge of the history of this discussion; for the Vivaraṇakāra's arguments are different both from those of the old nature-philosophy as well as those refuted by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors. While the latter difference suggests the conclusion (which cannot, however, be regarded as absolutely cogent) that the Vivaraṇakāra's arguments are of a marked antiquity or, at least, archaic, the former makes one realize that what we ultimately have to do with is a phenomenon, only too well-known in the history of Indian philosophy, viz. the substantial preservation of a traditional theorem, while introducing a palpable change or, perhaps, a considerable progress as regards the manner in which the traditional view is defended by arguments. This becomes even more clear when we take into account what is said in an anonymous verse quoted by Śrīdhara :<sup>45</sup>

*na ca bhāsām abhāvasya tamastvaṃ vṛddhasaṃmatam /*  
*chāyāyāḥ kārṣṇyam ity evaṃ purāṇe bhūguṇaśruteḥ ||*  
*dūrāsannapradeśādi mahadalpacalācalā /*  
*dehānuvartinī chāyā na vastutvād vinā bhavet ||*

44. Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. II. Bd., Salzburg, p. 15 ff. = History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, tr. by V. M. BEDEKAR, Delhi 1973, p. 3 ff.

45. Cf. the edition mentioned in fn. 32, p. 25.



For, regarding the 'shadow argument' as attested in this verse, one cannot but refer to what FRAUWALLNER has said about the difficulties the old nature-philosophers were faced with,<sup>46</sup> viz.: "One could not, in a natural manner, explain shadow to be a form of one of the known elements. Such an explanation was also excluded because of the old popular view that shadow is something substantial." Instead of "popular" or, perhaps in addition to it, FRAUWALLNER might have said "magical". In contradistinction to this archaic view, the 'shadow argument' as brought forward in the PYSV gives the impression of being quite rationalistic; and this not so much because in this connection, too, the author refers to empirical facts only, i. e. natural phenomena, known to everybody or at least easily verifiable, but rather because his argument is distinctly different from that adduced in the anonymous verse in that the Vivaraṇakāra (just as the Jaina Guṇaratna)<sup>47</sup> does not seem to have thought any longer, at least not primarily, of the shadow of man as forming an essential part of any human being.

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46. As BEDEKAR's translation (p. 20) is in this case (too) not faithful to the original (p. 38), I give my own English rendering here.

47. Cf. Tarkarāṣyadīpikā on Śaddarśanasamuccaya, verse 49 (ed. Dr. Mahendra Kumar JAIN [Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jainagranthamālā : Sanskrit Grantha No. 36] Benares 1969, p. 267 f.).



## SELF AND THE IN-EFFABLE IN EARLY BUDDHISM

By

P. V. BAPAT

[ Note — References in the following paper are made to passages in Pāli Nikāyas of Nālandā, except references to the Sutta-nipāta, which are made to PTS edition of the Text.]

Some time ago, I received from my friend, Rev. Father A. ESTELLER, St. Xavier's College, Bombay, a copy of the book : Self and Non-self in Early Buddhism, edited by Shri Joaquin FEREZ-REMON for review. I worked on the same and prepared a review of the same. It was sent to him in December 1981. For one reason or the other, it has not been published. The book contains an illuminating commentary on the problem of Self, which is used for the Pāli word *Attā* ( Sans. *Ātmā* ). The whole text discusses the problem of Self (*attā*) and non-self in early Buddhism. The author comes to the conclusion that in some Pali passages the word Self used for Sanskrit Ātman is out-spoken in lodging what the *attā* is not, without ever destroying the truth of *Attā*. Even at the end of the Nikāyan period, the authors wrote as if they knew nothing of the *An-attā* doctrine ( p. 146 ). Original Buddhism by right of birth belonged to the non-Brahmanic world, where the plurality of selves was accepted, as a matter of fact ( p. 365 ). In the Nikāyas true Self is even silently present and its reality is never brought into question.

Let us look at some passages. In the *Mahāvagga* ( p. 25 ) of the Vinaya, we have a passage which clearly refers to the presence of Self : *yaṃ vā attānaṃ gaveseyyāthā ti*. In A. i. 148 we have a passage where *attā* is mentioned : *attā khato ca hoti, upahato ca*. *Attā* obviously refers to an independent self. There is the mention of a Path ( Sn. 514 ) made by oneself ( *pajjen katena attanā* ). In Dh. 165, we have *attanā va kataṃ pāpaṃ attanā saṃkilissati attanā va akataṃ pāpaṃ attanā va visujjhati*. Here is the purity and impurity of the self by one's actions, good or bad. In A. iv. 203-04, there are ten cases mentioned where the word *attā* is used. There is a passage in Dh. 323, where we have the control over self : *yathā attanā sudanten danto dantena gacchati / attā hi attano nātho ko hi nātho paro siyā* ( Dh. 160 ), and *pariyodapennyā attānaṃ citta-klesehi paṇḍito* ( Dh. 88 ) are other examples where the *attā*, the Self, is referred to. In S. I. 168-69 ( *Sundarika-sutta* ) we have : with fire constantly burning, always with a self composed :

...60



*hitvā ahaṃ Brāhmaṇa dāru-dānaṃ  
ajjhataṃ eva ujjalāyāmi jotim  
niccagginī nicca-samāhitatto  
arhaṃ ahaṃ Brahmācariyaṃ carāmi*

Here also mark the use of the words *nicca* and *atta* in line 3. The word *attā* in M. ii. 223 : *attānaṃ ceva ukkaṃsenti* is accepted in early Buddhism. So we know that in early Buddhism, the word *attā* was accepted.

There are several passages which show the existence of Self (*attā*). There are several examples that show the existence of *self* in early Buddhists. All these examples show the use of *attā*, which would make us believe in the use of *attā* in some passages. These passages show that the Buddhists did believe in the existence of *self*, which later came to be rejected. In A. iv. 203-04 we have a passage which mentions *attā* in ten sentences beginning with : *dasa imāni pāsamsāni thānāni — idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu, attanā ca pāpiccho hoti, appicch-kathaṃ ca bhikkhūnaṃ kattā hoti* etc. Ten cases are all given.

So all this material shows the use of *attā* in Buddhist literature. Now we proceed to the other part of the question — the use of the In-effable state. The final stage of Nibbāna is difficult to describe. People cannot trace him : *anvesaṃ nādhigacchanti | idaṃ nissitaṃ Tathāgatassa viññānaṃ ti. Taṃ kissa hetu? Ditthevāhaṃ, Bhikkhave, dhamme Tathāgatam ananujjo ti*. In this very life it is difficult to trace him. So no wrath or delight at the statements in favour or against the Buddha. He has taught that at all times he has declared the truth of suffering and the truth of its cessation ( M. i. 185 ). The man who has reached the final stage has gone into a stage beyond this world of suffering. He has gone into a state where no description would be correct : *atthaṃ paleti. na upeti saṅkhaṃ ti* ( Su. 1074 ). There are no words which would be fitting (*yena na vajju taṃ tassa natthiti* — Su. 1076 ).

So the conclusion of the author Joaquin FEREZ-REMON is : when he affirmed the existence of *attā* against the materialists, he affirmed the reality of something objectively true. When he decided the *attā* against the eternalists, he did not deny the true *attā*, but the *attā* of the eternalists that is wrongly identified with the Khandhas ( p. 302 ). This development of *anattā* doctrine is classified by Miss HORNE as a later doctrine ( 301 ).

Thus the author concludes that in Early Buddhism there is the belief in Self, i. e. *attā*, along with passages which show the non-self (*anattā*) in the sense of Khandhas, which are five — Rūpa, Vedanā, Saññā, Sāṅkhārā and Viññāṇa, the constituents of a human being.



# THE PRESENT STATE OF RESEARCHES ON THE SANSKRIT EPIGRAPHY OF CAMBODIA : SOME OBSERVATIONS\*

By

KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA

Since the publication of the seventh volume of the *Inscriptions du Cambodge* of George COEDÈS, undeniable advances have been made, over the past twenty years or so, in the study of the political history, and of the religious, social and political institutions of ancient Cambodia. Although no significant text has been discovered since then – so far as I am aware – relating to what may be termed the ‘Indian period’ (with which alone I shall be concerned in this paper), one will shortly possess – thanks to the efforts of Professor LOKESH CHANDRA and the cooperation of the Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient – all the collection in facsimile. On the other hand, I have heard of the project of a new edition and translation of the Cambodian inscriptions.

In this bright perspective, I should like to present here – confining myself to the Sanskrit inscriptions – some reflections which, it is hoped, will aid future work.

The great pioneers in the field of Cambodian epigraphy were full of concern for details. Nevertheless, it is almost beyond the capacity of a single human being to achieve perfection in a work of this kind. If BERGAIGNE’s work is nearly perfect today, thanks to the corrections of BARTH, neither BARTH himself nor FINOT nor COEDÈS has so far found a systematic corrector, or, at any rate, nothing of the sort has appeared in print so far.

When I met COEDÈS for the first time, about twenty-eight years ago, he told me that his reading of the inscriptions was correct but that he was not so confident about his translations.

Later experience showed, however, that not only his translations but his readings also sometimes needed correction. Proportionately, it is true, there are more errors in FINOT’s work.

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Abbreviations : BEFECO = *Bulletin de l’Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient*; IC = G. COEDÈS, *Inscriptions du Cambodge*; ISCC = BARTH & BERGAIGNE, *Inscriptions sanscrites de Campā et du Cambodge*.



In my early work, I made some corrections both as regards reading and as regards translation and interpretation. This work has been interrupted long since, because of my other preoccupations. But, thanks to this Congress, and especially to the invitation from Professor KARASHIMA to participate in this Seminar, – an invitation in the sending of which Professor ISHIZAWA played a significant role – I returned for a while to the Sanskrit epigraphy of Cambodia. On that occasion, I was incited to revise my Vocabulary, published some twenty years ago. And, in doing this work, I read some texts more carefully than I had done before and also examined some more estampages. This has revealed more errors, both in reading and interpretation, in COEDÈS's work than I had noticed before.

I am sure that, if COEDÈS were alive, he would welcome the improvements I am going to suggest today as he welcomed, more than twenty years ago, some previous ones, and that publicly before, among others, some of the foremost Sanskritists of that time, adding that as BERGAIGNE's work had been corrected by BARTH so also should his own be corrected by others. His was a kind of modesty and generosity which the greatest of scholars, and they alone, can possess.

Toward the beginning of the first volume of the *Inscriptions du Cambodge* (p. 22, st. XXXVIII), there is a curious mistake. In the verse :

*gavām bahusahasrāṇi mahiṣās chāgalā api |*  
*dviradendrāḥ saganikā bahavas turagās tathā ||*

COEDÈS translates *dviradendrāḥ saganikā* (ḥ) as 'des éléphants avec leurs cornacs', while he should have put 'des éléphants superbes avec leurs femelles'. *Ganikā* in the sense of 'female elephant' is given in the *Amarakośa*, and it is also found used in the *Rāmāyaṇa* II, 100, 50.

There are some interesting facts relating to the Vāt Sithor or Srei Santhor inscription of the reign of Jayavarman V (968–1001 A. D.), published in the sixth volume of the *Inscriptions du Cambodge*,<sup>1</sup> which I should like to record here.

This is one of the most important Buddhist inscriptions that have come down to us from ancient Cambodia. It mentions several points of Buddhist doctrine as well as two Buddhist texts which are found mentioned nowhere else in Cambodian epigraphy.

As is well known, the style and the vocabulary of the Buddhist inscriptions in Sanskrit from Cambodia do not differ, in general, from those of the Brahmanical inscriptions. However, one finds in the former words and expressions

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1. pp. 195ff,



peculiar to Buddhist Sanskrit. All of them I have recorded in my Vocabulary.<sup>2</sup> Now, relying upon COEDÈS's reading, I recorded, from the Vât Sithor inscription, the word *evavidha*, for *evamvidha* 'such, of this type', which, not recorded elsewhere in Buddhist Sanskrit, seemed to recall to me Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit *evarūpa* (= Sanskrit *evamrūpa*). I found the same word in a Nepalese manuscript, brought by Sylvain LÉVI to Paris, of a Śaiva text, known also in ancient Cambodia, the *Śivadharma*, which sometimes shares its vocabulary with Buddhist Sanskrit, e. g., *triṣkālām*.<sup>3</sup> But an examination of the estampage preserved at the Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient reveals that the reading is wrong : the text has the regular *evamvidha*.

In COEDÈS's edition, the last verse of the inscription reads as follows :

*ājñām imām yo 'nugato 'pi pāpī  
kalpeta tatpāpaviṣaṃ sudhāyai |  
yas tām atītas tv api puṇyakarmā  
jāyeta tatpuṇyasudhām viśāya ||*

Instead of *tatpuṇyasudhām*, *tatpuṇyasudhā* is, of course, expected. Now, from the estampage it is clear that the text has the correct form.

It is true that both these may be just misprints.

The preceding verse, v. XCIX, is a difficult one :

*grāhyam budhenāparavaktramātram  
ihārthasiddhyai kila kaiś cid uktam |  
prāg eva sarvajñamataṃ vimukteḥ  
svargasya mārgo nṛpavākyaṃ etat ||*

COEDÈS translates :

'D'aucuns prétendent sans doute que cette parole n'est qu'un langage tardif en vue de la réalisation du bonheur terrestre ; mais le sage doit comprendre au contraire qu'elle exprime la pensée ancienne de l'Omniscient, et que c'est le chemin de la délivrance et du ciel'.

As I have suggested in my Vocabulary, *aparavaktra* in this verse seems to be used in the sense of 'having the face turned toward (i. e., leading to) inferior ends'.<sup>4</sup> And *prāg eva*, which COEDÈS seems to render by 'ancienne', by connecting it with *sarvajñamataṃ*, means 'how much more', being equivalent to regular Sanskrit *kim u*, *kim uta*, *kim punar*. As EDGERTON notes,

2. Cf. BEFEO, LII (1964), p. 9.

3. See *ibid.*, pp. 36 & 65.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 29.



*prāg eva* (=Pāli *pag eva*), in this sense, is found used not only in Buddhist Sanskrit proper, but also 'in some texts the vocabulary of which is otherwise virtually standard Skt., e. g. *Buddhacarita* iv. 10, 81; xi. 7.<sup>5</sup> The expression is not really confined to the Buddhist texts; for, as E. H. JOHNSTON pointed out, in this sense it 'occurs several times in Vācaspati Mishra's commentary on the *Yogasūtras*'.<sup>6</sup> I know of at least one occurrence of it in Vācaspati-Misra's *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā* as well: *na khalu vijñānam anātma-samvedanam ātmānam api gṛhṇīyāt, prāg eva tatprāmāṇyam*.<sup>7</sup> However, in JOHNSTON's words, it is 'primarily Buddhist'.<sup>8</sup> It is, therefore, interesting to find it in the Vāt Sithor inscription.

In the light of these observations, COEDÈS's translation of the verse has to be modified in its entirety :

'It is said that the wise should accept the words uttered by some, leading only to inferior ends, in order to realize their aims here below : how much more these words of the king, which express the thought of the Omniscient, and which are the way to Deliverance and to Heaven !'

The Sanskrit inscriptions from Cambodia are admirably correct. They are more correct even, it seems, than the average Sanskrit inscriptions from India itself. We can no longer accept DARMESTETER's opinion expressed in 1883, which has sometimes been repeated since then, namely : 'Some of the difficulties of interpretation presented by the Sanskrit inscriptions (from Cambodia) seem to come from the fact that, despite their Aryan purity, they underwent more than it appears Khmer influence'.<sup>9</sup>

Barbarisms and solecisms are rare : and the last Sanskrit inscription from Cambodia, composed in the 14th century, does not show any of those signs of decadence which we encounter already in the 12th century in Champa, and in the 14th in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, the great pioneers found mistakes where there is none. Even BARTH, who was so perspicacious, wrote about the word *abhidhi* 'name', which is found several times used in the Sanskrit epigraphy of Cambodia in place of *abhidhā* or *abhidhāna* : 'The word *abhidhi* is not found in the lexicons, and seems to be a barbarism'.<sup>10</sup> The fact that the word is not found in the dictionaries does not mean much. There are many words used in literature, which are not

5. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, s. v.

6. Translation of the *Buddhacarita*, p. lxviii.

7. *Nyāyadarśana* (I), edited by Anantalal THAKUR, Darbhanga, 1967 (*Mithila Institute Series* : Ancient Text No. 20), p. 24.

8. *Loc. cit.*

9. Cf. BEFEO, LII, pp. 5-6.

10. ISCC, p. 94, n. 11.



found in BÖHTLINGK. I have not met so far, it is true, the word *abhidhi* in the Sanskrit literature of India ; but BARTH was forgetting that it is formed correctly, in accordance with Pāṇini III, 3, 92.<sup>11</sup>

Insufficient attention to Pāṇini has been responsible for some 'corrections' in the hands of FINOT and COEDÈS as well. Thus, in an inscription of the reign of Jayavarman VII, FINOT proposed to correct *ārogyaśālam* 'hospital' into *ārogyaśālā*,<sup>12</sup> forgetting Pāṇini II, 4, 25, where both the forms *śālā* and *śālam* are prescribed.<sup>13</sup> COEDÈS corrected, for instance, *ekānnaviṃśati* '19' into *ekonaviṃśati*,<sup>14</sup> forgetting Pāṇini VI, 3, 76.<sup>15</sup> Incidentally, it may be noted that the reading *ekānnaviṃśatin dāsās* seems to be a misprint for *ekānnaviṃśatir ...*<sup>16</sup> — Forgetting Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* 5 on Pāṇini VI, 1, 94,<sup>17</sup> he corrected *sphuritādharaṣṭhī* into *sphuritādharaṣṭhī*.<sup>18</sup>

The future editors, if they aim at perfection, will have to take into account facts of this kind, which could be multiplied.

Now I should like to emphasize one aspect of the Sanskrit epigraphy of Cambodia which has been neglected so far : their literary aspect. COEDÈS once asked me what I thought of the highly literary compositions, such as the *Prè Rup* inscription of Rajendravarman : were they written by Cambodians or by Indians ? This was, of course, a question which I was not able to answer : is it inherently impossible that ancient Cambodians should have written these texts ? But, whosoever may have been the authors of these inscriptions, they testify to the presence in distant Cambodia of a Sanskrit culture of a high standard. And, to the historian, this fact is no less important than the other aspects of Indo-Khmer culture.

It is strange that BARTH, who paid so much attention to the epic and Purāṇic myths alluded to in the Sanskrit epigraphy of Cambodia, did not notice that in the first inscription edited by him in his *Inscriptions sanscrites du Cambodge*, that from Hân ČEI, the author was drawing upon Kālidāsa's *Raghuvamśa* to delineate the *digvijaya* of King Bhavavarman, and that one had to wait several years for Franz KIELHORN to point out this salient fact.<sup>19</sup>

11. Cf. BEFEO, LII, p. 30 ; LV ( 1969 ), p. 151.

12. BEFEO, III, p. 25, n. 2.

13. See also J. WACKERNAGEL, *Altindische Grammatik*, II, 1, p. 39.

14. IC, III, p. 183, n. 4.

15. See also J. WACKERNAGEL - A. DEBRUNNER, *Altindische Grammatik*, III, pp. 387 f.

16. Cf. facsimile in *Corpus*, V.

17. See also J. WACKERNAGEL, *Altindische Grammatik*, I, pp. 319-20.

18. IC, VII, p. 172, n. 1.

19. *Epigraphia Indica*, VI ( 1900 ), p. 4, n. 1.



The influence is unmistakable, although the difference between first-rate and second-rate composition is equally perceptible. Thus *Raghuvamśa* IV, 49:

*diśi mandāyate tejo dakṣiṇasyām raver api |*  
*tasyām eva raghoḥ pāṇḍyāḥ pratāpaṃ na viṣehire ||*

gives in the Han ČEI inscription (A, 6) :

*śaratkāḷābhīyātasya parānāvṛtatejaśaḥ |*  
*dviṣām asahyo yasyaiva pratāpo na raver api ||*

and *Raghuvamśa* IV, 54 :

*bhayotsrṣṭavibhūṣāṇām tena keralayositām |*  
*alakeṣu camūreṇuś cūrṇapratidinidhīkṛtaḥ ||*

gives there (A, 7) :

*yasya sainyaraḥ dhūtam ujjhītālamkṛtiṣu api |*  
*ripustrigaṇḍadeśeṣu cūrṇabhāvam upāgatam ||*

Throughout the Sanskrit epigraphy of Cambodia, Kālidāsa, and in particular his *Raghuvamśa* (as could be naturally expected), continued to inspire the authors of the *praśastis*. The thoughts of quite a number of verses of the Prè Rup inscription of Rājendravarman are derived from the *Raghuvamśa*, although the forms differ. Kālidāsa's echoes can also be heard in the epigraphy of Yaśovarman, in the East Mebon inscription of Rājendravarman,<sup>20</sup> and even in the late inscriptions from Prāsāt Čruṇ of Ankor Thom,<sup>21</sup> belonging to the reign of Jayavarman VII. The majority of these cases I have recorded elsewhere.<sup>22</sup> In this paper, I would touch upon one aspect of the *kāvya* tradition in ancient Cambodia which has not always been correctly elucidated so far.

It is well known that the Sanskrit poets use in their compositions words, expressions and technical ideas derived from various Śāstras. Inadequate recognition of this fact has sometimes led to grave errors of translation and interpretation in the Sanskrit epigraphy of Cambodia. Thus, for instance, the clear allusion to Vedānta, — whose doctrine of *ātmaikatva* 'oneness of the *ātman*' provided the author of the Prè Rup inscription with the theoretical basis for Rājendravarman's exhortation to his successors to protect his religious foundation as though it were their own, — escaped the notice of COEDÈS.<sup>23</sup>

20. BEFEO, XXV, pp. 309ff.

21. IC, IV, pp. 207ff.

22. Cf. *The Cultural Heritage of India* (Calcutta), V (1978), pp. 407ff.

23. *Journal Asiatique*, 1971, pp. 99-101.



Allusions to facts of grammar and use of rare words and expressions codified in treatises of grammar — 'ornements savants' as Louis RENOU put it<sup>24</sup> — are quite frequent in the literary *kāvya*s, and a number of them are also found in the Sanskrit *prāśastis* from Cambodia. However, full justice has not been done to them so far.

Thanks to a note of COEDÈS, every student of the Sanskrit epigraphy of Cambodia knows the word *rājanvant* (fem. *rājanvatī*), which Pāṇini (VIII, 2, 14) mentions, in place of the regular *rājavant*, in the meaning of 'having a good king' (*rājanvān saurājye*), and which is used in verse 48 of the Prè Rup inscription.<sup>25</sup> But has the meaning of the verse been properly understood? Here is what we read :

*rājanvatīty anyanṛpo 'nvaśāt prāñ  
nipātanāl lakṣaṇam antareṇa |  
yo lakṣaṇaiḥ saṃskṛtavarnāvardhi-  
padais tu sādhutvadharām dharitrīm ||*

COEDÈS translates :

'*Rājanvatī* : " elle a bon roi ". Auparavant un autre roi avait gouverné la terre sans ( que celui-ci possédât ) la qualité distinctive provenant de cette exception grammaticale : lui, au contraire, gouverna la terre pourvue de bonté, avec les qualités distinctives provenant du fait que le mot est augmenté d'une lettre ( la lettre *n* ) [ ou : que le rang des castes a été amélioré ]'.

And he gives the following explanation<sup>26</sup> :

' Pāṇini, VIII, 2, 14 (*rājanvān saurājye*) mentionne une exception à la règle en vertu de laquelle le *n* final d'un thème en *-an* tombe en composition devant une consonne : *rājavān* " possédant un roi " devient *rājanvān* quand il s'agit d'un " bon roi ". Le sens de cette stance est le suivant : sous le règne précédent, la terre avait un roi, elle était *rājavatī* : mais sous le règne de Rājendravarman, qui est un " bon roi ", elle devient *rājanvatī* par l'addition de la lettre *n* ( avec un jeu de mots sur *varṇa* = " lettre " et " caste " ).

I shall not discuss COEDÈS explanation of the technical question of grammar. But his interpretation of the verse of the Prè Rup inscription seems to fit in well rather with the verse of the *Raghuvamśa*, VI, 22, which was also, perhaps, a source of inspiration to the author of this inscription :

24. In J. WACKERNAGEL, *Altindische Grammatik*, I : *Introduction générale* (1957), p. 26.

25. *IC*, I, p. 82.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 112, n. 3,



*kāmaṃ nṛpāḥ santu sahasraśo 'nye  
rājanvatīm āhur anena bhūmim |  
nakṣatratārāgrahasamkulāpi  
jyotiṣmatī candramasaiva rātriḥ ||*

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that, since Kālidāsa, the word is found several times used in Sanskrit poetry.

COEDÈS misses an essential point in the verse of the Prè Rup inscription : he does not notice the opposition, distinctly referred to, between *nipātana* 'mention as a ready-made form', and *lakṣaṇa* 'rule' of grammar prescribing such and such formations (in another sense, 'distinctive characteristic'). Pānini, it is true, mentions the word *rājanvant* as a ready-made form. But the poet of the Prè Rup inscription fancies : the earth was called *rājanvatī* 'having a good king' while another king had governed her, but it was merely in virtue of the mention of the word as a ready-made form, and not in virtue of a grammatical rule (or, in another sense, not in virtue of a distinctive characteristic) [*nipātanāl lakṣaṇam antareṇa*]; whereas with Rājendravarman the earth was so called in virtue of a grammatical rule, that is, the word *rājanvant* became a regular formation (or, in another sense, in virtue of a distinctive characteristic). It may be noted that the double meaning that COEDÈS points out in this verse extends to *sādhutva*, which in *sādhutvadharaṃ dharitrīm* has, in addition to the meaning 'bonté', 'goodness,' the grammatical meaning of 'correctness'.

But the most interesting allusion to Grammar I know of in the Sanskrit epigraphy of Cambodia is that contained in verse 23 of the Bāksēi Čāmkrōn inscription,<sup>27</sup> also belonging to the reign of Rājendravarman (944-968 A. D.), which, decidedly, was a significant epoch in the history of Cambodia, so far as the Sanskrit culture is concerned :

*vṛddhiṃ guṇaṃ yo guṇavṛddhihīnām  
vikalpayām āsa nayan nayāḍhyah |  
yuktyānuśāstā prakṛtiṃ puṭiṣṭho  
mṛjīm vidhitsuṇṇa iva samkramajjāḥ ||*

COEDÈS translates :

'Grand politique, éducateur habile, il conduisait au mérite et à la fortune ses sujets dépourvus de mérite et de fortune, en les modifiant adroitement, comme un connaisseur des gradations qui désire réaliser la pureté [ou : Doué de méthode maître habile, il appliquait le *guṇa* et la *vṛddhi* à une forme primitive dépourvue de *guṇa* et de *vṛddhi*, en la modifiant avec justesse, comme un connaisseur des divers degrés, désireux d'employer (la racine) *mṛj* ("purifier")] '.

27. IC, IV, p. 91.



Here also there is a *śleṣa*, as in the verse of the Prê Rup inscription. But all the technical terms of grammar used have not been perceived. Hence the entire translation is defective. *Samkrama*, which COEDÈS renders by 'degré', as though the author were speaking of the different 'degrees' of a vowel, is, in reality, we know from Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* on Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* 10 on Pāṇini I, 1, 3 (*iko guṇavṛddhī*), a technical term used by ancient non-Pāṇinian grammarians to designate the suffixes marked with *k* or *ñ*, before which applies the prohibition of *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* (cf. Pāṇini I, 1, 5).<sup>28</sup> These 'other grammarians' (*anye vaiyākaraṇāḥ*), Patañjali tells us, hold that there is optionally *vṛddhi* of the vowel of the root *mṛj* (cf. Pāṇini VII, 2, 114: *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ*) before suffixes marked with *k* or *ñ*, but *only* if they begin with a vowel. Thus are optionally formed, e. g., *parimṛjanti* / *parimārjanti*, *parimamṛjatuḥ* / *parimamārjatuḥ*, but obligatorily *mṛṣṭaḥ*, *mṛṣṭavān*. Patañjali accepts this idea. And so do all the later Pāṇinīyas, following two different procedures: the one indicated by the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* himself, and the other initiated by Jinendrabuddhi in his *Nyāsa* on the *Kāśikā-vṛtti* on Pāṇini I, 1, 5 (we need not go into the details here).<sup>29</sup> Bhāmaha (*Kāvyālaṃkāra* VI, 31) refers to this theory, using the very term *saṃkrama*; but he recommends the *vṛddhi*:

*vṛddhipakṣam prayuñjita saṃkrame 'pi mṛjer yathā |*  
*mārjanty adhararāgaṃ te patanto bāṣpabindavaḥ ||*

The author of the Bāksēi Čāṃkrōn inscription does not make any such recommendation. On the contrary, by employing, for 'made', the verb *vikalpayām āsa*, he suggests, thanks to the *śleṣa*, - so it seems to me, - that the *vṛddhi* of the vowel of the root *mṛj* of which he is going to speak is 'admitted as optional.' What he says, therefore, is this: The king, judiciously governing (*yuktyānuṣāstā*), brought his subjects (*prakṛti*) to merit (*guṇa*) and prosperity (*vṛddhi*) but also deprived them of merit and prosperity (*vṛddhiṃ guṇam yo guṇavṛddhihīnām vikalapayām āsa nayan - prakṛtim*), that is, rewarded the good and punished the wicked, - just as the grammarian, teaching judiciously (*yuktyānuṣāstā*), when he prescribes the operations relating to the base (*prakṛti*), viz., the root *mṛj*, optionally applies the *vṛddhi* before a suffix

28. Cf. Nāgeśa's *Uādyota* on this passage of the *Mahābhāṣya*: *guṇavṛddhipratiśedhaviṣayakṛitah prācāṃ samjñā*. Also *Kāśikā-vṛtti* on Pāṇini I, 1, 5: *saṃkramo nāma guṇavṛddhipratiśedhaviṣayaḥ*, and Haradatta's *Padamāñjarī* thereon: *saṃkrāmato 'pakrāmato guṇavṛddhiḥ asmād iti kṛtvā*.

29. See Y. OJIHARA & L. RENOU, *La Kāśikā-Vṛtti*, I (Paris, 1960 - Publications de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient, XLVIII), pp. 15, 21; Saramadeva, *Durghaṭavṛtti* (ed. -tr. by L. RENOU, Paris, 1940ff.), I, 1, 5.



marked with *k* or *ñ* but beginning with a vowel (*mṛjīm vidhitsann iva saṃkramajñāḥ*).

Great is the burden of the poets, said Bhāmaha ( V, 4 ). No less great is that of their interpreters.



## UNKNOWN DHĀRAṆĪS FROM EASTERN TURKESTAN

*By*

G. M. BONGARD-LEVIN

M. I. VOROBYOVA-DESYATOVSKAYA

Among its collection of materials delivered to St. PETERSBURG at the end of the 19th century by N. F. PETROVSKY, Russia's consul in Kashgar, the Manuscript Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Leningrad) keeps four sheets of a manuscript (inventory number SI P/70) copied in the 1st millennium A.D. in what later became Eastern Turkestan in the original Indian writing which has come to be known as upright Central Asian Brāhmī. According to palaeographic data, the manuscript can be dated from the 7th-8th centuries. W. CLAWITER and L. HOLZMANN refer to its Brāhmī type as "VII. South Turkestani Brāhmī."<sup>1</sup>

The text is written on pre-coated brownish paper of Central Asian origin in black Indian ink on both sides of the sheets five lines on each side. The size of the whole sheet is 27.7 by 6.5 centimetres. On the left the sheet has a margin one centimetre wide with pagination in Brāhmī figures. It is to be found on two sheets (1) No. 21 and (4) No. 29, which are preserved whole. The other two sheets are damaged and have no pagination - (2) 23 by 6.5 centimetres with the left edge torn off and (3) 12 by 6.5 centimetres with the right half torn off. Seven centimetres from the left edge of all sheets there is a hole for a cord around which is traced a circumference with 1.7 centimetres in diameter.

The manuscript contains a Sanskrit text of dhāraṇīs with a list of the names of the tathāgatas who should be addressed with these dhāraṇīs. The title of the work is lost. It opens on sheet No. 21 on the formula - Siddham namaḥ. The second sheet has no pagination on it and is damaged but the content of the text shows that it followed Sheet No. 21 (No. 22). The third sheet is damaged worst. Practically only a half of it is left. However, the dhāraṇīs on it are partly numbered: dhāraṇī No. 73 (side a, line 3) and dhāraṇī No. 80 (side b, line 5). The first dhāraṇīs on sheet 29a bear ordinal number 81. Consequently, the previous sheet must have pagination (No. 28). The last of the extant dhāraṇīs have ordinal number 86 /sheet 29 b(5)/. Calculation shows that each

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1. W. CLAWITER, L. HOLZMANN: *Sanskriithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden*, Teil I. Wiesbaden, 1965, Tafel 36, Kat.-Nr. 531.



sheet of the manuscript had had 9-11 dhāraṇīs recorded on it. Thus, the beginning of the dhāraṇīs addressed to the tathāgatas is on sheet 21a. What text was carried by the previous 20 sheets remains unclear : the manuscript could contain either a collection of dhāraṇīs written out of different works or one work consisting of several sections ( chapters ). The Sanskrit text of the dhāraṇīs represented in the manuscript had hitherto been unknown to scholars and, as far as can be gathered from the publications, has not been discovered among the Sanskrit manuscripts originating from Central Asia ( Eastern Turkestan ) which are available in other collections of the world - German, French, English, Japanese and Indian.

Attempts to identify the text by the Chinese and Tibetan translations of the Tripiṭaka have failed. It has been found possible only to determine the type of the dhāraṇīs and establish what canonic text contains dhāraṇīs based on a similar structural principle. Dhāraṇīs of the most similar type have been translated and preserved in the Chinese *Tripiṭaka*, ( Tripiṭaka Taisho, No. 882 ). A Tibetan translation of the work is also preserved : D-b'zin-g'segs-pa thamscad kyi de-kho-na-ñid bsdus-pa 'zes-bya-ba theg-pa chen-po'i mdo ( Kanjur, Ierge edition, rgyud-'bum, volume ña, sheets 1b-142a, No. 479 ). The Sanskrit title of the work is reconstructed as the Sarvatathāgatatattva-saṃgrahanāmamahāyānasūtra. The Mahāyāna sūtra entitled Collection of the Essences of all "tathāgatas". The Chinese translation of the sūtra was made in the 10th century, between 980 and 982. The translator, Shi hu ( Dānapāla ? ), received an education in India. The Tibetan translation goes back to the 11th century. The translators were Śraddhākaravarma and Rin-chen-bzang-po. Meanwhile, the Sanskrit text at the authors' disposal is recorded in a manuscript of the 7th-8th centuries. Apparently, that was precisely when it was in circulation in what later became Eastern Turkestan. The study of the Central Asian Brāhmī manuscripts coming from Eastern Turkestan shows that wide use in this period was made here of dhāraṇīs of three types :

1) Magic formulas addressed to the local deities - the oldest stratum of dhāraṇīs which goes back to the pre-Buddhist cults of Central Asia. In the early centuries of our era these deities were included among the Buddhist pantheon. The most important among such dhāraṇīs were the Pañca-rakṣā = dhāraṇīs, addressed to five goddesses the chief of which was called Mahāmāyūrī.<sup>2</sup>

2. The Sanskrit text of the Pañca-rakṣā-dhāraṇī, discovered in Eastern Turkestan, was first published by Academician S. F. OLDENBURG : see Proceedings of the Eastern Department of the Russian Archaeological Society ( further ZVORAO ), XI, St. Petersburg, 1899, pp. 207-214 ; 215-218.



2) Magic formulas of the Vajrayāna type, addressed to Vajrapāṇi and other tantric deities of the vajra holder category (vajra-dhara).<sup>3</sup>

3) The Mahāyāna magic formulas addressed to buddhas and bodhisattvas. Hitherto of these dhāraṇīs were known the Sarvatathāgatoṣṇīṣasitātpatra-nāma-  
aparājitā-mahāpratyaṅgira-vidyā-rājñī,<sup>4</sup> the Sarvadharmā-anantanayamukhā-  
dhāraṇī<sup>5</sup> and a number of dhāraṇīs without names. Apparently, the list of the  
Mahāyāna dhāraṇīs can now be extended by another work, the Sarvatathāgata-  
tattvasaṃgraha-sūtra. The Sanskrit text of the aforesaid Mahāyāna dhāraṇīs is  
not preserved in India itself. Possibly, in Central Asia for many centuries fun-  
ctioned an earlier text of the dhāraṇīs which had sprung up in India in the  
Mahāyāna's formative period and, edited at a later date, formed the foundation of  
the subsequent Chinese and Tibetan translations. In Eastern Turkestan an older  
text continued to circulate – a possible explanation for the fact that the Sanskrit  
dhāraṇīs addressed to the tathāgatas both in number and in content are different  
from their Chinese and Tibetan counterparts represented in the respective transla-  
tions. There is another conceivable explanation. Because among the 26 names  
of the tathāgatas extant in the dhāraṇīs in full many are not registered in other  
Buddhist texts (the authors use as their source of information the Buddhist  
Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, by F. EDGERTON), possibly, these are borrowings  
of local, Central Asian deities subsequently included among the names of buddhas.  
Etymologically, they resemble extended epithets rather than proper names. Here  
is the list of the tathāgatas, names and epithets which are not to be found in the  
EDGERTON Dictionary :

- 1) Sūryottamaprabhāsaśrītejonirbhāsa
- 2) Bahuvidhatejorājaśrīnirbhāsa
- 3) Asaṃkhyeyakalpakaṭṭisamudānītabuddhi
- 4) Sarvadharmānayatīkurvitatejonirbhāsa
- 5) Śubhakanakagagananirnādayūhatejaunirbhāsa
- 6) Asambhāvavyūha
- 7) Garjitadharmasāgaranirghoṣa

3. See the Vajrapāṇi-dhāraṇī published by S. F. OLDENBURG : ZVORAO, VIII, St. Petersburg, 1894, p. 58. See also G. M. BONGARD-LEVIN, M. I. VOROBYOVA-DESYATOVSKAYA, E. N. TYOMKIN. A fragment of the Sumukha dhāraṇī. – "Indo-Iranian Journal", 1967, Vol. X, Nos 1-3, pp. 150-159 ; G. M. BONGARD-LEVIN, M. I. VOROBYOVA-DESYATOVSKAYA, E. N. TYOMKIN. Concerning the Study of the Monuments of Indian Writing Coming from Central Asia. Materials on the History and Philology of Central Asia, Issue 3, Ulan-Ude, 1968, pp. 110-113 (in Russian).

4. See W. CLAWITER, L. HOLZMANN, N. 631.

5. ibid. N 62.




- 8) Nirmitamegha
- 9) Susvaraśrī
- 10) Sambhavaruta

On the other hand, none of these names occurs among those of the Yakṣas, Sadagas (Tibetan sa-bdag) and other local deities recorded in the Pañca-rakṣā-dhāraṇī.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps it is an apocryphal text created on lines of the canonic Mahāyāna texts in the first millennium A. D. on the territory which later became Eastern Turkestan. Further study of the texts coming from this area will introduce specifications in the authors' assumptions.

Below are facsimiles, transliteration and translation of all the four sheets of the manuscript.

#### TRANSLITERATION

##### f. 21a




1. Siddham nama. sūryauttamaprabhāsaśrītejonirbhāsāya tathāgatāya tadya-
2. thā sūrye sūrye jñāna-sūrye svāhā | namau bahuvidhatejorājasrī-nirbhāsāya tathāga-
3. tāyaḥ tadyathā śiri śiri tejaśiri svāhā || namau asaṃkhyeyakalpa-kaṭṭīsamudā-
4. nītabuddhaye tathāgatāyaḥ tadyathā samudaye. jñāna samudaye svāhā || namau sa-
5. rvadharmanayati-kurvitatejonirbhāsāya tathāgatāya. tadyathā garbhe garbhe jñā-

6. See S. LÉVI. Le Catalogue géographique des yakṣa dans la Mahāmāyūri. - Journal Asiatique. Ser. 11, t. 5, 1915, pp. 19-138.




## f. 21b



1. na-garbhe svāhā namo 'subhakanakagagananirṇādavyūhatejaunir-  
bhāsāya tathāgatā-
2. ya. tadyathā gagane gagane gagana-viśuddhe svāhā || namau  
ratnamerave tathāgatāya.
3. tadyathā meru meru ratna-meru svāhā || namau guṇa-samudrāya  
tathāgatāya. ta-
4. dyathā guṇe guṇe guṇa-samudre svāhā || namau dharmadhātusvara-  
ketave tathāgatāya.
5. tadyathā ketu-k[e]t[u]\* jñāna-ketu svāhā | namau dharmasamudra-  
garjanāya tathāga-

## f. [ 22 ]a



1. tāya namau dharmasa[mu]†dravegaśirirājāya tathāgatāya tadyathā  
sama-sama
2. ...[svā]hā namau dharmemdrarājāya tathāgatāya tadyathā rama-  
rama ratikare svā-
3. [hā namau] ...meghāya tathāgatāya. tadyathā ghume ghume ghumā.  
ghume svāhā


\* Miswriting? - In the manuscript - kaṭa.

† Miswriting, akṣara mu is omitted.




4. ...[ta]thāgatāya. tadyathā śiri śiri. śirāya svāhāḥ name deva-
5. ...[tathā]gatāya. tadyathā makuṭe makuṭe. dharma-makuṭe svāhā ॥  
namau

## f. [ 22 ]b



1. ...tathāgatāyaḥ tudyathā jaye jaye jayamati svāhā ॥ namoddhī-
2. ...[tathāgatā]ya tadyathā druma-druma drume svāhā ॥ namau  
gaganaghau[sā]†ya ta-
3. ...[ta]dyathā gagane gagane gagana-same svāhā namau samamṭta-  
sambhavapra-
4. [dīpāya tathā]gatāya. tadyathā sambhava-buddha-satyena svāhā ॥  
namau ūṇasīprabhā-
5. [samataye tathā]gatāya. tadyathā ume ume umāvati svāhā ॥ namau  
sāntanirghauṣā-

## f. [ 28 ]a




1. ...sayeta pravaraājāya[ ] [ ]
2. ...[ ] [ ] [ ]rane svāhā ॥ namau megha[ ]

† Perhaps miswriting : akṣara yā instead of sā.




3. ...[ ]te svāhā || 73 namaḥ sūryateja-
4. [se tathāgatāya]...[svā]hā | namau dharmapradīpaśrī-
5. [merave tathāgatāya]... dīpa svāhā || namaḥ arcīśi-

f. [ 28 ]b



1. [raye tathāgatāya]... [na]mau devaśrīgarbhāya tathāga-
2. ...vinarditanidvanprabhāya
3. ...[sa]me svāhā || namaḥ samaḥ sa-
4. ...[me]ru-meru-buddha-meru svāhā || namau gagana-
5. [cittāya]... 80 namaḥ asaṃbhavavyūhā-

f. 29a




1. ya tathāgatāya. tadyathā saṃbhave phu saṃbhave phu saṃbhava-  
vyūhe phu svāhā || 81 namau garji-
2. tadharmasāgaranirghoṣāya tathāgatāyaḥ tadyathā garja-garja-garjate  
svāhā namau dharma-
3. dhātusvaraghaṣāya tathāgatāyaḥ tadyathā dhara-dharaṇivaddhe  
svāhā || namau nirmi-



4. tameghāya tathāgatāyaḥ tadyathā nirmi-nirmi-jñāna-nirmi svāhā ||  
84 namaḥ susva-
5. rāsriye tathāgatāya. tadyathā svare svare, buddha-svare svāhā |  
85 namaḥ samam-

## f. 29b



1. tadiktejase tathāgatāya tadyathā tara-tara buddhādhiṣṭhite svāhā  
namau dharmasa-
2. mudraya tathāgatāya tadyathā samudre samudre dbarmadhātu-  
samudre svāhā | nama
3. sambhavarutāya tathāgatāya tadyathā sambhave sambhave sam-  
bhavamtu buddhādhiṣṭhā-
4. nena svāhā || namau guṇasāgaraya tathāgatāya tadyathā guṇe guṇe  
buddha-sambha-
5. va-guṇe svāhā 86. namaḥ śrīpradīpāya tathāgatāya tadyathā śiri  
śiri pra[dīpa]



# PRINCIPLES OF TEXT-CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION SOME REMARKS ON A NEW EDITION OF THE CHĀNDOGYA UPANIṢAD UNDER PREPARATION

By

WOLFGANG MORGENROTH

The Chāndogya Upaniṣad is without any doubt one of the central texts of Hinduism. This can be easily seen from the large number of books and articles dealing with this work and mentioned in the bibliographies of L. RENOU<sup>1</sup> and R. N. DANDEKAR.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless from my point of view we can't be much satisfied with the critical editions of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad printed up to now. A new attempt seems to me to be necessary.

The first edition of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad was published in 1850 by the German Eduard RÖER within the Calcutta series Bibliotheca Indica.<sup>3</sup> There is a lot of misprints in this book which was based on one manuscript only. In the following decades some more editions were published in India, but as far as these prints have been available to me most of them are reprints of RÖER's text more or less improved.

The best Indian edition of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad appeared first in 1890. It was made at Poona and became part of the Anandāśrama saṃskṛta granthāvali getting No. 14.<sup>4</sup> This edition shows, besides the text of the Upaniṣad, the commentary made by Śaṅkarācārya and the subcommentary given by Ānandagiri. It makes use of 17 manuscripts 12 of them showing the text, five giving only the commentaries.<sup>5</sup> One of the manuscripts used is the manuscript first printed by E. RÖER.<sup>6</sup> Within the same series editions of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad were published later accompanied by commentaries of Raṅgarāmānuja<sup>7</sup> and

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1. RENOU, Louis. *Bibliographie védique*, Paris 1931.

2. DANDEKAR, R. N. *Vedic bibliography I*, Bombay 1946, II (1961), III (1973) Poona.

3. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad with the Commentary of Śaṅkara Ācharya, and the gloss of Ānanda Giri, ed. by Dr. E. RÖER (= BI 3) 1850.

4. Chāndogyopaniṣat, ānandagirīkṛtāṭikāsaṃvalitaśaṅkarabhāṣyasametā, Poona 1913 (= ASG (ASS) 14), 4th edition.

5. Only 5 manuscripts give us text, commentary and subcommentary.

6. It is the ms. ka

7. Chāndogyopaniṣat, śrīmadraṅgarāmānujamuniviracitaprakāśikopetā, Poona 1910 (= ASG (ASS) 63).



Nityānanda<sup>8</sup> getting the No. 63 and No. 79 respectively. As far as the text is concerned there are no differences between the volumes 14 and 79, but some between the volumes 63 and 14. In 63 we can't find any information about the manuscript base of the text.

In Europe a critical edition of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad was published by O. v. BÖHTLINGK in 1889.<sup>9</sup> BÖHTLINGK couldn't use the Poona edition of 1890 with its manuscript readings given in an apparatus but only RÖER's print and three manuscripts more kept in the Tübingen university library. BÖHTLINGK's attempt is remarkable from its big number of emendations which led to a strong discussion among scholars in the last decades of the 19th and the first decades of the 20th century.<sup>10</sup> The number of text emendations proposed by BÖHTLINGK is no less than 349.

In 1930 the French scholar FOUCHER added a text to the translation of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad into French made by E. SENART some decades earlier. This text is mainly based on BÖHTLINGK's edition. Only in a few cases SENART gave in notes own readings as well as other translators did, i. e. the Italian PAPERSE in 1937.<sup>11</sup>

This was the situation in the fifties when I tried to make a critical edition of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad using all informations on manuscript readings given in ASS 14 and in BÖHTLINGK's edition. I examined carefully all emendations proposed by BÖHTLINGK and others but in that time it was not possible for me to use other Indian manuscripts.<sup>12</sup> Now the situation has changed and therefore a new critical edition of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad is now under preparation using the attempt of 1958 as a starting point.

Here I'll try to make - within the space limited - some remarks on principles to be followed in the new edition.

8. Chāndogyopaniṣat, nityānandakṛtāmītākṣarāvyaḥyāsametā, Poona 1915 (= ASG (ASS) 79).

9. BÖHTLINGK, Otto. Khāndogyoponishad, Kritisch herausgegeben und übersetzt von O. B., Leipzig 1889.

10. Cp. W. D. WHITNEY, The Upaniṣhads and their latest translation AJPh VII, 1; BÖHTLINGK's Upaniṣhads, AJPh XI, 408-439; On BÖHTLINGK's Upaniṣads, JAOS 15, 1893, L-LVIII. BÖHTLINGK, O., Zu den von mir bearbeiteten Upaniṣaden, BKSGW 43 (1891), 70 i BKSGW 49 (1897), pp. 78-93, 127 ff., BKSGW 50 (1998), 83 ff.

11. SENART, E., Chāndogya-Upaniṣad. Traduite et annotée par E. S., Paris 1930; PAPERSE, V., Chandogya-Upaniṣad, Traduzione, introduzione e note da V. P. BOLOGNA 1937 (= Testi e Documenti per la storia della Religione divulgati a cura di R. PETTAZZONI Vol. 7).

12. MORGENRÖTH, W., Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, Versuch einer kritischen Ausgabe, I, Teil : Text, II, Teil : Übersetzung, III, Teil : Ergänzungen, Jena 1958 (Phil. Diss.).



1. The critical edition has to be based on a greater number of manuscripts. It is a matter of fact, that the manuscripts printed or used for critical editions mostly come from the Western part of India. There are also old manuscripts in the South and the East and in the important manuscript collection of Katmandu in Nepal. The last mentioned manuscripts have now become available in microfilm.<sup>13</sup> In 1980 I found important manuscripts of the South in Madras and Trivandrum. I think it necessary to make an attempt to classify all these manuscripts in order to get a more solid base for our text construction. But – of course – this is a very difficult task.

2. All grammatical forms handed down to us within the manuscripts must be kept, even if they are prakritisms or in another way against the rules of the classical grammar.

As I already pointed out in an article published at Moscow in 1964,<sup>14</sup> there are many such forms within the text of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Sometimes prakritisms can't be easily found out.

In the story of Raikva (IV, 1, 2) occurs the word *bhallākṣa* being an address to a goose. LÜDERS translated "Bärenauge" (eye of a bear [*bhalla*]), but this seems to me to be a very bad address to a goose. Therefore I prefer another interpretation: *bhalla* can be a prakritism for *bhadra*. But what is the meaning of *bhallākṣa* in that case?

Śaṅkara says *bhallākṣeti mandadr̥ṣṭitvaṃ sūcayann āha* and Ānandagiri explains *bhallākṣaśabdo bhadrākṣaviśayaḥ sanviruddhahalakṣaṇayā mandadr̥ṣṭi-vasūcakah.*

The first translators followed Śaṅkarācārya: "Blödaugige" (DEUSSEN), "Short-sight" (HUME), "Kortsynede" (TUXEN) etc., but SWAMI SWAHANANDA translated in 1956 "one having good sight". From my point of view all these meanings are wrong. *bhadra* never means 'good' but 'blessed, auspicious, fortunate, happy'. *bhadrākṣa* is an expression parallel to *bhadramukha* in Sanskrit or *bhaddamukha* in Pali meaning 'one whose eyes are auspicious'.<sup>15</sup> If we accept that there are prakritisms in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad we are not permitted to improve grammatical forms like *abhyatto* (III, 14, 2) and others.

13. MORGENROTH, W., Die Sprache der Chāndogya-Upanishad, in : Istorija i kul'tura drevnej Indii. Moskva 1963, 223-234.

14. DEUSSEN, P., Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda, Leipzig 1897, HUME, R. E., The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 2nd ed. London 1931, SWAMI SWAHANANDA, Chāndogya Upaniṣad, Madras 1956, TUXEN, P., de aeldste Upanishader, Kjobenhavn 1921-22.

15. Cp. J. PRZYLUKI, BSOS V, 303; W. MORGENROTH, Ch. Up. 1958, S. 512-514.



The verbal form *ālapayīṣyathāḥ* (IV, 2. 6) is against the rules of Pāṇini who only knows parasmaipadam forms of the root *lap*. Therefore BÖHTLINGK and others suggested emendations. I think them unnecessary because I found several forms in Ch. Up. striking against Pāṇini's rules in this respect. It is well known that we can state this for epic Sanskrit too. Therefore from my point of view it may be possible to explain *ālapayīṣyathāḥ* in this way. But perhaps it came into existence by changing an imperative form in *-tāt* to *-thāḥ* in order to separate the second and the third person. It was K. HOFFMANN who supposed such changes in Ch. Up. without mentioning *ālapayīṣyathāḥ*. I dealt with that form in an article published some years ago.<sup>16</sup>

3. In the new critical edition of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad an attempt is to be made to reject emendations by new interpretations of difficult readings. Only one example can be mentioned here. In Ch. Up. XIV 14 Uddālaka says that everybody needs a teacher as a guide, because otherwise he would be like a blindfolded man, who was brought to a desert and doesn't know his position. The text runs as follows :

*yathā somya puruṣaṃ gandhārebhyaḥ 'bhinaddhākṣam āñiya  
taṃ tato 'tjane viśṛjet  
sa yathā tatra prāṇ vodaṇ vādharāṇ vā pradhmayītābhi-  
naddhākṣa āñito 'bhinaddhākṣo viśṛṣṭaḥ...*

In all the critical editions of Chāndogya Upaniṣad known to me – also in ASS 14, which is otherwise strictly against emendations – the western direction has been added here inspite of the fact that no manuscript handed it down to us. In ASS 14 we read *prāṇ vodaṇ vādharāṇ vā pratyaṇ vā pradhmayīta....*

In the same way HERTEL (1922), HILLEBRANDT (1921), GELDNER (1928), PAPPESIO (1937) and RUBEN (1954) translated the passage. BÖHTLINGK (1889) and SENART/FOUCHER (1930) put the western direction between the northern and the southern one as it would be more correct.<sup>17</sup> I think this emendation wrong.

First we have to discuss the form *pradhmayīta* together with its meaning. It gave offence to many scholars. BÖHTLINGK for instance made more than one proposal to change it into another form.<sup>18</sup> I think that we can keep the optative

16. MORGENROTH, W., *Ālapayīṣyathāḥ*, in : MIO 10, 1964, 287–294.

17. Cp. MORGENROTH, W., *Die Lehre des Uddālaka Āruṇi, Bemerkungen zur Textkritik und Interpretation*, in : Arch. Or. 38, 1970, 33–44. HERTEL, J., *Die Weisheit der Upanischaden*, 2. Aufl., Leipzig 1922. HILLEBRANDT, A., *Aus Brahmanas und Upaniṣaden*, Jena 1921. GELDNER, K. F., *Vedismus und Brahmanismus*, Tübingen 1928. RUBEN, W., *Beginn der Philosophie in Indien*, Berlin 1954.

18. Cp. MORGENROTH, W., Ch. Up. 1958, S. 496–98,



in *-ita* ( instead of *-eta* ), because there are many examples for such a formation in the *brāhmaṇa* literature.<sup>19</sup> As far as the meaning is concerned it can be taken from active forms to be found in AV 18. 2. 28

*agnim ṭām asmāt pra dhamāti yajñāt*  
( Agni shall blow them away from that sacrifice )

and in AV 3. 2. 2.

*pra vo dhamatu sarvataḥ*  
( Let him blow you away in every direction )

The passive form<sup>20</sup> in our passage means ' to be blown away, to be put forth, to go a wrong way '.<sup>21</sup>

Now it becomes clear why the western direction is missing in our text : A man who was brought to India from Gandhāra would not go a wrong way if he would turn to the west, for he would come back to Gandhāra. There is no reason to add *pratyān*.

4. The teachings of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad often show stereotypes and parallelisms. They enable us to improve the text in several cases as far as the usage of pronouns and particles is concerned. In VII. 11. 1, *tad* has to be changed into *tasmāt* ( *tasmād āhuḥ* ) and *vā* has to be added after *tad* ( *tad vā etad* ) for reasons of parallelism.<sup>22</sup>

From the parallel structure of the teachings we can also see that in some cases glosses have been put into the text by later manuscript writers like Nihāraḥ in III, 19. 2.

*tad yad rajataṃ seyam pṛthivī,*  
*yat suvarṇaṃ sa dyauh,*  
*yaj jarāyu te paryatāḥ,*  
*yad ulbaṃ sa meghe (nīhāraḥ),*  
*yā dhamanayas tā nadyaḥ,*  
*yad vāsteyam udakaṃ sa samudraḥ.*

Glosses will be given in brackets.<sup>23</sup>

19. Cp. K. HOFFMANN, MSS 8, 5-25.

20. I follow EDGERTON, 'While WHITNEY (AI. Gr. 3. Aufl. § 738 b) looks at *pradhmayīta* as an *ātmanepadam* form.

21. Cp. EDGERTON, JAOS 35 ( 1915 ), 234/35.

22. Cp. MORGENROTH, W., Ch. Up. 1958, 502.

23. Cp. MORGENROTH, W., Glossen in der Chāndogya Upaniṣad, in : *Indologica Taurinensia*, Vol. VIII-IX ( 1980/81 ), 283-291,  
... 63



If we are permitted to accept glosses within the text of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad proved by the parallel structure of the teachings, we may also be allowed to think about other glosses too. Only one example is to be given here.

Ch. Up. VI. 13 contains a well known experiment of Uddālaka. He wants to show his son that there is something invisible in the things of the world. Therefore Śvetaketu was ordered to put salt into water. On the following day it had disappeared. The father asked the son to taste the water. In translation the passage runs as follows :

Tastē it from the border. How is it ?

Salty.

Taste it from the centre. How is it ?

Salty.

Taste it from the other border. How is it ?

Salty.

Set it aside and come to me.

He did so. *tac chaśvat samvartate.*

The meaning of the last mentioned sentence is difficult. From my point of view it can be taken as a gloss meaning 'this is always to add', i. e. 'he did so' is always to add between the question of the father and the answer of the son. Of course there are many other interpretations of this sentence.<sup>24</sup>

5. In his translation of the Prapāṭhaka VI of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, HILLEBRANDT put away the refrain '*sa ya eṣo 'nīmaitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ, tat satyam, sa ātmā, tat tvam asi śvetaketo*' in the Khandas 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 in order to indicate, that originally the refrain didn't belong to those teachings.<sup>25</sup> This procedure touches the difficult question of the development of the teachings handed down to us by the Upaniṣads. It is a question often and oppositely discussed. In 1947 Walter RUBEN tried to find out five generations of thinkers from the upaniṣads.<sup>26</sup> Though P. HACKER criticized him correctly as far as several details are concerned<sup>27</sup> I feel this way the only method for a real historical approach to the upaniṣads. But more cautiousness is necessary. The well founded analysis of some important parts of BAU and ChU. published by E.

24. Cp. MORGENROTH, W., Ch. Up. 1958, 493-496.

25. HILLEBRANDT, A., Aus Brāhmaṇas und Upaniṣaden, Jena 1921, Ann. 91.

26. RUBEN, W., Die Philosophen der Upanishaden, Bern 1947, and in other publications : Beginn der Philosophie in Indien, Berlin 1954, 2. Aufl. 1956; Wissen gegen Glauben, Berlin 1979.

27. HACKER, P., Rev. of RUBEN 1947, in : ZDMG 100 (1950), 393-398. HACKER P., Zur Methode der geschichtlichen Erforschung der anonymen Sanskritliteratur des Hinduismus, in : ZDMG 111 (1962), 483-492.



HANEFELD<sup>28</sup> shows clearly, that we are not permitted to take the teachings of Uddālaka as a unity. HILLEBRANDT's procedure seems now to be justified. The difficult question of the development of all the teachings of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad will be the topic of another paper. It will also be dealt with in the commentary of the critical edition now under preparation.

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28. HANEFELD, E., *Philosophische Haupttexte der älteren Upaniṣaden*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1973 (Phil. Diss.).







## HINDU CULTURE IN THAILAND

By

SATYA VRAT SHASTRI

A country in the neighbourhood of India, Thailand, has intimate religious, linguistic and cultural ties with it that go back to hoary past. Emperor Aśoka is said to have sent two of his emissaries here, the monks Sona and Uttara as part of his mission to propagate Buddhism in countries far and near. They are believed to have introduced Buddhism into Thailand. They are said to have landed at Nakhon Pathom, Nagara Prathama, the First City, so called perhaps to commemorate that event and delivered their first sermon at a site where a Chedi now stands as a memorial. Tradition has it that at the very first sermon the monks converted a few thousand people from among the 20,000 present to Buddhism. The Purāṇas mention Indian ships laden with merchandize touching the ports in Suvarṇabhūmi which in all likelihood included Śyāmadeśa, Siam, as Thailand was known then. Due to contact with the Khmers who were highly Hinduised the Hindu religion as well as the Sanskrit language found their way into Thailand. So profound was the impact of both that much of that is noticeable even now. Quite a large part of the vocabulary of Thai is Sanskritic. In the words of Dr. William J. GEDNEY who made an in-depth study of spoken Thai from the point of view of Indic content in it in his masterly Dissertation *Indic Loan Words in Spoken Thai* (Yale University Ph. D. thesis, 1947) "there are as many words of Indic origin in spoken Thai as are Greek and Latin words in spoken English." It is in line with this that a big corpus of individual names and names of cities and towns in Thailand is found to be of Indic origin. As for religion, the two most powerful world religions, Buddhism and Hinduism called in Thai Sāsana Phut or Buddhaśāsana and Sāsana Phrām or Śāsana Brāhmaṇa or Brāhmaṇaśāsana are from India. Of these the former one is live in Thailand and vigorously practised while the latter, though extinct now, has left many traces on its social and cultural life. As a matter of fact, the whole pantheon of gods and goddesses is Hindu in origin. The very words for gods and goddesses are Sanskritic in origin : *theva*, *thevī*, *thevadā*, Sanskrit *deva*, *devī* and *devatā*. There is nothing like the Hindu Saṃskāras now in Thai life, but as religious rites three are known there : Nāmakorn, Nāmakaraṇa, naming or christening ; Vivāha or Vivāhamonkhon Vivāhamaṅgala or Monkhon somrot, Maṅgala samarasa for marriage ; and Jhapaṇakiccā, a Pali word, Sanskrit Kṣapaṇakṛtya for Antyeṣṭi, last rites. For the four stages of life or Āśramas there are words for at least two in Thai, Phrommachan, Brahmacharya and Gṛhat,



Gr̥hastha. There are no words for Vānaprastha and Samnyāsa in Thai. Though the caste system is not practised in Thailand as it is in India, there are words for castes in Thai : Phrām for Brāhmaṇa, Kasat for Kṣatriya, Phait for Vaiśya and Sūd for Śūdra, of which the last two are of academic interest only, being found in lexica and no longer in use in day to day vocabulary. The word for the merchant class in use is Banij spelt differently in Roman as Phanich or Phanit or Wanij from Sanskrit Vaṇij, merchant, trader.

At present the word Brahmin in Thailand in the form Phrām is connected only with a particular group. It appears these people going by the name Brahmin had come long back from India and from there too from South India. Even to-day they sport a big tuft of hair in the style of South Indian Brahmins and wear Dhoti. Their dress consists of white buttoned up coat, white Dhoti and white canvas shoes. They have their own ritual, their own temples and their own festivals and customs.

Even though Thailand is a Buddhist country and Buddhism is its State religion, still the Royal Palace has a priest, a Rājaguru, or in his absence a Huana Phrām, Chief of the Brahmins, who is one among the Brahmins. He occupies an important place in the royal palace and has a distinctive role to play in the Coronation ceremony and deciding about the dates of important occasions.

Not every one born in the Brahmin family is called a Brahmin. This appellation attaches to only that one who has had initiation in Brahminhood. It is the Royal Priest or in his absence the Chief of the Brahmins, called Huana Phrām who is authorised to provide initiation in Brahminhood. At the moment there are twenty-seven such Brahmins in Thailand.

There is no age limit for initiation into Brahmanhood. But a person of less than 21 years of age cannot take part in the Brahmin ritual.

The earliest of the Brahmin temples in Thailand is at Nakhon Sī Thammarāt. Tradition has it that it was set up with the advent of the Brahmins there. The Brahmin temple in Bangkok is about 200 years old having come up with the founding of the City. On entering it the very first thing that one comes across is the image of Brahmā in a small Prang. Behind that in three shrines are found the images of Śiva, Gaṇeśa and Viṣṇu respectively. Besides these, the temple had many other images which are now preserved in the National Museum, Bangkok. Particularly noteworthy among these are the images of Harihara. From the point of art style they can be assigned to the Sukhothai Period. Some of the images are really big. Dark in colour they carry on them golden ornamentation.



Just at a little distance from the temple is a sky high swing called in Thai Sāo Ching Chā. It is said that till some thirty years back there used to take place a big festival there once a year. The idols of Śiva and Pārvatī were brought to it in a procession from the royal palace to which worship was first offered by the Rājaguru who would swing it for a while. The king would then take over from him and would ceremonially pull the swing. After the ceremony the idols would be taken back to the palace in a procession with the same fanfare with which they were brought.

At present, except the Brahmin temples, there is only one Hindu temple in Thailand which is still live. Called Sān Phra Kāl, Sanskrit Śālā Vara Kāla and situated in Lopburi in the central part of Thailand it attracts large crowds. Its name would give the impression of its being a Śaiva sanctuary while actually it is a Vaiṣṇava one. It has in it a four-armed idol of Viṣṇu. At present the arms have got broken. Thais worship it in large numbers, and make offerings of cocoanut and other fruits. Dhūpa, Dīpa and Naivedya, the three customary ingredients of Purāṇic worship are offered by them in the form of joss sticks, candles and fruits/vegetables. Monkeys move about freely on the lower portion on the temple precincts. Devotees treat them to fruits and nuts. Nobody harrasses them. Whenever the desire of the devotees is fulfilled they organize dance performances in the temple hall.

Lopburi also has another temple called Prāṅ Khaek. Literally meaning guest the word Khaek has come to signify a Hindu. It, therefore, means Hindu temple. Though in ruins, it still maintains its grandeur.

Being a Buddhist country, it is natural for Thailand to abound in Buddhist Wats, but it has some forty to fifty Hindu temples too. They carry on them in stone scenes in an highly artistic manner from the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata* and the Purāṇas. At the very entrance to Prāsād Panom Rung (Prāsād is a Thai word for a temple), there is a huge figure of Naṭarāja, Śiva, in dancing posture. In another temple called Wat Phra Kona at the top portion of the main gate is depicted the scene of Nārāyaṇa on the Śeṣa bed with deities around him and with Lakṣmī pressing his feet. Another temple, Prāsād Ban Pluang, has panels on top on all four sides. Two of these depict Indra on Airāvata, a common enough motif in Thailand, while the other two depict the scenes of the suppression of Kāliya and the lifting of the mount Govardhana respectively. In the scene of the Kāliya suppression the baby form of the Lord is depicted most beautifully by the artist. A peculiarity of the sculpture lies in the depiction of the hoods of the serpent in the descending order, one falling below the other, on both sides. The cave Tham Vua Daeng has in it a rock cut sculpture of Śiva and Pārvatī on Nandi. The divine couple are shown in a loving posture. Pārvatī



is bashful probably because of the presence of some other beings around. The divine couple being in a mood of merriment, it was natural for the favourite vehicle, Nandī also to feel happy. He is shown smiling. Certainly the very best in the artist has come out here. To show an animal like a bull in a smile required a degree of artistic skill which the sculptor possessed eminently.

At present the Hindu god whose worship is most popular in Thailand is Brahmā whose number of images can be discerned at various places. The most well known of these is the one in the compound outside the Hotel Erawan which attracts huge crowds. It is common to see the Thais passing by the Hotel to fold their hands in reverence towards its direction. Dance performances arranged by the grateful devotees too are a common sight there.

It may not be out of place to mention here that the Brahmā worship in Thailand is of recent origin. It is said that the construction of the Hotel Erawan could not come to completion for one reason or the other. Whenever it would be resumed after some interruption some difficulty or the other would crop up. Some one suggested then that an image of Brahmā be put up in the compound outside. When that was done, no difficulty came up and the hotel was erected in full. Since then people came to have faith in Brahmā and his images came to be installed at various places.

The other gods with whom the Thais are familiar - though they may not be offering worship to them - are Indra; Narai, Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu; Isuan, Īśvara or Śiva; Khanesa, Gaṇeśa; Yommarāt or Yima, Yamarāja or Yama; Lakṣmī, Lakṣmī; Saraswadi, Sarasvatī and the vehicles of some of them such as Airāvaṇa; Garuḍa, Hamsa and so on. Thais also are familiar with the semi-divine beings like the Yakṣas, Gandharvas, Kinnaras etc. In many Buddhist Wats huge figures of Yakṣas attract the eye. In the same way do the figures of the winged Kinnarīs.

What better instance of the influence of Hindu gods and goddesses on Thai life could there be than the fact that one of these, Gaṇeśa, has been adopted by Krom Silpakorn, the Department of Fine Arts of the Government of Thailand, as its emblem. The Department runs two institutions, one, a University, the Mahāvidyālaya Silpākorn, the Silpākorn University, Silpākorn in Sanskrit is Silpākara, and the National Theatre. At the very entrance to the National Theatre, high on the front side, is a large figure of Gaṇeśa in standing posture all in white. At the top are found the three figures done highly artistically in iron bars of the Hindu Trinity, Phrām, Brahmā, Narāi, Nārāyaṇa and Isuan, Īśvara. Since the Department of Fine Arts and the Silpakorn University deal with art and sculpture, outside them is installed a beautiful image of the divine architect Viṣṇvakarman, with typical Purāṇic description of the axe in hand. On both



sides of the old building of the Faculty of Arts of the oldest University of Thailand, the Chulalongkorn University, are depicted the figures of Sarasvatī all in white, *sarvasuklā* mounted on a swan.

Garuḍa being the royal emblem, his figures are a common sight in Thailand.

In the Wat Phra Kaeo or more popularly, the temple of the Emerald Buddha, there are figures of Viṣṇu on Garuḍa. On its ceiling is a Trisūla while outside in the compound are seen a number of figures of Garuḍas, Kinnaras and Narasimhas.

Yommarāṭ or Yamarāja is not a god for the Thais to be feared as for the Indians. According to Thais, he not only takes away life but also gives it. There is a feeling of reverence for him among them, and not that of awe or fear. That is the reason why the word is used as a title in that country. King Chulalongkorn had conferred the same on an high official Sukhamnaya Vinita in appreciation of his services to the State. Later the gentleman came to be known by that very name. It was the same gentleman who had led the Thai delegation to India in 1899.

It is not only the name Yommarāṭ or Yamarāja of the god Yama that the Thais are familiar with. They also know his other name of Dharmarāja, the word found in the name of the city Nakhon Sī Thammarāṭ, Sanskrit Nagara Śrī Dharmarāja. The excavations in it as also in Sukhothai and Phuttalung have yielded a number of images of Viṣṇu, Śiva and other Hindu deities. Some thirty or so Sanskrit inscriptions found in Thailand also mention the Śivalinga and Viṣṇudhvaja.

Thailand seems to have had a great impact of Hindu sages and seers. There are a number of places that carry the name Rasī or Ṛṣi with them like Kuṭī Ṛṣi popularly pronounced as Ku lisi or Tham Rasī. A number of figures of Ṛṣis are found on boundary pillars in Wats or Panels in Prasads like those at Panom Rung. They answer the description of typical Indian seers, Ṛṣis sitting in a cross-legged posture in lion cloth with matted hair and rosary in hand.

Many of the episodes from the biggest of the Hindu epics, the *Mahā-bhārata*, the Thais know quite well. The episodes like those of Sāvitrī and Satyavān, or Uṣā and Aniruddha form part of Thai school texts. As for the other epic, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, well, it has become a part of Thai life. It is found among the Thais in the form of the puppet dance called Khon, in the form of the shadow play called Hnāng and in the form of the poems called the *Rāmakiṇ*, the last having been composed by the Thai kings themselves, kings Taksin the



Great, Rāma I, Rāma II, Rāma IV and Rāma VI. The central episodes of the Rāma story are found depicted in the bas reliefs, as many as 152 in the temples of Wat Phra Jetubon, the Funerary temple of the ruling dynasty of Thailand and the mural paintings as many as 178 in the Temple of the Emerald Buddha in Bangkok. Wat Po also carries a number of sculptures from it. So do temples like Prāsād Panom Rung and Prāsād Hin Pimāi to mention only a few of the more prominent of them. Just outside the National Museum in the open there stands a majestic statue of Rāma with bow in hand. Inside it are several exhibits which depict *Rāmāyaṇa* scenes. In Prāsād Panom Rung on the walls outside are depicted such scenes as the assumption of the deer form by Mārīca, the abduction of Sītā by Rāvaṇa, the fight between Vālin and Sugrīva, the placing of chopped off head of Indrajit in front of his mother Mandodarī in her palace, the tying of Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa in Nāgapāsa with downcast monkeys around and the triumphant return of Rāma to Ayodhyā. Prāsād Hin Pimāi has scenes like the coronation of Sugrīva, building of the causeway to Lānkā, the fight between Rāma and Rāvaṇa and so on. Though adopting it from India the Thais have contributed much of their own to the Rāma story. To quote the words of Prof. Munich JUMSAI, an eminent educationist and an authority on the *Rāmakien* : "The version (of the *Rāmāyaṇa*) was adapted to Thai sentiments and colouring and portrays the customs, beliefs, politeness and gallantry of Thai ways of life. True, the story is Indian, but the clothes that they now wear are Thai of former days. The story is so made and adapted to Thai character that no Thai thinks of it as a thing originated from foreign origin. It so depicts Thai ways of life and sentiments that it has become a true masterpiece of Thai literature." (*Thai Rāmāyaṇa*, Chalermnit, Bangkok, Second Edition, 1967, p. 2).

Now a word about some Thai festivals. Some of these like Songkrān and Loi Krathong have strong Hindu overtones. Both of them on account of the characteristics respectively of throwing water on all, known or unknown and the offerings to water are similar to Holi and Gaṅgāpūjana in India, the local variations being the lack of colour in water as also artistic Krathongs in place of the plain cups of water.

In music there is a particular style in Thailand which is called Khaek Dontri (Dontri = Tantrī) or the Hindu music. The name itself is enough to put a spotlight on its Hindu connection.

Before he closes, the writer of these lines would like to make a mention of an event which has become his life-time memory. In late 1978 in the course of his extensive travels across Thailand he saw one evening on the Si Saket Railway station in the Northeast of Thailand a lady with two small children about 8 or 6.



Both of them were putting on five tufts of hair. Immediately it put him to the ancient Dharmasāstra texts which mention Kākapakṣas, the five tufts to be worn by young boys as also the *Rāmāyaṇa* which describes the young Rāma wearing them as he accompanies the sage Viśvāmitra. He was struck as to how the tradition which is getting extinct even in India could survive in a land like Thailand.

Any one who has observed Thai life and society closely cannot help observing that the influence of Hinduism on these is all pervasive. Rightly has the great Indian Poet Rabindranath TAGORE said on a visit to Siam or Thailand as it was known then :

I come a pilgrim at thy gate O Siam,  
To offer my verse to the endless glory of India,  
Sheltered in thy home,  
Away from her own deserted shrine,  
To bathe in the living stream that flows in thy heart.







## NĀGAYAJÑOPAVĪTIN

By

V. P. LIMAYE

I first came across this word in *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* of the great grammarian Bhartṛhari, of the famous *Vākyapadīya*, who lived about the fifth century of the Christian Era. In his fragmentary commentary published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona (1970), on page 191, he observes :

यथा नागयज्ञोपवीती भोज्यतामिति संहितानागयज्ञोपवीती एव भुङ्के न  
पृथङ्नागः । एवमेव स्कन्धपुत्रं भोजयेति सुपुत्रो भुङ्के ।...

One does not take away his *yajñopavīta* when he takes his food; so naturally he who has a snake as his sacred thread need not and does not take away or remove it from his neck and shoulders.

When I searched for this peculiar expression, embodying a strange and frightful practice, I found to my surprise the following, among others, from the *Mahābhārata* :

वसानं चर्म वैयात्रं महारुधिरवित्तवम् ।  
कृष्णाजिनोत्तरासङ्गे नागयज्ञोपवीतिनम् ॥ [10. 6. 4]

In another place (13. 127. 18) the word *nāga* is substituted by the word *vyāla*. The verse reads as follows :

व्याघ्रचर्माम्बरधरः सिंहचर्मोत्तरच्छदः ।  
व्यालयज्ञोपवीती च लोहिताङ्गदभूषणः ॥

This is from the description of sages of old who lived in the dense forests of ancient India with lions, tigers and snakes of various kinds and other wild beasts, as their friends, typifying the aphorism of *Yogasūtras* of Vyāsa :

अहिंसा प्रतिष्ठायां तत्सन्निधौ वैरत्यागः । [2. 35]

'Hate dissolves in the presence of love' as GANDHIJI used to say. There is a similar reference to sages as *Nāgayajñopavītavān* in the *Harṣacarita* of Bāṇa (of the seventh century A. D.) which I have not been able to trace while I am writing this short note.

True to the maxim *yathā naraḥ tathā tasya devaḥ*, we have transferred this aspect of man to our god Gaṇapati, the god of learning, of every new undertaking. Not only in Sanskrit works like the *Purāṇas* and others, quotations from which I shall give at the end, but also in sculpture we find representations of god



Ganapati with snake as his sacred thread. My attention was drawn to an article by Dr. M. K. DHAVALIKAR of the Deccan College (Archaeological Dept.) written in 'East and West' (1971), with the title "A note on two Gaṇeśa statues from Afghanistan", with two figures of statues of Gaṇeśa : figure 1 is from Gardez, Dargah Pir Rattan Nath, Kabul and figure 2 Saker Dhar (Kabul). I would recommend the reader to get and go through the article. A few extracts from the article :—

1) Statue of Gaṇeśa is presently worshipped by the Hindu residents of Kabul (the river city Kubhā of the *Rgveda*).

2) Yet another statue of Gaṇeśa at Saker Dhar (शकर धर). Both the statues are of great importance not only on account of their artistic merits but also because of their iconographical peculiarities.

3) The statue of Gaṇeśa can, with reasonable amount of certitude, be assigned to the latter half of fifth century or at best to the early sixth century. The god had four hands originally, all of which are now broken. He wears a snake as his sacred thread (*nāgayañnopavīta*) and another band (*udarabandha*). His lower garment (*antariya*) is a short dhoti (*ardhoruka*) on which are seen motifs like lion's head (*kirtimukha*) and claws.

4) Stylistically the statue resembles the early Gupta sculptures and can be dated to the fourth century when the Gupta influence had begun to appear and the Hellenistic (Greek) lingering. It may be therefore assigned to the traditional period between the Kuṣāṇa and Gupta. It is interesting indeed that the Hindus of Kabul are now worshipping this image in the Shore Bazar locality (*narasingadvāra*).

5) On the pedestal of the statue (fig. 1) is carved an inscription in two lines which records that "This great and beautiful Mahāvināyaka (i. e. Mahā-ganapati) was consecrated by the renowned शाही king, the illustrious शाही खिगल, who was परमभट्टारकमहाराजाधिराज, in the eighth year (of his reign) in the महा-ज्येष्ठमास, शुक्लपक्ष, त्रयोदशी, विशाखानक्षत्र and सिंहलग्न."

6) Worship of Gaṇeśa began sometime in the sixth century and during the following two or three centuries we witness his rapid rise to prominence, so much so, that by the tenth century an independent seat—albeit within the fold of Hinduism—commonly known as the Gāṇapatya, came into being. Gaṇeśa was also borrowed by other religious systems such as Buddhism and Jainism and his worship spread almost all over Asia, where Hinduism and Buddhism flourished. Even today Gaṇeśa is accorded a very high position by Hindus and it is one of the most important deities worshipped in India.



As already hinted above I conclude this short note by citing certain verses from the Purāṇas containing the word नागयज्ञोपवीतिन् :

- 1) नागयज्ञोपवीतं भज गणपतिम्  
[ *Mahānirvāṇatantra* 13. 144 ]
- 2) गणपतिर्भवेत् नागयज्ञोपवीतवान्  
[ *Skandapurāṇa* 2. 8. 27-39 ]
- 3) कुर्याद् गणपतिं नागयज्ञोपवीताङ्गम्  
[ *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa* 1. 29. 4 ]
- 4) नागयज्ञोपवीतिनं वन्देऽहं गणनायकम्  
[ *Padmapurāṇa* 5. 62. 3 ]
- 5) गजवक्त्र नमस्तुभ्यं नागयज्ञोपवीतिने  
[ *Gaṇeśapurāṇa* 69. 49 ]
- 6) नागयज्ञोपवीता ... काली  
[ *Kālivilāsantra* 5. 81 ]

I understand that *Mānavaśrautasūtra* has the word *nāgayañjñopavītin* but I could not find it in the *Vaidikapadānukramakośa* of Hoshiarpur.

In the end, I hereby thank my young friends Dr. M. K. DHAVALIKAR, Dr. M. S. MATE and Dr. Mrs. Usha RANADE of the department of Archaeology, Deccan College, Poona, for the unstinted and prompt help they rendered in the preparation of this short note.



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
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